{
 "slug": "cia-uap-003",
 "title": "CIA-UAP-003-THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE-THE U-2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS 1954-1974",
 "agency": "CIA",
 "year": "1974",
 "page_count": 406,
 "source_page": "https://wearenotalone.space/document/cia-uap-003/",
 "original_file": "https://www.war.gov/medialink/ufo/061226/release_03/documents/CIA-UAP-003-THE_CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_AGENCY_AND_OVERHEAD_RECONNAISSANCE-THE_U-2_AND_OXCART_PROGRAMS_1954-1974.pdf",
 "license": "U.S. Government work — public domain. Text is machine OCR from the original scan; the page image is authoritative.",
 "pages": [
  {
   "n": 1,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p01.jpg",
   "text": "-\n·\n··\nfri{) _i \\\n~===~===~~:::::::::~\n! ..,:\n•~ •....\n.. ·::/ ' ' .,.\n!:·-~~-.~..;'\n::::..:·\nt>\n·r:~.;.,- -:_;~::-:...~\nf; \":· .:..:.... :: •\n·+·,'(/\\,-_;',,:,..\n••• ·.i: •• ·\n: ·: -~ .;'~: :\\·· ~. • :•-: .... •:·\n!\n/ · ·,\n~ '.\n/.,. ,. THE CENTRAL\n: .... .\nINTELLIGENCE\nAGENCY AND\n-:.,:-. OVERHEAD (7 ;\nR ECONNAISSANCE\nThe U-2 and OXC.\\RT\nPrograms, 1954 - 1974\nGregory 'vV. Pedlow and\nDonald E. vVelzenbach\nt);J;\n:~•;/-;:~: _:;\n.\\~:·· ..:__..\n:>~~::.< :;;~..:.,·\n.•\n: .· . .\n[ },<~-~.~:_.:~ :·\n.~­\n::· .~_:•;··.::?;.\\ ..- ~:.-: ·\n:}·.··.\\ :·\n-:.: ,•.·-:· ·\n''{ :·: ·- ·..\n. ..• >\n.. ..\n~"
  },
  {
   "n": 2,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p02.jpg",
   "text": "Secret l<JOFOFU'il\nThe Central Intelligence Agency\nand Overhead Reconnaissance:\nThe U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-197 4\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 3,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p03.jpg",
   "text": "~ec, et MOFORf~\nThe Central Intelligence Agency\nand Overhead Reconnaissance:\nThe U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974\nGregory W . Pedlow\nand\nDonald E. Welzenbach\nHistory Staff\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nWashington, D.C.\n1992\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 4,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p04.jpg",
   "text": "♦ Chapter 1\nSearching for a System\nThe Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance............................................ 1\nEarly Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2\nNew Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4\nThe Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8\nLockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13\nScientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17\nThe BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17\nConcern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19\nThe Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21\nBritish Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23\nThe Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24\nThe Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26\nProject Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27\nA Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32\nCIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33\n♦ Chapter 2\nDeveloping the U-2\nThe Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39\nFunding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43\nMajor Design Features of the U-2........................................................... 45\nThe Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48\nPreparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56\nSecurity for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59\nThe CIA - Air Force Partnership.............................................................. 60\nTechnical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61\nDelivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66\nInitial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68\nU-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72"
  },
  {
   "n": 5,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p05.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, el NOFORN\nHiring U-2 Pilots ........ _ ................................................................................. 73\nPilot Training ............................................................................................... 75\nFinal Tests of the U-2................................................................................ 76\nThree Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79\nCoordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80\nPreparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82\nThe Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84\nAQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88\nThe U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89\n♦ Chapter 3\nU-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958\nThe Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94\nThe Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95\nPresident Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96\nFirst Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100\nFirst U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union............................................... 104\nSoviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109\nThe End of the Bomber Gap................................. : ................................ 111\nTactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112\nRenewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122\nRadar-Deceptive \"Dirty Birds\" ................................................................ 128\nThe New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133\nDetachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135\nThe Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139\nCooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142\nDeclining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143\nConcerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147\nMore Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149\nIntervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152\nBritish Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153\nThe U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959........................................... 157\n♦ Chapter 4\nThe Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960\nThe U-2 and the \"Missile-Gap\" Debate................................................ 159\nThe Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170\nThe Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177\nThe Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181\nThe Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183\nChanges in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187"
  },
  {
   "n": 6,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p06.jpg",
   "text": "Geeret PJOFORN\n..'t', Chapter 5\nU-2 Operations After May 1960\nU-2 Operations in Latin America ........................................................... 197\nU-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion........................................ 197\nAerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ............................................ 198\nU-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199\nU-2s Over South America .................................................................. 211\nU-2 Operations in Asia ............................................................................ 211\nDetachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ........................ 211\nChina Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 .......................................... 215\nU-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216\nU-2Cs for Detachment C..................................................................... 217\nU-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219\nEnd of Detachment C Operations ..................................................... 219\nDetachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221\nNew Detachment on Taiwan ............................................................. 222\nUse of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ................................... 230\nU-2s in India ......................................................................................... 231\nIncreasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233\nAdvanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237\nInfrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238\n....................................... 240\n~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~\n=-=-=~\nThe End of U-2 Overflights o\nain an\nChina ............................. 242\nPeripheral Missions by Detachment H............................................. 244\nOperation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246\nImprovements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247\nModification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ................... 247\nUse of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249\nA New Version of the U-2...................................................... ........... 251\nReplacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs............................... 253\nThe Final Years of the U-2 ..................................................................... 253\nSupport to Other Agencies ................................................................ 254\nOverseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255\nThe Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........................... 257\n0 ) Chapter 6\nThe U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968\nThe Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .................... 260\nCompetition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267\nThe Selection of the Lockheed Design ................................................. 270\nEfforts To Reduce the A·12's Radar Cross Section............................ 274\nThe OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277"
  },
  {
   "n": 7,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p07.jpg",
   "text": "See, et NOFOAN\nNew Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed............. 279\nDesigning the OXCART's Cameras ........................................................ 281\nChoosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283\nSelection of a Testing Site for t he OXCART....................................... 283\nDelivery of the First OXCART ................................................................ 286\nChanges in the Project Management .................................................... 286\nOXCART' s First Flights............................................................................. 288\nSpeed-Related Problems ...... .................................................................... 290\nNew Versions of the OXCART ............................................................... 291\nThe Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292\nAdditional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295\nDiscussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297\nFirst A-12 Deployment: Operation BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304\nThe End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307\nPossible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312\nSummary of the OXCART Program ...................................................... 313\n♦ Chapter 7\nConclusion\nU-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315\nParticipation of Allies in the U-2 Program........................................... 319\nU-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence ........................................... 319\nAdvances in Technology.......................................................................... 320\nCooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321\nImpact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program on the CIA. ....... 321\n♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325\n♦ Appendix B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327\n♦\nAppendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 ........................... 335\n♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337\n4 July 1954-1 May 1960\n♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .............................. 339\n♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347\n♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355"
  },
  {
   "n": 8,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p08.jpg",
   "text": "Warning Notice\nIntelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)\nNational Security Information\nUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions\nDissemination Control Abbreviations\nNOFORN (NF)\nNot releasable to foreign nationals\nNOCONTRACT (NC)\nNot releasable to contractors or contractor/\nconsultants\nPROPIN (PR)\nCaution-proprietary information involved\nORCON (OC)\nDissemination and extraction of information\ncontrolled by originator\nREL..\nThis information has been authorized for re­\nlease to...\nWN\nWNINTEL-lntelligence sources and meth­\nods involved\nClassified by~~~~\nDeclassify: OADR\nDerived from multiple sources\nAll material on this page\nis Unclassified."
  },
  {
   "n": 9,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p09.jpg",
   "text": "ieeret NOFGftN\nFOREWORD\nThis History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­\ntive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program.\nwhich from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary\naircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the\nprogram's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi­\ncal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program,\nalong with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the\nCIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and\npermanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and\nTechnology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais­\nsance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in\nthis study.\nThe authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the\nCIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART\nprojects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted\nproblems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an\nenormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July\n1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence\non the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed\nfor nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program·\nmanagers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover­\nage, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions\nover the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­\nful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only\nreluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down\nFrancis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower\nforbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency\nmust always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the\ndiplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em­\nployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond\noverhead reconnaissance programs.\nIndeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is\nthe only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA\nrecords and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The\nauthors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and\nhave interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in­\nformation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned\n-Sac,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 10,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p10.jpg",
   "text": "See1et N0F0RN\nreconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does\nreveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­\nlogical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national\npolicy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable\nreading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.\nMany people made import.1nt contributions to the production of\nthis volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript,\nGerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon­\nstrated her high talent as a copy editor, and[\n[ provided\nstaunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to\nmore members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and\nCartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic\nSupport, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the\ncall of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly\nwork of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this\nhandsome volume.\nDonald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W.\nPedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this\nwork. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began\nresearch on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff\non a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and\nTechnology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter­\nviewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning\nto his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member\nof the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns\nHopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence\nofficer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow\nundertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized.\nedited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be­\ncome NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly\nbenefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history\nof the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦\nJ. Kenneth McDonald\nChief, CIA History Staff\nApril 1992"
  },
  {
   "n": 11,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p11.jpg",
   "text": "Secret l\\10FeAN\nPREFACE\nWhen the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947,\nno one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a\nmajor program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose\nwould be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military\nservices had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and\nflights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime.\nBy the early I 950s, howev,er, the United States had an urgent and\ngrowing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its\nsatellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had\nbeen conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration\noverflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost\nand increased international tension. Furthermore. many important\nareas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais­\nsance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a\nhigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct\ndeep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.\nPresident Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers\nfeared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could\nlead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non­\nmilitary aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be\nmanned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the\ngreatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance\nprogram was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air\nForce provided vital support.\nThe Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted\n20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the\nU-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining\nAgency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA\ndeveloped a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad­\nvanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was\ncanceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air­\ncraft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71.\nNeither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in­\nformation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to\nthe public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA\nU-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 12,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p12.jpg",
   "text": "later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President\nLyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of\naircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l\n(strategic reconnaissance) versions.\nThe two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject\nof a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B.\nRoss's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers'\nmemoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many\nmore details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael\nBeschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair\n(l986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and\nNational Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac­\ncurate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to\nclassified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable\namount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the\npublic, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of\nthe U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's\noverall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions\non some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers\nmore from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the\nOXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air­\ncraft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been\nofficially declassified and released.\nAfter the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance\nprojects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the\nUnited Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the\nU-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the\nU-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac­\ncess to classified documents by interviewing many former\nparticipants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also\nquite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller\non the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2\n(l983).\nThere has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and\nOXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and\nTechnology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 13,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p13.jpg",
   "text": "Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret\nCodeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a\nwealth of technical and operational information on the two projects\nbut does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without\nexamining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af­\nfecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is\nimpossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and\nended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.\nIn preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro­\ngram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government\ndocuments, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air\nForce,\ncontractors,\nscientific advisory committees,\nand\nthe\nEisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor­\ntant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in\noverhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen­\ntation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there\nare no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual\nreconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of\nCentral Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the\nDirectorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence\nCommunity Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower\nPresidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.\nBoth authors are grateful for the assistance they have received\nfrom many individuals who played important roles in the events they\nrecount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have\nbecome known. The assistance of Agency records management\nofficers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance\nprogram is also greatly appreciated.\nTo ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in over­\nhead reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors\nhave kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some\naspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those\ninvolving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to\nbe described in very general terms. The omission of such information\nis not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency's recon­\nnaissance aircraft. ♦"
  },
  {
   "n": 14,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p14.jpg",
   "text": "1\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 1\nSearching for a System\nTHE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE\nFor centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or\nstructure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall\ntrees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the\nAmerican Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob­\nse_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better\nview of the \"other side of the hill.\" With the advent of dry film, it\nbecame possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi­\ntion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance\nproved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von\nFritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: '·'The\nnation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next\nwar.\"\n1\nBy World War II, lenses, films, and cameras had undergone many\nimprovements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster\nthan the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use\nphotoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be­\nfore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing\nafteiwarcl\nPeacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first in­\ncluded only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental high­\nways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to\nusing photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II,\nwhen the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communi­\ncation between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.\n' Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16."
  },
  {
   "n": 15,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p15.jpg",
   "text": "2\n6cc. ct P.OFORN\nChapter 1\nBy I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had\nbeen effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Soviet\nmilitary carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi­\nties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities­\nbomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap­\nons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air\ndefense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory\npolicies, was also largely an unknown factor.\nTight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed\nthe movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet\nUnion made its conventional means of communication-telephone,\ntelegraph, and radio-telephone-more secure, thereby greatly reduc­\ning the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu­\nrity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively\nblunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents\nusing covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and\nfrom target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re­\nport their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth­\nods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence\ntradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other\nmethods were available.\nEarly Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance\nAlthough at the end of World War II the United States had captured\nlarge quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet\nUnion, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source\nof current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was\ninterrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To\nobtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence\ncommunity established several programs to debrief German scientists\nwho had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but\nwere now being allowed to leave.~\n: At the end of World War II. th<! British had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor.\nmation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and\nthe term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical\ninformation. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather\nintt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab­\nsorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<!­\ngan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit\nindividuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had\nworked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the\nReturnee Exploitation Group (REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of\ns,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[\n)\nhe Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service\nHistorical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff .. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).\nI"
  },
  {
   "n": 16,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p16.jpg",
   "text": "3\nInterrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in­\nformation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer.\nAs a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying\nto obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force\neffort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of\nthe B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and\nelectronic \"ferret\" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking\nby Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com­\npletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also\nlacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the\nair-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of\nany accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography\" flights\n(called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along\nthe northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even\nmanaged to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in\nSiberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet\nmilitary response. 3\nIn 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense\nunits became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all\naircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April\n1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft\nover the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June\n1950, the Soviet Union extended its \"severe air defense policy'' to\nthe Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en­\ngine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in\nthe Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of\nSoviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected\nby the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey\nalso reported attacks on their planes. 4\n' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study\nRM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter­\nview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS\nCodeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study\nare on file at the DCI History Staff.\n' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New\nYork: Morrow, 1987) that \"the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this\ncase fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949.\" In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did\nnot attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in\nSoviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer.\nGeorge, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).\nSec, et NOF=ORI\\J\nChapter 1\n-Seere:t"
  },
  {
   "n": 17,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p17.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et NOFORN\nChapter 1\n4\nThe Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres­\nsive in August I 952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating\nJapanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home\nisland. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft\nstalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re­\nconnaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become\na very dangerous business.\nDespite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance\nof the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such\nmissions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet\nUnion, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation\ndetermined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly\nstrengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South\nKorea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa­\ntion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan­\nger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.\nNew Approaches to Photoreconnaissance\nWhile existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re­\nconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began\nplanning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using\nnew technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new,\nhigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of\nEastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th\nReconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war\nhe returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais­\nsance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called\npre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential\nenemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat\nreconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948,\nLeghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa­\nbility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution\ncameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu­\nnity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air\nForce, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the\nReconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development\nCommand at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.5\n' Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,\nDC. 19 August 1985 (S).\nSeoFat"
  },
  {
   "n": 18,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p18.jpg",
   "text": "5\nIn Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead\nreconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the\nMIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that\nan aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet\nfighters. Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude\nreconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began\nlooking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World.\nThis search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber­\nthe Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra\nhad made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki­\nlometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the\nCanberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The\nRoyal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the\nCanberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which be­\ngan flying in March 1950. 7\nAt Leghorn's insistence,\nthe\nWright\nAir Development\nCommand invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the\nsummer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even\nhigher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber\nversion of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft\nCompany was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb­\ner. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new\nCanberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new\nRolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that\nwas stressed to less than the standard military specifications.\nLeghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000\nfeet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin­\ning fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi­\nfied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a\nradius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo­\ngraph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.\nLeghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the\nPentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the\nAir Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance\n• 13.716 meters. To avoid giving a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s.\noriginal English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to\nthe metric system. To convert feet to meters. multiply by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in\nknots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85.\n' Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West\n(Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I 8.\n~,etNOFOAN\nChapter 1\nRichard S. Leghorn"
  },
  {
   "n": 19,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p19.jpg",
   "text": "6\nSecret i'JOF'OfUd\nChapter 1\ndivision in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to\napprove all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit\nreviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications.\nAccording to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special-pur­\npose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais­\nsance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance\naircraft should be capable of operating under wartime conditions.\nPellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifica­\ntions for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes,\narmor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to\nreach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights of the Soviet\nBloc. The final result of Leghorn's concept after its alteration by\nPellegrini ·s staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude\nRAF Canberra Mark-PR3\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 20,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p20.jpg",
   "text": "7\nwas only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection\nof his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952\nto work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development\nPlanning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~\nIn his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the\nAir Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked\nclosely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol­\nlowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre\nDame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais­\nsance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World\nWar IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air\nForce should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.\nUnderlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance\nwas the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft\nflying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that\nthe Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup­\nplied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584\n(Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to\n90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component\nquickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn­\ning radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar\ncould be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal\nrange (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of\nthe earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn,\nKiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to\n65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning\nradar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would\nnot be activated. 9\nThe problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un­\nlike Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar\ntechnology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im­\nproved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad­\nvocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft\nflying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.\n' Leghorn interview (S).\n' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).\nSec,et NOFORN\nChapter 1\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 21,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p21.jpg",
   "text": "iHret NOFORN\nChapter 1\n8\nThe Air Force Search for\nReconnaissance Aircraft\na Ni:tw\nWith interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air\nForce agencies began to develop ain aircraft to conduct such mis­\nsions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development\nCommand gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine\nthe high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft\nto give it long, high-lift wings and tlhe American version of the new\nRolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that\nRichard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year.\"'\nAt about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air\nDevelopment Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin­\ning ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with\ntwo German aeronautical experts--Woldemar Voigt and Richard\nVogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air\nForce Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft\nthat would combine the high-altitude perfonnance of the latest turbo­\njet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti­\ntudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought\nCorporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was\nserving as assistant chief of the New Developments Office of\nWADC's Bombardment Branch.\nBy March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-alti­\ntude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for \"an aircraft\nweapon system having an operational radius of 1.500 nm [nautical\nmiles) and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance\nmissions during daylight, good visibility conditions.\" The require­\nment stated that such an aircraft must have an optimum subsonic\ncruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the target.\ncarry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment.\nand have a crew of one.\n11\nThe Wright Air Development Command decided not to seek pro­\nposals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a\nsmaller company would give the new proj ect a higher priority and\n'\" Philip G. Strong. Chic:f. Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. '\"Recon­\nnaissance Capabilities.\" 21 August I 953. OSI records (S).\n\" Jay Miller. uKkheed U-2. Aerograph 3 (Aus:tin. Texas: Acrofax. 1983). p. 10.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 22,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p22.jpg",
   "text": "•\n9\nproduce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft\nCorporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and\nAirplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con­\ntracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.\nIn addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to\nexamine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al­\ntitude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three\nfirms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a singl.e-en­\ngine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial\nof 67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67\n(later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and\nMartin's design was a big-wing version of the 8-57 called the Model\n294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and\nother engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend­\ning designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell\nproposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim\nproject that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more\nadvanced concept from Bell was still being developed.\n11\nAir Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod­\n•ify\" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But\nword of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had\nreached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft\nCorporation, which submitted an unsolicited design.\nLockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft\ncompetition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had\nrecently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director\nof Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon\non business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend\nand colleague from the Air Force's Office of Development Planning\n(more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office\nsymbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying\naircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about\nthe search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit­\nable for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance.\nImmediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to\nLockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian\nofficial in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that\n'' The request for proposal. known as ··Design Study Requirements. ldentiticatic1n No.\n53WC-J6j07:· has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U·Z, pp. 10- 11.\nChapter 1"
  },
  {
   "n": 23,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p23.jpg",
   "text": "10\nSecret ld0F8RN\nChapter 1\nLockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft\nDesigns for the Air Force\nwould have co reach altitudes of between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and\ncompetition for a high-altitude\nreconnaissance aircraft\ncorrectly forecast, \"If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in\na practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8. it should be\ncapable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960.\"\nCarter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which\nwill have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before\n1960 will. of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary\nprocedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy.\" Some of the\n\"nonstandard\" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the\nelimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications.\nand the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed\nwith a warning that time was of the essence: \" In order that this spe­\ncial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful life, it is obvious\nthat its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid­\nered normal. ..\n1\n•\n1\nLockheed's senior officials approved Carter's proposal, and\nearly in 1954 the corporation's best aircraft designer-Clarence L.\n(Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the\nCL-282 but later to become famous under its Air Force designa1tor­\nthe U-2. Already one of the world's leading aeronautical engirneers,\nKelly Johnson had many successful military and civilian designs to\nhis credit. including the P-38, P-80, F-I04. and Constellmtion.\nJohnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the\nfuselage of the F-I04 jet fighter but incorporating a high-aspect--ratio\nsailplane wing. To save weight and thereby increase the aircraft\"s al­\ntitude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of\n\" Milkr. U1''kheed U-2. p. 12.\n-See,oc"
  },
  {
   "n": 24,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p24.jpg",
   "text": "11\n/\nChapter 1\ngravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g's.\nFor the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonaf­\nterburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the\nsame engine he had chosen for the F- 104, which had been the basis\nfor the U-2 design).\n1\n\" Many of the CL-282's design features were\nadapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detacihable.\nInstead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two\nskis and a reinforced belly rib for landing- a common saillplane\ntechnique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other tea­\ntures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot prnyload\narea that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL--282's\nmaximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile\nrange. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled\ngl\"d\nI er. .~•\nEarly in March 1954, Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 de­\nsign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development\nPlanning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and\nrecommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to\nKelly Johnson\n. sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a\nfull description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and\nmaintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that\nincluded Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief\nof Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant\nfor Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force.\nAfterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civilian officials were very\nmuch interested in his design but the generals were not.\n16\nThe CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the\nStrategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in early April\nby Eugene Kiefer. Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of\n\" Lockheed Corporation. ··strategic Reconnaissance and Intelligence ... Development\nPlanning Note #I. 30 November 1953 (U).\n\" Miller. locklctted U-2. p. 12. For more: J.:tails on Kdly Johnson's original pr,:,posal.\nsee '\"Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircrati\nCorporation. 5 March 1954'\" in Helen H. Kkyla and Robert D. o ·Hem. Hiswrv of the\nOffice of Special Activities. DS&T. Directorate of Science an<l Technology Hi~:torical\nSeries OSA-1. 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). Th,: 16\nvolumes of this history contain 20 chaptr:rs . .:ach paginated separately. Future rd,:rcm;,;;s\nwill be shorten,:d to OSA Hiswry. follow<:!d by the rekvant chapter and pag<:! numbers.\n•· Kelly Johnson Papers. ··Log for Project x:· April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation.\nAdvanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California.\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 25,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p25.jpg",
   "text": ".\n12\nSec,et NOFORN\nChapter 1\nThe Lockheed CL-282\nDevelopment Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay\nstood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth,\nand told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he\nwould put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not\ninterested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left\nthe room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time.\"\nMeanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force\ndevelopment channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air\nDevelopment Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care­\nfully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early\nJune. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's\nchoice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at\nWright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most\npowerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and\nBell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing\ngear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design.\"\nAnother factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission\nwas the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re­\nconnaissance experts had gained their practical experience during\n\" C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U).\n\" Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12.\nSee1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 26,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p26.jpg",
   "text": "13\nSect et NOFORN\nChapter 1\nWorld War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography\nexperts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as\nthe primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre­\nferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length\ncameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with\nthe development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de­\nvice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to\nbe partially disassembled before the camera could be installed.\nFinally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that\ntwo engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a\nspare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re­\ncords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable\nthan multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance\naircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning\nif one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19\nOn 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air\nForce rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine\nand was too unusual and because the Air Force was already commit­\nted to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air\nForce had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for\n28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection\nof the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began\nseeking new sources of support for the aircraft.\nLockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA\nAlthough the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of\nthe Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin­\nued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of\nthe Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for\nResearch and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott.\nGardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because\nbefore coming\nto\nWashington\nhe\nhad headed the\nHycon\nManufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena,\nCalifornia. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on\nthe CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this\n'\" Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California,\n20 May 1985 (S).\n'\" Johnson, \"Log for Project X,\" 7 June 1954.\niaaret"
  },
  {
   "n": 27,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p27.jpg",
   "text": "14\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 1\nTrevor Gardner\ndesign showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet\nUnion. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant,\nFrederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary\nTalbott.~'\nAccording to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander\nLeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri­\nmarily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intelligence. But\nGeneral LeMay had already showni that he was not interested in an\nunarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA\nsupport for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official\ninvolvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the\nAir Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carrying bal­\nloons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details\nof this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in\nthe Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however.\nserved on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in­\nformed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!!\nGardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on\n12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Development Command\nbegan to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly\nJohnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this\nmeeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search\nfor a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:\nProposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re­\nceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell . ...\nThe Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been\ngiven the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a\njet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day\nFighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic\nspeeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an\naltitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of\n1,400 nautical miles . ... The CL-282 can be manufactured\n\" Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach. tape recording. Wa.shington. DC.\n23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd\"y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2\nAffuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79.\n\" Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though\nhe was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve.\nFor S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the\nNorton interview (S).\n6ee,ot"
  },
  {
   "n": 28,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p28.jpg",
   "text": "Set1 el NOP'OAN\nChapter 1\n15\nmainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this\nplane can be produced within a year from the date oforder: Five\nplanes could be delivered for operations within two years..\nThe Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor­\nmal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget\nis 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the\nLockheed CL-282. :;\nGardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false\nimpression that most Air Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de­\nsign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro­\ncess of choosing the modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new\nBell X-16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.\nDuring their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick\nAyer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282\nbecause it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and\nbecause at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might\nmake it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked\nS.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong\npromised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hired\nSpecial Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell.\nJr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:\"'\nPhilip Strong\nRichard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be­\nfore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud­\nied at the London School of Economics for a year and then\ncompleted a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at\nYale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of\nTechnology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During\nWorld War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive\nofficer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war,\nhe served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the\nend of 1951, when he became a staff member of the Ford\nFoundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,\nwhen he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United\n'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo\nReconnaissance,\" 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.\n'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science\nand Technology Historical Series OSI-I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS\nCodeword).\nGee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 29,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p29.jpg",
   "text": "16\nChapter 1\nRichard M. Bissell, Jr.\nStates might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up­\nrising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly\nconcluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations\nagainst Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: \"I know I emerged from\nthat exercise feeling that very little could be done.\" This belief\nwould later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than\nhuman means of intelligence collection.\n25\nBissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became\ninvolved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing\nGuatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc­\ncupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the\nconcept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the\nidea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad­\nvise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the\nGuatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.!\n0\nMeanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al­\ntitude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to\nask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an\noverflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar.\nDulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the\nother proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met\non several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air\nForce finally turned down in October I 954. !'\nAlthough Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over­\nflight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un­\ndertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude\ntoward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,\nbut many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be­\ncome involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the\nLockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.\n\" Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New\nYork: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89.\n,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence.\nfrom Chief. Support Staff, OSI. \" Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and\nTechnical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job\nS0R-0 1424. bo\" I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape\nrecording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S).\n\" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and\nCoordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. --overflight of\nKapustin Yar.'' 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo\" I (TS. down­\ngraded 10 S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 30,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p30.jpg",
   "text": "iac;ret l)IQFORL'I\nChapter 1\n17\nMoreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit\nwell into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli­\ngence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,\nwhich relied on agents rather than technology.\n1 s\nAt this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal\nstill lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers\namong some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key\ndecisionmakers at both· Air Force and CIA remained unconvinced. To\nmake Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional\nsource of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov­\nernment advisory boards.\nSCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE\nScientists and engineers from universities and private industry had\nplayed a major role in advising the government on technical matters\nduring World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific ad­\nvisory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing\nte_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci­\nentific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a\nScientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of\ncurrent interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of\nnew technologies. The following year the Office of Defense\nMobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the\nTruman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•\nDC/ Allen W. Dulles\nThe BEACON HILL Report\nIn 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be­\ncause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about\ntargets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new\nways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air\nForce's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.\nSaville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air\n\" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald\nE. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t\n(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr .. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.\nPedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.\n\"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'\nUSAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:\nUSAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U)."
  },
  {
   "n": 31,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p31.jpg",
   "text": "18\nSecret ~OfiORN\nChapter 1\nSec1et\ndefense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these\nexperts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head­\nquarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which\nsoon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con­\nsultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.\nThe study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P.\nOverhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M.\nPurcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science\nMonitor;\nAllen F.\nDonovan from\nthe Cornell Aeronautical\nLaboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System\nLaboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation;\nStewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the\nPerkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour\nAssociates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col.\nRichard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer.30\nDuring January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study\nGroup traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and\nfirms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel\nmembers were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re­\nconnaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and\ncamera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess­\nful) proposals examined by the panel was an \"invisible\" dirigible.\nThis was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted,\nnonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet\nalong the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using\na large lens to photograph targets of interest. 31\nAfter completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the\nBEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem­\nbers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their\nrecommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of in­\ntelligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified\n\"' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence\nand Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app.\nA (S. downgraded to C).\n'' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985\n(U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,\nDC, 24 April 1985 (S}."
  },
  {
   "n": 32,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p32.jpg",
   "text": "19\nSec. et NOFOAN\nChapter 1\ndocument on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated\nradical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel­\nligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo­\ngraphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and\nmicrowave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad­\nvanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda­\ntions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance\naircraft:\nWe have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl­\nedge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten­\ntially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it\nwith the maximum amount of information obtainable through\naerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such\naerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles\nflying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point\npermitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they\ncan operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of\ndetection or interception. 1J\nConcern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack\nThe Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON\nHILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon­\nnaissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became\nPresident in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with\nthe quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities\nand the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11\nTo President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili­\ntary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap­\npeared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity\nwith the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in\nthe area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet\nUnion had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than\nUS ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months\nafter the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto­\nnated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech­\nnology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US\n'' BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by\nAllen Donovan and Louis Ridenour.\n'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\nSee,e'l"
  },
  {
   "n": 33,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p33.jpg",
   "text": "20\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 1\nscientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming\ninto the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the\nleaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen\nbomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And,\nat the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen­\nsion between Western Europe and the United States and between the\ndeveloped and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign\npolicy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such\nas Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a\nmenace to peace and world order.\nThe Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a\nthreat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United\nStates itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed\nout the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by\nSoviet long-range bombers.-'•\nConcern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental\nUnited States grew after an American military attache sighted a new\nSoviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of\nMoscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later\ndesignated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the\nturboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared\nto be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then\ngoing into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow\nMay Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel­\nligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the\nBison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented\na native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex­\nperts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's\nlarge numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to\npose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of\n1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight­\ning the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison\nbomber featured prominently in such stories. 1;\n\" RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a\nSurprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California:\nthe RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967).\n'' \"AF Cites Red Bomber Progress,\" Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; \"Is Russia\nWinning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, 'pp. 28-19;\n\"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'.\" Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; \"Red\nAir Force: The World's Biggest.\" Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33.\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 34,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p34.jpg",
   "text": "21\nSec, et NOf'Oft~\nChapter 1\n..\n~: ...\n. .\n:-.·~·~ .'\n~~~f':.:l-f.Je.) \\': .\n•.. g,.,\nau£ •\nSoviet Myasishchev-4 bomber\n(the Bison)\nThe Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel\nEven before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears\nthat the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the\nUnited States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory\nbody to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the\nBEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and\nhigh-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems\nPanel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study\nGroup: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the\nAir Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by\nEdward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and\nPhilip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI).\n31\n'\nThe chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a re­\nsearch associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been\ninvolved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940, when he first advised\nthe Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then estab­\nlished a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard\nUniversity Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality\n\"' Mc:moram.lum for Rolxrt Amory. Jr.. Dt::puty Direclor. lnlelligence from Edward L .\nAllen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operation:s Staff.\nOSI. \"Meeling of lhe Intelligence Systems Panc:l of th.: Scientific Advisory Board.\nUSAF:· 26 Augusl 1953. OSI (OSWR) records. job 80R-0l424. bo:< I (S).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 35,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p35.jpg",
   "text": "22\nSecret l\\'JOFOAl\\1\nChapter 1\nlenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing\ncameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory\nmoved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as\nlong as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at\nHarvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new\nhead of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research\nLaboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not\nend with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University,\nbecause he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais­\nsance. 17\nThe [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To\nprovide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet\nUnion, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best\nintelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog­\nraphy taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the\nGerman photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the\nUrals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not\nincluded. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide\nup-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force\nagencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments\nand proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance, in­\ncluding new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites.\nAmong the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi­\nple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and\nRB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for \"fighter conversion\"-for\nadapting a giant, I 0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and\nretrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re­\nconnaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-alti­\ntude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by\nthe summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnais­\nsance aircraft. 3~\n\" Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of\nBGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force)\nformt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston\nUniversity (Leghorn interview [SJ).\n\" :\\lemorandurn for Robert Amory. Jr.. Deputy Din.:ctor. lntc:lligence. from Edward L.\nAllen. Chief. Economic Research, ORR. and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff.\nOSI. \"Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientitic Advisory Boar<l. USAF,''\n26 August I 953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Cha<lwell. Assistant Director/Scientific\nlnrelligence. from Chief. Support Staff. OSI. .. Review of OSA Activities Concerned with\nScientific an<l Technical Collection Techniques ... 13 May I 955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records.\njob S0R-01424. bo:< I (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 !S) .\n..Sasret"
  },
  {
   "n": 36,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p36.jpg",
   "text": "23\nSee1 et NOFOftN\nChapter 1\nThe wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were\nall products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect\nintelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be­\nyond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying\nballoons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political\nconsequences.\nBritish Overflight of Kapustin Var\nThe British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air­\ncraft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN,\nwhich was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude\nreconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard\nLeghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in\n195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the\nCanberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls­\nRoyce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The\nrange of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on\n29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n\nSometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a\nhigh-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to\nphotograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad­\nvanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli­\ngence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise.\nSoviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.\")\nRumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of\n1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come\nuntil February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study\naerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific\nAdvisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi­\ncials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23\nMarch 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board\nat Langley AFB, Virginia.\n'\" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI.\nMemorandum for the Record. \"Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21\nOctober 1953,\" 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS,\ndowngraded to S).\n~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss,\nMayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there\nis no evidence to support this assertion.\nGeeFot"
  },
  {
   "n": 37,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p37.jpg",
   "text": "24\nSec, et NOFOAP~\nChapter 1\nAllen F. Donovan\nBaker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's\nIntelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its\nmembers about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they\nwere not cleared for this information. The panel did. however. discuss\nthe modifications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US\nCanberra, the B-57.\"\nThe Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282\nThe next Intelligence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25\nMay at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem­\nber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval­\nuated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft\nCompany. Even wichout Martin's specifications or drawings,\nDonovan had been able to estimate what could be done to the 8-57 by\nlengthening the wings and lightening the fuselage. He had determined\nthat alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnais­\nsance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,\nhe explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to\nmilitary specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly\nabove 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep­\ntion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need\n10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.':\nDevelopment of such an aircraft was already under way.\nDonovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the\nLockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly­\ning aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9\nsouthern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas\non high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.\nWhen he was finally able to make this trip in late summer,\nDonovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been\nseeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L.\nEugene Root. an old Air Force acquaintance who was n,ow a\nLockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi­\ntion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then\nshowed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life­\nlong sailplane enthusiast. Donovan immediately recognized that the\n.,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 38,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p38.jpg",
   "text": "25\nCL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain­\ning the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais­\nsance of the Soviet Union successfully:1\nUpon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with\nJames Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence\nSystems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how­\never, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24\nSeptember 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several\nmembers, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at­\ntend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com­\npetition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.\nBut once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design\nfor a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis­\ntened intently.\nDonovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance\naircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception.\nNext, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re­\nquirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane\nwing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored\nsingle-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli­\nable than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could\ntheoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained,\nit could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet,\nwhere it was sure to be shot down.\nThe second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in\ntechnical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was\nneeded to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet en­\ngine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because\nof the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti­\nmated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6\npercent of its sea-level thrust.\nFinally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport\naircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maxi­\nmum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and\n\" Donovan interview (S)\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 1\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 39,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p39.jpg",
   "text": "t\n26\nSet1et NOl'ORN\nChapter 1\nwingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man­\ndated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much\nweight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail­\nplane wing.\nIn short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000\nfeet, but only by making certain that all parts of the aeronautical\nequation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. The only plane\nmeeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's\nCL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the\nCL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft\nbecause it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....\nDonovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel\nof the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·\nAir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though\nthe Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by\nSeptember I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and\nhigh-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back­\ners were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds\nto Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was\nalready committed to the Martin RB-57 and the Bell X-I6. Additional\nsupport from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282\nproject to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on\nhigh-level advisory committees.\nThe Technological Capabilities Panel\nThe Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned\nover the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on\nthe United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed\nby a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack\nmight destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met\nwith Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the California Institute of\nTechnology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization's\nScience Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not\ndealing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise\nattack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the\nScience Advisory Committee's next meeting. After listening to\n\" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}."
  },
  {
   "n": 40,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p40.jpg",
   "text": "27\n~ et PdOfiOP\\r\\J\nGardner. the committee members decided to approach President\nEisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them\nabout the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that\nthese new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United\nStates. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili­\ntary surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this\nproblem.is\nT he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the\nmost prominent members. MIT President James R. Killian. Jr., to\nmeet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston\narea to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assess­\nment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April\n1954, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the\nPresident endorsed the concept.\nOn 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killian to re­\ncruit and lead a panel of experts to study \"' the country's technologi­\ncal capabilities to meet some of its current problems.\" Killian\nquickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office\nB_u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into\nthree special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive.\nand intelligence capabilites. with an additional communications\nworking group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabilities\nPanel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the\nnext 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa­\nrate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings\nwith every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish­\nments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on\nthe nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members\nbegan drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A\nProject Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282\nChapter 1\nJames R. Killian, Jr.\nEven before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was\nready. one of the three working groups took actions that would have a\nmajor impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had\n\" Beschloss. MC1ydav. pp. 73-7-': Technologii:al C:1pabili1ies Pan.:I of 1he Science\nAdvisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Auack. I-i February 1955. p. 185\n(hereafter cited as TCP Report) CTS/Rcs1ri<:1eJ Dat:1. <lowngrnJed to S) .\n.. Jamc:s R. Killian. Jr.. Spmnik. Scie111ists. and Eisettlww,:r: A Memoir of the r;;_~t\nSpecial Assiswnr to the Pre.~ide11t for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press.\n1977), p. 68: Beschloss. ,W<1yJay. p. 7-i: TCP Reporr. pp. 185- 186 (S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 41,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p41.jpg",
   "text": "28\nSecf@t NOl'OPU'-.t\nChapter 1\nTechnological Capabilities Panel\nIThe President of the United States I\nDirector, Office of\nDefense Mobilization\nExecutive Staff\nTechnological Capabilities\nMilitary Advisory\nPanel of the Science\n__ Committee\nDavid Z. Beckler, ODM\nAdvisory Committee\nLt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF\nLt. Gen. L. L Lemnitzer, USA\nSteering Committee\nRAdm. H. 0. Felt, USN a\nAdministrative Staff\nBrig. Gen. 8. K. Holloway,\nJ. R. Killian, Jr., Director\nUSAF a\nWilliam Brazeal\nJ. B. Fisk, Deputy Director\nMaj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a\nM. Comerford\nC. Klett\nL Wiesner\nL. A. OuBridge\nJ. P. Baxter\nM. G. Holloway\n• Constitute military consultant\ngroup.\nE. Hockett\nJ. H. Doolittle\nD. _Le_wis\nL. J. Haworth\nK. Welchold\nE. H. Land\nR. C. Sprague, Consultant\nProject 1\nProject 2\nProject 3\nCommunications\nWorking Group\nM. G. Holloway, Dir.\nL. J. Haworth, Dir.\nE. H. Land, Dir.\nE. P. Aurand\nE. Barlow\nJ. G. Baker\nJ. 8. Wiesner, Chmn.\nR. L. Belzer\nD. Dustin\nJ.Kennedy\nG. W. Gilman\nS. C. Hight\nR. Emberson\nA. Latham, Jr.\nH. T. Friis\nR. Mettler\nA.G. Hill\nE. Purcell\nW. H. Radford\nE. H. Plesset\nB. McMillan\nJ. W. Tukey\nW. Stratton\nR. Rollefson\nSubcommittee\nJ. West\nH. Scoville. Jr.\nC. Zimmerman\nM.A. Tuve\nH. A. Affel\nB. Horton\nR. Gilruth\nW. 8. Davenport, Jr.\nJ. L Morton\nR. H. Scherer\nJ. Mouzon\nConsultant for Technical\nAgency Contacts\nPersonnel\nLKacl.We.he.r._e;IA\nH. D. Chittim\n___JCIA\nS. R Clements, DOD"
  },
  {
   "n": 42,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p42.jpg",
   "text": "29\nSec, ct NOl'OP\\111\nChapter 1\nthe task of investigating the nation's intelligence capabilities. Its\nchairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fil­\nter and the instant camera. When James Killian asked Land to head\nProject Three, Land had to make a major decision about his caree:r. At\nthe time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from\nPolaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on\nthe technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land\ndecided to give up his interest in cinema's third dimension and return\neast to Polaroid and the panel appointmem!\n1\nLand's Project Three was the smallest of the three Technological\nCapabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called \" taxicab\ncommittees··-committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab.\nThe Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and\nEdward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of\nWashington University, St. Louis: mathematician John W. Tuke:y of\nPrinceton University and Bell Telephone Laboratories: and A llen\nLatham, Jr .. of Arthur D. Little. lnc., an engineer and former treasurer\nof the Polaroid Corporation:~\nEdwin H. Land\n[n mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington t,o ar­\nrange for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project\nThree study group. As the briefings progressed. the panel members\nbecame more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation's in­\ntelligence resources. Land later noted, \"We would go in and interview\ngenerals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor­\nried. Here we were, five or six young men. asking questions that these\nhigh-ranking officers couldn't answer.\" Land added that the Prnject\nThree members were also not overly impressed with the Central\nIntelligence Agency.~·\n1\nLand learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft\nsoon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly\nJohnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the: Air\nForce had rejected it. Although Land had heard Allen Donovan\n'' James R. Killian. Jr .. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. C:imbridgc.\nMassachusetts. 2 November 198-' (S); Land interview (TS Codcword).\n\" TCP Report. p. 188 (S).\n,., Land interview (TS Codeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 43,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p43.jpg",
   "text": "30\nSec, et NOFORM\nChapter 1\nbriefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the\n24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not\nrealize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same.\nAs soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however,\nhe telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are\nafter.\" 50\nA few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual\ndrawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be­\ncame enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker\nhad heard Allen Donovan·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in\nMay, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan\ndid not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24\nSeptember. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing\na camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51\nAt the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen\nDulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard\nBissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas\nas to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais­\nsance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un­\nclear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding\nacademic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian\nthrough his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access\nto DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel\nmembers to consider him the best CIA point of contact.\nAlthough surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282\nproject, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he\ncould about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954,\nBissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his\nstaff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro­\ngrams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of\nCentral Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF,\non 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's\n'\" Baker interview (S).\n\" Ibid.\n'' Bissell interview (S).\niaeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 44,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p44.jpg",
   "text": "31\nattention to a section of the report about a \"stripped or specialized\naircraft\" called the Lockheed CL-282. 53\nBy September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had be­\ncome very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in­\nterest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen\nDonovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting\nof the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land com­\nmittee decided to back the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been\na formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he\nprobably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept\nand immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance\nsystem.\nDuring September and October the Project Three study group\nmet frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance\nequipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer\nthan IO participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government\nofficial in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceed­\nings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited\n- Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S.\nPerkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For\ndiscussions on the 157 engine, the panel members asked Perry W.\nPratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson\nalso met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system. 5~\nBy the end of October, the Project Three meetings had covered\nevery aspect of the Lockheed design. The CL-282 was to be more\nthan an airplane with a camera, it was to be an integrated intelli­\ngence-collection system that the Project Three members were confi­\ndent could find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber\nfleet and, thus, resolve the growing \"bomber gap\" controversy. It was\nnot just the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the Land group's fan­\ncy; the plane was seen as the platform for a whole new generation of\naerial cameras that several committee members had been discussing\nsince the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings.\nJames Baker was in the process of developing a revolutionary new\n·'·' Memorandum for DOC! Charles Pearre Cabell from R. M. Bissell, Special Assistant\nto the Director for Planning and Coordination, \"Aerial Reconnaissance,\"' 24 September\nI 954, DCI Records, job 80-B- I 676R. box 25 (TS. downgraded to S).\n\"' Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82.\nSecret l'<JOFOAN\nChapter 1\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 45,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p45.jpg",
   "text": "32\nSecret NelFOAN\nChapter 1\ncamera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and\nthe Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight\nfilm. 55\nBy October l 954, the Project Three study group had drafted a\ncomplete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the\nCL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct\nthe overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were\nnot in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.\nFirmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro­\nvoke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked\naircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission\nwas the Central Intelligence Agency. 56\nIn late October l 954, the Project Three panel discussed the\nCL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of\nthe Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,\nTrevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the\nproject. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even\nones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore, the\nDCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu­\nman operatives and secret communications. the classic forms of intel­\nligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the\nimpression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair\nplay. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced\nthat technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new\ncamera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems.57\nA Meeting With the President\nAllen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did\nnot stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it\nwas able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.\nHaving participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence\nSystems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on\nhow to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter­\nmined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able\n\" Land interview (TS Codeword).\n\" Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).\n\" Land interview (TS Codeword).\nScere~"
  },
  {
   "n": 46,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p46.jpg",
   "text": "33\nSecret NOfiORN\nChapter 1\nto do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis­\nsioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence\ncommunity and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct\nline to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:\nEarly in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President\nEisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem­\noirs contain an account of this crucial meeting:\nLand described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and\nrecommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to\nour proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap­\nproved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it\nshould be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not\nbecome entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department\nor troubled by rivalries among the services. 58\nThe scientists from the advisory committees and the President\nwere thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should\nbe controlled by the CIA, not the military.\n- ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282\nMeanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work­\ning to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed\noverflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly\nurging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:\nHere is the brief report from our panel telling why we think\noverflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure\nthat we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons\nwhy this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force\nassistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action\nand technique that is right for the contemporary version of\nCIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always\nsupposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we\nfeel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in\nscientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing\nsuch partners to assist you as may be needed. This present op­\nportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to\nstart. 59\n\" Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot\nbe detennined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954.\n,. Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles, 5 November 1954, in OSA History,\nchap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 47,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p47.jpg",
   "text": "34\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 1\nThe letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com­\nplete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the\nCL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a\nthree-page memorandum, entitled \"A Unique Opportunity for\nComprehensive Intelligence.\"\nAware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the\nProject Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282\nprogram over traditional espionage methods:\nWe believe that these planes can go where we need to have them\ngo efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and\nindirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to\nsuch positive information as can thus be provided. 60\nThe Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the\nCIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air\nForce, noting that \"For the present it seems rather dangerous for one\nof our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight.\" The\ncommittee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282\nrather than an Air Force aircraft:\nThe Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the\nreach ofpresent Russian interceptors and high enough to have a\ngood chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light\n(15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military\nusefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if\nthrough some remote mischance it were detected and identi­\nfied_ 61\nOne additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air\nForce's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster\ncompletion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee\nthat his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months\nafter he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was\nnot scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956.\nThe strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists on the\nvarious advisory committees concerned with overhead reconnais­\nsance, combined with President Eisenhower's support, finally won\n\"'' Memorandum for DCI Allen F. Dulles from Project Three Panel, \"A Unique\nOpportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence,\" 5 November 1954, p. 3 (TS, downgraded to\nS) in OSA History, chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).\n•• Ibid.\n&eaFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 48,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p48.jpg",
   "text": "35\nover DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the\nsupport of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared\nthat a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's\nown RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October\n1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air\nForce Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L.\nPutt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar­\ngued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air­\nworthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force\nin different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and\nan armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were\ndiverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there\nwould not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs\nof the X-16 prograrn.62\nHaving heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack\non the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met\nwith General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed\ndesign. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists\nfrom the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to\ndiscuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also\npresent as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air\nDevelopment Command, who later recalled:\nWhat I did was present the results ofmy comparative analysis of\nall four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance\ncapabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the\nBell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57,\nbeing a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in\nmy opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be\ngood enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I\noverlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney en­\ngine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and\nFairchild designs. 63\nThis meeting-along with the knowledge that President\nEisenhower also supported the CL-282-helped win over the Air\nForce. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon\nthe X-16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying .\n•, Donovan interview (S).\n•-' Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13.\n~eeret NOF6ftr<J\nChapter 1\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 49,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p49.jpg",
   "text": "36\nSec, et NOP'ORl\\1\nChapter 1\nOn 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci­\nsion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary\nTalbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,\nAyer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin\nLand-all agreed \"that the special item of material described by\nLockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was\nagreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,\nregardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA\nunvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,\nIt is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de­\nveloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to\npromoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in\nNovember 1954 because the company had become heavily committed\nto several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson\nreceived a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to\ncome to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions\nfrom Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any\nprogram during the visit, but to get the information and return.\"\nWhen he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that\n\"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner\nthat I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,\nthat if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence\nfrom my job at Lockheed to do this special project.\" 05 Of course,\nKelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak­\ning such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's\nstatement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the\nproject, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned\nto California on the evening of I 9 November.\nFour days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory\nCommittee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the\nCL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem­\norandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to\napprove the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at\na meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior\nAir Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the\n\"\" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the\nSecretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS\nCodeword).\n\"\" Johnson, \"Log for Project X,\" 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.\n6eerati"
  },
  {
   "n": 50,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p50.jpg",
   "text": "37\nPresident and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower\ntold Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and\nthat the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it\noperational.66\nThus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol­\nogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the\nAgency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft,\nPresident Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project\nconducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all,\nthe determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the\nLockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais­\nsance system.\n6,\n\"\" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. \"Meeting at the White House:·\n24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss.\nMayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the\nPresident, 24 November 1954,\" White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series.\nDwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS.\ndeclassified).\n\" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In\nFebruary 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly\nurged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed\nthe panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations\nby June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report\nwas to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project\nThree Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of\nelectrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific\nAdvisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land\nPanel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of over­\nhead reconnaissance.\nPresident Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice\nhe was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on\nForeign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory\nBoard in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat­\nters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and\nupgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be­\ncame the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the\nfirst Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position\nKillian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's\nScientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board\nof Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by\nthe President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.\nSec, et NOi-ORN\nChapter 1\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 51,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p51.jpg",
   "text": ". ~--·-·· ~8 ~.\n~l0-,vi l\n.,.. . . : ."
  },
  {
   "n": 52,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p52.jpg",
   "text": "39\nSec, et NOPOPU~\nChapter 2\nDeveloping the U-2\nTHE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT\nOn 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles\ncalled his special assistant. Richard Bissell, into his office to te:ll him\nthat President Eisenhower had just approved a very secret program\nand that Dulles wanted Bissell to take charge of it. Saying it was too\n?~cret for him to explain, Dulles gave Bissell a packet of docuiments\nand told him he could keep it for several days to acquaint himself\nwith the project. Bissell had long known of the proposal to build a\nhigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, but only in the most general\nterms. Now he learned in detail about the project that proposed send­\ning aircraft over the Soviet Union.\nLate on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to\ngo to the Pentagon on the following day to represent the Agency at an\norganizational meeting for the U-2\n1 project. Before leaving, Bissell\nasked Dulles which agency was to run the project. The DCI replied\nthat nothing had been clearly decided. Bissell then asked who was\ngoing to pay for the project. Dulles answered: \"That wasn'li even\nmentioned. You'11 have to work that out.\"\n2\nBissell was accompanied by Herbert I. Miller, chief of the Office\nof Scientific Intelligence's Nuclear Energy Division, who soon be­\ncame the executive officer of the overflight project. When Bissell and\nMiller arrived at the Pentagon on the afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they\n' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U-2 until July 1955, this\nstudy will use the more widely known designator to avoid confusion.\nBissell interview {S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 1 {TS Codeword).\n5earet\n1"
  },
  {
   "n": 53,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p53.jpg",
   "text": "40\nSecret 1\\101'0~1\\1\nChapter 2\nJames A. Cunningham, Jr.\nsat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor\nGardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit­\ntle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the !Pro­\nject, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the secuirity\nmatters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting\nAir Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney\nJ57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeop­\nardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to tum ov,er a\nnumber of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-:52s,\nKC- l 35s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was\ngoing to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was\ngreeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because\nthey all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose\nfrom his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the rnee1ting\nadjoumed.\n3\nAfter the meeting. Bissell told Dulles that the CIA would hav,e to\nuse money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project\ngoing. The DC! used this fund to pay for covert activities, following\napproval by the President and the Director of the Budget. Dulles 1told\nBissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the over­\nflight program and to start putting together a staff for Project\nAQUATONE. the project's new codename.\nAt first the new \" Project Staff\" (renamed the Development\nProjects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell. Miller, and the\nsmall existing staff in Bissell's Office of the Special Assistant to the\nDCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the pro­\nject, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955\nthe project staff added an administrative officer, James A.\nCunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the\nDirectorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for\nthe next lO years. Two other key project officials who began their du­\n~ in 1955 wer~\n] the finance officer, and c==i\nL_lthe contracting officer.\"\n' OSA History, chap. 3. p. 2 (TS Codeword): Bissell interview, 8 November 1984 (S);\nBeschloss, Maydt1y. p. 89.\n• OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 6-7. chap. 4, pp. 1-2. chap. 5. pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword);\nChronology of rite Office of Speda/ Activities. 195.J• /968. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). p. 2-4 (TS\nCodeword) (hereafter cited as OSA Chronology)."
  },
  {
   "n": 54,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p54.jpg",
   "text": "41\nGee, ct NOfOftN\nChapter 2\nI\nUS Field Test Base\nCIA\n26\n26\n============\nProject AOUATONE Personnel\nSpecial Assistant to the DCI J\nfor Planning and Coordination\nI\nHeadquarters\nCIA\nUSAF -1]\n25\nI\nI\nI\nForeign Field Base A\nForeign Fielcj Base B\nCIA\n16\nCIA\n16\nUSAF\n34\nUSAF\n34\nContract\n52\nContract\n52\n102\n102\nTotal employees: CIA\nUSAF\nContract\nI\nForeign Field Base C\nCIA\n16\nUSAF\n34\nContract\n52\n102\nDuring the first half of 1955. the project staff grew slowly: many\nof the individuals working on overhead reconnaissance remained on\nthe rolls of other Agency components. To achieve maximum security,\nBissell made the project staff self-sufficient. Project AQUATONE had\nits own contract management, administrative, financial, logistic, com­\nmunications, and security personnel, and, thus, did not need to tum\nto the Agency directorates for assistance. Funding for Proj,ect\nAQUATONE was also kept separate from other Agency components;\nits personnel and operating costs were not paid out of regular Agency\naccounts. As approving officer for the project, Richard Bissell could\nobligate funds in amounts up to $100,000; larger sums requ ired i.he\nDCl's approval.\n1\nAt the end of April 1955, Bisselrs staff developed, and the\nDeputy Director for Support approved, the first table of organization\nfor Proj ect AQUATONE. Once operational. the project would have a\n' OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 5-7 (TS Ccxkword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 55,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p55.jpg",
   "text": ".\n42\nSec.ct NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nThe Matomic Building\ntotal of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test­\ning faci lity. and three foreign field bases. CIA employees represented\nonly one-fourth (92) of .the total. The Air Force personnel commit­\nment was larger, with l09 positions on the 1955 table of organization\n(this total does not include many other Air Force personnel, such as\nSAC meteorologists. who supported the U-2 project in addition to\ntheir other duties). The largest Project AQUATONE category was\ncontract employees, with 156 positions in 1955. This category in­\ncluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per\naircraft), the pilots, and support personnel from other contractors for\nitems such as photographic equipment.\n6\nThe first project headquarters was in CIA's Administration (East)\nBuilding at 2430 E Street, NW. Continued growth caused the\nAQUATONE staff to move several times during its first two years.\nOn l May l955, the project staff moved to the third floor of a small\nred brick building (the Briggs School) at 2210 E Street, NW. Then on\n3 October. the staff moved to Wings A and C of Quarters Eye, a\nWorld War fI \"temporary\" building on Ohio Drive. NW. in the West\nPotomac Park area of Washington. On 25 February l956, the project\nstaff moved again. this time to the fifth floor of the Matomic Building\n• Proj,:ct AQUATONE Table of Organization. 28 April 1955 in OSA History. chap. 3, an­\nneK 15 (TS Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 56,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p56.jpg",
   "text": "43\nat 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years\nuntil it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in\nMarch 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project\nstaff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved\nto the Tyler Building in Tysons Comer, Virginia.\n1\nBissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the\nDDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved\nin the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project.\nCabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly\nin overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the\nU-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the\nU-2 for the DCI.\nFUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR\nPROJECT AOUATONE\nSeth!l NOFORN\nChapter 2\nAlthough Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding\nfor the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be\nsettled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on\nthe U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29\nNovember and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a\nteam of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take\nthem off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why\nto their former supervisors. The engineers immediately began to work\n45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded\nto a total of 81 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65\nhours.\n8\nDDCI Charles Pearre Cabell\nKelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft with­\nout a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this pro­\ngram: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement.\nLockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process,\nhaving previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.\nCovert funding for sensitive projects sirnpli fies both procure­\nment and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to\nthe Federal Government and there is no public accountabi lity for their\n' OSA History. chap. 18. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword); OSA Chronology. pp. 4. 7. 10. 45 (TS\nCodeword).\n• Johnson. '\"Log for Project X ... 29 November-3 December 1954 (U).\n-Sec.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 57,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p57.jpg",
   "text": "44\nSasret NOFORN\nChapter 2\nuse. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,\ndesignates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government\nemployee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch­\ners. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competi­\ntive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about\na given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the\nFederal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed\ncan purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project\nwithout resorting at each step to the mandated procurement proce­\ndures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also\npermits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy\ncorporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destina­\ntion or use of the various purchases.\nIn mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI\nDulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund\nto finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency\nsigned a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project\nOARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed \"performance\nspecifications., rather than the standard Air Force \"technical specifica­\ntions,\" which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed\nthat such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original pro­\nposal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s\nequipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General\nCounsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26\nmillion for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air\nForce was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could\nonly budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance\nof the available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two\nsides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a re­\nview three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were\ngoing to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No.\nSP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery of the\nfirst U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to\nkeep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for\n$1,256,000 I\n~nd mailed it to Kelly Johnson's\nhome on 21 February 1955.9\n• John S. Warner. Oftice of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S): OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex\n42 (TS Codeword): Johnson, \"Log for Project X,\" 21 February 1955 .\n.Searet"
  },
  {
   "n": 58,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p58.jpg",
   "text": "45\n6eeret NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nAs it turned out, no review of the contract was necessary at the\nthree-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time\nbut under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring\nof 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed on a price for the\noriginal 20 aircraft of $17,025,542 plus a profit of $1,952,055 for a\ntotal of $18,977,597-less than $1 million for each aircraft. Because\nits design was based on Lockheed's F-104, the U-2 was relatively in­\nexpensive even though only a small number of aircraft had been or­\ndered. Only the wings and tail were unique; Lockheed manufactured\nthe other portions of the aircraft using the F-104's jigs and dies.\nMAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF THE U-2\nAware of the great need for secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson\nplaced it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank,\nCalifornia, known as the Skunk Works. 10 Lockheed had established\nthis highly secure area in 1945 to develop the nation's first jet aircraft,\nthe P-80 Shooting Star. The small Skunk Works staff began making\nthe _detailed drawings for the U-2, which was nicknamed the \"Angel\"\nbecause it was to fly so high.\nKelly Johnson's approach to prototype development was to have\nhis engineers and draftsmen located not more than 50 feet from the\naircraft assembly line. Difficulties in construction were immediately\nbrought to the attention of the engineers, who gathered the mechanics\naround the drafting tables to discuss ways to overcome the difficul­\nties. As a result, engineers were generally able to fix problems in the\ndesign in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. There was no empha­\nsis placed on producing neatly typed memorandums; engineers sim­\nply made pencil notations on the engineering drawings in order to\nkeep the project moving quickly. 11\nA little more than a week after he had been authorized to begin\nthe project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23-page report detailing his most\nrecent ideas on the U-2 proposal. The aircraft, he explained, would be\ndesigned to meet load factors of only 2.5 g's, which was the limit for\ntransport aircraft rather than combat planes. The U-2 would have a\n'\" The Lockheed '\"Skunk Works\" was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known\nas the .. Skonk Works\" in Al Capp·s comic strip Li'/ Abner.\nBen A. Rich (current head of the \"Skunk Works\"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach\nand Gregory W. Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988.\n6eeret\n11"
  },
  {
   "n": 59,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p59.jpg",
   "text": "46\nSecret NOfi6fltN\nChapter 2\n·\\......,. - ~... :: · ··•:Jt·1\"' .... 1._.,\n~ .\n..\n·• ~i~·;'\";~·- . ·•.\n< >. ~)\\~~,-~,\nspeed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum alti­\ntude would be 70,600 feet and the lllltimate maximum altitude would\nbe 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifica­\ntions, the new plane would take off at 90 knots, land at 76 knots, and\nbe able to glide 244 nautical miles from an altitude of 70,000 feet.\nAfter discussing the reconnaissance bay with James Baker, Johnson\nhad worked out various equipment combinations that would not ex­\nceed the weight limit of 450 pounds. Johnson ended his report by\npromising the first test flight by 2 August l 955 and the completion of\nfour aircraft by I December I955.':\nSkunk Works Design Staff\n\" Kelly Johnson. ·•A High-Altitude: Rcconnai~san(;C: Aircraft,\" 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.\nLockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S).\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 60,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p60.jpg",
   "text": "47\nIn designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with\ntwo major problems-fuel capacity and weight. To achieve interconti­\nnental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply of fuel, yet, it\nalso had to be light enough to attain the ultrahigh altitudes needed to\nbe safe from interception. Although the final product resembled a typ­\nical jet aircraft, its construction was unlike any other US military air­\ncraft. One unusual design feature was the tail assembly, which-to\nsave weight-was attached to the main body with just three tension\nbolts. This feature had been adapted from sailplane designs.\nThe wings were also unique. Unlike conventional aircraft, whose\nmain wing spar passes through the fuselage to give the wings continu­\nity and strength, the U-2 had two separate wing panels, which were\nattached to the fuselage sides with tension bolts (again, just as in sail­\nplanes). Because the wing spar did not pass through the fuselage,\nJohnson was able to locate the camera behind the pilot and ahead of\nthe engine, thereby improving the aircraft's center of gravity and re­\nducing its weight.\nThe wings were the most challenging design feature of the entire\nairp~ane. Their combination of high-aspect ratio and low-_drag ratio\n(in other words, the wings were long, narrow, and thin) made them\nunique in jet aircraft design. The wings were actually integral fuel\ntanks that carried almost all of the U-2's fuel supply.\nThe fragility of the wings and tail section, which were only\nbolted to the fuselage, forced Kelly Johnson to look for a way to pro­\ntect the aircraft from gusts of wind at altitudes below 35,000 feet,\nwhich otherwise might cause the aircraft to disintegrate. Johnson\nagain borrowed from sailplane designs to devise a \"gust control\"\nmechanism that set the ailerons and horizontal stabilizers into a posi­\ntion that kept the aircraft in a slightly nose-up attitude, thereby\navoiding sudden stresses caused by wind gusts. Nevertheless, the U-2\nremained a very fragile aircraft that required great skill and concen­\ntration from its pilots.\nThe final major design feature was the lightweight, bicycle-type\nlanding gear. The entire structure-a single oleostrut with two light­\nweight wheels toward the front of the aircraft and two small,\nsolid-mount wheels under the tail-weighed only 208 pounds yet\ncould withstand the force of touchdown for this 7-ton aircraft. Because\nboth sets of wheels were located underneath the fuselage, the U-2 was\nalso equipped with detachable pogos (long, curved sticks with two\nsmall wheels on them) on each wing to keep the wings level during\ntakeoff. The pilot would drop the pogos immediately after takeoff so\nSecr&t PJOFOFU'd\nChapter 2\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 61,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p61.jpg",
   "text": "48\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 2\nU-2 at testing site before\nattachment of wings and\ntail assembly\nthat they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its\nfront and back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of\nthe wingtips, which were equipped with landing skids.\n1\n)\nTHE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMERA SYSTEM\nBy December 1954, Kelly Johnson was at work on drawings for the\nU-2's airframe and Pratt & Whitn•:!Y was already building the J57 jet\n\" For the design ft:atures of the U-'.! in early 1955. see R. F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:\nReconnaissance Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January 1955.\npp. 7-9. OSA Records. job 74-B-6-l5. box I (S)."
  },
  {
   "n": 62,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p62.jpg",
   "text": "49\nSec. et NOFOAN\nChapter 2\n.. ·­\n. ·.• ,•\n..\n• ~:; ..:. ~ .::,,\n,',t •... . ,\" •.\n.:;~~~~;.\\i ~1i:\nh -;.:\n.. .\n...\n:~·-'~•-·\n. ___.-:.:.~~- ,:..-....\n: .~:~~·~-~~~~:~;\\ ~f~ '•\n.. :-'·· ~::....:,,.;_:,-:/~~ ~-\n:·.'.:~-:---·~,...\nengine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras.\nExisting cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to\nbe used in high-altitude reconnaissance.\nThe workhorses of World W'ilf II aerial photography had been the\nFairchild K-19 and K-21 framing cameras with lenses of varying focal\nlengths from 24 to 40 inches. Late in the war, the trimetrogon K-17\n.mapping-camera system came into use. This system consis~ed of lhree\nseparate cameras which made three photographs simultaneously: a\nvertical, an oblique to the left, and an oblique to the right The major\nshortcomings of the trimetrogon system were the large amount of film\nrequired and the system's lack of sharp definition on the obliques.\nThe standard aerial cameras available in the e'ilfly 1950s c:ould\nachieve resolutions of about 20 to 25 feet (7 to 8 meters) on a side\nwhen used at an altitude of 33,000 feet (10,000 meters), or about 25\nlines per millimeter in current tenns of reference. Such resolution was\nconsidered adequate because aerial photography was then used pri­\nmarily to choose targets for strategic bombing, to assess bomb dam­\nage after air raids, and to make maps and charts. Unfortunately, a\ncamera with a resolution of only 20 to 25 feet at a height of 33,000\nfeet was too crude to be used at twice that altitude. lndeed, for intelli­\ngence purposes a resolution of less than 10 feet was necessary to dis­\ncern smaller targets in greater detail. This meant that any camera\ncarried to altitudes above 68, 000 feet had to be almost four times as\ngood as existing aerial cameras in order to achieve a resolution of less\nthan 10 feet As a result, some scientists doubted that useful photogra­\nphy could be obtained from altitudes higher than 40,000 feet.'\"\n\" Baker imervil!w (S).\nU-2 landing gear and pogos\n.Sea,et­"
  },
  {
   "n": 63,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p63.jpg",
   "text": "~\n50\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 2\n+ ·~;~ ,·\\·~~:f~: .i ~ ~~\\ ~\n;.;.,-::., .\nJames G. Baker\nThe first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in\nthe mid- I940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S.\nPerkin of the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut,\ncollaborated on a design for an ex.perimental camera for the Army Air\nForce. They developed a 48-inch focal-length scanning camera that\nwas mounted in a modified B-36 bomber. When tested over Fort\nWorth, Texas, at 34,000 feet, the new camera produced photographs\nin which two golf balls on a putting green could be distinguished (in\nreality. however, the \"golf balls··· were 3 inches in diameter). These\nphotographs demonstrated the high acuity of Baker's lens, but the\ncamera weighed more than a ton and was much too large to be carried\naloft in an aircraft as small as the U-2.\nRealizing that size and weiglht were the major restraining factors\nin developing a camera for the U--2. James Baker began working on a\nradically new system in October 1954, even before the CIA adopted\nthe Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he\nwould need almost a year to produce a working model of such a com­\nplex camera. Since Kelly Johnson had promised to have a U-2 in the\nair within eight months, Baker needed to find an existing camera that\ncould be used until the new came:ra was ready. After consulting with\nhis friend and colleague Richard Perkin. Baker decided to adapt for\nthe U-2 an Air Force camera krnown as the K-38. a 24-inch aerial\nframing camera built by the Hycon Manufacturing Company of\nPasadena, California.\nPerkin suggested modifying several standard K-38 cameras in\norder to reduce their weight to the U-2's 450-pound payload limit. At\nthe same time, Baker would ma:ke critical adj ustments to existing\nK-38 lenses to improve their acuiity. Baker was able to do this in a\nfew weeks, so several modified K-38s, now known as A-1 cameras,\nwere ready when the first \"Angel\" aircraft took to the air in\nmid-1955.\n15\nCIA awarded Hycon a contract for the modified K-38 cameras,\nand Hycon, in tum. subcontracte:d to Perkin-Elmer to provide new\nlenses and to make other modifications to the cameras in order to\nmake them less bulky. In its tum, Perkin-Elmer subcontracted to\nBaker to rework the existing K-38 lenses and later design an im­\nproved lens system. To keep his liens-designing efforts separate from\n\" Ibid.\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 64,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p64.jpg",
   "text": "51\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 2\nhis research associate duties at Harvard and his service on go,vem­\nment advisory bodies, Baker established a small firm known as Spica,\nIncorporated, on 31 January 1955.\nThe A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 framing\ncameras. One was mounted vertically and photographed a 17.2° swath\nbeneath the aircraft onto a roll of 9.5-inch film. The second K-38 was\nplaced in a rocking mount so that it alternately photographed the left\noblique and right oblique out to 36.5° onto separate rolls of 9.5-inch\nfilm. The film supplies unwound in opposite directions in ordler to\nminimize their effect on the balance of the aircraft. Both cameras\nused standard Air Force 24-inch focal-length lenses adjusted for max­\nimum acuity by Baker. The development of the special rocking mount\nby Perkin-Elmer's Dr. Roderic M. Scott was a major factor in neduc­\ning the size and weight of the A- I system, because the mount pro­\nvided broad transverse coverage with a single lens, ending the need\nfor two separate cameras.\n16\n•• OSA History. chap. I. annt!x 3, pp. 1-3 (TS Co1kword).\nA-1 camera\nSeGF&t"
  },
  {
   "n": 65,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p65.jpg",
   "text": "52\nSettet N0FORl)I\nChapter 2\nA-2 camera\nU-2s equipped with the A- I camera system also carried a\nPerkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch film and a 3-inch lens.\nThis device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs of the\nterrain passing beneath the aircraft. Because the A- I system was: new,\nit also included a backup camera system. a K-17 6-inch three-camera\ntrimetrogon unit using 9-inch film.\nWhile the A-1 system was still being developed, James )Baker\nwas already working on the next generation of lenses for high-alrtitude\nreconnaissance. Baker was a pioneer in using computers to synthesize\noptical systems. His software algorithms made it possible to model\nlens designs and determine in advance the effects that variatio,ns in\nlens curvatures. glass compounds. and lens spacings would have on\nrays of light passing through a lens. These .. ray-tracing\" programs re­\nquired extensive computations, and, for this he turned to the most\nmodem computer available, an IBM CPC (card-programmed callcula­\ntor) installation at nearby Boston University.\n17\n\" Ibid.. chap. I. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword).\n-Seeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 66,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p66.jpg",
   "text": "53\nBaker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the\nA-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of prob­\nlems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of\nthree separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines.\nOne K-38 filmed the right oblique, another the vertical, and a third\nthe left oblique. The A-2 system also included a 3-inch tracking\ncamera. All A-2 cameras were equipped with the new 24-inch f/8.0\nBaker-designed lenses. These were the first relatively large photo­\ngraphic objective lenses to employ several aspheric surfaces. James\nBaker personally ground these surfaces and made the final bench tests\non each lens before releasing it to the Agency. These lenses were able\nto resolve 60 lines per millimeter, a 240-percent improvement over\nexisting lenses. 18\nOnce Baker and Scott had redesigned the 24-inch lens for the\nK-38 devices, they turned their attention to Baker's new camera de­\nsign, known as the B model. It was a totally new concept, a high-reso­\nlution panoramic-type framing camera with a much longer 36-inch\nf/10.0 aspheric lens. The B camera was a very complex device that\n- used a single lens to obtain photography from one horizon to the\nother, thereby reducing weight by having two fewer lenses and shutter\nassemblies than the standard trimetrogon configuration. Because its\nlens was longer than those used in the A cameras. the B camera\nachieved even higher resolution-100 lines per millimeter.\nThe B camera used an 18- by 18-inch format, which was\nachieved by focusing the image onto two counterrotating but overlap­\nping 9. 5-inch wide strips of film. Baker designed this camera so that\none film supply was located forward, the other aft. Thus, as the film\nsupplies unwound, they counterbalanced each other and did not dis­\nturb the aircraft's center of gravity.\nThe B camera had two modes of operation. In mode I, the\ncamera used a single lens to make seven unique exposures from 73.5°\non the far right and far left obliques to vertical photos beneath the air­\ncraft, effectively covering from horizon to horizon. Mode II narrowed\nthe lateral coverage to 21 S on either side of vertical. This increased\nthe available number of exposures and almost doubled the camera's\n\" \"Basic Configuration and Camera Data:· 24 January 1956. OSA Records (TS\nCodeword); OSA History, chap. 5. annex 44 (TS Codeword).\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 2\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 67,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p67.jpg",
   "text": "54\n&ee1 et NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nB camera .\noperating time. Three of the seven B-camera frames provided stereo\ncoverage. The complex B cameras were engineered by Hycon's chief\ndesigner, William McFadden.'\"\nJames Baker's idea for the ultimate high-altitude camera wa:s the\nC model that would have a 240-inch focal length. In December 1954,\nhe made preliminary designs for folding the optical path using three\nmirrors, a prism, and an f/20.0 lens system. Before working ouIt the\ndetails of this design, however, Baker flew to California in early\nJanuary 1955 to consult with Kelly Johnson about the weight and\nspace limitations of the U-2·s payload compartment. Despite eve~y ef­\nfort to reduce the physical dimensions of the C camera, Baker ne,eded\nan additional six inches of payload space to accommodate the bigger\nlens. When he broached this subject to Johnson, the latter replied,\n\" Six more inches? I'd sell my grandmother for six more inches!I\" ~\n•·• Ibid.: Bakl!r interview (S),\n'' Bakc:r intl!rvkw (S)."
  },
  {
   "n": 68,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p68.jpg",
   "text": "55\nRealizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too\nheavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch\nf/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, re­\nsulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight\nand space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the\nmirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica mate­\nrial developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced\nthe weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a\n180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the\npast, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have\ntaken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer\nprogram, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.\nWhen a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January\nl 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length,\nwhich was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the\ncamera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty\nin aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engi­\nneers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years\nlater, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile\nCrisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.\nThe failure of the C camera design was not a serious setback to\nthe high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera\nproved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-trans­\nport system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of\nhigh-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is\nstill in use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after\nSeptember 1958.\nDuring the period when he was designing lenses for the CIA's\noverhead reconnaissance program, James Baker was also working on\nclassified lens designs for the Air Force and unclassified designs for\nthe Smithsonian Institution. To protect the security of Baker's work\nfor the Agency, Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff told\nBaker to work on lenses for the U-2 in the open and not make any\neffort to classify the documents connected with the project. Miller be­\nlieved that by not calling attention to the effort through the use of spe­\ncial security measures, the project could be completed faster and still\nnot be compromised. This \"hiding in the open\" strategy proved very\nsuccessful?\n\" Ibid.\n6ee1 et NOFOfitM\nChapter 2\n$ee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 69,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p69.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et NOFORN\nChapter 2\n56\nIn addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other im­\nportant item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James\nBaker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, the optical peri­\nscope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the aircraft and also\nproved to be a valuable navigational aid. 22\nPREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2\nAs work progressed in California on the airframe, in Connecticut on\nthe engines, and in Boston on the camera system, the top officials of\nthe Development Projects Staff flew to California and Nevada to\nsearch for a site where the aircraft could be tested safely and secretly.\nOn 12 April 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland (the se­\nnior Air Force officer on the project staff) flew over Nevada with\nKelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's\nchief test pilot, Tony Le Vier. They spotted what appeared to be an air­\nstrip by a salt flat known as Groom Lake, near the northeast corner of\nthe Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground.\nAfter debating about landing on the old airstrip, LeVier set the plane\ndown on the lakebed, and all four walked over to examine the strip.\nThe facility had been used during World War II as an aerial gunnery\nrange for Army Air Corps pilots. From the air the strip appeared to be\npaved, but on closer inspection it turned out to have originally been\nfashioned from compacted earth that had turned into ankle-deep dust\nafter more than a decade of disuse. If LeVier had attempted to land on\nthe airstrip, the plane would probably have nosed over when the\nwheels sank into the loose soil, killing or injuring all of the key fig­\nures in the U-2 project.23\nBissell and his colleagues all agreed that Groom Lake would\nmake an ideal site for testing the U-2 and training its pilots. Upon re­\nturning to Washington, Bissell discovered that Groom Lake was not\npart of the AEC proving ground. After consulting with Dulles, Bissell\nand Miller asked the Atomic Energy Commission to add the Groom\nLake area to its real estate holdings in Nevada. AEC Chairman Adm.\nLewis Strauss readily agreed, and President Eisenhower also ap­\nproved the addition of this strip of wasteland, known by its map des­\nignation as Area 51, to the Nevada Test Site. The outlines of Area 51\n\" Information supplied by James Baker to Donald E. Welzenbach, 12 May 1986 (U).\n'·' OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.\nSea,at"
  },
  {
   "n": 70,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p70.jpg",
   "text": "57\n~Mt N6f0Ri\\J\nChapter 2\nare shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area\nadjoining the northeast comer of the much larger Nevada Test Site. To\nmake the new facility in the middle of nowhere sound more attractive\nto his workers. Kelly Johnson called it the Paradise Ranch, which was\nsoon shortened to the Ranch.!•\nAlthough the dry lakebed could have served as a landing strip.\nproject managers decided that a paved runway was needed so that\ntesting could also take place during the times when rainwater runoff\nfrom nearby mountains filled the lake (at such times the base acquired\nyet another unofficial name, Watertown Strip). By July 1955 the base\nwas ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began\nmoving in.\nArea 51, the Ranch\n'' OSA History, chap. 8. pp. 2-6 (TS Co,kword): John:;on, \"Log for Project x:· ::?5-29\nApril I 955: Clarence L. \"Kelly\" Johnson with Maggi<! Smith. Kelly: More Thun My\nShare of Ir All (Washington. DC: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1985). p. 123.\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 71,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p71.jpg",
   "text": ".. . .. ·. .\n.•.\n....... ....\n·: - .\n-- -·-\nNorth\nPacific\nOcean\nArea 51\nOregon\nCalifornia _\n\"\"o~\n0\n20-\n&f-_...._,........-\n-:i-1o Mileo\nAEC/Vevada\nNevada\nEdwards AFB\n.+\n·1.osAllgeles\n•\nArea 51\n- ~\n_,,.,...\n......\nSprings\n.\nSpriaga\nLasVega\nArizo11a\n0\n50\n,oo-..\n1--......-.-~-\"'\"J,ooMilet\nQ\n50\nSecro~ NOFORl<I\n•·.\n·. ' .• ...\n··· . •,.\n.·.··\n• ·.."
  },
  {
   "n": 72,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p72.jpg",
   "text": "59\nSec,et NOFORN\nChapter 2\nSECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT\nOn 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air\nForce and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2)\nin which the services agreed that the CIA \"assumed primary respon­\nsibility for all security\" for the overhead reconnaissance project\n(AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for\nthe security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a\nheavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to\nkeep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central\nIntelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine\nwhich contractor employees require security clearances and has had\nto devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing fa­\ncilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has\nbeen a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25\nThe most important aspect of the security program for the U-2\nproject was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for\nthe product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the\nU-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of\n_CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.\nThe terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also\nplayed a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnais­\nsance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the\nAgency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as \"articles,\" with\neach aircraft having its own \"article number.\" Similarly, the pilots\nwere always called \"drivers.\" In cable traffic the aircraft were known\nas KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise air­\ncraft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article num­\nbers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as\nKWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot).\nThus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell\ninto unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords\nor at worst to \"articles\" and \"drivers,\" giving no indication of the\nnature of the program. -'6\nEven the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement\nof CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altime­\nters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the\n\" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).\n,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 73,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p73.jpg",
   "text": "Sec,st NOFORN\nChapter 2\n60\ndevices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised\neyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000\nfeet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi­\ncials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on\nexperimental rocket planes. 27\nTHE CIA ­ AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP\nAt the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in\nDecember 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation\nof responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed\nonly that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency\nwould pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still\nunsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an\ninteragency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for\nthe program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this\nsubject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan\nTwining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.\nCurtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were\nready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF\ntalks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that\nSAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.\nEventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. \"I want this\nwhole thing to be a civilian operation,\" the President wrote. \"If uni­\nformed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over\nRussia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it.\" 28\nWith the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen­\ncies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles\nand Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic\nagreement, titled \"Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities­\nProject OILSTONE\" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codename for the\nproject). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection\nand training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational\nsupport. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract­\ning, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also\nhad a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the\nn Ibid.\n,. OSA History. chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.\nieare:&"
  },
  {
   "n": 74,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p74.jpg",
   "text": "61\nproject-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex­\nclusive province of Lockheed.~\n9\nAs a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the\nprogram, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As\nRichard Bissell later remarked about the U-2 project, \"The Air Force\nwasn't just in on this as a supporting element, and to a major degree it\nwasn't in on it just supplying about half the government personnel;\nbut the Air Force held, if you want to be precise, 49 percent of the\ncommon stock.\"\n30\nOne of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE\nwas Col. Osmund J. Rieland. He began coordinating Air Force a:ctivi­\nties in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27\nJune 1955, Rieland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief\nof Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4\nAugust, the day after the signing of the CIA- Air Force agreement. ln\nMarch 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was fol­\nlowed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.\n. . . -\nAnother Air Force officer. Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary. joined the: pro­\ngram in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966. l1onger\nthan any of the other project managers. Using the Air !Force\nInspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Otificer,\nAFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense\nDepartment support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His 11 years\nwith the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of\nAir Force continuity.J•\nTECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO\nHIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT\nTo get the U-2 aircraft ready to Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve\nproblems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the\nneed for a fuel that would not boil off and evaporate at the very high\naltitudes for which the aircraft was designed. Gen. James H. Doolittle\nSee, el N61-0ftN\nChapter 2\nOsmund J. Rieland\n,. OSA History. chap. 3. p. 15 and annex 14 (TS Codeword).\n•• Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquaners. 12 October 1965 (TS Codc::word).\n\" Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary (USAF-Ret.). interview by Donald E. Wc:lzc:nbach. tape re­\ncording, 3 April 1986 (S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 3 (TS Codtword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 75,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p75.jpg",
   "text": "62\nSee, el N61'0Rl\\1\nChapter 2\nLeo P. Geary\n(USAF. Ret.), a vice president of the Shell Oil Company who had\nlong been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a\nmember of the Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell\nto develop a special low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel\nfor the craft. The result was a dense mixture, known as LF-1 A, JP-TS\n(thermally stable), or JP-7, with a boiling point of 300°F at sea level.\nManufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts that\nShell normally used to make its \"Flit\" fly and bug spray. In order to\nproduce several hundred thousand gallons of LF-1 A for the U-2 pro­\nject in the spring and summer of 1955. Shell had to limit the produc­\ntion of Flit. causing a nationwide slhortage. Because of the new fuel's\ndensity, it required special tanks .:11nd modifications to the aircraft's\nfuel-control and ignition systems.)~\nEven more important than the problem of boiling fuel was the\nproblem of boiling blood, namely the pilot's. At altitudes above\n65,000 feet, fluids in the human body will vaporize unless the body\ncan be kept under pressure. Furthermore, the reduced atmospheric\npressure placed considerable stress on the pilot's cardiovascular sys­\ntem and did not provide adequate oxygenation of the blood. Keeping\nthe pilot alive at the extreme altitudes required for overflights there­\nfore called for a totally different approach to environmental equip­\nment; it required a system that coul,d maintain pressure over much of\nthe pilot's body. The technology tha,t enabled U-2 pilots to operate for\nextended periods in reduced atmospheric pressure would later play a\nmajor role in the manned space program.\nAdvising the Agency on high-•altitude survival were two highly\nexperienced Air Force doctors, Col. Donald D. Flickinger and Col. W.\nRandolph Lovelace, 11. Dr. Lovelace had begun his research on\nhigh-altitude flight before World War II and was a coinventor of the\nstandard Air Force oxygen maslk. In the early 1950s, he and\nFlickinger made daring parachute jiumps from B-47 bombers to test\npilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. Flickinger served as the\nmedical adviser to Project AQUATONE for almost a decade.H\nFlickinger and Lovelace suggested that the Agency ask the\nDavid Clark Company of Worcester, Massachusetts, manufacturer of\nenvironmental suits for Air Force pilots. to submit designs for more\n\" Land interview (TS Codeword): Bissell inte,rview (S): James A. Cunningham. Jr.. inter­\nview by Donald E. Welzenbach. Washington. DC. tape recording. 4 October 1983 (TS\nCodeword).\n'·' OSA History. chap. 10. pp. 29-34 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 76,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p76.jpg",
   "text": "63\nSacFat NQFOAN\nChapter 2\nMC-2 partial-pressure suit (seen\non pilot Francis Gary Powers)\nadvanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Rus•!ckas\nthen developed a complex life-support system, which was the first\npartially pressurized \"spacesuit\" for keeping humans alive for\nlengthy periods at ultrahigh altitudes. The effort to provide a safe en­\nvironment for pilots at high altitudes also involved the Fi1rewel\nCompany of Buffalo, New York, which pressurized the U-2 cockpit to\ncreate an interior environment equivalent to the air pressure at an alti­\ntude of 28,000 feet. The system was designed so that, if the interior\ncockpit pressure fell below the 28,000-feet level, the pilot's suit\nwould automatically inflate. In either case, he could obtain oxygen\nonly through his helmet.·~\n\"' Ibid .. chap. 5. p. 19 (TS Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 77,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p77.jpg",
   "text": "64\n6eeret NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nThe early models of these MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits\nwere very uncomfortable for the pilots. To prevent loss of pressure,\nthe heavy coverall had to fit tightly at the wrists and ankles (in the\nearly models of these suits, the feet were not included in the pressur­\nization scheme). The pilot had to wear gloves and a heavy helmet that\ntended to chafe his neck and shoulders and was prone to fogging.\nProblems with the pilot life-support system were believed to have\nbeen the cause of several early crashes of the U-2.\nHaving gotten a pilot into this bulky suit and shoehorned him\ninto his seat in the cockpit, the next problem was how to get him out\nin an emergency. The U-2 cockpit was very small, and the early mod­\nels did not have an ejection seat. Even after an ejection seat was in­\nstalled, pilots were reluctant to use it because they were afraid they\nwould lose their legs below the knees when they were blown out of\nthe cockpit. To save weight, the first pilot's seat was extremely simple\nwith no height adjustment mechanism. Designed for pilots of\nabove-average height, the seat could be adjusted for shorter pilots by\ninserting wooden blocks beneath the seat to raise it. In later versions\nof the aircraft, Kelly Johnson added a fully adjustable seat. 35\nThe Air Force undertook bailout experiments at high altitudes\nfrom balloons in the autumn of 1955 to determine if the suit designed\nfor the U-2 pilot would also protect him during his parachute descent\nonce he was separated from the life-support mechanisms inside the\naircraft. To avoid getting the \"bends\" during such descents or during\nthe long flights, pilots had to don their pressure suits and begin\nbreathing oxygen at least 90 minutes before takeoff so that their bod­\nies would have time to dissipate nitrogen. This procedure was known\nas prebreathing. Once the pilots were in their suits, eating and drink­\ning became a major problem, as did urination. The first model of the\npressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for uri­\nnation. A subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized be­\nfore donning his flying suit. This method of permitting urination\nduring flight proved very uncomfortable and, by the autumn of 1955,\nwas replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made the\ncatheter unnecessary. To reduce elimination, pilots ate a low-bulk,\nhigh-protein diet on the day before and the morning of each mission.\n\" Lecture by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Halloran (former Air Force U-2 pilot) at the National\nAir & Space Museum, 24 April 1986 (U).\niearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 78,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p78.jpg",
   "text": "65\n&ee, et Pd6p;Ofllrd\nChapter 2\nTo prevent pilots from becoming dessicated during the long\nmissions-a condition aggravated by their having to breathe pure\noxygen-provision was made for them to drink sweetened water. This\nwas accomplished by providing a small self-sealing hole in the face\nmask through which the pilot could push a strawlike tube attached to\nthe water supply. Project personnel also pioneered in the development\nof ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers. These were primarily\nbacon- or cheese-flavored mixtures that the pilot could squeeze into\nhis mouth using the self-sealing hole in the face mask. Despite all\nthese precautions. U-2 pilots normally lost 3 to 6 pounds of body\nweight during an eight-hour mission:\"'\nFood and water were not the only items provided to pilots on\noverflight missions: they also received a suicide pill. During the early\nl950s, tales of Soviet secret police torture of captured foreign agents\nPilot undergoing prebreathing\n•• lnforma1ion supplied by fames Cunningham and former U-2 pilots Carmine Vi10.\nHervey Stockman. Jacob Krall. and Gkndon Dunaway 10 Donald E. Wel1.cnbach. May\n1986.\n•\nSeccet"
  },
  {
   "n": 79,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p79.jpg",
   "text": "Se1.ret NOfiORN\nChapter 2\n66\nled Bissell and Cunningham to approach Dr. Alex Batlin of Technical\nServices Division in the Directorate ,of Plans )\n1 for ideas to help \"cap­\ntured\" U-2 pilots avoid such suffering. Battin suggested the method\nused by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule\ncontaining liquid potassium cyanide. He said a pilot had only to put\nthe ampule in his mouth and bite down on the glass; death would fol­\nlow in 10 to 15 seconds. Project AQUATONE ordered six of the poi­\nson ampules, called L-pills, and offered one to each pilot just before a\nmission. It was up to each pilot to decide if he wanted to take an\n33\nL-pill with him. Some did; most did not.\nDELIVERY OF THE FIRST U-2\nOn 25 July. less than eight months after the go-ahead call from Trevor\nGardner, Kelly Johnson was ready to ,deliver the first aircraft, known as\narticle 341, to the \" Paradise Ranch\" site. With its long, slender wings\nand tail assembly removed, the airc:raft was wrapped in tarpaulins,\nloaded aboard a C-124, and flown to Groom Lake, where Lockheed me­\nchanics spent the next six days readyi.ng the craft for its maiden flight.\nBefore \"Kelly's Angel\" could actually take to the air, however,\nit needed an Air Force designator. Col. Allman T. Culbertson from the\nAir Force·s Office of the Director of Research and Development\npointed this out to Lieutenant Colonel Geary in July 1955, and the\ntwo officers then looked through the aircraft designator handbook to\nsee what the options were. They decided that they could not call the\nproject aircraft a bomber, fighter, or transport plane, and they did not\nwant anyone to know that the new plane was for reconnaissance, so\nGeary and Culbertson decided that it should come under the utility\naircraft category. At the time, there were only two utility aircraft on\nthe books, a U- l and a U-3. Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed\nCL-282 was going to be known officially as the U-2.\n39\n\" At the time this Direc1ora1e was known as th,e Deputy Directorate/Plans. with the slash\ninterpreted to mean eith.:r \"for\" or \"of.\"· Terminology for the major subdivisions of the\nCIA and their directors ha.~ varied over the pa.~t four decades. For the sake of consistency.\nall titles of Directorates and Deputy Directors h,1vc bc:c:n placed in the current Agency for­\nmat: the organization is known a., the \"Directorate of x·· and the head is known as the\n··Deputy Director for x:·\n\" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Wdzenbach: Sayre Stevens.\nMemorandum for the Record. ·•Discussion with Dr. Alex Batlin Re Project MKNAOMI.\"'\nJuly 1975 (S).\n•• Geary intervic:w (S).\n$1)Qf8t"
  },
  {
   "n": 80,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p80.jpg",
   "text": "67\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 2\nArrival of U-2 prororype ar Area 51\n(left); Article 341, the U-2\nprototype (below}\n;. ;:;-~\n;t~\n~~.\n...~.,,\n•i~;:t~\nJohnson had designed the U-2 to use the Pratt & Whitney\n(P&W) J57/P-3 I engine. which developed 13,000 pounds of thrust\nand weighed 3.820 pounds. giving it a power-to-weight ratio of 3.4: 1.\nWhen the U-2 first took to the air. however, these engines were not\navailable because the entire production was needed to power spedally\nconfigured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first U-2s there­\nfore used P&W 157/P-37 engines, which were 276 pounds heavier\nand delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 81,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p81.jpg",
   "text": "Sec,el NOFOPIN\nChapter 2\n68\npower-to-weight ratio of 2.7: I was almost 20 percent less efficient\nthan the preferred P-31 version:\"\nTo conduct lengthy missions over hostile territory, the U-2\nneeded to carry a large amount of fuel. Kelly Johnson used a\n'·wet-wing\" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was not stored\nin separate fuel tanks but rather in the wing itself. Each wing was di­\nvided into two leak-proof compartments, and fuel was pumped into\nall the cavities within these areas; only the outer 6 feet of the wings\nwere not used for fuel storage. The U-2 also had a I 00-gallon reserve\ntank in its nose. Later, in 1957, Johnson increased the fuel capacity of\nthe U-2 by adding 100-gallon \"slipper\" tanks under each wing, pro­\njecting slightly ahead of the leading edge.\nOne of the most important considerations in the U-2's fuel sys­\ntem was the need to maintain aircraft trim as the fuel was consumed.\nThe aircraft therefore contained a complex system of feed lines and\nvalves draining to a central sump, which made it impossible to pro­\nvide the pilot with an empty/full type of fuel gauge. None of the first\n50 U-2s had normal fuel gauges. Instead there were mechanical fuel\ntotalizer/counters. Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set\nthe counters to indicate the total amount of fuel in the wings, and then\na flow meter subtracted the gallons of fuel actually consumed during\nthe flight. The pilot kept a log of the fuel consumption shown by the\ncounters and compared it with estimates made by mission planners\nfor each leg of the flight. As a double check. U-2 pilots also kept\ntrack of their fuel consumption by monitoring airspeed and time in\nthe air. Most pilots became quite expert at this. Several who did not\ncame up short of their home base during the 20 years these planes\nwere flown:'\nINITIAL TESTING OF THE U-2\nPreliminary taxi trials began on 27 July 1955, when the first run down\nthe newly completed runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's\nchief test pilot, Tony Le Vier, was at the controls. A second taxi trial\n\"' OSA Hiswry. chap. 8. p. 13 (TS Codeword).\n\" Information supplied by Norman Nelson. former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works.\n10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller, ltickheed U-2. pp. 77, 96.\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 82,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p82.jpg",
   "text": "69\nfollowed on I August. LeVier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try\nthe ailerons. ·'It was at this point that I became aware of being air­\nborne.'' LeYier noted afterward. \"which left me with utter amaze­\nment, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately\nstarted back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my\nheight because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or\nheight. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately\nl 0 degrees.\" The U-2 bounced back into the air, but Le Vier was able\nto bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes\nwith little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before\n.\n,,\ncoming to a stop. -\nBissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and\nbounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared off toward the plane. They\nsignaled to Le Vier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put\nout a fire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeYier\ncomplained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence\nof markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very\nminor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and dam­\naged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste of the airwor­\nthiness of the U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's\nwheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in\nground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great dis­\ntances.\nTaxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the\nfirst planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the con­\ntrols and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by\nmaking initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and let­\nting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed\nwith this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to\ntouch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to\n8,000 feet, Le Vier leveled off and began cycling the landing gear up\nand down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control\nsystems. Finally. LeYier made his first landing approach. As the U-2\nsettled down. the forward landing gear touched the runway and the\nplane skipped and bounced into the air. LeVier made a second attempt\nto land front wheels first. and again the plane bounded into the air.\n'' Transcripts of th.: test pilors· and obs.:rv.:rs· comments on the initial U-2 tt:st flights\nhave been published in ··secret First Flight of Artide 0OI ... Spyplanes vol. 2. 1988. pp.\n64• 7 I. 82-85.\nSect et NOFORN\nChapter 2\nSesret"
  },
  {
   "n": 83,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p83.jpg",
   "text": "70\nSec,et NOfO\"N\nChapter 2\nFirst flight of the U-2,\n4 August 1955\nWith Kelly Johnson watching from a chase plane and giving a con­\nstant stream of instructions, LeYie:r made three more unsuccessful\nlanding attempts. With the light fading and a thunderstorm fast ap­\nproaching from the mountains to the west, LeVier made one last ap­\nproach using the method he had advocated: letting the aircraft touch\non its rear wheel first. This time the U-2 made a near-perfect landing,\nwhich came just in the nick of tim<!. Ten minutes later, the thunder­\nstorm began dumping an unheard-of 2 inches of rain, flooding the dry\nlakebed and making the airstrip unusable:\n1\nNow that the first problems in flying and landing the U-2 had\nbeen worked out, Kelly Johnson scheduled the \"official\" first flight\nfor 8 August 1955. This time outsiders were present. including\nRichard Bissell. Col. Osmond Ritla1nd, Richard Homer. and Garrison\nNorton. The U-2 flew to 32,000 feet and performed very well. Kelly\nJohnson had met his eight-month deadline.\"\n•• Ibid .. pp. 21 -22: Johnson, .. Log for Project X.\" 4 August 1955.\n.. Johnson. \" Log for Project X,\" 8 August 1955.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 84,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p84.jpg",
   "text": "71\nLe Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov­\ning on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.\nThis first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took\nthe aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its\nspeed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed\nof Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti­\ntudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier\ntook the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the\n42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit\ntraining program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even\nhigher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its\ninitial design altitude of 65,600 feet. 05\nOn 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at\n64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/\nP-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft\ndescended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers\nfrom Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The\nP-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris­\n_ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore\ntended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually\nbecame apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from\n57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the \"bad­\nlands\" or the \"chimney.\" F\\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until\nsufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became avail­\nable in the spring of 1956:0\nMeanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,\nLockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of\neven the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem.\nPratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the\nnext year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters\nand KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in\nthe Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion\nof a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's\nKC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the\nU-2s. 47\n\" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.\n\"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).\n\" Geary interview (S ).\nSectel NOFORP•\nChapter 2\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 85,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p85.jpg",
   "text": "Secret ~Q~OR~I\nChapter 2\n72\nAs the deliveries of U-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a\nmajor logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees\nfrom Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal of curiosity.\nThe project staff decided that the simplest approach would be to fly\nthe essential personnel to the site on Monday morning and return\nthem to Burbank on Friday evening. Frequent flights were also neces­\nsary to bring in supplies and visitors from contractors and headquar­\nters. Therefore, a regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service\n(MATS) flight using a USAF C-54 aircraft began on 3 October 1955.\nJames Cunningham promptly dubbed this activity ·•Bissell's\nNarrow-Gauge Airline.\" Less than seven weeks after it started, a\nMATS aircraft bound for Area SI crashed on 17 November. killing all\n14 persons aboard the plane, including the Project Security Officer,\nCIA's William H. Marr, four members of his staff, and personnel from\nLockheed and Hycon. This crash represented the greatest single loss\nof life in the entire U-2 program:\"\nU-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK\nHigh-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side\neffect-a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flying objects\n(UFOs). In the mid- l 950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes\nbetween 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s\nand B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently,\nonce U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic con­\ntrollers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.\nSuch reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours\nfrom pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun\ndropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the\nplane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the\nairliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of 60,000 feet\nwas considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver\nwings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the\nairliner pilot, 40,000 feet below. to be fiery objects. Even during day­\nlight hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the\nsun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower alti­\ntudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned\nflight was possible above 60,000 feet, so no one expected to see an\nobject so high in the sky.\n\" OSA Hisrory. chap. 7. pp. 17-19 (TS Co<lcwor<l).\n.Saeret­"
  },
  {
   "n": 86,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p86.jpg",
   "text": "73\n1\nSeeret PJOFORN\nChapter 2\nNot only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic\ncontrollers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to\nthe Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton\ncharged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the\nAir Force's Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the\noperation collected all reports of UFO sightings. Air Force investiga­\ntors then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natu­\nral phenomena. BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the\nAgency's Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sight­\nings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to elimi­\nnate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal\nto the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later\nOXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports\nduring the late 1950s and most of the I960s!\"\nHIRING U-2 PILOTS\nIn authorizing the U-2 project, President Eisenhower told DC! Dulles\nthat he wanted the pilots of these planes to be non-US citizens. It was\nhis belief that, should a U-2 come down in hostile territory. it would\nbe much easier for the United States to deny any responsibility for the\nactivity if the pilot was not an American.\nThe initial effort to find U-2 pilots was assigned to the\nDirectorate of Plans Air/Maritime Division (AMO). The DDP had ex-\nAMO op­\n~e_ra_t~iv-e~---------------~-a~sk~e-d~th,---,at discreet\n~~-~---~---,--------r=._\n_J\ninquiries be made to see if an\nfliers were interested in a\nhigh-paying covert project ~---~\nbrought to the United States---.t_o_r...,.tr_a_t_m_n_g_.~r,.;~i-e-an-w~h~1,~e-,~A~N~l~D~h-,r~e~a~a-n­\nlflier residing in England, and he also came to the\nUnited States for training.\nIn theory the use of foreign pilots seemed quite logical: in prac­\ntice it did not work out. Th ~------~---~~~and\ncould only tly light aircraft. Language was also a barrier for the\nalthough several were good fliers. Because Lieutenant\n~C_o_l_o_n_e_l Geary \\ad taken a class~ ofl\n~hrough tlyincr\nschool at Randolph AFB in 1950, he got the job of training the=\n\" Information suppli.:d by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzcnbach (U)."
  },
  {
   "n": 87,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p87.jpg",
   "text": "Seeret NOFORN\nChapter 2\n74\nrecruits in mid-1955. Geary arranged for an Air Force officer of\nI\nJto stay with the group during a preliminary training\nprogram at Lu e Air Force~e plan to use foreign pilots soon\nran into trouble when onlyl__________,pilots passed the\nschool and reported to Area 5 1. They made only a few flights in the\nU-2, and by the autumn of 1955 they were out of the program.\n51\n'\nEven before the elimination of the I\nlit was clear that there\nwould not be enough trained foreigrn pilots available in time for de­\nployment. Bissell therefore had to start the search for U-2 pilots all\nover again. Lt. Gen. Emmett (Rosy) O' Donnell, the Air Force's\nDeputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, authorized the use of Air Force\npi lots and provided considerable assistance in the search for pilots\nwho met the high standards established by the Agency and the Air\nForce. The search included only SAC fighter pilots who held reserve\ncommissions. The use of regular Air Force pilots was not considered\nbecause of the complexities involved in having them resign from the\nAir Force, a procedure that was necessary in order to hire them as ci­\nvilians for the AQUATONE project.\nSAC pilots interested in the U-2 project had to be willing to re- ·\nsign from the Air Force and assume civilian status-a process known\nas sheep-dipping-in order to conduct the overflights. Although Air\nForce pilots were attracted by the challenge of flying U-2s over hos­\ntile territory, they were reluctant to leave the service and give up their\nseniority. To overcome pilots' reluctance, the Agency offered hand­\nsome salaries, and the Air Force promised each pilot that, upon satis­\nfactory conclusion of his employment with the Agency. he could\nreturn to his unit. In the meantime, he would be considered for pro­\nmotion along with his contemporari,es who had continued their Air\nForce careers.~'\nThe selection process for Agenc:y U-2 pilots was very rigorous.\nBecause of the strain involved in flying at extreme altitudes for long\nperiods of time, painstaking efforts were made to exclude all pilots\nwho might be nervous or unstable in any way. The physical and psy­\n. chological screening of potential U--2 pilots was conducted by the\nLovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research in\nAlbuquerque, New Mexico, under a contract signed with the CIA on\n'' OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 1-10 (TS Codeword): Geary interview (S).\n'' OS..\\ History. chap. 10. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword); Geary interview (S); Francis Gary\nPowers with Curt Gentry. Openuion Overflight (New York: Holt. Rinehart. and Wilson.\n1970). pp. 25-27."
  },
  {
   "n": 88,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p88.jpg",
   "text": "75\n~eeret NOFOAPJ\nChapter 2\n28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical\nand mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select\npilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates.\nThe Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned\noverflight program and resulted in a much lower accident rate for\nCIA U-2 pilots than for their counterparts in the Air Force program. 51\nPILOT TRAINING\nEven before the recruiting effort got under way, the Air Force and\nCIA began to develop a pilot training program. Under the terms of the\nOILSTONE agreement between the Agency and the Air Force, re­\nsponsibility for pilot training lay with SAC. This essential activity\nwas carried out under the supervision of Col. William F. Yancey. who\nwas assigned to March AFB and flew to nearby Area 51 each day.\nColonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be\ntrained by Lockheed test pilots to fly the U-2. Once they became\nqualified, these SAC pilots would become the trainers for the\n··_sheep-dipped\" former Reserve SAC pilots. who would fly U-2 mis­\nsions for the CIA.\n•\nThe original U-2 test pilot. Tony LeVier, trained several other\nLockheed test pilots in the difficult art of flying the U-2. Eventually\nthere were enough trained Lockheed pilots available to test the air­\ncraft coming off the assembly line and also train the SAC pilots.\nTraining was difficult because there was no two-seat model of the\nU-2. All instruction had to be given on the ground before takeoff and\nthen over the radio once the craft was airborne. Almost 15 years\nelapsed before a two-seat U-2 was available for training new pilots.\nDespite the difficulties involved in training U-2 pilots. Colonel\nYancey had a cadre of six qualified Air Force U-2 pilots by\nSeptember 1955. These six were now ready to train the Agency's pi­\nlots. 51\nTraining pilots was not easy because the U-2 was a mixture of\nglider and jet. Although those chosen for the overflight program were\nall qualified fighter pilots, they now had to learn to fly the delicate\nU-2. Its large wings had tremendous lift but were also very fragile\n\" OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 5-6: chap. 5. p. 18 (TS Codeword).\n\" OSA History. ch,1p. 11. pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).\n..Searct -­"
  },
  {
   "n": 89,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p89.jpg",
   "text": "76\nSeerct NOFORN\nChapter 2\nand could not survive the stresses of loops and barrel rolls. Moreover,\nthe original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be\nflown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in\nrough air. At operational altitude, where the air was much less dense,\nthey could not exceed Mach 0.8 (394 knots). Speeds in excess of\nthese limits could cause the wings or tail section to fall off.\nAirspeed was a very critical factor for the U-2. At maximum alti­\ntude only 6 knots separated the speeds at which low-speed stall and\nhigh-speed buffet occurred. Pilots called this narrow range of accept­\nable airspeeds at maximum altitude the ..coffin corner\" because at\nthis point the U-2 was always on the brink of falling out of the sky. If\nthe aircraft slowed beyond the low-speed stall limit, it would lose lift\nand begin to fall, causing stresses that would tear the wings and tail\noff. A little too much speed would lead to buffeting, which would\nalso cause the loss of the wings or tail. Flying conditions such as\nthese required a U-2 pilot's full attention when he was not using the\nautopilot. Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson\nadded a vernier adjustment to the throttle to allow the pilot to make\nminute alterations to the fuel supply. 50\nAmong the unique devices developed for the U-2 was a small\nsextant for making celestial .. fixes\" during the long overflights.\nBecause cloud cover often prevented U-2 pilots from locating naviga­\ntional points on the earth through the periscope, the sextant turned out\nto be the pilots' principal navigational instrument during the first\nthree years of deployment. When clouds were not a factor, however.\nthe periscope proved highly accurate for navigation. During the final\ntests before the aircraft became operational. U-2 pilots found they\ncould navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than I nautical\nmile over a 1.000-nm course.5'\nFINAL TESTS OF THE U-2\nFlight-testing of the U-2 continued throughout the fall and winter of\n1955-56 in order to test all the various systems. By mid-January\n1956. SAC officials were so impressed that they also wanted to pur­\nchase a fleet of these planes. On 30 January. DCI Dulles agreed to\n\" Cunningham int.:rview (TS Codeword): John Parangosky. intt:rview by Donald E.\nWdzenhach. tape recording. 6 March 1986 (S): information supplied by James\nCh..:rbonneaux to Donald E. Wdzenhach (S).\n\" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).\nSeci:et"
  },
  {
   "n": 90,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p90.jpg",
   "text": "77\nSec,et MOFOKI\\I\nChapter 2\nA-2 camera being installed\nin U-2\nhave CIA ace as executive agent for this transaction, which the Air\nForce called Project DRAGON LADY. To maintain secrecy, the Air\nForce transferred funds to the CIA, which then placed an order with\nLockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be determined by the Air\nForce. The Air Force later bought two more U-2s, for a total of 31 .\nThe aircraft purchased for the Air Force were known as the\nFollow-On Group, which was soon shortened to FOG.\n56\nOnce enough pilots had been trained, Project AQUATONE man­\nagers concentrated on checking out the complete U-2 system: planes,\npilots, navigation systems, life-support systems, and cameras. From\n10 through 14 April 1956, U-2s equipped with A-2 cameras took off\nfrom Area 51 and made eight overflights of the United States in order\nto test the various flight and camera systems as part of the standard\nAir Force Operational Readiness Inspection. Colonel Yancey and his\ndetachment served as observers during this weeklong exercise.\n•· OSA Historv. chap. 5. pp. '.!5-26 (TS Code.word).\nScc,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 91,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p91.jpg",
   "text": "78\nSecret NOfORN\nChapter 2\nU-2 detachment in formation\nover Nevada\nColonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the\nU-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro­\ngrammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de­\ntachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level\nPentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the\nChief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's detem1i­\nnation that the U-2 was ready for deployment.\n57\nDuring these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again\ndemonstrated its unique airworthiiness. On 14 April 1956, James\nCunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received\na call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had\nexperienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western bor­\nder of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a sec­\nond flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to\nget the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and\nRitland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of\nthe Air Force, had arranged for sealled orders to be delivered to every\nairbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what\nto do if a U-2 needed to make an e:mergency landing.\nCunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could\nglide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The\npilot, who by this time was over Arkansas. radioed back that, given\nthe prevailing winds and the U-2·s 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he\ncould reach Albuquerque. New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham\nwas on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the\nAir Force's Assistant Director of Operations. Brig. Gen. Ralph E.\n\" Bbscll imcrvicw (S); OSA flisrory. chap. 11. pp. 15-16 (TS Codeword).\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 92,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p92.jpg",
   "text": "79\nSec. et NOFORN\nChapter 2\nKoon, call the commander of Kirtland AFB near Albuquerque.\nGeneral Koon told the base commander about the sealed orders and\nexplained that an unusual aircraft would make a deadstick landing at\nKirtland within the next half hour. The general then instructed the\nbase commander to have air police keep everyone away from the craft\nand get it inside a hanger as quickly as possible.\nAfter a half hour passed, the base commander called the\nPentagon to ask where the crippled aircraft was. As he was speaking,\nthe officer saw the U-2 touch down on the runway and remarked,\n\"It's not a plane, it's a glider!\" Even more surprised were the air po­\nlice who surrounded the craft when it came to a halt. As the pilot\nclimbed from the cockpit in his \"space\" suit, one air policeman re­\nmarked that the pilot looked like a man from Mars. The pilot, Jacob\nKratt, later reported to Cunningham that, from the beginning of the\nfirst flameout until the landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had covered\nover 900 miles, including more than 300 by gliding.58\nAside from this extraordinary gliding ability, however, the U-2\nwas a very difficult aircraft to fly. Its very light weight, which enabled\nit to achieve extreme altitude, also made it very fragile. The aircraft\n-was also very sleek, and it sliced through the air with little drag. This\nfeature was dangerous, however, because the U-2 was not built to\nwithstand the G-forces of high speed. Pilots had to be extremely care­\nful to keep the craft in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at\noperational altitude. If the nose dropped only a degree or two into the\nnose-down position, the plane would gain speed at a dramatic rate,\nexceeding the placarded speed limit in less than a minute, at which\npoint the aircraft would begin to come apart. Pilots, therefore, had to\npay close attention to the aircraft's speed indicator because at 65,000\nfeet there was no physical sensation of speed, without objects close at\nhand for the eye to use as a reference.59\nTHREE FATAL CRASHES IN 1956\nThe first fatality directly connected with flying the U-2 occurred on\n15 May 1956, when test pilot Wilburn S. Rose, flying article 345A,\nhad trouble dropping his pogos, the outrigger wheels that keep the\n,. Bissell interview (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary,\ninterview by Gregory W. Pedlow, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 12 October 1988 (S).\n'\" James Cherbonneaux, Carmine Vito, and Hervey Stockman (former U-2 pilots), inter­\nview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, May 1986 (S).\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 93,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p93.jpg",
   "text": "80\n~eerct NOPORl<I\nChapter 2\nwings parallel to the ground duriing takeoff. Once airborne, Rose\nmade a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the lefthand\npogo. When he attempted to make a righthand turn to come back over\nthe runway to shake loose the remaining pogo. Rose stalled the U-2\nand it plunged to earth, disintegratiing over a wide area. Three months\nlater. on 3 1 August 1956, a second fatal crash occurred during a\nnight-flying exercise. Frank G. Grace stalled article 354 at an altitude\nof about 50 feet when he tried to climb too steeply at takeoff. The\ncraft fell , cartwheeled on its left wing. and struck a power pole near\nthe runway. More experienced U-2 pilots always cut back abruptly on\nthe throttle as soon as the pogo sticks fell away in order to avoid such\nstal Is.\nBefore the year was out, two more U-2s were destroyed in\ncrashes. one of them fatal. On 17 September 1956, article 346 lost\npart of its right wing while on its takeoff ascent from Lindsey Air\nForce Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. The aircraft disintegrated in mid­\nair. killing pilot Howard Carey. The loss of article 357 on l 9\nDecember 1956 resulted from pilot hypoxia. A small leak prema­\nturdy depleted the oxygen supply and impaired Robert J. Ericson's\njudgment as he flew over Arizona. Because of his inability to act\nquickly and keep track of his aircraft's speed. the U-2 exceeded the\nplacarded speed of 190 knots and literally disintegrated when it\nreached 270 knots. Ericson managed to jettison the canopy and was\nsucked out of the aircraft at 28,0001 feet. His chute opened automati­\ncally at 15,000 feet, and he landed without injury. The aircraft was a\ntotal loss.\"''\nCOORDINATION OF COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS\nFrom the very beginning of the U-2 program. it was apparent that\nsome sort of an interagency task force or office would be needed to\ndevelop and coordinate collection requirements for the covert over­\nhead reconnaissance effort. In a 1three-page memorandum to DCI\nDulles on 5 November 1954 setting forth the ideas of the\nTechnological Capabilities Panel's Project 3 on this subject. Edwin\nLand wrote:\nIt is recommended that . .. a permanent task force. including Air\nForce supporting elements. he set up under suitable cover to\nprovide guidance on procurement, to consolidate requirements\n· • U-2 Acci<l.:nt R.:port~. folders -1. 10. and 1-1. OSA records. job 67-8--115. box I (S)."
  },
  {
   "n": 94,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p94.jpg",
   "text": "81\n-&ec:t et rc:iOFORN\nand plan missions in view ofpriority and feasibility, to maintain\nthe operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissem­\nination of rhe resulting information in a manner consistent with\nits special security requirementsY\nWhen the U-2's development and testing approached comple­\ntion, Land's recommendation was put into effect. Following a mt!et­\ning with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles and Trevor\nGardner (who had been promoted from his special assistant post co\nbecome Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and\nDevelopment), Richard Bissell established an Ad Hoc Requirements\nCommittee (ARC) on I December 1955. He then named James Q.\nReber to be Intelligence Requirements Officer for the U-2 project and\nchairman of the ARC. Reber was already experienced in coordination\nwith other intelligence agencies, for he had headed the Directorate of\nIntelligence DI Office of Intelligence Coordination for four years.\nThe first full-scale ARC meeting took place on I February 1956 with\nrepresentatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force present.\nAttending for the CIA were representatives from the Office of\nResearch and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Scientific Intelligence\n. (QS I). The CIA membership later expanded to include the Office of\nCurrent Intelligence (OCI) and a representative from the Directorate\nof Plans. In 1957 the National Security Agency (NSA) also began\nsending a representative. The State Department followed suit in 1960.\nalthough it had been receiving reports from the committee all along.'~\nAR C's main task was to draw up lists of collection requirements.\nprimarily for the U-2. but also for other means of collection. These\nlists prioritized targets accordi ng to their ability to meet the three ma­\njor national intelligence objectives concerning the Soviet Union in the\nmid-1950s: long-range bombers, guided missiles, and nuclear energy.\nThe committee issued its list of cargets for the use of the entire intelli­\ngence community using all available means of collection, not j ust for\nthe CIA with the U-2.\n63\n\" OSA History. chap. I. annex I (TS Codeword).\n' ' Minu1es of lh<! Ad Hoc Rcquiremc:n1s Commiuc:e of I February 1956. lmclligence\nCommuni1y (IC) Staff records. COMIREX. job 33-B-1 21 A. boll I. \"ARC Minu1cs.\n1956-1957:'\" Memorandum for the Joim Study Group from James Q. Reber. \"Handling of\nRequirements for the U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box 10.\n\"CHALICE (GeneralJ\" (TS Codeword>.\n\"\nt,,lemorandum for lhc Joint S1udy Group from James Q. Rc:bcr. \"Handling of\nRequirements for 1he U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box I0.\n\" CHALICE (Gen.:rall\" (TS Cod.:worJ>.\nChapter 2\nJames 0. Reber"
  },
  {
   "n": 95,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p95.jpg",
   "text": "82\nGee, et NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nArthur C. Lundahl\nARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and\ntlie project staff's operations section then used the list to plarn the\ntlightpachs for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee\nwas not responsible for developing flight plans. it assisted the plan­\nners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan\nwas ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee\ndrew up a decailed justification for the selection of the targets. This\npaper accompanied the flight plan.(J\n[n developing and pnontIz1ng lists of targets, the committee\nmembers had to take into account the varying needs and interesIts of\ntheir parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally\nemphasized strategic intelligence: aircraft and munitions factories,\npower-generating complexes. nuclear establishments. roads. bridlges.\ninland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually plac,ed a\nheavier emphasis on order-of-baule data. The Air Force. in panicular.\nhad a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of\nSoviet and East European airfields and radars.\nAlthough the committee members kept the interests of their ser­\nvices or agencies in mind. their awareness of the vital nature of their\nmission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted\nto reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although oc­\ncasionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a\ndissent to the recommendation of the committee as a whole.\"\n5\nPREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE\nPRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS\nOn 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant. Richard\nBissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl. the chief of CIA's Photo­\nIntelligence Division (PID), on Project AQUATONE. At !DC[\nDulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his divi­\nsion a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for\nthe exploication of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With\nonly 13 members, the PID staff was too small co handle the expe,cted\n~ lbi<l.: Jam.:s Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Wd·lenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow.\nWash ington, DC. 21 May 1987 (S).\n\"' Reber interview (Sl.\nGec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 96,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p96.jpg",
   "text": "83\n-see,, et P.OFQRPJ\nChapter 2\nThe Steuart Building, home\nof the Photo-lntelligel\"lce\nDivision\nflood of photographs that the U-2 would bring back. so in May 1955\n. t~~ Directorate of Support (DS) authorized expanding PID to 44 per­\nsons. Soon afterward the division moved from its room in M Building\nto larger quarters in Que Building.\nThe Photo-[ntelligence Division continued to expand in anticipa­\ntion of large quantities of U-2 photography. lts authorized strength\ndoubled in January\n1956\nwhen a new project known\nas\nHTAUTOMAT came into existence to exploit U-2 photography. All of\nthe products from this project would be placed in the new control sys­\ntem. By the summer of 1956, the PlD had moved to larger quarters in\nthe Steuart Building at 5th Street and New York Avenue, NW. PID\nphotointerpreters had already begun to work with U-2 photography\nfollowing a series of missions in April 1956. when U-2s photo­\ngraphed a number of US installations that. were considered analogous\nto high-priority Soviet installations. As a result of these preparations,\nPrD was ready for the mass of photography that began coming when\nU-2 operations commenced in the summer of 1956.\"\"\n~ For a more detailed history of photointerpretation in the CIA. sec Urban J. Lim:han. The\nNational Photographic lmerpretation Center. vol. I. Antecedents anti Early Years.\nDirectorate of Science and Technology Historical Sc:ries NPIC-2. December 1972. pp.\n171 -19~ (S)."
  },
  {
   "n": 97,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p97.jpg",
   "text": "84\nGeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 2\n•\nProject GENETRIX balloon\nlaunch\n•'\ni 't ­\nTHE IMPACT OF THE AIR FOR:CE PROJECT\nGENETRIX BALLOONS\nWhile the Agency was making its fi nal preparations for U-2 over­\nflights. the Air Force started a reconnaissance proj ect that would\ncause considerable protest around the world and threaten the exist­\nence of the U-2 overflight program before it even began. Project\nGENETRIX involved the use of camera-carrying balloons to obtain\nhigh-altitude photography of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union. and\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 98,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p98.jpg",
   "text": "85\nthe People's Republic of China. This project had its ongms 10 a\nRAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of I 955, the Air\nForce had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design\nand recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal­\nloons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval\non 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases\nin Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force\nhad launched a total of 516 balloons.67\nProject GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors\nhad hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre­\nvailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and\nthen across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal­\nloons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher\nlatitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the\nSoviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos­\ntile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast\nsupplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually\nrecovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958)\nfrom the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four of these pay-\nJoads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photog­\nraphy was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded\nin obtaining useful photographs.\"\"\nThe low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not\nthe only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of pro­\ntest and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked.\nAlthough the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons\nwere being used for weather research connected with the International\nGeophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the\nUnited States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that\nthe balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent\nstrongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations\nfrom which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also col­\nlected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and trans­\nmitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in\n9\nMoscow for the world press.~\n., P. G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. \"Project GENETRIX\nSummary.\" 15 February 1956 (S).\n\"' Final Report. Project I 19L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air\nCommand. 5 Mar~·h 1956. D-582, Genernl Summary (S. declassitic:d 1979).\n\"'' New Yr,rk Times, IO February 1956. p. I: Omaha World Herald, 11 February I 956, p. I.\nSec.el NOfOftN\nChapter 2\nSea,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 99,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p99.jpg",
   "text": "86\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 2\nPhotograph of Dodonovo Atomic\nEnergy complex taken by a\nProject GENETRIX balloon\nAll of this publicity and protest led President Eisenhower to con­\nclude that ··the balloons gave more legitimate grounds for irritation\nthan could be matched by the good obtained from them,\" and h,e or­\ndered the project halted. On 7 February 1956 Secretary of State\nDulles informed the Soviet Union that no more \"weather research\"\nballoons would be released. but he did not offer an apology for the\nh\n;n\nft .\nover ,g ts.\nDespite the furor caused by GENETRIX. Air Force Chief of\nStaff Twining proposed yet another balloon project only five weeks\nlater, in mid-March 1956. This project would employ even higher fly­\ning balloons than GENETRIX and would be ready in 18 rnoinths.\nPresident Eisenhower informed the Air Force. however, that he was\n··not interested in any more balloons.··\n1\n'\n'\" Andrew J. Goo<lpastcr. Memorandum for th.: R.:i:ord. •• 10 Fcbrnary 1956 Confonmcc of\nJoint Chids of Scaff with thc President ... WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. dcclassiticd 1980):\nSt.:phcn E. Ambrose. Eiserzhmn:r. The Pri:sid,:111 vol. 2 (Ncw York: Simon and Schuster.\n1984). p. J10.\n\" Quoted in Ambrose:, £isenltm,·a: Tiu: Pri:sidi:111. p. J 10.\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 100,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p100.jpg",
   "text": "87\nAlthough the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX\nwas limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most com­\nplete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War IL It\nwas referred to as \"pioneer\" photography because it provided a base­\nline for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of\nsuch things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when\nU-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.\nOf still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the\ndata that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of\nthe balloons-whose average altitude was 45,800 feet-over the\nSoviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of\nhigh-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later\nable to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.\nOne\ncompletely\nfortuitous\ndevelopment\nfrom\nProject\nGENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel\nbar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethyl­\nene gasbag was secured to the top of the bar and the camera-payload\n_and automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By\nsheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters-corresponded to\nthe wavelength of the radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known\nby its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used\nby Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept.\nThe bar on the GENETRIX balloons resonated when struck by\nTOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US\nand NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate\na number of previously unknown TOKEN radars.\nThese radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during\nthe balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar net­\nworks, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques.\nAnalysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and\ntracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations\nto notify each other of the balloons' passage (handing off), and the\naltitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of\nthis information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.'~\n'' Final Report. Project l 19L, 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air\nCommand. 5 March 1956. D-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).\nSeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 2\ni,eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 101,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p101.jpg",
   "text": "Seeret NOFORP•\nChapter 2\n88\nThese positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh\nthe political liabilities of the international protesLS. CIA officials be­\ncame concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could\nsour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights. including those\nby the U-2. which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.\nDDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February\n1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the ..additional\npolitical pressures being generated against all balloon operations and\noverflights. thus increasing the di ffi.culties of policy decisions which\nwould permit such operations in the: future.\"\n73\nIn addition to its concern for tlhe future of the U-2 program. the\nAgency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over­\nflights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the\nFree Europe Committee-a covert Agency operation based in West\nGermany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern\nEurope.\nAQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR :SELECTED\nMEMBERS OF CONGRESS\nAlthough knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded se­\ncret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,\nDCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be\ntold about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with\nSenators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell , the ranking\nmembers of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom­\nmittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project\nAQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem­\nbers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a\nresult of the senators' recornmendllttion that the senior members of\nthe House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later\nmet with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and\nClarence Cannon. Official Congress.ional knowledge of the U-2 pro­\nject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.\nThe House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcomrninee\ndid not recei\\·e a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss\nof Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.\n7\n\"\n\" Philip G. Strong. Attachment 10 Mcmoran<l um for DCI Dulks...Projcct GENETRIX\nSummary.\" 15 Fcbruary 1956. OSI records (S)1.\n\" John S. Warn.:r. Lcgislativc Counsel. McrnoranJum for the Rccord ...AQUATONE\nBri.:tings:· 18 Novc:mbc:r 1957. Office of C,ongressional Affairs rci:onJs. job 61-357.\nbox 2 (S): Wam.:r interview (S).\nSecr:et"
  },
  {
   "n": 102,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p102.jpg",
   "text": "89\n~eeret NOFOAN\nChapter 2\nTHE U-2 COVER STORY\nIn February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still\nraging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests,\nRichard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for over­\nseas operations. It was important to have a plausible reason for de­\nploying such an unusual looking plane, whose glider wings and odd\nlanding gear were certain to arouse curiosity.\nBissell decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2\nwas an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the\nNational Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). Such a cover\nstory, however, needed the approval of all concerned: Air Force intel­\nligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air\nDivision, the SAC U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters\nproject officer, and NACA's top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Moreover,\nthe CIA Scientific Advisory Committee was also consulted about the\ncover plan.\nSenior CIA officials and the other agencies involved in provid­\n• ing cover for the U-2 approved the final version of the overall cover\nstory at the end of March 1956. The project staff then began working\non contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory.\nBissell advised the project's cover officer to \"produce a document\nwhich sets forth all actions to be taken ... not only press releases and\nthe public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and\nat least an indication of the diplomatic action....We should at least\nmake the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really\norderly fashion.\" The cover officer then prepared emergency proce­\ndures based on the overall weather research cover story, and Bissell\napproved these plans. There was one final high-level look at the cover\nstory on 21 June 1956, the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern\nEurope, when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian,\nand Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet\nUnion, including the proposed emergency procedures. Killian and\nLand disagreed with Bissell's concept and made a much bolder and\nmore forthright proposal: in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile\nterritory, the United States should not try to deny responsibility but\nshould state that overflights were being conducted \"to guard against\nsurprise attack.\" This proposal was put aside for further thought\n(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re­\nmained the basis for statements to be made after a loss. The project\nstaff then went on to prepare a number of different statements to be\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 103,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p103.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et NOfORN\nChapter 2\n90\nused in various scenarios, including one in which the pilot was cap­\ntured. Even in such a case, however, the proposed policy was for the\nUnited States to stick to the weather research cover story, a course of\naction that would prove disastrous in May 1960.75\n\" OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 30-35; chap. 11, annex 73 (TS Codeword).\nSecrei"
  },
  {
   "n": 104,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p104.jpg",
   "text": "~ q) ~\nQI C0V\\L"
  },
  {
   "n": 105,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p105.jpg",
   "text": ".~ 7~­\nBlanL"
  },
  {
   "n": 106,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p106.jpg",
   "text": "93\niee,et NOFORN\nChapter 3\nU-2 Operations in the\nSoviet Bloc and Middle East,\n1956-1968\nBy January 1956, everyone working on Project AQUATONE could\nsee that the U-2 was nearing the time for operational deployment.\nDuring tests the aircraft had met all the criteria established in late\nI 954. Its range of 2,950 miles was sufficient to overfly continents, its\naltitude of 72,000 feet was beyond the reach of all known antiaircraft\nweapons and interceptor aircraft, and its camera lenses were the finest\navailable.\nBecause the main targets for the U-2 lay behind the Iron Curtain.\nBissell and his staff began looking for operational bases in Europe.\nThe United Kingdom, America's closest ally, seemed the logical\nchoice for U-2 bases, and, on 10 January 1956, Bissell flew to\nLondon to discuss the maner with Royal Air Force (RAF) and MI-6\nofficials. Their initial response was favorable, but they told Bissell\nthat the proposal needed approval at a much higher level.\nBissell reported his findings to DCI Dulles, who promptly ar­\nranged to meet with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in Londcin to\nexplore the possibility of winning the British Government's approval\nfor the project. Dulles presented his case to Lloyd on 2 February, and,\nby early March. Prime Minister Anthony Eden approved the basing of\nU-2s in the United Kingdom. The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB,\nan RAF base also used by the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC).'\n' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 10-15 (TS Codeword).\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 107,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p107.jpg",
   "text": "~eo,et PIIOFOAN\nChapter 3\n94\nTHE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A\nTO LAKENHEATH\nThe first Agency U-2 detachment, consisting of four aircraft and\npilots, was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance\nSquadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The \"provisional\" designation\ngave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air\nForce units did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1,\nknown within the Agency as Detachment A, began deploying to the\nUnited Kingdom on 29 April 1956. By 4 May, all of the detachment's\npersonnel and equipment, including four aircraft, had arrived at\nLakenheath. !\nShortly after deployment, on 7 May, the National Advisory\nCommittee on Aeronautics (NACA) released an unclassified U-2\ncover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown\nby the USAF Air Weather Service to study such high-altitude phenom­\nena as the jet stream, convective clouds, temperature and wind struc­\ntures at jet-stream levels, and cosmic-ray effects up to 55,000 feet. 3\nBefore overflights could begin from Lakenheath, however, sev­\neral incidents occurred that dampened Prime Minister Eden ·s interest\nin having the U-2s on British territory. In mid-April 1956, a Soviet\nnaval squadron brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai\nBulganin on an official visit to the United Kingdom. Although the\nships were docked in Portsmouth Harbor, a British counterintelli­\ngence operative and underwater expert, retired Royal Navy\nCommander Lionel Crabb, apparently undertook a mission to exam­\nine the hulls of these vessels but vanished in the process. His headless\nbody was later found washed up on a beach. This so-called Frogman\nIncident caused an uproar in Parliament and a protest from Moscow\nthat soured relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet\nUnion. To avoid further deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, the\nPrime Minister wrote to President Eisenhower on 16 May asking that\noverflights be postponed. Only two days later, a U-2 on a training\nflight from Lakenheath inadvertently penetrated the British radar net­\nwork, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry\nmade a public announcement that a special NACA aircraft was con­\nducting high-altitude research in the United Kingdom. At about the\n' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword).\n' Press Release of 7 May 1956 (U) in OSA History. chap. 7. annex 60 (TS Codeword).\nSec1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 108,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p108.jpg",
   "text": "95\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nsame time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told\nPrime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath,\nwhen in reality there were four.'\nTHE MOVE TO WIESBADEN\nTo avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to\nbegin the program of U-2 overflights beyond the Iron Curtain without\nfurther delay, Bissell moved Detachment A on 11 June I 956 to\nWiesbaden, one of the busiest airfields in West Germany, without\nnotifying West German authorities. The detachment commander, Col.\nFrederick McCoy, was disappointed in his hope that the redeployment\nof the U-2s could be accomplished without drawing undue attention.\nThe strange-looking planes, with bicycle-type wheels and wings so\nlong they touched the ground after landing, aroused considerable in­\nterest. Wiesbaden was to be only a temporary home for Detachment\nA; the Air Force began preparing Giebelstadt near the East German\nborder for use by the U-2s. Giebelstadt was an old World War II\nairbase that had been one of the launching sites for the GENETRIX\nballoons.5\nSoon after the four U-2s arrived in Wiesbaden, they were refitted\nwith the more powerful J57/P-3 l engines. The new engines were bet­\nter suited for operations behind the Iron Curtain because they were\nless likely to suffer flameouts than the earlier model. Once the new\nengines were installed, the aircraft received the designation U-2B.6\nBissell was anxious to get the overflights started by late June\nbecause SAC weather experts had predicted that the best weather for\nphotographing the Soviet Union would be between 20 June and 10\nJuly. Bissell, however, had not yet received final authorization from\nPresident Eisenhower to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. On 28\nMay 1956, when DCI Allen Dulles met with the President to discuss\nthe U-2's readiness for operations, Eisenhower still made no decision\non overflights. Three days later Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff\n' Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British\nIntelligence Community (New York. 1986). pp. 495-496; Beschloss, Mayday, p. I16; OSA\nHistory, chap. 11, pp. 18-21 (TS Codeword).\n' OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 21-23 (TS Codeword).\n• Ibid .. pp. 23, 26 (TS Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 109,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p109.jpg",
   "text": "96\nSee1 et NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nNathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining\n\"AQUATONE Operational Plans.\" In the meantime, President\nEisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi­\nnal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During\nhis recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision\non the overflight program. 7\nPRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE\nTOWARD OVERFLIGHTS\nThe President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet\nUnion. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence\nabout Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con­\ncerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.\nFrom the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower\nhad worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to\nhostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft\nwere too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the\nLand committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of\nthe military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the\nsame reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to\ntake the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.\nIn fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis­\nsions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his\nfamous \"Open Skies\" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2\nwas still under development but making good progress. At the\nGeneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower\noffered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for\nthe Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in­\nstallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with\nsimilar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita\nKhrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.\nAlthough the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept\nhis proposal. he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was\nstill being considered, Eisenhower had stated, 'Tl\\ give it one shot.\nThen if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2.\"x\n' Ibid., pp. 23-25 and anne:( 73. \"AQUATONE Operational Plans,.. 31 May 1956 (TS\nCodeword).\n·' Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 110,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p110.jpg",
   "text": "97\nEven though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of\nthe U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being\nbuilt to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize\nsuch flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that\noverflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might\neven lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the\nPresident's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2\nflights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not\nbe able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based\non a 1952 study of Soviet World War II-vintage radars and on 1955\ntests using US radars, which-unknown to US officials-were not as\neffective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before\nU-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific\nIntelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was\npublished on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that \"Maxi­\nmum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at ele­\nvation in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles....\nIn our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed.\" The OSI study\nadded, however, \"It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis­\n. tent tracking of the Project vehicle.\" 9 Completed just thr~e weeks be­\nfore the initation of overflights, this study seems to have had little\nimpact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to\nbelieve that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might\neven fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications. 10\nSoviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern.\nAlso fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the\nSoviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would\nbe. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who\nwas present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project\nand served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue,\nlater recalled:\nAllen '.s approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did\nlose one, the pilot would not survive. . . . We were told-and it\nwas part of our understanding of the situation-that it was al­\nmost certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could\n• OSA Histor;,; chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde­\ntected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961\n(New York, 1965), p. 41.\n\"' Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington,\nConnecticut. 28 October I 988 (S).\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 3\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 111,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p111.jpg",
   "text": "98\nioe,et ().IQFORN\nChapter 3\nColonel Goodpaster with\nPresident Eisenhower\nwke it as a certainty that no pilot would survive .. . and that al­\nthough they would know where the plane came from, it would be\ndifficult to prove it in any convincing way.\"\nCIA assurances that the U-2 would probably not be detected. and\nthat a crashed U-2 could not be traced back to the United States,\nhelped overcome the President's worries about overflights. The most\nimportant reason why President Eisenhower decided to send recon­\nnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, however, was the urgent\nneed for accurate intelligence to confirm or disprove claims of Soviet\nadvances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of\nthe new Soviet Bison bomber in the spring of 1954 had been followed\nby reported sightings of more than 30 of these bombers in the spring\nand summer of 1955 (in reality these were sightings of the same\ngroup of IO aircraft that circled around out of sight and made several\npasses during a Soviet air show). Soon members of Congress were\ncalling for investigations into the relative strength of the US and\n\" Quoted in Bc:schloss, Mayday. p. 118.\n6eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 112,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p112.jpg",
   "text": "99\nSoviet Air Forces. 12 Early in 1956, concern about a possible Soviet\nadvantage in long-range bombers grew as Air Force Chief of Staff\nTwining informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the\nSoviet Union already had more Bisons than the United States had\nB-52s and that the Soviets would be able to \"maintain this advantage\nfor some time if they keep on the production curve we are now pre­\ndicting.\" 13 By May 1956, reporting on the growing Soviet air\nstrength was no longer confined to aviation journals; U.S. News and\nWorld Report, for example, featured articles headlined \"Can Soviets\nTake the Air Lead?\" and \"Is U.S. Really Losing in the Air?\" 1\"'\nAlongside fear of possible Soviet superiority in long-range\nbombers came a new potential threat: Soviet progress in guided mis­\nsile research. Trevor Gardner, Air Force Assistant Secretary for\nResearch and Development, warned in September 1955 that \"the\nmost complex and baffling technological mystery today is not the\nRussian capability in aircraft and nuclear weapons but rather what the\nSoviet progress has been in the field of guided missiles.\" 15 On 30\nJanuary 1956, Time magazine made the guided missile its cover story .\n. The article began by describing a hypothetical crisis set in 1962 in\nwhich the United States suffered a humiliating defeat because it had\nlagged behind the Soviet Union in guided missile development. 16 Just\ntwo weeks after this story appeared, the Soviets successfully tested a\nmissile with a range of 900 miles, and President Eisenhower admitted\nat a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the\nUnited States in some areas of the missile field. Administration critic\nSenator Stuart Symington then claimed, \"The facts are that our missile\ndevelopment may be ahead in the short-range area, but their mis­\nsile development is ahead in the area that counts by far the most-the\n\" Robert Hotz. \"Russian Jet Airpower Gains Fast on US,\" Aviation Week, 23 May 1955,\npp. I 2-15; \"Aviation Week Story Spurs Debate on US, Red Airpower Positions,\" Aviation\nWeek. 30 May 1955. pp. 13-14.\n'' Claude Witze. \"Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining Warns Congress.\"\nAviation Week, 27 February 1956. pp. 26-28; Robert Hotz, \"Russian Air Force Now\nGaining in Quality,\" Aviation Week. 12 March I 956, p. 286.\n\" \"Can Soviets Take the Air Lead? What LeMay, Wilson, Ike Say,\"' US News and World\nReport. 11 May 1956, pp. 108-114; \"ls U.S. Really Losing in the Air?\" US News and\nWorld Report. I 8 May I 956. pp. 25-27.\n\" William Coughlin. \"Gardner Defends Greater R&D Spending,\" Aviation Week. 26\nSeptember 1955, p. 14.\n\" \"Missiles Away,\" Time. 30 January 1956, pp. 52-55.\nSeu et ftlUFOHN\nChapter 3\nS&&fCt"
  },
  {
   "n": 113,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p113.jpg",
   "text": "100\nSeoret NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nSecaet\nlong-range area.\" 17 Fears of Soviet missile progress increased when\nNikita Khrushchev stated on 23 April 1956, \"I am quite sure that we\nshall have very soon a guided missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead\nwhich could hit any point in the world.\" 18\nFaced with growing Congressional and public anxiety over\nSoviet offensive capabilties, President Eisenhower approved the pro­\nposed overflight program. Colonel Goodpaster relayed this decision\nto Bissell, Land, and Killian at a meeting on 21 June. The President\nnevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized\nonly 10 days of overflights when operations over the Soviet Union\nwere ready to start in early July 1956. 19\nFIRST OVERFLIGHTS OF EASTERN EUROPE\nThe CIA initiated U-2 flights over hostile territory even before the\nPresident granted final approval for overflights of the Soviet Union.\nAfter consulting with the Commander of US Air Force Europe,\nRichard Bissell used existing Presidential permission for Air Force\noverflights of the Soviet Union's East European satellites as his au­\nthority to plan a mission over Poland and East Germany. Bissell had\ninformed the President of his intention to conduct such missions in\nthe \"AQUATONE Operational Plan\" submitted on 31 May.\nThe first operational use of a U-2 took place on Wednesday,\n20 June 1956. Carl K. Overstreet flew a U-2 equipped with an\nA-2 camera over Poland and East Germany. At the end of the mis­\nsion, Detachment A immediately rushed the exposed film to the\nUnited States for processing. The developed film arrived at the\nPhoto-Intelligence Division (PIO) on 22 June 1956. PIO personnel\nconsidered the pictures obtained by mission 2003 to be of good\nI.\nqua 1ty.-\n0()\n\" Robert Hotz, \"Firing of900-Mile Russian Missile Spurs US Changes,\" Aviation Week,\n20 February 1956, p. 27.\n\" \"Is Russia Really Ahead in Missile Race?.\" US News and World Report, 4 May 1956,\np. 34.\n'\" OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword): A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for\nthe Record, 21 June 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).\n\"' OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 2003 (20 June 1956),\nOSA records, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 114,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p114.jpg",
   "text": "101\nFollowing the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to\nbegin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President\ngranted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take\nplace for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a\nCIA and State Department recommendation that West German\nChancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to\noverfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex­\nisting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of\nEastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had\ninvited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show,\nwhich opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff\nNathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a\nweek, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet\nUnion be staged until the Air Force delegation had left.11\nBoth of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union\nwere cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell\nand the Chief of Station for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed\nChancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans\n_Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project. 11\nA few days later the Air Force delegation returned from\nMoscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of opera­\ntions against the Soviet Union.\nWhile waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear,\nDetachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on\n2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and\nBulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and\nRomania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President\nEisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the\nPresident found \"very interesting, very positive.\" Eisenhower was\nanxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft.\nBissell replied that, although East European radars had picked up the\n20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000\nfeet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morn­\ning's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2\n\" Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,\n1966), pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword).\n\"' OSA History, chap. 11. p. 28 (TS Codeword).\n6eeret NOFGRN\nChapter 3\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 115,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p115.jpg",
   "text": "North\nSea\nFirst Overflight s, 20 June - 5 July 1956\n)\nf\n\\\nSweden\n.__,_,_\"-..\n)\n~\nSTOCICHOUil\n-~\n✓\nvf!.\nSea\n\\f Finland\n,; .......___\n;\n--- Mission 2003\nt,,_f!.ElSINICI\n-\n-\n-\nMission 2009\n.. ,-( *\nv ~\n-\n- ·- Mission 2010\n<)~_,\n7';;../;,-J)\ny\n· J\nI\n/~\n~..1\n20June\n2 July\n2 July\n\\\n'\n~~\n\\Romania\n/\n~'\nA\n~\n'\n--\nf ,-\n/\n\"'\"-- '\n-\nIUCIIA\n'\n('~\nREST\n~ ;r-\n• *\n,\nBlack\nSea\nTurkey\nMediterranean Sea\n~\n-\n&,c,et tof6f0At~\n. .."
  },
  {
   "n": 116,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p116.jpg",
   "text": "r/\no/\nNorth\nSea\n1/'.\nAMSTERDAM ;,\n0\n0\nBaltic\nS<la\n--- Mission 2013 4 July\n-\n-\n-\nMission 2014 5 July\nR. S. F. S. R.\nU-2 photography of\nLeningrad, 4 July 1956\nFili Airframe Plant,\nMoscow, 5 July 1956\n=====================:l1::=•=e=e=Fe=t=u=o=r=o=n=• ◄=:::::ll:===============,J\nr\n. : na7.:J(BO~n•1 \"42"
  },
  {
   "n": 117,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p117.jpg",
   "text": "104\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 3\ndetachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two\nflights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were \"ready\nand eager to go in beyond the satellites\" and overfly the center of the\nSoviet Union. 23\nEisenhower replied that he thought it \"urgent\" to know whether\nthe recent flights had been tracked by hostile radars. The President\nwas obviously concerned that CIA estimates that the U-2 could fly\nvirtually undetected were proving false. One of the reasons why he\nhad approved the overflight program was the CIA's assurance that the\nSoviet Union would remain unaware of the flights or-at the very\nworst-receive only occasional, vague indications.\nFIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION\nThe question of how well the Soviets could track U-2 flights had not\nyet been settled when the first overflights of the Soviet Union took\nplace. On Wednesday, 4 July 1956, the U-2 known as Article 347 be­\ngan the first flight over the Soviet Union. Final authorization for mis­\nsion 2013 had come shortly before takeoff. Late on the evening of 3\nJuly, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building to\ngive the \"Go\" or \"No go\" decision. Although the President had ap­\nproved the overflight, the final decision to start a mission depended\non a number of factors, especially the weather over the target area and\nat the takeoff and landing sites. Bissell made the decision just before\nmidnight Washington time, which was six o'clock in the morning in\nWiesbaden. This pattern of last-minute approvals continued for the\nduration of the U-2 overflight program. 2•\nWhen Wiesbaden received the \"Go\" signal, a U-2 equipped with\nan A-2 camera and flown by pilot Hervey Stockman took off on a\ncourse that took it over Poznan, Poland, where riots had occurred on\n28-30 June. After Poznan, Stockman headed for Belorussia, where he\nturned north to Leningrad. The last leg of the mission took the U-2\nover the Soviet Baltic states before returning to Wiesbaden. The main\ntarget of this mission was the naval shipyards in Leningrad, center of\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster·s handwritten notes on 2 July 1956 meeting, WHOSS. Alpha.\nDDEL (TS).\n,. Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).\n-ieerct"
  },
  {
   "n": 118,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p118.jpg",
   "text": "105\nthe Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's\nroute also overflew a number of major military airfields to make an\ninventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber.\n1s\nThe second overflight, on the following day, continued the\nsearch for Bison bombers. Pilot Carmine Vito's route was similar but\nsomewhat to the south of Stockman's and also flew farther east, more\nthan 200 kilometers past Moscow. Although the Soviet capital was al­\nmost completely hidden by clouds, the A-2 camera with haze filters\ntook some usable photographs of the city. These turned out to be the\nonly U-2 photographs of Moscow because no other mission was sent\nover the Soviet capital. Among the key targets photographed during\nmission 2014 were the Fili airframe plant, where the Bison was being\nbuilt; the bomber arsenal at Ramenskoye. where the Bisons weire test­\ned; the Kaliningrad missile plant; and the Khimki rocket-,engine\nplant.=\n0\nWhen Allen Dulles returned to work on Thursday. 5 July 1956.\nhe asked Bissell if any overflights had taken place during the\nIndependence Day holiday. One had been made on the fqurth and an­\nother just that morning, Bissell replied. (Because of the six-hour time\ndifference, the 5 July flight was safely back in Wiesbaden by the\ntime Dulles spoke to Bissell.) When Dulles asked the routes of these\nmissions. Bissell told him that they had overflown both Moscciw and\nLeningrad. \"Oh my Lord.\" Dulles exclaimed, \"do you thi1:1k that\nwas wise the first time?\" \"Allen.\" Bissell replied. \"the first is the\nsafest.\" :,\nPresident Eisenhower also wanted to know the results of the 4\nand 5 July flights, but his principal concern was whether there had\nbeen any indication that either flight had been discovered or tracked\nby radar. Eisenhower told Colonel Goodpaster \"to advise Mr. Allen\n\" Urban J. Linehan. Na1io11al Phowgraphic /merpretatio11 Center: The Years of Project\nHTAUTOMAT. 1956- 1958. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series\nNPIC-3. December 1974. 6 vols. (hereafter cited as NPIC History). vol. l, p. 20 (S):\nMission folder 2013 (4 July 1956). OSA records. job 67-8-328. bo,c 7 (TS Codeword).\nNote on mission numbers: each proposed mission received a number. but not all of these\nmissions were flown.\n'\" NP/C History. vol. I. p. 21 (S): Mission folder 2014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job\n67-8-328. box 7 (TS Codeword).\n\" Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S).\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 3"
  },
  {
   "n": 119,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p119.jpg",
   "text": "106\nSect et NOFOffN\nChapter 3\nDulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the\nflights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus­\npended.\" Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that\nreports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be\navailable for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials\nmet with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime.\nGoodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive\nwas that the operation should continue \"at the maximum rate until the\nfirst evidence of tracking was received.\" 1\"\nAlthough President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus­\npending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked,\" his\nmain concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions,\nmeaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for\nmost or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to\nattempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights\ncould not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over­\nflight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre­\nalistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the\nSoviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the over­\nflights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two\noverflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re­\nports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and\nmade several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could\nnot track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage\nwas weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and\nLeningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown\nthese two cities. 30\nDetachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet\nUnion during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of\nthe missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956.\nThey covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and\nBelorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately. a broken camera\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS. Alpha.\nDDEL (TS).\n'\" Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.\nPedlow. Washington. DC. 8 July 1987 (S).\n\"' Mission fold.:rs 2013 (4 July 1956) and 1014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job\n67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).\n~QGFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 120,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p120.jpg",
   "text": ". - : ,\nAdditional Overflights, 9-10 July 1956\nMission 2020 9 July 1956\nFinland\nMission 2021 9 July 1956\nMission 2023 10 July 1956\nNorth\nSea\nMCISCOW\n*\nR. S. F. S. R.\nBlack SEia\n~\nq,\nTurkE~Y\n~\n~111~ 13\n~\n•\n?\n~...\n• o<)\nMediterranean Sea\n()\n..\n••\n•,,, Malta\n(U.K.)\nSec, et NOFORN\n......\n. . ..\n·:. ·.•"
  },
  {
   "n": 121,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p121.jpg",
   "text": "108\nSec, et NOFORIQ\nChapter 3\nshutter ruined much of the photography of one of the flights. The\nthird mission (2023), on the following day, included the Crimean\nPeinsula. 31\nThe film from the first overflight (4 July) was flown to the\nUnited States immediately after the U-2 landed at Wiesbaden. Several\nmembers of the Photo Intelligence Division were on hand when the\nfilm was developed to check on the results. Also present was James\nBaker, who had accepted an offer by project officials to get a first­\nhand look at how the new A-2 lenses were working.·'1\nThe photos from July overflights were generally good, despite\noccasional problems caused by cloud cover. The huge amount of film\ntaken by these missions provided more information about the Soviet\nUnion's ability to track and intercept U-2s. Photointerpreters examin­\ning the films eventually discovered the tiny images of MiG-15s and\nMiG- l 7s beneath the U-2s in various pursuit and attack attitudes:\nclimbing, flipping over, and falling toward Earth. It was even possible\nto determine their approximate altitudes. These photographs showed\nthat the Soviet air defense system was able to track U-2s well enough\nto attempt interception, but they also provided proof that the fighter\naircraft available to the Soviet Union in l 956 could not bring down a\nU-2 at operational altitude. )l\nOne problem with early U-2 photography became apparent only\nafter the first films were developed. If there was surface water on the\nrunway at Wiesbaden when the U-2 took off, the camera windows be­\ncame begrimed. Although the water dried during the flight, the oily\nscum it left behind degraded the photographic image. To combat this\nproblem, AQUATONE ground crews took brooms and spent several\nhours before takeoff sweeping puddles of water from the runway to\nbe used by the U-2. Kelly Johnson eventually designed a jettisonable\ncover for the camera windows, which was released at the same time\nas the pogos so that it could be recovered and reused. 34\n\" Mission folders 2020 (9 July 1956), 2021 (9 July 1956), and 2023 ( 10 July 1956), OSA\nrecords. job 67-8-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).\n\" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).\n'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\n'\"' Baker interview (S).\nSec, et"
  },
  {
   "n": 122,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p122.jpg",
   "text": "109\nSect et NOFORl'1\nChapter 3\nSOVIET PROTEST NOTE\nThe 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet\nUnion on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in\nMoscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a\n\"twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force\" and\ngave details of the routes flown by the first two missions. The note\ndid not mention Moscow or Leningrad, however, because the Soviets\nhad not been able to track these portions of the overflights. The\nSoviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as \"inten­\ntional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence . ., As soon as the\nnote arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956,\nColonel Goodpaster called Bissell and told him to stop all U-2 over­\nflights until further notice. The next morning Goodpaster met with\nBissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three additional flights\nhad taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet note but\nadded that no more were planned. 35\n__ -\nLater Eisenhower told Goodpaster that he \"didn't like a thing\"\nabout the Soviet note and was going to discuss the matter with\nSecretary of State Dulles. With the strong approval of President\nEisenhower, Goodpaster informed DCI Dulles that \"there is to be no\nmention of the existence of this project or of operations incident to it,\noutside the Executive Branch, and no mention within the Executive\nBranch to others than those who directly need to know of the opera­\ntion, as distinguished from output deriving from it.\" 36\nDuring these initial overflights, the U-2 flew above 69,000 feet\nand could be seen only fleetingly by pilots of the Soviet interceptor\naircraft. Thus, it appears that the Soviet claim that the intruder was a\ntwin-engine bomber was probably based on the assumption that this\nwas another overflight by a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine\nCanberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in\n1953. The US reply, sent to the Soviets on 19 July, truthfully denied\nthat any US \"military planes\" had overflown the Soviet Union on the\ndays in question. Meanwhile, on 16 July the Polish Ambassador to\n\" \"Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I 0, I 956 with U.S. Reply, ..\nUS Department of State Bulletin, 30 July I 956, pp. 19 I- I 92: Andrew J. Goodpaster.\nMemorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).\n,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,\nDDEL (TS).\nSeeaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 123,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p123.jpg",
   "text": "110\nSec,el NOFORN\nChapter 3\nthe United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of\nPoland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note\nfrom the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was\nsent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37\nThe details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro­\ntests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet in­\nterception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected\nover the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked\nfor extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President\nEisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the\nPresident recalled how he had been told that \"not over a very minor\npercentage of these (flights) would be picked up.\" He went on to\nquestion \"how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection\nis not likely to be avoided.\" After discussing the possibility of basing\nU-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had\n\"lost enthusiasm\" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United\nStates were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, \"the\nreaction would be drastic.\" The President was also concerned that the\nAmerican public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that\ntheir country had violated international law. He stated, \"Soviet pro­\ntests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would\n•\nth\n,, 38\nbe quite ano er.\nThe President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not\nlost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he\nmet with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to\nhelp make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to\nreduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus­\nceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug­\ngested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore\nthem. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a\nproject known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called\nthe Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air\nForce Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the\nAgency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by sev­\neral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into\n·\" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I 0, 1956 with U.S. Reply,\"\nUS Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp.\n32-33 (TS Codeword).\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,\nDDEL (TS).\nSearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 124,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p124.jpg",
   "text": "111\n39\nSec, et NOFOAP4\nChapter 3\nradar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The ef­\nfort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the\nyear.\nTHE END OF THE BOMBER GAP\nDuring the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had\nmade eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over\nthe Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of\nAugust with their initial evaluation of the photography obtained by\nthese flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move\non 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the\nphoto interpreters were finished, they were able to write \"finis\" to the\ncontroversy over Soviet bomber strength.\nAlthough the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union pos­\nsessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers,\nU-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison\n6ombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by\nthe July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by\nthe photographs of the Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he\ncalled \"million-dollar\" photography. The actual value of the U-2\nphotos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their ev­\nidence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for ad­\nditional B-52 bombers to \"catch up\" to the Soviets.\"0\nBecause of the need to protect the source of the information\nabout Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue\ndid not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA\nbegan providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photog­\nraphy without identifying the source, some members of Congress­\nunaware of the existence of the U-2-questioned the motivation be­\nhind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier es­\ntimates of Soviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air\nForce appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by\nWhite House direction in order to hold down military expenditures.\n•• Records of Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS\nCodeword).\n~• NP!C History, vol. I. p. 23 (S).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 125,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p125.jpg",
   "text": "Seeret NOFOAN\nChapter 3\n112\nNo one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal\nthat U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for\nthis change in the estimates.\"\nThe need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused\nproblems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply\nrestricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to\nU-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a \"slot\" ba­\nsis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or \"slot\"\ncould have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure\nroom, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the\nroom. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information\ntoo sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts\ndid not have access to information that would have greatly aided the\nproduction of intelligence estimates:1\nTACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s\nDURING THE SUEZ CRISIS\nAlthough U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of\nPresident Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used\nelsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for\nU-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel\nNasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de­\ncision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi­\nnancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked\nan international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2\nprogram.\nLong before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to\ndeploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I\nMay 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish\nPrime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime\nMinister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX pro­\ngram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in­\nvolved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet\nplane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the\n\" John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military\nStrength (New York: Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47.\n'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 126,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p126.jpg",
   "text": "113\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nBases for U-2 Operations in the Middle East, 1956\nNORTH\nATLANTIC\nOCellN\n~·\n;;·,,.\n&eeret f'40FOAP◄\nSuez takeover, however, the second contingent of U-2 aircraft and pi­\nlots was still being trained in Nevada. This unit would not be ready\nfor redeployment before the end of August and would not become es­\ntablished at Incirlik airbase near Adana, Turkey, until early September\n1956. The Agency referred to the AQUATONE detachment at Adana\nas Detachment B, cryptonym KWCORK; the Air Force covername\nwas Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional 2; and the unit's\nunofficial name was Tuslog Detachment 10-10. By whatever name,\nthe Adana detachment became the mainstay of U-2 activity for the\nnext three and a half years.'\n3\nThe fast-moving events of the Suez Crisis would not wait for\nDetachment B pilots to complete their training. With tension growing\nbetween Egypt and the Suez Canal Company's former owners, the\nUnited Kingdom and France, as well as between Egypt and Israel.. US\n'·' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 9. 39-40: chap. 12. pp. 5. 12 (TS Codeword).\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 127,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p127.jpg",
   "text": "114\nSecret NOFORI\\I\nChapter 3\nmilitary and foreign policy planners needed immediate information\nabout developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Detachment A was,\ntherefore, assigned the first Middle East overflights. On 29 August,\nU-2 missions 1104 and 1105 left Wiesbaden and overflew the eastern\nMediterranean littoral, starting with Greece, then Egypt, Israel,\nLebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Because these target areas were beyond\nthe round trip range of the Wiesbaden-based U-2s, the planes landed\nat Adana for refueling. The next day, the same two planes, with dif­\nferent pilots, took off from Adana and overflew the same Middle East\nterritory, this time including the Gaza Strip, before returning to\nWiesbaden. The film contained evidence of large numbers of British\ntroops on Malta and Cyprus and more new French-made aircraft in\nIsrael than had previously been reported.\"'\"'\nAs the situation around Suez grew more tense, the Eisenhower\nadministration decided to release some of the U-2 photos to the\nBritish Government. On 7 September, James Reber, chairman of the\nAd Hoc Requirements Committee, and Arthur Lundahl, chief of the\nPhoto Intelligence Division, flew to London, taking with them photos\nof the eastern Mediterranean area, including the Suez Canal, taken on\n.\n.\n30 August. These were the first and the only photos of the Middle\nEast that the President authorized to be given to the British during the\n1956 crisis!5\nThe Eisenhower administration viewed the developments in the\neastern Mediterranean with great concern. To keep the President and\nSecretary of State abreast of developments in the area, Deputy\nDirector for Intelligence Robert Amory established on 12 September\na multiagency group known as the PARAMOUNT Committee to\nmonitor the situation on a round-the-clock basis. The PARAMOUNT\nCommittee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building.\nComposed of members from CIA, State, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air\nForce, this committee met daily-frequently several times a day-to\nproduce reports based on information obtained from U-2 photogra­\nphy, communications and electronic intelligence, and agents. The\nphotointerpreters working for the PARMOUNT committee also came\nfrom several agencies: the CIA, the Army, and the Navy.46\n.... Mission folders 1104 (29 August 1956) and 1105 (29 August 1956), OSA records, job\n67-8-972, box 6 (TS Codeword).\n\" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); NP/C History, vol. I, pp. 56-58 (S).\n.. NP/C History, vol. I. pp. 47-49, 54-56 (S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 128,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p128.jpg",
   "text": "115\nThe Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2\nairplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector\nof strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more\nimportant than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the\nmanufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in\nWashington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because of the\nMiddle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like\na tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after\nlanding for instant interpretation or \"readout.\" Photo-Intelligence\nDivision personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex­\nploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the\nU-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on\ntactical developments around Suez.\nPIO acted quickly co carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and\nReber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe head­\nquarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for\nprocessing and inte retin U-2 film in West Gennany. They had\nC\nbeen preceded by:.,;--,r;,.,.-.,...,..-,.-,.,..,....,-..,.1 hief of PIO's Special· Projects\nBranch. Following eta1 e\nsions with Air Force photo­\n. intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a por­\ntion of a nea,by Air F-; photo laboratory for developing U-2 film.\nWith the assistance ofl\nlchi7~TAUTOMAT\nphoto laboratory, and\n1r t-orce personnel,L__J had the lab\nready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission\nf m the Middle East. After quickly developing the film,\nd his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud­\n1 d 1t or indications of British and French preparations for hostilities\nand sent their first report to Washington on 15 September.\nAlthough the Air Force provided considerable assistance in es­\ntablishing!\n[ photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not\nlike the idea of CIA personnel controlling overseas photo processing\nand interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force con­\ntrol. Further negotiations led to a CIA-Air Force agreement at the end\nof October. under which the Air Force would name the commanding\nofficer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy,\nwho was responsible for technical and intelligence matters:'\nPIO soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the\nWest German operation, which continued to develop and interpret\nU-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and\n'' Ibid .. pp. 49-52 (S).\n~etNOFORN\nChapter 3\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 129,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p129.jpg",
   "text": "116\nSecret NOPOAN\nChapter 3\nOctober 1956. This unit's timely and accurate information enabled the\nPARAMOUNT Committee to predict the joint Israeli-British-French\nattack on Egypt three days before it took place.\nOn I I September, Detachment A pilot Jacob Kratt overflew the\nFrench Mediterranean naval base at Toulon. He brought back imagery\nrevealing that France was loading troopships at Toulon. During the\nrest of the month, Detachment A pilots flew another eight missions\nover the Middle East. By this time, the new Detachment B in Turkey\nwas ready for operations, and it was better positioned to provide cov­\nerage of the Middle East. Detachment B began flying missions in\nSeptember and soon became the primary detachment for Middle East\noverflights, conducting nine out of the IO such missions flown in\nOctober . ..s\nDetachment B's first U-2 flight, on 11 September 1956, made\npasses over Turkey, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The next flight, more than\ntwo weeks later, covered much the same ground but flew as far west\nas Malta, Sicily, and Crete. Both were \"special\" missions aimed at\nmaintaining surveillance of the British and French fleets and forces as\nthey prepared for the attack on Egypt. Meanwhile, Detachment A pi­\nlots flew four missions in the Western Mediterranean.\nDuring this period, the PARAMOUNT Committee's photo­\ninterpreters developed the new science of \"tent-ology\"-counting the\ntents of British forces on the islands of Cyprus and Malta to deter­\nmine the number of troops deployed. The photointerpreters used\nchanges in the number of tents to determine that the British forces\nwere beginning to move toward the beaches, where they were eventu­\nally lightered to offshore troopships.\"\nNoting the U-2 activity in the Middle East, President Eisenhower\nwrote in his diary on 15 October 1956: \"Our high-flying reconnais­\nsance planes have shown that Israel has obtained some 60 of the\nFrench Mystere pursuit planes, when there had been reported the\ntransfer of only 24...\n50 Other U-2 photographs revealed the presence\n\"' OSA History. chap. 19. annex 120. \"CIA U-2 Missions Flown. 1956-1968.\" pp. 1-2 (TS\nCodeword).\n\" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\n'\" Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary. 15 October 1956. DDEL."
  },
  {
   "n": 130,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p130.jpg",
   "text": "117\nSec. et N6fOFU~\nChapter 3\n.9f British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus: The Anglo-French\nmilitary buildup greatly irritated President Eisenhower, who consid­\nered these activities a violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in\nwhich the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had agreed\nto m~ntain the status quo in armaments and borders in the Middle\nEastXfo Arthur Lundahl he remarked, \"It's a hell of a note when you\nc\nhave to G-2 your friends.\" s(\nU-2 photography continued to keep the President and other key\nofficials well informed about the progress of the crisis. }lights over\nIsrael and Rhodes on 21 October and Cyprus on 25 October revealed\nheavy military concentrations and an increase in the number of troop\ntransports and air forces. On the basis of this information,: Secretary\nof State John Foster Dulles told the President on 28 October that he\nbelieved an Israeli attack on Jordan was imminent, adding that he\nthought the British and French would take advantage of such an at­\ntack to occupy the Suez Canal. 51\nThe 10-day Middle East war began on the afternoon of 29\nOctober 1956 with Israeli paratroop drops in the Sinai peninsula, fol­\nlowed by mobile columns striking deep into Egyptian territory. tfhe\nnext day, 30 October, Francis Gary Powers conducted mission 1314.\nHe overflew Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and finally the Sinai.Jwhere he\nphotographed black puffs of smoke from the fighting between Israel\nand Egypt. Adana-based U-2s were in the air for the next two days\nfilming the Suez Canal area@fld neighboring countrie£f3\nThe United Kingdom and France entered the fray on the evening\nof 31 October with bombing raids against major Egyptian airfields.\nThe Anglo-French bombing campaign continued for the next 48\nhours. Ear)Y on the morning of 1 November, an Adana-based U-2, pi­\nloted by LWilliam Hall, took off to gather intelligence on the\nAnglo-French military activity. After photographing Cyprus, Hal]\nflew south to the Sinai Desert, where he made several passes to obtain\ncomplete coverage of the Israeli-Egyptian fighting there. [He then\nheaded west to Cairi passing directly over the main Egyptian airbase\n\" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\n\" Telephone calls, 28 October 1956, DOE Diary, DDEL.\n'' Powers, Operation Overflight, pp. 308-309; Mission folder 1314 (30 October 1956),\nOSA records, job 67-B-972, box I (TS Codeword).\n-Secret"
  },
  {
   "n": 131,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p131.jpg",
   "text": "Mission 1316, 1 November 1956\nTurkey\nCyprus ',\n(U.K.)\n'·\nMediterranean Sea\nlncirlik Airbase\n_/\\\no/\nt.\n</\n\\\nf\nSyria\n\\ t\nSinai\n{1\nEgypt('!\n(~ Pemnsula /f\nSaudi\nArabia\n:I---'----r-...&.100-_--,,oo....,.\n1====\\=°'=l=(\"\"====l ( Jz\n........,~..\n...._...........\n1t:=============:::l\nSecret NOFORN\nl=:=:±:::::::::=========== ==:!J\n7:14'\"\"(l!OOa<131 44?•"
  },
  {
   "n": 132,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p132.jpg",
   "text": "119\nSec, et NOFOA~\nChapter 3\nat Almaza, where he filmed neatly arranged rows of Egyptian military .' ============::i\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\nr:\n-\n! U-2 photography of Egyptian\naircraft. Contmumg past Cairo to film another a1rfield,U:lal.!Jturned · airbase at Almaza,\nsoutheast and then north to fly along the Nile, again crossing directly i 29 October 1956\n,,.........\nover Almaza. The photography from this leg of the mission rev,eaJed\nthe burning wreckage of the Egyptian aircraft During the short period\nof time that had passed betweenCHall's tw~ passes, a combined\nAnglo-French air armada had attacked the airbase. When shown the\nbefore and after photos of Almaza, President Eisenhower told Arthur\nLundahl: \"Ten-minute reconnaissance, now that's a goal to shoot\nfor!\" )4 Eisenhower was pleased with the aerial photography but\n~\n'\"' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); i3eschloss (Mayday. p. 138) mistak­\nenly identifi~ this quote as coming from the British, but they did not receive copies of\nthese photos:__i\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 133,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p133.jpg",
   "text": "120\nSeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nangered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He\nquickly called for a cease-fire ~and denied the United Kingdom any\nfurther U-2 photographs of the Middle Eaaj\nThe l November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photo­\ngraphed Anglo-French preparations to invade Egypt. President\nEisenhower was informed of this impending invasion on Sunday, 4\nNovember. On the following day, British and French paratroopers\ndropped near Port Said at the north end of the Suez Canal. This action\nprompted Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin to send messages to\nFrance, Britain, and Israel warning that the Soviet Union was ready to\nuse force to crush the aggressors. 55\nEarly on the morning of election day, 6 November, the\nAnglo-French invasion armada arrived at Port Said and began landing\ntroops. Back in Washington President Eisenhower met with Allen\nDulles to discuss the deepening international crisis. Worried that the\nSoviet Union might be poised to intervene in the war, the President\nordered Dulles to have the Adana-based U-2s fly over Syria to see\nwhether the Soviets were moving planes to Syrian airbases in\npreparation for a strike against the forces attacking Egypt. The answer\nto Eisenhower's question came much sooner than expected because\non the previous day a U-2 had already overflown Syria before making\na run across northern Egypt. The film from this flight had reached\nWiesbaden for processing and readout during the night. The results\nwere in the hands of the PARAMOUNT Committee by midmorning\non 6 November, while the President was motoring to Gettysburg to\ncast his ballot. By the time the President returned to the White House\nby helicopter at noon, Colonel Goodpaster was waiting for him with\nan answer: there were no Soviet aircraft in Syria. Because of the\nPresident's concern about possible Soviet moves, Syria was the target\nof 14 additional U-2 flights between 7 November and 18 December\n1956.56\nThe increasing reliance on Adana-based U-2s for coverage of the\nMiddle East during the Suez Crisis made it difficult for the\nphotointerpreters to supply timely information. When Detachment B\naircraft returned to their base at Adana, there were no film-processing\n\" Donald Neff, Warriors at Sue:-.: Eisenhower Takes America intv the Middle East (New\nYork: Simon and Schuster. 1981 ), p. 403.\n'\" Memorandum of Conference. 6 November 1956. Eisenhower Diary, Whitman File,\nDDEL (U); OSA History, chap. 19, annex 120, p. 3 (TS Codeword).\niearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 134,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p134.jpg",
   "text": "121\n~.,et NOFORP4\nChapter 3\nfacilities available, and the film had to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding\na 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the crisis, this\ndelay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US\ndecisionmakers needed a more rapid response. On 29 October,\nRichard Bissell ordered Lundahl to establish a film-processing facility\nat Adana. Two PlD employees went to Adana on 13 November to set\nup the facility, and two photointerpreters moved from Wiesbaden to\nAdana to help in the effort. Forward processing was, however, ham­\npered by the location of the Adana facility on a tlat, arid plain in\nsouthern Turkey, 35 miles from the Mediterranean at the very end of a\nlong supply line.\nThe PID team obtained and outfitted a trailer for film processing,\nbut many problems had to be overcome. The first major problem was\nobtaining enough clean water. Detachment B personnel, therefore,\npurchased large amounts of borax locally for use in purifying water.\nIn fact, they bought so much borax on the local market that one of\nthem was arrested by the Turkish police. who believed he was using\nthe chemical to make drugs. It was also difficult to obtain a constant\nsource of developers and fixers for processing the U-2 film, si nce the\nlarge Air Force supply facility at Wheelus AFB in Libya refused to\nprovide the needed photographic chemicals. When PIO personnel ac­\ncompanied processed film from Turkey to the United States, they re­\nturned to Turkey sitting atop cartons of chemicals for the next day's\nprocessing. At first, film was developed in improvised tanks using\nflimsy wooden spools and hand-turned cranks to move the film\nthrough the solutions. Later, the Adana facility moved from its trailer\nto a building and received more up-to-date processing equipment. As\nwas the case with the photo lab in Germany, the Adana lab's person­\nnel came from the Agency and the armed forces.\n57\nThe need to produce very timely intelligence diminished after\nthe British and French agreed to a cease-fire on 7 November 1956. By\nthe end of the month, foreign troops began evacuating Egyptian terri­\ntory, and the pressure on the Adana photointerpretation unit eased.\nThe facility remained in existence, however, and was used twice in\nDecember 1956 and 11 times in the first half of 1957. It was then\nplaced in caretaker status, for emergency use only.\n\" NP/C History. vol. I. pp. 53-54 (S): Lun<hhl ~nd Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 135,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p135.jpg",
   "text": "122\nSec,el NOFORN\nChapter 3\nRENEWED OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION\nThroughout the fall of 1956, U-2s provided valuable coverage of the\nMiddle East crisis, but they were not conducting their original mission\nof strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower\nhad halted all such overflights by his order of 10 July, and, in the\nmonths that followed, he remained unconvinced by CIA arguments in\nfavor of a resumption of overflights. On 17 September 1956, DDCI\nCabell and Richard Bissell went to the White House to ask President\nEisenhower to authorize more flights over the Soviet Union. Adm.\nArthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also at­\ntended the meeting. Bissell and Defense Department representatives\nreviewed the valuable intelligence from the July U-2 flights, and\nBissell then informed Eisenhower that many important intelligence re­\nquirements remained unfilled. To fill these requirements, Bissell not­\ned, would require photography of approximately 15 separate areas of\nthe Soviet Union. Pleading for the authority to resume overflights,\nBissell stressed that conditions for photography were becoming less\nfavorable as the days grew shorter. While the U-2 was then still safe\nfrom interception, he added, it might not be in the future. 5K\nPresident Eisenhower aclrnowledged the value of the U-2 but\nemphasized that the international political aspects of overflights re­\nmained his overriding concern. He said he would talk further with\nJohn Foster Dulles about the matter, noting that the Secretary of State\nhad at first seemed to belittle the political risk but had later found it\nincreasingly worrisome.\nA little more than two weeks later, on 3 October, when the\nPresident again met with Bissell, Cabell, and Radford, John Foster\nDulles was also present. In opening the meeting, Eisenhower said he\nhad become discouraged regarding Project AQUATONE. Although\nhe had been assured that \"there would be a good chance of not being\ndiscovered on most, if not all, operations, just the opposite had\nproved true.\" The President observed that arguments in favor of re­\nsuming U-2 operations did not take world opinion into consideration.\nHe added that great efforts had been made for many years \"to create\nan opinion in the world that we are not truculent and do not want\nwar,\" and, if knowledge of the U-2 overflights got out, world opinion\nwould view them as \"provocative and unjustified.\" 59\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference. 17 September 1956, WHOSS,\nAlpha, DDEL (TS).\n,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 3 October 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,\nDDEL (TS).\n-Se&FOt"
  },
  {
   "n": 136,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p136.jpg",
   "text": "123\nSecretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially\nagreed with the President's comments, he thought that \"really impor­\ntant results\" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He,\nnevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI\nCabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer\nthan the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish\na reference bank of geographic and manmade features. Siding with\nCabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the need for more intelligence to\nmake estimates better.\nPresident Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments.\nAlthough willing to consider extensions of the radar-seeking ferret\nflights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained op­\nposed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union.\nEvents in Eastern Europe in the fall of l 956 helped to change the\nPresident's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away from a\nconfrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to\nfind itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demon­\nstrations led to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy\n• on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew\nfrom Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November,\nhowever, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were\ngetting out of hand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his\nnation's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact-and ordered Soviet\ntroops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President\nEisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA re­\nquests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian\nrebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights of that nation, in­\ncluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made.\n60\nAlthough President Eisenhower had not been willing to allow\noverflights during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union's actions in\nHungary convinced him to authorize renewed overflights of the\nSoviet Bloc, a decision that was made easier by his reelection by a\nlarge margin in early November. Initially. however, the President only\nauthorized overflights of Eastern Europe and Soviet border regions,\nnot the deep penetration overflights that had been requested by CIA.\nAt a 15 November 1956 meeting with Acting Secretary of State\nHerbert Hoover, Jr. (John Foster Dulles was recovering from cancer\n~• Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).\n-5-ec,-et NOFORN\nChapter 3"
  },
  {
   "n": 137,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p137.jpg",
   "text": "124\nSec,et NOf6ftN\nChapter 3\nsurgery). JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford. DCI Allen Dulles, and\nRichard Bissell, Eisenhower explained why he refused to allow over­\nflights of the Soviet Union: \"Everyone in the world says that, in the\nlast six weeks, the United States has gained a place it hasn't held\nsince World War fl. To make trips now would cost more than we\nwould gain in form of solid information.\" Hoover agreed and rnoted,\n\"If we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic.\"\nTom between his desire to maintain a \"correct and moral\" position\nand his wish to know what the Soviet Union was up to. the Pres.idem\nfinally authorized several overflights of Eastern Europe and the\nSoviet border, \"but not the deep one,\" adding that the aircraft should\n\"stay as close to the border as possible.\" (>I\nThe first of these flights, mission 4016 on 20 November 1956,\nwas the first overflight of Soviet territory since IO July. This mission\nleft Adana and flew east over Iran, then reversed and flew west along\nthe Soviet-Iranian border to Soviet Armenia. where it crossed into the\nSoviet Union and photographed Yerevan. An electrical malfunction\nthen forced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, to return to Adana. Soviet\ninterceptor aircraft made sev.eral unsuccessful attempts to reach this\nU-2, and the Soviet Government sent a secret protest note to\nh.\n6'\nWas ington. ­\nOn IO December. Bulgaria was the target of two U-2 missions.\none (40 I 8) from Detachment B at Adana and another (2029) from\nDetachment A at Giebelstadt. Bulgarian fighter aircraft made lO dif­\nferent attempts to intercept the first mission. but the flight proceeded\nwithout difficulty.\n6\nJ\nThe second flight came close to crashing but not through the ef­\nforts of interceptors. The pilot of mission 2029 was Carmine Vito,\nwho had flown the first U-2 mission over Moscow on 5 July. He was\nknown co his colleagues as the Lemon-Drop Kid because he always\ncarried these hard candies in the knee pocket of his flight suit. Despite\n•• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. ~ovember IS.\n1956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS): Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 374.\n•' M ission folder 40 16. 20 November 1956. OSA records. job 67-8-972. bo)( 7 (TS\nCodeword).\n•·' Mission folders 1019 (IO December 1956) and 4018 (10 December 1956). OSA re­\ncords. job 67-B-328. box 7 and job 67-B-972. box 7 (TS Codeword).\n_secret"
  },
  {
   "n": 138,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p138.jpg",
   "text": "125\nwarnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet face­\nplate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate\ncandy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10\nDecember, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force en­\nlisted man who oversaw his preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the\nrighthand knee pocket of Vito's flight suit, unaware that this pocket\nalso contained Vito's supply of lemon drops. After he took off. Vito\nbegan indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About midway\ninto the mission, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth\nwhat he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate,\nhe began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it hard no\nflavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops.\nAlthough tempted to bite down, Vito decided instead to reopeIn his\nfaceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spicting the object\ninto his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pill wi1th its\nlethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass. had\nstood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria\nwould have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and\nwould probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.\"\"\n. . . _ Detachment A's security officer overheard Vito relating: the\nL-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and promptly reported\nthe conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call\nreached Washington. James Cunningham immediately ordered L--pills\nplaced in boxes so that there would be no chance of mistaking them\nfor anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another\nthree years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachmernt B.\nCol. William Shelton, raised an important question that had niever\nbeen considered: what would happen if an L-pill with its volatile con­\ntents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that\nsuch an accident would result in the death of the pilot, James\nCunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to\nthe Technical Services Division (TSO) for a better idea. By this time\nthe state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with cJ1lgal,\nan extremely deadly shellfish toxin. The needle was hidden in a tiny\nhole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison--nee­\ndle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilo1t had\nto use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more\nh\n6s\noverfl.1g ts.\n\"' Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Carmine Vito. interview by Donald E.\nWelzenbach. Washington, DC. 7 May 1986 (S).\n~• Cable from Detachment B to Development Projects Division (DPD). 4 January 1960;\ncabk: from DPD to Detachment 8, 7 January 1960. OSA records, job 67-B-972. box 18,\n\"Operation KNIFE EDGE\" (TS Codeword).\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 3"
  },
  {
   "n": 139,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p139.jpg",
   "text": "Sceret NOFORN\nChapter 3\n126\nAlthough the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956\ncaused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15\nDecember 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bomb­\ners photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash over\nthe Far Eastern coast of the Soviet Union (as part of the Air Force's\nOperation BLACK KNIGHT). President Eisenhower had approved\nthe mission after being told by the Air Force that the high-speed\nRB-57Ds would probably not be detected. 66\nReacting strongly to the Soviet protest. the President told\nSecretary of State Dulles on 18 December that he was going to \"order\ncomplete stoppage of this entire business.\" As for a reply to the\nSoviet protest, Dulles said, \"I think we will have to admit this was\ndone and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it.\" Dulles noted that\n\"our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment.\"\nEisenhower agreed, noting that this was no time to be provocative. He\nthen instructed Colonel Goodpaster to call Secretary of Defense\nWilson, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Radford, and DCI Dulles to\norder: \"Effective immediately, there are to be no flights by US recon­\nnaissance aircraft over Iron Curtain countries.\" 67\nFlights along the borders of Iron Curtain countries continued,\nhowever, and, on 22 December 1956, Detachment B flew the first\nmission (4019) by a U-2 equipped for electronic intercept. The elec­\ntronic-detection equipment known as the System-V unit (see appendix\nC) was installed in the bay normally used by the main camera, and the\nplane flew along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian\nSea and on to Afghanistan. The System-V unit worked well. 68\nEarly in 1957, a mission along the Soviet border accidentally\nturned into an overflight. On 18 March 1957, a U-2 collecting elec­\ntronic intelligence along the Soviet southern border entered Soviet\n•~ Goodpaster interview (S).\n'' Telephone calls 18 December 1956. DDE Diary. DDEL. (U); Andrew J. Goodpaster.\nMemorandum for the Record, 18 December l956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. down­\ngraded to S); the Soviet protest note of 15 December 1956 and the U.S. reply of I I\nJanuary 1957 are contained in .. Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes ...\nUS Department of Stare Bulletin. vol. 36. 28 January l 957. p. 135. Although Dulles\"s ini­\ntial inclination had been to offer an apology. the U.S. reply stated that the \"only autho­\nrized United States Air Force flights in the general area of the Sea of Japan were normal\ntraining activities.\"\n.. Mission folder 4019 (22 December 1956). OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS\nCodeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 140,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p140.jpg",
   "text": "127\nairspace because of compass error compounded by a slight error in\nthe pilot's dead reckoning. Because of heavy cloud cover, the pilot,\nJames W. Cherbonneaux, did not realize he was over the Soviet\nUnion until he saw Soviet fighters attempting to intercept him. These\nattempts at interception once again demonstrated the Soviets' ability\nto track the U-2 and their inability to harm it. 69\nAt this point in early 1957, the U-2 program was in limbo.\nAlthough the President would not allow U-2s to fly their primary mis­\nsion of reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, he did not cancel the pro­\ngram and continued to authorize flights along Soviet borders. The\nCIA's overhead reconnaissance program also faced a renewed bid by\nthe Air Force, which now had its own growing U-2 fleet, to gain con­\ntrol of the overflight program in the spring of 1957. The uncertainty\nsurrounding the future of the project made planning and budgeting\nextremely difficult. In April 1957, Richard Bissell asked the DCI and\nDDCI to push for a decision on whether the U-2 program was to con­\ntinue in civilian hands and what its scope was to be. In briefing papers\nprepared for the DCI, Bissell argued for maintaining a nonmilitary\noverflight capability, which could \"maintain greater security, employ\ndeeper cover, use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside military\ncontrol, and, therefore, make possible more plausible denial of US\nmilitary responsibility in the face of any Soviet charges.\" In urging\nthe resumption of overflights, Bissell stated that four U-2 missions\nover border regions of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe had been\ndetected by the Soviets without causing any diplomatic protest. He\nalso noted that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign\nIntelligence Activities had unanimously recommended the resumption\nof overflights.70\nAll of these issues were discussed on 6 May 1957, when\nPresident Eisenhower met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald\nQuarles, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining, Acting Secretary\nof State Christian Herter, and three CIA officals-DCI Dulles, DDCI\nCabell, and Richard Bissell. The President expressed concern about\nthe impact of overflights on US-Soviet relations and about possible\nSoviet responses such as closing off access to Berlin. Although\n\"\" Information supplied by James W. Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Welzenbach (S);\nMission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS Codeword).\n'\" OSA History, chap. 4. pp. 15-16; annex 22 (TS Codeword).\nSec1 et NOFORN\nChapter 3\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 141,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p141.jpg",
   "text": "128\nieeret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nremaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union,\nEisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral\nareas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the\nSoviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights\ncould be staged from Pakistan if the Pakistani Government consent­\ned. The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over the\nU-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by\ncivilians \"during operations of this kind.\" 71\nThe President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the\nSoviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to\nlearn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union\nwas too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra­\ntion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis­\nsile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting-but\nno hard data-was available.\nEven after he had authorized the resumption of overflights,\nPresident Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He\npersonally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard\nBissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes\nmarked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord­\ning to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk\nfor detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving\nas a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his\nshoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi­\nnate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan.71\nRADAR-DECEPTIVE \"DIRTY BIRDS\"\nOne additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho­\nrized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that\nSoviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May\n1957 meeting with the President, Richard Bissell reported on the\nprogress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conft:rence with the President. 6 May 1957\n(TS); \"Record of Action-Meeting of May 6. 1957,\" WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).\n'' Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday. p. 140.\nSeoFat"
  },
  {
   "n": 142,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p142.jpg",
   "text": "129\n'\"'Sll,tc et NQFQRN\nChapter 3\nChordwise wire\n/Spanwise wire\nabsorption devices for the U-2. Once these devices_ were install,ed on\nthe operational U-2s, he explained, the \"majority of incidents would\nbe undetected.\"\n73\nWork on methods of reducing the U-2's vulnerability to radar de­\ntection had begun in the fall of 1956 as the result of President\nEisenhower's disenchantment with the overflight program following\nSoviet detection and tracking of the first series of U-2 missions. The\nCIA proprietary firm Scientific Engineering Institute was condutcting\nthis research under a project codenamed RAINBOW. SEI Chief\nEngineer Dr. Franklin A. Rodgers, formerly of MIT, converted the\ntheories of Harvard physicist Edward Purcell into systems that ,could\nbe used on aircraft. SEI's radar-deception system consisted of a series\nof attachments to the U-2. First bamboo poles and later fiberglass\nrods were attached to the wings. where they would not interfere with\nthe control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely circling\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. 6 Ma:y 1957\n(TS); .. Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957,\" WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).\n\"Trapeze• antiradar attachments\nto the U-2\nSU&Fet"
  },
  {
   "n": 143,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p143.jpg",
   "text": "130\nSec. et NOFetU~\nChapter 3\nthe aircraft, was a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced ferrite\nbeads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture incoming\n70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the loop or weaken them\nso much that they would not register as a valid radar return. This con­\nfiguration was called the trapeze and was not very successful.\nA second approach, tested in early 1958, involved the use of\nplastic material containing a printed circuit designed to absorb radar\npulses in the 65- to 85-MHz range. Nicknamed \"wallpaper,\" this ma­\nterial was glued to parts of the U-2's fuselage, nose, and tail.\nAlthough the \"trapeze\" and \"wallpaper\" systems provided protection\nagainst some Soviet radars, the systems proved ineffective against ra­\ndars operating below 65-MHz or above 85-MHz. Furthermore, both\nof these additions degraded the U-2's performance. The weight and\ndrag of \"trapeze\" reduced the aircraft's operating ceiling by 1,500\nfeet, and \"wallpaper\" sometimes caused engines to overheat. 74\nSEI's research results were tested by another firm known as\nEdgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G), which was also composed\nof MIT faculty members. Under an Air Force contract to evaluate ra­\ndars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian Springs,\nNevada, not far from Area 51. Although Kelly Johnson had been\nclosely involved with the radar deception project since its early days,\nhe cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that\nmade his aircraft less airworthy. (Johnson's dislike of the antiradar at­\ntachments was reflected in the unofficial nickname for aircraft that\nhad been so modified-\"dirty birds.\") After Lockheed mechanics\nhad mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a\nLockheed test pilot would fly the plane over EG&G's Indian Springs\ninstallation. This was little more than a series of radar sets and a\ntrailer containing instrumentation. EG&G technicians could thus re­\ncord and evaluate the U-2's radar returns as it traversed a specified\ncourse over their facility. 75\nThis method of testing radar-deceptive modifications proved\nboth time consuming and dangerous. During a test flight on 2 April\n1957, the \"wallpaper\" modification acted as insulation around the\n\" Records of the Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records\n(TS Codeword).\n\" References to EG&G programs for the U-2 are contained in the later Convair contracts\nfor Projects FISH and KINGFISH. OSA records. job 67-B-415, box I (TS Codeword).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 144,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p144.jpg",
   "text": "131\nSHret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nengine of the U-2 known as article 341, causing it to overheat and\ntlameout. Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot\nRobert Sieker bailed out but was struck and killed in midair lby the\nU-2's tailplane. The aircraft crashed in an area of Nevada so remote\nthat Area 51 search teams needed four days to locate the wreoekage.\nThe extensive search attracted the attention of the press. and a\n·wallpaper\"\nSec,el"
  },
  {
   "n": 145,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p145.jpg",
   "text": "132\nSaaret NOF6ftl'II\nChapter 3\nWreckage of Article 341,\n2 April 1957.\n12 April 1957 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune was headliined,\n\"Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Ca.lied\nSuper Snooper.\" 76\n•\nBecause of its large wingspan. an out-of-control U-2 tended to\nenter a classical flat spin before ground contact. This slowed descent\nand actually lessened the impact. If there was no fire after impact, the\nremains of crashed U-2s were often salvageable, as was the case with\nthe wreckage of article 34 1. Kelly Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works\nused the wreckage, along with spares and salvaged parts of other\ncrashed U-2s, co produce another flyable airframe for about\n$185,000.\n77 The U-2's ability to survive a crash in fairly good co1ndi­\ntion should have been noted by the Development Projects Staff for\nconsideration in its contingency plans for a loss over hostile terriItory\nbecause the equipment on board the aircraft could easily compromise\nthe weather research cover story.\nThe loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro­\ntotype \" dirty bird\" U-2, led Kelly Johnson to suggest that Lockheed\ninstall a large boom at the Indian Springs radar test facility. Using the\n,. Accident folder. cr-ish of 2 April 1957, OSA records (S).\n\" Lockheed contracts. OSA Records (S)."
  },
  {
   "n": 146,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p146.jpg",
   "text": "133\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nboom, which could lift entire airframes 50 feet in the air, technicians\ncould change the airframe's attitude and run radar tests almost contin­\nuously without having to fuel and fly the plane.n\nBy the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception system\nwas complete, and in July the first \"dirty bird\" (DB) arrived at\nDetachment B. The first operational use of this aircraft occurred on\n21 July l 957 in mission 4030 over Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On 31 July,\nthe same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a total of\nnine DB missions over the USSR. The antiradar system did not prove\nvery effective, and its use was curtailed in May 1958.79\nTHE NEW DETACHMENT C\nOn 8 June 1957, a U-2 took off from Eielson Air Force Base in\nAlaska to conduct the first intentional overflight of the Soviet Union\nsince December 1956. This mission broke new ground in two re­\nspects: it was the first overflight conducted from American soil and\n• -the first by the new Detachment C.\nDetachment C (known officially as Weather Reconnaissance\nSquadron, Provisional-3) was composed of the third group of pilots to\ncomplete their training in Nevada. In the autumn of 1956, this third\ndetachment needed a new base because Area 51 was about to become\nthe training site for a large number of Air Force pilots who would fly\nthe 29 U-2s purchased by the Air Force. The Agency decided that the\nbest location for Detachment C would be the Far East and begao\nlooking for bases there.\nEven without the arrival of the Air Force pilots, Detachment C\ncould not have stayed in Nevada much longer. In June 1957, the en­\ntire facility had to be evacuated because the Atomic Energy\nCommission was about to conduct a series of nuclear tests whose fall­\nout was expected to contaminate the Groom Lake facility. All remain­\ning CIA personnel, materiel, and aircraft were transferred to Edwards\nAFB, California, and became known as Detachment G.\n\" Ibid (S).\n,., Cunningham interview (TS Codeword}.\nSoe11et"
  },
  {
   "n": 147,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p147.jpg",
   "text": "134\nGee. et NOl'OFUQ\nChapter 3\nThe search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to\nask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the\ndetachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the\nbase for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK\nKNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not\nwish to locate another one there and denied the request. The Agency\nthen turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C\nto use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japan.ese\nGovernment received no notification of the proposed deployment be­\ncause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili­\ntary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early\n1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families\nof Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas\ntours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on\nthe base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded\nJapan.\"\"\nDetachment C began conducting m1ss1ons in June 1957 alfter\nseveral aircraft and pilots flew to Eielson Air Force Base near\nFairbanks, Alaska. Air Force rndar order-of-battle reports and NSA\nstudies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,\nwi th antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those\nin the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective. To take ad­\nvantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions\nfrom Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air­\ncraft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable\nto photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the\nKamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never\nentered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on\n19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined ev;ery\nthird frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars.\nbut there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three\nmonths during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de­\ntachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/ 16 September 1957\nachieved excellent results. The radar-deception devices proved in1ef­\nfective, however. as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed\nby five fighters.s'\n. , OSA History. ch.ip. l5, pp. 2. 16-19: chap. 16. p. I (TS Co<lcword).\n\" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957). 6005 C!0 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September\nl 957). OSA records. job 67-8-3'.!8. bo.~ 7 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 148,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p148.jpg",
   "text": "135\n-$ee,Fet NOFORN\nChapter 3\nDETACHMENT B FLIGHTS FROM PAKISTAN\nThe most important series of overflights in the summer of l 957 were\nthose that Detachment B staged to gather intelligence on the Soviet\nUnion's guided missile and nuclear programs. President Eisenhower\nhad approved these overflights at the meeting on 6 May 1957, pro­\nvided that Pakistan allowed the U-2s to operate from its territory (the\n•\ntaroets were too far away from the U-2 base in Turkey).\nRichard Bissell 's\nersonal assistant, and\nmet with President\n--;l;--:::s-;-:-k-:-=--\nr- M.--:.:-i==--=:-\ni me' M.--:,,-i=-· s7 =-=\n--=--:--:yn\n~eed Suhra ward y. and\nand:.-e:-::\nrza, •r=--=r:-:-=--=-\n01'\"'=cer:-riruse -=-=::-l'.-c:-::a\nAnny Commander Gen. Ayub Khan between 3 and 7 June 1957 and\nreceived permission to operate from Lahore. The airfield at Peshawar,\na more desirable location, was not available because of repair work.\nDetachment B at Ankara ferried four of its U-2s, two of which were\ndirty birds, to Lahore. A C-124 brought in eight pilots and ground\ncrews to prepare for missions over the Soviet Union and the People·s\nRepublic of China (PRC) beginning on 4 August {Operation SOFf\nTOUCH). During a 23-day period, these aircraft made nine flights:\nseven over the USSR and two over the PRC. Although one of the\nseven flights over the USSR was a failure because the camera\n. malfunctioned after taking only 125 exposures, the remaining mis­\nsions over Central Asia were a complete success. producing a bo­\nnanza of information that kept scores of photointerpreters busy for\nmore than a year.•~\nThe 5 August flight, a dirty bird piloted by Buster Edens. was\nthe first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of\nthe Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was certain\njust where the range was located, so the U-2 pilot followed the rail\nlines in the area. As a result, the plane did not pass directly over the\nrangehead and obtained only oblique photography.\nAlthough known in the West today as Tyuratam, this missile in­\nstallation had no name when it was first photographed in August\n1957. In preparation for a briefing to President Eisenhower on the\nSOFf TOUCH photography, Dino Brugioni, an assistant to PIO chief\nArthur Lundahl, examined all the existing maps of the area to see if\nhe could find a place name for the missile base. Only one map. made\nby the Gennans during World War 11, showed a community in the vi­\ncinity of the missile facility. The settlement's name was Tyuratam.\nwhich means \"arrow burial ground\" in the Kazakh language, and this\n'' OSA History. chap. 12, pp. 19-20 (TS Codeword): NP/C Hiswry. vol. 1. pp. 159-161\n(Sl.\nSeccet"
  },
  {
   "n": 149,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p149.jpg",
   "text": "---\n•\n•\nOperation SOFT TOUCH Overflights, August 1957\nr-'t -\n-\n-\nMission 4036\n8 August\n/\n• -\n• -\nMission 4039 12 August\n/.r,.,,- - ··-- Mission 4045 21 August\n•\n• •••• Mission 4048 21 August\n••• •• • - Mission 4049 22 August\n--- Mission 4050 22 August\n-\n-\n-\nMission 4051 22 August\n-\n• -\nMission 4058 28 August\nIla\nPa\nSecret NOFORN\n,\n,\nI\nI\n,\nI ,\nI I Sinkiang\n_,' u· h\n1 1\n,g ur\n1 1• Autonomous\nI I\nRegion\nII\nII\n~\n/I\n/\n......... ..."
  },
  {
   "n": 150,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p150.jpg",
   "text": "137\n....eeret N6f'OPUQ\nChapter 3\nU-2 photography of 1\"yuratam\nMissile Testing RangEi\nwas the name Brugioni gave the missile base. Official Soviet releases\nconcerning this base have always referred to it as Baykonur, but the\ncommunity of Baykonyr is actually more than 200 miles north of\nTyuratam.\n11\nWhile PID was still analyzing the SOFT TOUCH photography,\nthe Soviet Union announced the successful launch of an interconti­\nnental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Baykonyr (Tyuratam). On 26\nAugust l 957, the Soviet news agency TASS stated that a \"su­\nper-long-range multistage intercontinental ballistic rocket\" had been\nsuccessfully tested, adding \"it is now possible to send missiles to any\n\"' Lundahl and Brugioni intcrv i<!w (TS Codeword).\n&ecuet"
  },
  {
   "n": 151,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p151.jpg",
   "text": "138\nSet1 et N6F8RN\nChapter 3\nSemipa/atinsk Nuclear\nWeapons Proving Ground,\n22 August 1957\npart of the world.\" ,s, The Soviet announcement made the intelligence\ncommunity want even more information on Tyuratam, and a second\nU-2 piloted by Edwin K. Jones flew over the area on 28 August 1957,\njust one week after the Soviet ICBM launch. This mission obtained\nexcellent venical photographs of the main launch complex. and\nphotointerpreters soon determined that the Soviets had only one\nlaunchpad at Tyuratam. The base was not photographed again until 9\nJuly 1959, at which time it still had only one launch pad, although\ntwo more were under construction.\"\n5\nOn 20 and 21 August 1957, U-2s conducted the first overflights\nof the Soviet nuclear testing grounds al Semipalatinsk, north-north­\nwest of Lake Balkhash. The first mission. piloted by Sammy V. C.\nSnider, passed over part of the provi ng grounds, flew on to\nNovokuznetsk, and then proceeded to Tomsk, where it began its re­\nturn leg that included coverage of a very large uranium-processing fa­\ncility at the new city of Berezovskiy. In the second mission, James\nCherbonneaux flew directly over the Semipalatinsk proving grounds\nonly four hours before a half-megaton device was detonated. In fact,\nthe U-2 unknowingly photographed the aircraft that was to drop the\n\"' .. Is Russia A~ad in Missil.! Raet.'... US News and World Report. 6 September 1957. pp.\n30-3.3.\n\" Mission fokkrs 4058 (28 August 1957) an<l 4125 (9 July 1959). OSA recor<ls. job\n67-8-972. boxes 8 and 11 (TS Codeword).\n6e&FOt"
  },
  {
   "n": 152,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p152.jpg",
   "text": "139\nSec, et N6f6filN\nChapter 3\nOn its way to Semipalatinsk. the 21 August m1ss1on tle:w a\nsearch pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for an­\nother Soviet missi le-related installation and made the first photo­\ngraphs of what was later determined to be the new missile test center\nat Saryshagan. This facility was used to test radars against incoming\nmissiles fired from Kapustin Yar, I .400 miles to the west. Sarysh:agan\nlater became the center for the development of the Soviet Union's ad­\nvanced antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon system.\nOn 23 August 1957, DDCI Cabell, Richard Bissell, and Air\nForce Chief of Staff Twining met with President Eisenhower to re:port\non the results of Operation SOFT TOUCH. They showed the\nPresident some of the photographic results of the earlier missions and\nreported on the effects of the antiradar measures. Although the\nantiradar measures had not proved successful, the photographic yield\nfrom the missions was extremely valuable. Bissell then informed! the\n·President that the SOFT TOUCH operation was just about to con­\nclude with the transfer of the aircraft back to Adana. He asked per­\nmission for one of the U-2s to make another overflight of the Soviet\nUnion on this return trip, but the President denied the request. not\nwishing to conduct any more overflights than were necessary.~'\nTHE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A\nDuring the summer of 1957, all overflights of the Soviet Union were\nconducted by either Detachment B or Detachment C. Detachment A\nin Germany was a less desirable starting point for overfl ights of the\nSoviet Union because such missions had to cross Eastern Europe first,\nincreasing the likelihood of detection and diplomatic protests.\nFurthermore, the Soviet Union's air defense and radar networks were\nstrongest along its western borders. so Detachment B missions over\nthe southern portion of the Soviet Union and Detachment C missions\n-\nMission folder 4045 (10 August 1957) and 4050 (21 August 1957). OSA records. job\n67-B-972. box 3 (TS Codeword).\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record, 23 August 1957. WHOSS. Alpha.\nDDEL (TS)."
  },
  {
   "n": 153,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p153.jpg",
   "text": "140\nSeuet NOFORP•\nChapter 3\nin the Far East were less risky than those conducted by Detachment\nA. Finally, the main target of U-2 photography after the bomber issue\nreceded was Soviet missile and nuclear progress. The testing areas for\nthese weapons were located in the vast open spaces of the south-cen­\ntral and eastern portions of the Soviet Union, which lay beyond the\nrange of Detachment A's aircraft.\nThe decline in importance of Detachment A had begun with the\nPresident's standdown order of IO July I 956. During the next three\nmonths, the detachment conducted only 11 missions, all over the\nMediterranean region rather than the original target of the Soviet\nUnion, and the slow pace of activity and change in mission adversely\naffected pilot morale. One of the detachment's aircraft was lost in a\ncrash on 17 September, killing pilot Howard Carey and garnering un­\nwanted publicity. Conditions improved when the detachment moved\nto the newly renovated facility at Giebelstadt in early October 1956,\nbut security now became a problem there. Detachment A personnel\ndiscovered that a long, black Soviet-Bloc limousine was parked at the\nend of the Giebelstadt runway whenever the U-2s took off.:s,s\nDuring the next year, Detachment A mounted only four over­\nflights. The first two were over Eastern Europe: one over Bulgaria on\n10 December 1956 and the other over Albania on 25 April 1957.\nThen a long period of inactivity folllowed, ending with a third mission\non 11 October 1957, which conducted electronic surveillance of\nSoviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of\nDetachment A, mission 2040 on l 3 October 1957, flew north over\nNorway to the Bering Sea, turned southeast to overfly Murmansk, and\nthen exited to the north, returning to Germany via Norway.\n89\nAlthough the final missions of Detachment A achieved excellent\nresults. project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe\nwas not a satisfactory location for overflights of the Soviet Union and\nhad notified Detachment A on 20 September 1957 that its operations\nwould cease in November. By 15 November 1957. all of the detach­\nment's personnel and aircraft had returned to the United States.\nDuring Detachment A's 17-month period of operations, seven pilots\n\"\" OSA History. chap. 11, pp. -U-42 (TS Codeword).\n\"\" Mission folder.; 40 18 (JO December 1956). 2036 (25 April 1957). 2037 ( II October\n1957). 2040 (13 October 1957). OSA records. job 67-8-972. boll 7, and job 67-8-328, box\n6 {TS Codeword).\n--sec,et -­"
  },
  {
   "n": 154,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p154.jpg",
   "text": "0\n0\nFinal Overflight by Detachment A, 13 October 1957\n1\\)0\n200 K~ome<e,,\ntOO\n200Miles\nNorwegian\nSea\nBarents Sea\nKola\nPeninsula\n'1'v\nSweden f\n/\nFinlaind\n~ '\nGulf\nof\nBothnia\nJ\n;\n_,..');,,• • ~\n.A HEl$1NIO\n_J\n~\no <7~ [.}·•..,,1 .,...,..r~\n_g,,-\nGulfot Fi.mand\nBaltic Sea\nSecret NOFORN\nn•1.a <8009501 4-92"
  },
  {
   "n": 155,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p155.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 3\n142\nhad flown a total of 23 missions: six over the Soviet Union, five over\nEastern Europe, and most of the remaining 12 missions over the\nMediterranean area.')()\nCOOPERATION WITH NORWAY\nThe final missions of Detachment A had one unforeseen result: the\nbeginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian\nIntelligence Service on the U-2 program. Norwegian radars tracked\nthe overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957,\nand Col. Vilhelm Evan° Chief of the Norweoian Defense Staff\nIntelli 0 ence Service\nIn March 1958, Colonel\nEvang came to Washington and received a briefing from Arthur\nLundahl together with sanitized photos that did not reveal the altitude\nof the aircraft or the focal length of the camera. The Agency provided\nadditional photos to Norway during a visit by a PIO staff member in\nJuly.~'\nLater that year Norway agreed to provide an airfield for the\nUnited States to conduct U-2 flights that did not violate Soviet air­\nspace. On 15 September l\na Detachment B staging party arrived\nat Bodo Air Force Base\n·~~~-----c~~~~~\\this\nwas followed by an ELINT collection flight over international waters\n(the Kara Sea) on 25 October. On 6 November, the U-2 returned to\nAdana by conducting a lengthy ELINT collection flight along the bor­\nders of the Soviet Union and East Germany. During the initial portion\nof the mission, when the U-2 flew along the Soviet-Finnish border\nand then turned east over the Gulf of Finland to come within 60 miles\nof Leningrad (while remaining over international waters), the aircraft\nwas the target of 23 unsuccessful Soviet intercept attempts.92\n•., OSA History, chap. I [. p. 44: chap. I9. annex 120 (TS Codeword).\n\"' Ibid., chap. 11, pp. 44-45 (TS Codeword); NPIC History. vol. 3. pp. 447-8 (S) .\n•,, Mission folders !482 (9 October !958), 4092 (25 October !958). and 4093 (6\nNovember 1958). OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes 3 and 10.\n.Saeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 156,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p156.jpg",
   "text": "143\nSewet NOFOHN\nChapter 3\nDECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY\n·operation SOFf TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high\nwater mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment\nB staged one more overflight on IO September 1957. when a U-2 pi­\nloted by William Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin\nYar Missile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in\n1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ballistic missile\n(MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted\nits successful overflight of the lCBM impact site at Klyuchi, and\nOctober saw the final two overflights of Detachment A. After these\nmissions, penetration overflights became a rarity. There would be\nonly six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two. in 1959;\nand three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this\nperiod, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of flights along\nSoviet border areas that occasionally penetrated shon distances inside\nthe border. but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of\nauthorizing ''deep penetration·• overflights. which invariably brought\nprotests from Moscow.\nThe border flights took place under tight controls. Beginning in\nthe fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coor­\ndinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement:\n\" This is not a penetration overflight'' and warned about flying too\nclose to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down\nU-2 at Bodo, Norway\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 157,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p157.jpg",
   "text": "144\nSec1 et NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nU-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as\nwas the case on 27 October I 957, when electronic intelligence equip­\nment on a U-2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet\nairspace revealed 12 attempts at interception by Soviet fighters.'n\nThe sole U-2 overflight of 1958 was conducted by a dirty bird\nfrom Detachment C. On I March 1958, mission 6011 overflew the\nSoviet Far East and photographed the Trans-Siberian Railroad,\nSovetskaya Gavan', the Tatar Strait, and a strange installation at\nMalaya Sazanka, which was eventually determined to be a structure\nfor mating nuclear devices with their detonators. This was the first\nand only U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union staged from Japan.94\nOn 5 March 1958, the Soviet Union delivered a vigorous protest\nconcerning this mission, prompting President Eisenhower to tell\nColonel Goodpaster on 7 March to inform the CIA that U-2 flights\nwere to be \"discontinued, effective at once.\" 95 This standdown was\nto last more than 16 months, until July 1959. The Soviets had not\nbeen fooled by the antiradar devices carried by mission 601 l, as was\ndemonstrated by the detailed information about the mission contained\nin a Soviet aide-memoire delivered on 21 April I 958. It was clear that\ndirty bird aircraft were not effective and that Soviet radar operators\nhad little difficulty in tracking them. At this point, the Agency aban­\ndoned the use of the antiradar devices on the U-2. As a substitute,\nLockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant\nqualities, but this project also proved unsuccessful.\nThe U-2s were not the only cause for the Soviet protests that so\nvexed the President. On 27 June 1958, an Agency C-118 on a courier\nflight from Adana to Teheran strayed into Soviet Armenia and was\nshot down; the Soviets captured two survivors, including one Agency\nemployee. Ten days later the Air Force began launching balloons de­\nsigned to fly across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This new\nballoon project (known as WS-461 L) had been authorized by\nPresident Eisenhower on 25 June after Deputy Secretary of Defense\nDonald Quarles argued that a small number of balloons should be\n'\" Mission folder 4061 (27 October 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, bol\\ 8 (TS\nCodeword).\n•• Mission folder 6011 (1 March 1958), OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS\nCodeword).\n'\" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 7 March 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,\nDDEL (TS, declassified).\nG8GF8t"
  },
  {
   "n": 158,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p158.jpg",
   "text": "145\nlaunched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the\nwest-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed\nat an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned\nabruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to\n110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One of the key arguments\nthat convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles 's\nclaim that the balloons' \"chance of being detected is rather small and\ntheir identification or shootdown practically nil.\" 96\nRelease of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the\nBering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28\nJuly, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made,\ncamera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland.\nThe loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon\nwas equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its\ncamera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force\ntechnician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons\nshould cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he ad­\njusted regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after\n. 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three suc­\ncessive days. however, the technician forgot to reset the timing de­\nvices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three\nWS-461 L balloon payloads was recovered.'n\nThe Polish protest was quickly followed by a Soviet note pro­\ntesting the balloons' violation of the Soviet Union's airspace. Several\nmonths later, the Soviets placed the US balloon and photographic\nequipment on display in Moscow for the world's press. President\nEisenhower was angry that the Defense Department's assurances that\nthe balloons would not be detected had proved false. Even worse, one\nof the balloons had been recovered by the Poles because the Air Force\nhad disobeyed his instructions for the balloon project. When the Air\nForce had proposed the use of timers to bring down the balloons at\nthe end of the mission, Eisenhower had said no, fearing that a mal­\nfunction could cause the balloons to come down prematurely. Furious\nat the Air Force's insubordination, the President ordered General\n'\"' Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 25 June 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,\nDDEL (TS).\n'\" Donald E. Welzenbach. \"Observation Balloons and Weather Satellites,\" Studies in\nIntelligence 30 (Spring 1986): pp. 26-28 (S).\nSecret r'10FORN\nChapter 3\nSeere:t"
  },
  {
   "n": 159,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p159.jpg",
   "text": "146\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nEquipment from a WS-461L\nballoon on display in Moscow,\n11 October 1958\nGoodpaster on 29 July 1958 10 rell rhe Air Force that \" the project is\nto be discontinued at once and every cent thac has been made avail­\nable as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is 1to be\nimpounded and no further expenditures are to be made.\" \"'\nTwo days later Eisenhower followed up this order with a formal\nmemorandum co Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy telling him that\n\"there is disturbing evidence of a deterioration in the processes of\ndiscipline and responsibility within the armed forces.\" He cited, in\nparticular, \"unauthorized decisions which have apparently resulted in\ncertain balloons falling within the territory of the Communist Bloc\"\nand overflights over routes \"that contravened my standing orders.\"\n99\nOn 2 September I 958, there was another violation of Soviet ai r­\nspace when an unarmed Air Force EC-130 on an electronic intelligence\ncollection mission crossed from Turkey into Soviet Armenia and was\nshot down by Soviet fighter aircraft. Six of the men on board were\nkilled and the remaining 11 were never heard from again, despite State\nDepartment attempts to get the Soviet Union to reveal their fate.\"\"'\n\" Andrew J. Goodpaster, l\\lkmorandum for the Record. :!9 July 1958. WHOSS. Alpha,\nDDEL (S): Goodpa.~ter interview (S) .\n•,. Quo1ed in Ambrose. Eiserrhower: The President. pp. 475-476.\n\"\" \"US Rc:presen1a1ions to 1he Sovie! Government on C-130 Transport Shoe Down by\nSovie! Fighl<!r Aircr.i.ft.\" US Departmerrt ofState Bulletin. 23 Fd,ruary 1959. pp. 2621-271:\nBeschloss, Mayday. p. 159.\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 160,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p160.jpg",
   "text": "147\nSeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nPresident Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower\ntension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US\nballoons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms Iimita­\ntion negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United\nStates sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to\nUS proposals for a \" study of the technical aspects of safeguards\nagainst the possibility of surprise attack ... One week later the S,oviets\nagreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on\nIO November I 958. President Eisenhower was also attempting tt:> per­\nsuade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmo­\nspheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22\nAugust 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the\ncondition that the Soviet Union al so refrain from further tests and join\nin negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ac­\ncepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 3 I October 1958 in\nGeneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree\nto a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on I and 3\nNovember. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of\n1958, President Eisenhower. detennined to reduce to a minimum any\naggravation of the Soviets. kept the U-2 overflight program in\n[. b\n10 1\n_ 1_ro o.\nIn November 1958, relations with the Soviet Union worsened af­\nter Khrushchev precipitated a new crisis over West Berlin by an­\nnouncing plans to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by May\n1959. He stated that such a treaty would terminate Allied rights in\nWest Berlin. Four days later, Soviet troops began harassing US Anny\ntruck convoys on the highways leading from West Germany to West\nBerlin. Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening\nas the blockade of l 948-49, President Eisenhower wished to :avoid\nany actions that would provoke the Soviets. Tension over West Berlin\nwas, therefore, an additional reason for continuing to keep the U-2\naway from the Soviet Bloc. oo:\nCONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES\nAGAINST THE U-2\nAnother reason for President Eisenhower's gro~ ing rel!J.~ ance to au­\nthorize flights over the Soviet Union may have ~ en c~ ;rn , hat the\nSoviets were developing countenneasures that would enable them to\n\"\" Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 489-J9 I.\n\"'' Ibid .. pp. 502-504.\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 161,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p161.jpg",
   "text": "148\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 3\nshoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had\nestimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union\nwith impunity for only about two years. This period was already over,\nand the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop\nU-2 overflights. From the very beginning, Soviet air defense units had\nnot only tracked U-2s with radars, but had also made repeated efforts\nto shoot them down with antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft.\nIn 1956 such attempted interceptions had involved primarily MiG-15s\nand MiG- l 7s, which could barely reach 55,000 feet. The advent of\nMiG- l 9s and MiG-21 s, which could climb even higher, provided a\ngreater threat for U-2 pilots.\nRealistic training for pilots learning to intercept the U-2 became\npossible after the Soviets developed a new high-altitude aircraft, the\nMandrake, which was actually an improved version of the\nYakovlev-25 all-weather interceptor. The Mandrake used a high-lift,\nlow-drag wing design similar to that employed by the U-2, but its\ntwin engines made it heavier. The Mandrake's operating altitude was\n55,000 to 65,000 feet, and its maximum altitude was 69,000, far less\nthan the 75,000 feet reached by the U-2. Like the U-2, the\nMandrake's wings would not tolerate great stresses, so it could not be\nused as an attack aircraft at the high altitudes at which both planes\noperated. Between 1957 and 1959, Yakovlev built 15 to 20 of these\naircraft in two versions: the Mandrake-R or YAK-25RM and the\nMandrake-T, sometimes called the YAK-26. These high-altitude air­\ncraft were used to overfly the Middle East, India, China, and\nPakistan, as well as border regions of NATO nations in Europe during\nthe late 1950s and early I 960s. It is not believed that Mandrakes ever\nattempted to overfly the continental United States.\"'-'\nBeginning in late 1957, the Mandrake served as a practice target\nfor pilots of high-performance Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 intercep­\ntors. The Soviet technique that most concerned U-2 pilots was the\n\"snap up\" or power dive and zoom climb. In this maneuver,\nground-based radar operators would direct the interceptor aircraft\nalong the same flight path as the U-2. When the MiG pilot achieved\nthe same compass heading as the U-2 flying more than 10,000 feet\nabove him, he would put his aircraft into a shallow dive to pick up\n01\n'\n\"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake,\" Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 3, no. 7, 16 February\n1985.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 162,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p162.jpg",
   "text": "149\nSeer et N6F6RN\nChapter 3\nspeed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and\nzoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to\ncome up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and mis­\nsiles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black\nof space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high\nas the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were\ncompletely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided in­\nsufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain\naircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex\nof their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pi­\nlots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide\nwith a U-2 during a zoom climb. 1().1\nU-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gal­\nlery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the\nsilvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had\noriginally believed the U-2 would fly so high that it would be invisi­\nble, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoid­\ning the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty\nwas calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full\n_c_O;J.t of paint cost the U-2 250 feet of altitude, substantially less than\nthe L,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird-devices.\nBy late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done.\nAfter a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating\nthe U-2s with a standard blue-black military specification paint on top\nand a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests over Nevada\nrevealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over\nwith a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with\nk\nf\nthe dar canopy o space.\n105\nMORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2\nLess conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing\nthreat of Soviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase\nthe U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the\naircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959,\nLockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s­\noriginally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air\n\"u Information supplied by Jacob Kratt and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.\nWt:lz.:nbach, May 1986.\n\"\" Lockheed contracts, OSA r.:cords (S).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 163,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p163.jpg",
   "text": "1Su\nSoviet MiG-21 interceptor (top),\nSoviet MiG-19 interceptor\n(middle), Soviet MiG-19\nphotographed by a U-2,\n13 October 1957 (bottom)\nSec.et NOFORN"
  },
  {
   "n": 164,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p164.jpg",
   "text": "--\n.a.\n..\n·--·- - ... ------::::::\nYAK-25RD Mandrake on\ndisplay at the Gagarin\nMilitary Academy Museum\n(top and middle)\nU-2 in the new black\npaint scheme (left)\nSec.et NOFORN"
  },
  {
   "n": 165,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p165.jpg",
   "text": "152\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nForce of 31-with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney 175-Pl3 jet\nengine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust\nwhile adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power,\nthe engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quick­\nly, thereby reducing the telltale contrails that the U-2 produced as it\npassed through the tropopause at 45,000 to 55,000 feet. With the new\nengine, U-2 passed through this portion of the atmosphere faster and\ndid so before entering hostile airspace, thus reducing the chance of\nvisual detection. The 175 power plant also made it possible for the\nU-2 to carry a larger payload and gain another 2,500 feet in altitude,\npermitting it to cruise at 74,600 feet. The new engines were in very\nshort supply because of the needs of the Air Force's F-105 construc­\ntion program, but Colonel Geary used his Air Force contacts to obtain\nan initial supply of 12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its orig­\ninal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10\"\nDetachment C in Japan received the first of these re-engined air­\ncraft, known as U-2Cs, in July 1959, and two more arrived in Turkey\nfor Detachment B in August. All Agency U-2s had the new engines\nby the summer of 1962, but by then only seven CIA U-2s remained in\nservice.\nINTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958\nAlthough the U-2 was used less and less for its original role of gather­\ning strategic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc, it had acquired the new\nmission of providing US decisionmakers with up-to-date information\non crisis situations all around the world. The first use of the U-2 to\ngather tactical intelligence occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis.\nAfterward, U-2s from the Turkish-based Detachment B conducted pe­\nriodic overflights to monitor the situation in the troubled Middle East,\nand they became especially active during the summer of 1958.\nOn 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US troops to\nland in Lebanon in response to a request for assistance by Lebanese\nPresident Camille Chamoun. Three months earlier, Eisenhower had\nturned down a similar request because the rioting that had led\nPresident Chamoun to ask for American aid had died down before in­\ntervention became necessary. In July, however, President Eisenhower\nsaw the overall situation in the Middle East as much more threaten­\ning. On 14 July forces aligned toward Egyptian President Gama[\n\"\"' OSA History, chap. 16, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Geary interview (S).\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 166,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p166.jpg",
   "text": "153\nSect et NOFOfU'~\nChapter 3\nAbdel Nasser overthrew the Government of Iraq and assassinated the\nroyal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser,\nwho had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt\nand Syria in the new United Arab Republic. President Eisenhower de­\ncided that US intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in\nLebanon and to show Nasser that the United States was willing to use\nforce to defend its vital interests in the region. Before intervening in\nLebanon, the United States consulted with the United Kingdom,\nwhich also decided to intervene in the Middle East by sending para­\ntroopers to assist the Government of Jordan on 17 July.\nWith US Marines and Army troops deployed in a potentially\nhostile situation in Lebanon, US military commanders and intelli­\ngence community analysts immediately requested tactical reconnais­\nsance flights to look for threats to the US units and evidence that\nother Middle Eastern countries or the Soviet Union might be prepar­\ning to intervene. The U-2s of Detachment B in Turkey carried out\nthese missions.\nBecause tactical reconnaissance required an immediate readout\nof-the films taken, the Photographic Intelligence Center (the new\nname for the Photo-Intelligence Division from August 1958) quickly\nreopened the film-developing unit at Adana and staffed it with lab\ntechnicians and photointerpreters. Throughout the summer of 1958.\nDetachment B U-2s brought back photography of military camps. air­\nfields, and ports of those Mediterranean countries receiving Soviet\narms. The detachment also kept a close watch on Egyptian-based\nSoviet submarines, which posed a threat to US 6th Fleet ships in the\nMediterranean. In addition, U-2s flew occasional electronic intelli­\ngence collection missions along the Soviet border and over the Black\nSea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as the crisis in\nthe Middle East eased, the United States began withdrawing its\n14,300 troops. It was not until 25 October, however, that the last\nAmerican soldier left Lebanon. 101\nBRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROJECT\nShortly after the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon, a new group\nof pilots joined the U-2 project. In November 1958, four RAF officers\narrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United\nKingdom's participation in U-2 operations. The British had first\n\"\" Ambrose, Eisenhower: Tlte President. pp. 462--473.\nSee1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 167,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p167.jpg",
   "text": "154\nSee, et NOFOAN\nChapter 3\nbecome involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the\nUnited States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To\nhandle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which\nlater merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation be­\ntween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to\ninclude frequent consultation between the requirements and photo­\ninterpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and\nArthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for\ndiscussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (gener­\nally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities\nCommittee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Recon­\nnaissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108\nThe idea of using British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in\nthe spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upset that his aircraft had\nnot been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December\n1956 standdown-was searching for ways to reduce the political risks\nof overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for mis­\nsions over the Soviet Union. One of his proposals was to use non-US\npilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible de­\nnial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense\nDepartment, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President\nEisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2\n•\nIC>'J\nproJect.\nDuring the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick\nWhite, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L.\nMacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on sev­\neral occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the\nCIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting\nin which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had\nconsented to the resumption of U-2 missions over the Soviet Union,\nresulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957.\nBut when flights ceased in October, the thought of British participa­\ntion became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the\nBritish to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final politi­\ncal decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February\n1958, Bis sell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj ~---~__J\nto ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to\n'\"\" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the\nCOMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).\n'\"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 6 May 1957\n(TS); idem, \"Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957,\" WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).\nScere4i"
  },
  {
   "n": 168,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p168.jpg",
   "text": "155\nselect a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to\nBissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2. 110\nIn June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came\nto project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA\nofficials to work out an agreement on plans and procedures for the\njoint project. The two sides decided to establish a small RAF contin­\ngent that would be integrated into and supported by Detachment B at\nAdana. The British missions would be operationally controlled by\nCIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots began\ntraining in Texas. One of these pilots, Squadron Leader Christopher\nH. Walker, died in a training accident in July 1958. Because of the\naddition of RAF officers to the program, Project AQUATONE re­\nceived a new codename, CHALICE. By the end of November 1958,\nthree RAF pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B at Adana\nwith Turkish approval.\nFormal approval by the political leaders of the United Kingdom\nand the United States had come several months earlier. On 27 August\n-1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British\nparticipation in the project as long as he had the right to approve or\ndisapprove all operational flights by RAF pilots. On the same day,\nPresident Eisenhower gave his approval in principle for the joint pro­\n.\nIll\nJect.\nBoth sides stood to gain from the joint nature of the U-2 project.\nFor Richard Bissell, British participation was a means to gain an addi­\ntional source of authorization for overflights of the Soviet Union. Six\nmonths earlier, Bissell had cabled to the London Chief of Station that\nhe wanted British participation because it would \"facilitate operations\nby them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of author­\nity accorded by US political authorities.\" 112\nPresident Eisenhower viewed British participation as a way to\nconfuse the Soviets as to the sponsorship of particular overflights and\nalso to spread the risk in the event of a loss. Furthermore, he was used\n\"\" OSA History, chap. 13, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword).\n'\" Ibid.. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword).\n\"' Ibid., p. I (TS Codeword).\nSee1 et NOFOAN\n• Chapter 3\nSecs et"
  },
  {
   "n": 169,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p169.jpg",
   "text": "i\n156\nSecret NOFQRO.L\nChapter 3\nto working closely with the British from his wartime experience and\nbelieved that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as­\npect of their alliance with the United States.\n113\nOn the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical ex­\ntension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two\ncountries on the U-2 program. The direct involvement of the British\nalso enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the\nMiddle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United\nKingdom than to the United States. The British also may have rea­\nsoned that direct participation in the program was the best way to en­\nsure that they had a right to share in the U-2's take. Otherwise, the\nUnited States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2\nphotography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.\nBy November 1958, British pilots had joined Detachment B, and\narrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be\nusing to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final\nexchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister\nMacmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au­\nthority for the joint program: \"Br itish missions are carried out on\nyour authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au­\nthorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have\nestablished. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two\ncomplementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ\nRichard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source\nof approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early\n1960, this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted\ntwo highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at\na time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight\nfor almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots\nin Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the\nUnited Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi­\nlots took part in overflights.\nIn Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2\nprogram was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude\nweather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support\nthis cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early\n'\" Goodpaster interview (S).\n,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I0-11 (TS Cod,:word).\n£ee.ot"
  },
  {
   "n": 170,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p170.jpg",
   "text": "157\nSec, et MOF'ORI\\I\nChapter 3\nMay 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before\nreturning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place\nover England on 5 and 6 October 1959.\nTHE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959\nEarly 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle\nEastern countries, with occasional overflights of Albania to check for\nreported Soviet missile installations. Detachment C mainly collected\nhigh-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over\nTibet and Southwest China (see chapter 5). The overflight program\nagainst the Soviet Union seemed to be at a standstill, but pressures\nwithin the government were building to resume deep-penetration\nflights to resolve the growing \"missile-gap\" controversy.\nOrganizationally, the U-2 project underwent a major change after\nRichard Bissell became CIA's Deputy Director for Plans on I January\n1959. At first glance, Bissell's selection seems unusual because he\n• liad spent most of his Agency career heading the U-2 project, but his\nfirst major assignment had been coordinating support for the opera­\ntion that overthrew the leftist Government of Guatemala in 1954.\nFurthermore, Bissell's U-2 project was the major covert collector 0f\nintelligence against the CIA's primary target, the Soviet Union.\nDuring his years as head of the Development Projects Staff\n(DPS), Bissell had opposed proposals to bring all Agency air activi­\nties together into a single office, fearing that he would lose control of\nthe U-2 project. Once he became Deputy Director for Plans, his view­\npoint changed; he was now in a position to consolidate all air activi­\nties under his own control. On 16 February 1959, the DPS became the\nDevelopment Projects Division (DPD) of the Directorate of Plans (at\nthe time known as the Deputy Directorate/Plans or DDP). Despite the\ntremendous increase in the scope of his duties after assuming control\nof the DDP, Bissell retained personal control of his previous\nDevelopment Projects Staff projects: the U-2 program, another pro­\nject to develop a photosatellite, and a third project to design a fol­\nlow-on aircraft for the U-2 (OXCART). Although the amalgamation\nof all Agency air operations and the transfer of the U-2 project to the\nDDP made sense, the question remained as to whether one individual\ncould effectively control all these different activities.\niearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 171,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p171.jpg",
   "text": ".\n-\n158 - -­\n.\n. .\n.\n•\n,.\n•\n-\n.\n'\n• • •• •\n•\n• • •\n•\n•\n•'•\n'••\n• •\n• •\n. -\n. .\n.\n•\n_.\n..\n•. :. .\n.. .\n•\n•\n:· .\n• :··\n..\n•\n• • .\n.\n•.\n•\nl\n•\n• ••\n•\n•. •,\n.\n. . .\n. . . -\n. •\n.\n.\n.\n.\n. . .\n.\n: ·: . . . ..\n..\n-:·\n•\n•\n•\n•\n•\n.:: .\n.\n;- ···.\n•·. •• .\n-­ ...\n. ..\n·.\n;\n. .\n. -\n..\n·•• ··.\n.\n.\n. .. .\n•\n•\n•\n.. '\n.\n.\n.. . . .\n• ·-. . . .· .,:\n.\n.\n+\n. .\n•.\n. . .\n•\n. .\n.\n.'\n.\n. .\n.\n·.\n.\n. . ..\n.: .\n'\n. . .\n.\n.\n.\n. .\n.\n.\n. . . .\n.\n•. .\n. . .\n~ .\n·.\n. .\n.\n. .\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.. .\n..• .\n.\n• .. •. ·_ •.. .\n..\n..\n.\n. ."
  },
  {
   "n": 172,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p172.jpg",
   "text": "159\nThe Final Overflights of\nGeern·t NOf'OHN\nChapter 4\n_\nthe Soviet Union,\n1959-1960\nTHE U-2 AND THE \"MISSILE-GAP\" DEBATE\nDespite President Eisenhower's reluctance to send U-2s over the\nSoviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of\n1959, after a pause of more than a year. The overriding factor in his\ndecision was the growing '•missile-gap\" controversy. which had its\n•roots in a series of dramatic Soviet announcements during the second\nhalf of 1957. The first announcement revealed the successful test of\nan intercontinental ballistic missile in August. Then in October, the\nSoviets announced the successful orbiting of the world's first artificial\nearth satellite, Sputnik. One month later the Soviets orbited a second\nsatellite containing a dog and a television camera. To many\nAmericans, including some influential members of Congress, the\nSoviet Union's space successes seemed to indicate that its missile\nprogram was ahead of that of the United States. By the spring of\n1958, after the United States had successfully launched several satel­\nlites, fears of a space technology gap between the two superpowers\nhad eased. By the end of the year, however, new concerns arose that\nthe Soviet Union was producing a missile arsenal that would be much\nlarger than that of the United States. This was the famous missile gap\nthat received widespread publicity beginning in early 1959.\n1\nThe missile-gap controversy was fueled by Soviet boasts about\nthe success of their missile program. On 4 December 1958. a Soviet\ndelegate to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack stated: \"Soviet\nICBMs are at present in mass production.\" Five days later, Soviet\n' For an overview of tht: controversy. see Roy E. Licklider. \"The Missile Gap\nControversy.\" Political SL'ience Quanerly 85 ( I 970):600-6 l 5.\nSecact"
  },
  {
   "n": 173,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p173.jpg",
   "text": "160\nSec,et N6F6AN\nChapter 4\nLaunch of Sputnik,\n4 October 1957\nPremier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an\nICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles.\nThese statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this\nsame month of December, the firs:t attempt to launch the new US\nTitan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer\npropaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM,\nand the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM\nlaunches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February\n1959, a space of almost nine months.:\nTo conceal the difficulties in their missile program. Soviet lead­\ners continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of\nFebruary 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party\nCongress in Moscow by claiming that \"serial production of intercon­\ntinental ballistic rockets has been organized.\" Several months later\nSoviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky stated that these missiles\nwere capable of hitting \"precisely ainy point\" and added, \"Our army\nis equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and\nother rockets of long, medium and short range.\" When asked at a\npress conference to comment on Malinovsky's statement, President\nEisenhower replied, \"They also said that they invented the flying ma­\nchine and the automobile and the tellephone and other things .... Why\nshould you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are\nnot so respectful of the other three?'\"\n3 Nevertheless, the Soviet state­\nments were taken at face value by most Americans, including many\nmembers of the intelligence community.\n' Lawrence Freedman. US lntell(~ttnce and the Soviet Strategic Threat. 2nd. ed.\n(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1936). pp. 69-70.\n' Ford Eastman. .. Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag:· Aviation Week, 9 Febru.:lf)'\n1959, pp. 26-27.\nScerel"
  },
  {
   "n": 174,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p174.jpg",
   "text": "161\nAs concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in­\nterruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet\nadvantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were\nexperiencing difficulties in deve loping an operational ICB M. the Air\nForce assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile\nwas ready for deployment.'\nThe controversy intensified early in February 1959, when\nSecretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate\nPreparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities\nfor the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early\n1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United\nStates in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be\ntemporary and that at its end the United States would enjoy a techno­\nlogical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the\nmore advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num­\nber of obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles, but it was his mention of a 3\nto l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such\nas Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap\nwould eventually be even larger.s\nFaced with rising public and Congressional concern about the\nmissile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President\nEisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in­\nfonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a\nNational Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and\nDeputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behind to talk to the\nPresident about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti­\ncism of the missile gap from Symington and other Democratic\nSenators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use\nof the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen\nDulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances\nabout the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho­\ntographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of\nphotographs required.\nThe President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that\nthe reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he\nstated that U-2 flights should be \" held to a minimum pending the\n• Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO.\n' .. What About the Missile Gap'1 .. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13.\nSec. et NOFORN\nChapter 4\nSeci:et"
  },
  {
   "n": 175,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p175.jpg",
   "text": "162\nSec, et NOfOF'IN\nChapter 4\navailability of this new equipment.\" Quarles objected that the satel­\nlites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied\nthat this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build\na first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower\nfinally conceded that \"one or two flights might possibly be permissi­\nble,\" but he ruled out \"an extensive program.\" In light of the \"crisis\nwhich is impending over Berlin\" he did not want to be provocative. 6\nAs the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower\nstuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, al­\nthough the Soviet Union's resumption of ICBM testing almost per­\nsuaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President\ntentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he\ncalled in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdraw­\ning his authorization, explaining that \"there seems no hope for the fu­\nture unless we can make some progress in negotiation.\" Eisenhower\nremained worried by \"the terrible propaganda impact that would be\noccasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail.\" Although he\nagreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the\n\"distortions several senators are making of our military position rela­\ntive to the Soviets,\" Eisenhower believed that such information\nwould not be worth \"the political costs.\" 7\nThe President remained willing to consider flights that did not\noverfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic in­\ntelligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The\ntwo missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June\n1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved\nboth an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air­\ncraft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry in­\ntercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds\nafter launch.8\nEfforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration mis­\nsions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell\nmet with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight\n• Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha.\nDDEL (TS); Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, Mayday, p.\n173.\n' Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 514-515: Beschloss. Mayday,\np.176.\n• Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 ( 18 June I 959), OSA records, job\n67-8-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword).\niearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 176,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p176.jpg",
   "text": "163\nto gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions con­\ntinued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State\nHerter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that \"the intelli­\ngence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped.\" The strong\nbacking of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State\nDepartment finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the\n•\n•\n9\nmIss10n.\nOn 9 July 1959, more than 16 months after the previous over­\nflight of the Soviet Union, a U-2 equipped with a B camera left\nPeshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile\ntest range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation\nTOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed\nthat the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam.\nWhile this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary\nmission along the Soviet-Iranian border.'\n0\nDespite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident.\nPresident Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over­\n•flights of I.he Soviet Union. in part because he did not wish to increase\ntension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States sched­\nuled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still\nwanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possi­\nble. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of\nmissile tests in mid-I 959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of\nI.he less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering mis­\nsions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the\nII\nyear.\nWithin the United States, concern about the Soviet missile pro­\ngram continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored\nanother space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon,\nand Khrushchev stressed this success when he arrived in the United\nStates three days later. He also boasted of Soviet missile progress in\nprivate conversations with President Eisenhower. while making no\n• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 7 July 1959 (TS): iJem,\nMemorandum of Conference with the President. 8 July !959. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL\n(TS).\n\"' Mission folder 4115 (9 July 1959). OSA records (TS Codeword).\n\" OSA Hisrorv. chap. 19. annex 120. pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).\n~etNOFORPJ\nChapter 4\niiee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 177,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p177.jpg",
   "text": "164\nSee, et NOFOAN\nChapter 4\nmention of overflights by the United States. After the trip was over,\nKhrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make ex­\naggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the\nconfusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in\nNovember 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev told a conference of\njournalists, \"Now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of\natomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe\nour potential enemies off the face of the earth.\" He then added that\n\"in one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the as­\nsembly line in the factory we visited.\" 11 Because the Soviet Union\nhad been launching at least one missile per week since early fall, US\npolicymakers placed great weight on his remarks.\nDespite the intelligence community's intense interest in the\nSoviet Union's nuclear and missile programs, President Eisenhower\ndid not authorize any more overflights of the Soviet Union during the\nremainder of the year. On the other hand, he raised no objections to\n(and probably welcomed) the first British overflight of the Soviet\nUnion in December 1959. For almost a year, the RAF pilots of\nDetachment B had been ready to fly over the Soviet Union, but Prime\nMinister Harold Macmillan had not previously authorized any such\nmissions because of his own visit to the Soviet Union, several interna­\ntional meetings, and other state visits. As a result, British U-2 mis­\nsions had been confined to the Middle East. Now that the Prime\nMinister's approval had been obtained, Detachment B conducted\nOperation HIGH WIRE with an RAF pilot. Squadron leader Robert\nRobinson left Peshawar on 6 December and overflew Kuybyshev,\nSaratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range\nbefore landing at Adana. The mission photography was excellent, but\nit did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at\nTyuratam, not Kapustin Yar. 13\nBecause there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959,\nmany questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan­\nswered. Within the intelligence community there was still consider­\nable disagreement over the size of the Soviet missile force. Thus,\nduring testimony before the US Senate in January 1960, DCI Allen\nDulles, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Air Force Chief of\n\" William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York:\nRandom House, 1987), p. 10 I.\n\" OSA History, chap. 11, p. 33 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 8005 (6 December 1959),\nOSA records, job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS Codeword).\n&earet"
  },
  {
   "n": 178,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p178.jpg",
   "text": "165\nSec. et NOFORl'J\nChapter 4\n-\nJ .\n•. ~ ·~-:.. -?.,-\n.._.,.,,..__,_~ -\n-.\n-~1}').'~F '<\n....;\nStaff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of\ndeployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on\nevidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to\nthe Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning.\n14\nAs a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determinced to\nobtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis­\nsile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli­\ngence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing\nthe most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. Alt this\ntime there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the\nTyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was e:<tremely large\nand liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only bie de­\nployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed rai!lroad\ntracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles. tlhere­\nfore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying\nalong railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the\n\" Licklider. \"Missile Gap Controversy.\" pp. 608-609.\n. •\n-r.- -·\n~\n·\nSaratov Engels Airfield,\n6 December 1959"
  },
  {
   "n": 179,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p179.jpg",
   "text": "Baltic\n~a\nFinland\nBlack Sea\nTu\n•\n'\n-··\n·1~- .....\n;.. :~.:\n~~~~ •' :~·f.:~<,,·\n·ir.fa\n0\nFirst British Overflight, 6 December 19!59\n,\n/\n,.0-r\n:\n,/ !\n\\\n,,~\n\"\",\n( ~\n•\n(\nI \\\nS. R.\nKaz.3kh S.S.R.\n~eeFet NOFORU\nLake Balkhash ___,<\n,.,r-;;;::~::....,.\n) { ,,\n\"\\;\n\"\n... .\n· •.­\n.· .,"
  },
  {
   "n": 180,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p180.jpg",
   "text": "i\n167\nPresident\"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.\nAt a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle\nurged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to\nthe maximum degree possible. The President's response, as\nsummarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed\nthat the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in\nhis attitude toward U-2 flights: \"The President said that he has one\ntremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free\nworld. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were\nlost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could\nbe put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness.\"\n15\nA few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over\nthe Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis­\nsion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary\n1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at\nthe controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE\nEDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed\nnorthwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long\nstretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from\ntnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis­\ncover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.\n16\nDespite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con­\ntinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as\nmany as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted\nthat any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional\nU-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,\nPresident Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis­\nsions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence\nof Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re­\nsumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be\nflown during the month of March. The President's continued riestric­\ntions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo­\nrandum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting\nthat the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile\ndeployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein.\"\n'' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233.\n\" Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS\nCodeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword).\n\" OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. \"The President's Board:\n1956-60.\" Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S).\nChapter 4\n5eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 181,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p181.jpg",
   "text": "168\nSec, et N6f6IU4\nChapter 4\nIn authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President\nEisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of\ncomplications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield\nat Peshawar, however, the mission could not be staged in March, and\nthe President agreed to extend his dleadline until l 0 April 1960. One\nday before the expiration of this cle.adline, a U-2 equipped with a\nB-camera took off from Peshawar on the last successful overflight of\nthe Soviet Union, Operation SQUARE DEAL. As had been the case\nduring the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary\nmission along the Soviet-Iranian border. After leaving Peshawar, mis­\nsion 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pic­\ntures of two new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST\ninstallations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at\nSemipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the\nrailroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam. where it pho­\ntographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a\nnew Soviet missile was in the offing.\n18\nIn his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should\nhave been shot down. \"but our antiaircraft batteries were caught nap­\nping and didn't open fire soon enough.\" Khrushchev explained that\nSoviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft\nmissile and batteries of this missile had been deployed near known\ntargets of the U-2.\n19\nThe CIA already had strong indications of improvements in the\nSoviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development\nProjects Division had asked Air force experts at the Air Technical\nIntelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabili­\nties against the U-2. On 14 March ll960, Col. William Burke, acting\nchief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:\nThe sreatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the\nAT!C analysis concedes a remote possibility thac the SAM may\nbe less effective than estimatea~ their present evaluation is that\nthe SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful inter­\ncept at 70,000 feet providing th.at detection is made in sufficient\ntime lO alert the site.\n10\n,. Mission folder 4155. 9 April 1960. OSA records. job 67-8 -328. box 6 (TS Codeword).\n•• Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little.\nBrown. & Co .. 1974). pp. 443-444.\n\"' Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy· Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke.\nActing Chief, DPD ...Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations:· 14 March 1960, IC\nStaff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A. box I 0 . .. CHALICE (General) .. (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 182,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p182.jpg",
   "text": "Operation SQUARE DEAL, 9 April 1960\n; ;<::~~r~-r).i ...-·\n0\n0\n300-\nI(~\n,,..,.,~Y\ngan7 \\\"; Lake Balkhash\n;\ns\nU. S. S. R.\nSeeret ~IOFOAt~\nChina\n7241'0 {BOQ;MSJ .442\n.\n' •· ··"
  },
  {
   "n": 183,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p183.jpg",
   "text": "170\n~eeFet J.\\IOFOAN\nChapter 4\nOne of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se­\nlected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that\npenetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest\nchance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system.\nColonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as\nthe preferred route for the next overflight had stated, \"There is a rea­\nsonable chance of completing this operation without detection.\"\nEscaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet\nSAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major\nthreat to the U-2.\nCIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go\nundetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's\nELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very\nearly stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the\nU-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning\nagainst future overflights from Pakistan (or anywhere else, for that\nmatter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell\nthat \"experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL\nindicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/\nAfghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor.\" 11\nUnfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the\nlogical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that\nthe risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intel­\nligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack\nof success at interception to date had probably made the project staff\noverconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the\nPresident's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities\nwere pressing for more photos of the Soviet Union in order to settle\nthe missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and\nCongress.\nTHE LAST OVERFLIGHT: OPERATION GRAND SLAM\nEven before the 9 April overflight took place, President Eisenhower\nhad consented on 28 March to an additional overflight during the\nmonth of April. His willingness to allow yet another overflight was\n\" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Colonel Burke,\nActing Chief, DPD. \"Operational Priority of Proposed CHALICE Missions,\" 26 April\n1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A, box 10. \"CHALICE (General)\" (TS\nCodeword).\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 184,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p184.jpg",
   "text": "171\nSec, et NOPORICJ\nChapter 4\nstrengthened when the Soviet Union did not protest the 9 April mis­\nsion. As Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky later re­\nmarked about the lack of protest, ''This was virtually inviting us to\nrepeat the sortie ... ~=\nAlthough President Eisenhower had authorized another over­\nflight for April, he left the designation of its targets up to the experts\nat the ClA. Of the three missions that remained under consideration.\none-Operation SUN SPOT-would overfly southern targets,\nTyuratam and Vladimirovka, while the other two would cover rail­\nroad networks in the north-central portion of the Soviet Union. The\nintelligence community had been interested in this area ever since late\n1959, when there were indications that the Soviets were building an\nSS-6 launch facility there. This was the first indication that :SS-6s\nmight be located anywhere other than Tyuratam testing facility. where\nthe missiles were launched from a general purpose launching pad.\nThe intelligence community was anxious to obtain photography of a\n\" George B. Kistiakowsky. A Scientist lll rlie \\¥/,ire House (CamhriJg.:: l·t.1rvarJ\nUniv.:rsity Press. 1976). p. 3::8.\nSA-2 surface-to-air missile\nSeG:ret"
  },
  {
   "n": 185,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p185.jpg",
   "text": "172\n6eeret l).!Qi;QRPJ\nChapter 4\ndeployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for\nphotointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photogra­\nphy for similar installations.13\nThe two proposed overflights that would cover the northern rail­\nroad lines received the strongest consideration. Both plans contained\nnew features. Operation TIME STEP called for a U-2 to take off from\nthe USAF base at Thule, Greenland, which would be the first over­\nflight staged from this base. The aircraft would then fly over Novaya\nZemlya on its way to cover the railroad lines from the Polyamyy Ural\nMountains to Kotlas. The return flight would be over Murmansk with\nthe landing to take place at either Bodo or Andoya on Norway's\nnortheast coast. The other proposed overflight, Operation GRAND\nSLAM, was the first U-2 mission planned to transit the Soviet Union;\nall previous missions had penetrated not more than halfway and then\nleft in the general direction from which they came. GRAND SLAM\nproposed to fly across the Soviet Union from south to north, departing\nfrom Peshawar, Pakistan, and landing at Bodo, Norway. The mission\nwould overfly Tyuratam, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Kotlas, Severodvinsk,\nand Murmansk.\nThe two preferred missions both required the use of the airfield\nat Bodo, which had been authorized by senior Norwegian intelligence\nand military officers. Because the Bodo airfield was involved in\nNATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area, Bissell in­\nformed the White House that neither mission could be flown before\n19 April. Once the maneuvers ended, bad weather over the Soviet\nUnion kept the mission from taking place when it was originally\nscheduled. Richard Bissell, therefore, asked President Eisenhower for\nmore time. and, on 25 April, General Goodpaster relayed the\nPresident's instructions to Bissell that \"one additional operation may\nbe undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation\nis to be carried out after May l. \" 14 The President did not want to fly\nmissions any later than that because the Paris Summit was scheduled\nto begin on 16 May 1960.\nBy this time, CIA planners were concentrating on Operation\nGRAND SLAM as the most likely route for the proposed mission be­\ncause it offered the best chance of photographing suspected locations\n'·' OSA Hi.1·tory, chap. 12. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).\n\" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 569; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 10.\n6eere~"
  },
  {
   "n": 186,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p186.jpg",
   "text": "•.7'\nI>!' .\n•\n-~~~ t~•~- :L:·\\;~. .•;\n• ,.·Turkey ,\n,\n-~:,~-~~-::. ~-'.0\n.. •\n• •\n. :·;, :·~~.\n'\\\n/\nt....._r\n:....,,.,.,,,\nMOSCOW\n*\n.....,___\"\"\"__\na\\\n.\n200\nOperation GRAND SLAM, 1 May 1960\n-\n-\n-\nProposed mission route\n--- Actual mission route\nR.\nKazakh S.S.R.\nTurkmen\nTEHERAN\n·\n*\n.\ni I\ni·\n1."
  },
  {
   "n": 187,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p187.jpg",
   "text": "174\nSec, el NOFOAN\nChapter 4\nof Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME\nSTEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather\n( which would affect both navigation and photography) because the\nflightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire\nmission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of\nits greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960,\nColonel Burke stated:\nOperation \"TIME STEP\" is our last choice because we can as­\nsume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will\nbe detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in\ndenied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a\nstrong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would\npermit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile\nequipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus\nenhancing the possibility ofsuccessful intercept. In addition, we\nmust assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically in­\nterfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail­\nable to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they\ndesire to do so. 15\nThe concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should\nalso have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would\nbe the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed\ncovering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the\nU-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to\nintercept the aircraft.\nThe pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis\nGary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers\nhad joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis­\nsions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China\nas well as six along the Soviet border.\nTo prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project manag­\ners decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night be­\nfore the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera\nwas loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure\nto local residents because of darkness and its short stay-less than six\n\" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William\nBurke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, \"Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations,\" 14 March\n1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, \"CHALICE (General)\" (TS\nCodeword).\n6ec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 188,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p188.jpg",
   "text": "175\nhours on the ground. Originally scheduled for Thursday, 28 April,\nGRAND SLAM was canceled because of bad weather over the north­\nern Soviet Union. This had been the case for the past several weeks.\nWhen this flight was canceled, the U-2 returned to Adana before sun­\nrise. That evening the U-2 flew back to Peshawar for another attempt\nto stage the mission early on the 29th, but bad weather again forced\ncancellation of the mission, and the U-2 returned to Adana. Because\nof continued bad weather over the target areas, no mission was\nplanned for Saturday, 30 April. 20\nMeanwhile, the plane ferried to Peshawar on 27 and 28 April\nhad accumulated so many hours of flight time that it had to be\nremoved from service for periodic maintenance. A different aircraft\nwas, therefore, ferried to Peshawar on Saturday night, 30 April. This\naircraft, article 360, had made a crash landing in Japan during the pre­\nvious September (see chapter 5). Although it had been refurbished by\nLockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would give\nit greater altitude, pilots did not completely trust this aircraft and con­\nsidered it a \"hangar queen.\" As Powers noted in his memoirs, .. Its\ncurrent idiosyncrasy was one of the fuel tanks, which wouldn't feed\nall its fuel.\" 27 The aircraft was equipped with a B-model camera. a\nSystem-YI electronic intelligence unit, and a System-lXB device,\nwhich generated false-angle information in response to the radar\npulses used by some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems.\nOperation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep-pen­\netration overflight of the Soviet Union, began almost 30 minutes late\non Sunday, I May 1960, a delay due to difficulty in getting takeoff\napproval\nfrom\nWashington.\nThis\ndelay\nwas\ncaused\nby\ncommunications problems that are typical at sunrise and sunset\nduring spring and autumn, when the ionosphere will not support reli­\nable communications. In attempting to relay the authorization mes­\nsage, the radio operator in Adana was unable to reach the base in\nPeshawar, whose codename was HBJARGON. Realizing that neither\nthe prearranged nighttime nor daytime frequencies were working, the\noperator began sending a message in the clear, using one of the guard\nfrequencies in the transition area between the daytime and nighttime\nfrequencies. The radio operators at Peshawar kept hearing the Morse\n'' Mission folder -115-1 ( I May 1960). OSA records (TS Codeword).\n\" Powers. Operation Overflight, p. 76.\nSect et N6f6RN\nChapter 4\nSe&ret"
  },
  {
   "n": 189,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p189.jpg",
   "text": "176\nSec.et rdOFOAN\nChapter 4\ncode letters JGOHB, JGOHB as they tuned from one prearranged fre­\nquency to the other. Then one of the Peshawar operators decided to\ntune in the guard frequency where the Morse transmission was stron­\ngest. He was able to discern a break in the letters, making the mes­\nsage read \"HBJGO HBJGO.\" The Peshawar operators realized this\nstood for \"HBJARGON Go.\" The detachment chief, Col. William\nShelton, who had been waiting anxiously inside the radio van for a\n\"Go\" or \"No Go\" message, leaped from the van and ran across the\nfield to give the signal for takeoff to Powers, who was sitting in the\nU-2C at the end of the runway. 28\nPowers started his takeoff roll at Ol 59Z on l May 1960. Once\nairborne, Powers guided his aircraft toward Afghanistan. Following\nstandard operating procedure, Powers clicked his radio switch when\nhe reached penetration altitude of 66,000 feet, which signaled the op­\nerations unit at Peshawar that everything aboard the aircraft was\nworking and the mission would proceed as planned. Aside from this\nsimple signal, Powers and all U-2 pilots maintained strict radio si­\nlence during penetration missions.\nPowers' first target was- the Tyuratam Missile Test Range after\nwhich he headed for Chelyabinsk, just south of Sverdlovsk. The\nplanned route would take him over Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk, northwest\nto Kirov. north over Yur'ya and Plesetsk, then to Severodvinsk. north­\nwest to Kandalaksha, north to Murmansk, and, finally, west to Bodo,\nNorway.\nMay Day turned out to be a bad time to overfly the Soviet\nUnion. On this major holiday, there was much less Soviet military air\ntraffic than usual, so Soviet radars could easily identify and track\nPowers' U-2. In addition, the Soviets responded to the intrusion by\nordering a ban on civilian air traffic in a large portion of the Soviet\nUnion. Soviet radar began tracking the U-2 when it was still 15 miles\nsouth of the Soviet-Afghan border and continued to do so as the air­\ncraft flew across the Central Asian republics. When Powers reached\nthe Tashkent area, as many as 13 Soviet interceptor aircraft scrambled\nin an unsuccessful attempt to intercept his plane.\nPowers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into\nthe mission, an SA-2 surface-to-air missile detonated close to and just\nbehind his aircraft and disabled it 70,500 feet above the Sverdlovsk\n'·' Richard K. Pero, \"Message Received-Unfortunately,\" Studies in Intelligence 27\n(Winter 1983):29 (S).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 190,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p190.jpg",
   "text": "177\nSee, et NOFORN\nChapter 4\narea. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers\nlooked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu­\ngal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy\nand prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the\nlast minute, so that it would not go off while he was still in the plane.\nWhen he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked\nout of the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, un­\nable to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he\ntlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand\nfeet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where\nhe was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials. 29\nHis aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were\nable to identify much of its equipment when they put it on display 10\ndays later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction\ndevice, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small\nexplosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.\nHow had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although\nsome CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been fly­\ni_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he main­\ntained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been\nbrought down by a near miss of a Soviet surface-to-air missile. This\nturned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in\nMoscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a\nthree-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also\nscored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept\nthe U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site be­\nfore the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid\nknown SAM sites.\nTHE AFTERMATH OF THE U-2 DOWNING\nThe first indication that something was wrong with Powers' m1ss1on\ncame even before he was overdue at Bodo, Norway. The CIA\nOperations Center learned on l May at 0330 hours Washington time\n'' Powers, Operation Overjliglzt. pp. 82-84; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 26-28: Transcript of\nDebriefing Tapes of Francis Gary Powers, 13 February 1962. Board of Inquiry on the\nConduct of Francis Gary Powers, Operations MUDLARK tiles, OSA records. job\n74-8-605, box 6 (S).\n\"' Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); OSA History, chap. 14, p. 55\n(TS Codeword).\n&eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 191,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p191.jpg",
   "text": "178\nSecret l'JOFORl'J\nChapter 4\nthat the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight 's pro­\ngress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although\nthere was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the mi:ssing\nU-2. key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center\nthat morning (with the exception of Bissell. who was out of town and\ndid not arrive until 1530) to analyze the latest information and discuss\ncourses of action. They quickly established a new project. known as\nOperation MUDLARK. co gather and evaluate all available informa­\ntion about the downed U-2.\"\nBissell and the other project officials did not know wh,ether\nPowers was dead or if the plane and camera had been destroyed', but\nthey believed chat there was no way that a pilot could survive a crash\nfrom an altitude above 70,000 feet. They. therefore, decided to stick\nwith the standard cover story for U-2 fl ights: that they were we:acher\nflights staged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administr:ation\n(NASA)-originally\nthe\nNational\nAdvisory\nCommittee\nfor\nAeronautics. renamed in 1958. This cover story had been approve:d by\nthe President in 1956.\nBy the end of the day, the Operation MUDLARK officials had\nprepared a statement based on the standard cover story but modified\nto fie the available information on Powers· flight and to show Adana\nas the aircraft's base in order to conceal Pakistan's role in the mission.\nThis revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent\nwith it, was sent to the field commander at Adana, co Air Force\nEurope headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara to replace\nthe cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of\nthe mission. The first announcement of the new cover story came, late\non 2 May by the Adana base commander, but it did not appear in print\nuntil the following day. On Tuesday, 3 May, NASA released a state­\nment about a high-altitude weather plane that was missing on a flight\ninside Turkey. The statement had been designed to provide an e>epla­\nnation for the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union by noting\nthat \"the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was ex­\nperiencing oxygen difficulties.,. .,: Thus. if the Soviets protested and\npointed to wreckage inside their borders, NASA could claim that the\npilot had lost consciousness and the aircraft had then flown into the\nSoviet Union before crashing.\n'' Geary incerview (S).\n'' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 39."
  },
  {
   "n": 192,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p192.jpg",
   "text": "179\ngee1 et NOFORl'ii\nChapter 4\nThis statement had been prepared for a \"best case·· scenario, that\nis to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film sur­\nvived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes\nand survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes\nthat much of the aircraft itself could be salvaged. The small destruc­\ntive charge aboard the U-2 was not sufficient to destroy much more\nthan the camera. The tightly rolled film, which could reveal the exact\npurpose of the mission even if the pilot and aircraft did not survive,\nwas very hard to destroy. Kelly Johnson later conducted an experi­\nment that revealed film taken out of a completely burned-out aircraft\ncould still provide usable imagery. 33 After almost four years of suc­\ncessful U-2 missions, Richard Bissell and the rest of the Development\nProjects Division had become overconfident and were not prepared\nfor the ··worst case\" scenario that actually occurred in May I 960.\nThis failure played directly into the hands of Soviet Premier Nikita\nKhrushchev, who shrewdly decided to release information about the\ndowned U-2 a little at a time, thereby encouraging the United States\nto stick with its vulnerable cover story too long. As he later wrote,\n\"Our intention here was to confuse the government circles of the\nUnited States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead,\nthey would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had acci­\ndentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on\nthe Soviet side of the border.\"'\" The first word from the Soviet Union\ncame on Thursday, 5 May, when Premier Khrushchev announced to a\nmeeting of the Supreme Soviet that a US \"spyplane\" had been\ndowned near Sverdlovsk. He made no mention of the fate of its pilot.\nKhrushchev's announcement aroused considerable interest in the\nmedia in the United States, and that same day the State Department\nand NASA issued another statement that continued the \"weather\nplane\" cover story, adding that the pilot became lost during a routine\nmission near the Caucasus Mountains. Soon afterward. the US\nAmbassador to Moscow cabled a report to the State Department indi­\ncating that the pilot might be alive after all. Two days later, on 7 May\n1960. Khrushchev confirmed this report by revealing that the U-2 pi­\nlot was alive and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet\nUnion.\n\" Geary intt!rview.\n'\" Khrushcht!v. Khrushchev Remembers: The Lase Teswmem. p. 507.\nSec1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 193,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p193.jpg",
   "text": "180\nSecret NOFOAN\nChapter 4\n•.. ~--~\n-===-------· -,-\n' • ')\nKhrushchev and the U-2\nwreckage\nThis revelation completely demolished the US cover story., and\nsenior administration officials then debated what the appropriate\ncourse of action should be. Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility\nfor the overflight and resign. but President Eisenhower did not want\nto give the world the impression that he was not in control of his ad­\nministration. On Wednesday, 11 May, the President read a statement\nto the press in which he assumed full responsibility for the U-2 mis­\nsion but left open the question of future overflights, even though four\ndays earlier he had approved the recommendation of his key foireign\npolicy advisers to terminate all provocative intelligence operations\nagainst the Soviet Union:'~\nThe U-2 affair had its greatest consequences when the\nlong-awaited summit meeting in Paris began less than a week latc:r on\n16 May. Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted on being the first\nspeaker and read a long protest about the overflight, ending with :a de­\nmand for an apology from President Eisenhower. In his reply\n\" OSA Historv. chap.\nI ➔ , pp. 14-16 (TS CocJ,:worcJJ: Bcschloss. Mayday. pp. 43-66.\n243-J58.\nGea,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 194,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p194.jpg",
   "text": "181\nSec, et ~OFORI\\I\nChapter 4\nEisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not\nbe resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point\nthe summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by\nPresident Eisenhower.\nTHE WITHDRAWAL OF THE\nOVERSEAS DETACHMENTS\nThe loss of Powers' U-2 ultimately resulted in the end of Detachment\nB in Turkey. As soon as the Development Projects Division learned\nthat Powers was alive in Soviet hands, it immediately evacuated the\nBritish pilots from Adana to protect the secret of their involvement in\nthe project. Project officials hoped that tlights might eventually re­\nsume from Adana, but President Eisenhower's order ending over­\nflights of the Soviet Union made this very unlikely. Less than four\nweeks later. a coup ousted the government of Turkish Premier Adnan\nMenderes on the night of 27 May 1960. Because the new government\nhad not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to al­\nl_Qw any U-2 tlights from Adana, even those necessary for maintain­\ning the aircraft's airworthiness. As a result, no more U-2s flew out of\nAdana. Instead of being ferried home, three of the four remaining\nU-2s were disassembled and loaded aboard C-124 cargo planes for\nthe return trip to the United States.\"'\nThe fourth U-2 remained inside a hangar at Incirlik airbase for\nseveral years, looked after by a skeleton crew, in case the Adana in­\nstallation needed to be reactivated. Finally the decision was made to\nclose down the Adana U-2 facility. During Detachment B's 44 months\nof active existence, 21 pilots had flown its aircraft, including four\nRAF pilots and three pilots transferred from the deactivated\nDetachment A. Fourteen Detachment B pilots were later assigned to\nother U-2 detachments, but the closing down of Detachment B marked\nthe end of Britain's direct involvement in U-2 operational overflights.\nA four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G,\nEdwards AFB, until the end of the CIA U-2 program in I 974, but\nRAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U-2.\nThe loss of Powers' U-2, the resultant failure of the Paris\nSummit, and the end of U-2 operations in Turkey were just the first in\na series of setbacks for the U-2 program. On 8 July 1960, the\n'• OSA History. chap. 12. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).\nSee.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 195,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p195.jpg",
   "text": "182\nSecret NOFOfUd\nChapter 4\nJapanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment\nand complaints in the press about the presence of \"spyplanes\" on\nJapanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The\nvery next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were disman­\ntled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s. 37\n[n the midst of the furor in Japan. on l July 1960, just six weeks\nafter the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force\nRB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over interna­\ntional waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors\nwere captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio­\nlated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for\ndowning the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacer­\nbated an already tense international atmosphere. 3\"\nOne additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summer of\nI960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its\ninvolvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international coop­\neration for its space program. decided to end its support of the cover\nstory that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices.'''\nThese developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 opera­\ntions from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and air­\ncraft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment\nG at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the\nC[A had vacated the Nevada testing site in 1957 as a result of AEC\nnuclear testing. Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from\nDetachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers'\ncapture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a\nnew cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project\nIDEALIST.\"\"\n\" OSA Chronology. p. 28 (TS Codeword).\n\" \"Mystery of the RB--+7,\" Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37: .. Nikita and the RB--+7.\"'\nTime. 25 July I 960. pp. 30-31.\n,., At a meeting of high-levt:1 CIA. NASA. and State Department ofticials on 31 May 1960,\nNASA was willing to continue its association with U-2 flights for the time being. but the\nAdministrator of NASA. Dr. Keith Glennan. believed that his agency \"would be well ad­\nvised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible.\" James A. Cunningham.\nMemorandum for the Record. ··Tdephont: Conversation with Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy\nDirector, NASA,\" I June 1960. DPD chrono tile #.+553-60. OSA records (S).\n\"' OSA Hisrorv, chap. !2. pp. -H--+9; chap. 16. p. 10 (TS Codeword).\nSe&Fet"
  },
  {
   "n": 196,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p196.jpg",
   "text": "183\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 4\nTHE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS\nDowned U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interro­\ngation at the hands of the Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on\nwhat to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told\nthat he might as well tell the Soviets whatever they wanted to know\nbecause they could get the information from his aircraft anyway.\nNevertheless, Powers tried to conceal as much classified information\nas possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap­\ntors. To extract the maximum propaganda value from the U-2 Affair,\nthe Soviets prepared an elaborate show trial for Powers, which began\non 17 August 1960. Powers continued to conceal as much information\nas possible, but, on the advice of his Soviet defense counsel, he stated\nthat he was sorry for his actions. The Soviet court sentenced him to\nIO years' \"deprivation of liberty,\" with the first three to be spent in\n•\n01\npnson.\nDuring the next 18 months, confidential negotiations to obtain\nthe release of Powers took place as the United States explored the\npossibility of trading convicted Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel for\n_Powers. These negotiations were conducted by Abel ·s court-ap­\npointed defense counsel, former OSS lawyer James Donovan. in cor­\nrespondence with Abel's \"wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East\nGermany. In November 1961, Acting DCI Pearre Cabell wrote to\nSecretary of State Dean Rusk supporting such a trade, and on l 0\nFebruary 1962 the actual exchange took place in the middle of the\nGlienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin. As part of the\ndeal, American graduate student Frederick Pryor, who had been jailed\nin East Germany for espionage, was released at another location.\nAfter Powers returned to the United States, he underwent exten­\nsive debriefing, for many questions about his mission remained unan­\nswered. To conduct the debriefing, the Agency immediately\nreconvened the Damage Assessment Team that had met for two\nmonths in the summer of 1960 to estimate what Powers knew about\nthe overflight program and could have told Soviet interrogators.\nGiven Powers' long involvement with the U-2 program, the team had\nconcluded in 1960 that his knowledge was extensive and he had prob­\nably revealed most of it to the Soviets. After two weeks of debriefing\nPowers in February 1962, however, the team found that the damage\nwas much less than had been estimated, and they were quite satisfied\n\" Powers. Operation Overjlight, pp. 160-192; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 33 1-335.\nSeGFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 197,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p197.jpg",
   "text": ".\nSeu et N0F0flN\nChapter 4\n184\nTrial of Francis Gary Powers\n.......\n'\n·'\n\"' --~,,\n-::-\"\n\"\"'\nwith Powers· behavior.'J After reading the debriefing reports. Allen\nDulles expressed support of Powers· actions and told Powers. ·--we\nare proud of what you have done.\" but Dulles had already resigne:d as\nDCI in November 1961.'' The new DCI, John A. McCone. demanded\na closer look at Powers· actions and set up a Board of Inquiry headed\nby retired Federal Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. After eight days of\nhearings and deliberation. the board reported on 27 February that\nPowers had acted in accordance with his instructions and had \"c:orn­\nplied with his obligations as an American citizen during this period.\"\nThe board, therefore, recommended that he receive his back pay.\n'' James J. Whit.:. ..Franci$ Gary Powcr.;- Th.: Unmaking of a Hero. 1960-1965,\" (drafti.\nCIA History Staff. 1974. p. 19 ISL\n\" Powas. Or,acuion Overjfigfrt. p. .307.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 198,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p198.jpg",
   "text": "185\nThe Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi­\ndence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of\nI May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers\nafter his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with\ntestimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and\nhis commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board;\nthe results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to un­\ndergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of\nhis aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent\nwith Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical.\nHe asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check\nJohnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force\nquickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings.\nMcCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted\nPowers' testimony-a report by the National Security Agency (NSA)\nthat suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude\nand turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being\ndowned-and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March\nfor another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by\nNSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days lat­\ner, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed\nServices Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate\nForeign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2\nAffair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.-'-'\nAlthough all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted prop­\nerly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the pub­\nlic, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior\nfrom sensational press reports and statements by public figures who\nwere not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers· actions\nwhile in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations\nCommittee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the\nimpact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI\nMcCone on 6 March 1962: \"Don't you think he is being left with just\na little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is\nsupposed to do, why leave it hanging?\" ,s Doubts about Powers did\nremain in the public mind because he received no public recognition\nfor his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also\n\"' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 352-35-k Thomas Powers. Man Wlzo Kept the Secrets. p. 328;\nPrettyman Board. DCI records (S).\n\" United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze\nSencae Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). vol. 12. 86th Congre.~s. Second\nSession...Report on the U-2 Incident.\" 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).\nSecret NOfiotUd\nChapter 4\nSeccet"
  },
  {
   "n": 199,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p199.jpg",
   "text": "186\nSec, et NO,-OPU~\nChapter 4\nsnubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly wel­\ncomed two Air Force RB-47 fliers released by the Soviet Union.\nMcCone remained hostile to Powers. and in April 1963 he awarded\nthe Intelligence Star to all of the U-2 pilots except Powers. Finally on\n25 April 1965, just two days before McCone's resignation became ef­\nfective, Powers received the Star (which was dated 1963 on the back)\nfrom DDCI Marshall S. Carter:\n6\nPowers' return from captivity raised the question of what his fu­\nture employment should be. This issue had already been discussed\none year earlier by John N. McMahon, executive officer of the DPD.\nwho noted that he and Col. Leo P. Geary (the Air Force project offi­\ncer) were concerned about a major dilemma for the CIA and the US\nGovernment: \" On the one hand we have gone to considerable lengths\nto prove that the U-2 program was a civilian undertaking and not mil­\nitary aggression; on the other hand there is on fi le a document that\nassures Francis Gary Powers that if he so desires he may be reinstated\ninto the USAF.'' On 21 March 1961 McMahon wrote:\nIf we grant him [Powers/ the right that is now his, namely rein­\nstatement in the Air Force, then we would be subjecting our­\nselves to probable adverse propaganda by the USSR. Admitting\nlittle appreciation for the finer points ofpolitical and psycholog­\nical warfare, should Francis Gary Powers return to the USAF I\nsuspect that the Soviets would have a \"PP\" field day illustrating\nour big lie. The question then. since we cannot permit Powers to\nreturn to the USAF. is what do we do with him.\"\nDespite this negative recommendation, the Air Force agreed on\n4 April I 962 to reinstate Powers effective I July, a decision that was\napproved by the Agency, State Dep•artment, and White House. Then\nPowers· divorce proceedings began. and the Air Force, concerned\nabout adverse publicity, postponed reinstatement until the end of the\nproceedings. In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed\nas a U-2 pilot. In March 1963, he met with Colonel Geary to discuss\nhis future plans and decided to stay with Lockheed.\"11 Powers re­\nmained at Lockheed until U-2 testing ceased in September 1969.\nEarlier in the year, he had published an account of his experiences on\n\"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 14. p. 54 (TS Codeword): Beschloss. Mayday. p. 397.\n\" John N. McMahon to Chief. Cover Staff. DPD. 21 March I 961. Operation MUDLARK\nfiles. OSA records. job 74-B-605. box 6 (S).\n\" OSA History. chap. 14, p. 52 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 200,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p200.jpg",
   "text": "187\nSee, el NGfiOAN\nChapter 4\nthe U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a\nlight plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and\nthen a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a\ncameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the\n•\n-19\nway to an assignment.\nCHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES\nAFTER MAY 1960\nOne of the most important changes in the overflight program after the\nloss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal\nprocedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four\nyears of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower adminis­\ntration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over­\nflight program. The President personally authorized all flights over\nthe Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the\nDCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to\nCIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions\nor of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State\nor his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the\nSecretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary.\nColonel (later General) Goodpaster.\nThe approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very\nunstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re­\nviewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his\nhands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis­\ners before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a\nsecond approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold\nMacmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by\nthe RAF pilots in Detachment 8.\nThe loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in\nthe approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister\nMacmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots\nwho remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more\noperational missions (although the use of British pilots was consid­\nered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process\n•• Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed\nfor criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft\nform). but Kelly Johnson's \"U-2R Log\" records on 25 September 1969: \"We havt: no\nRight test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven\nyears. but he doesn't have an ATR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for\nhim-not even flying the Beechcraft.\"\nSeccet"
  },
  {
   "n": 201,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p201.jpg",
   "text": "188\nChapter 4\nSec,et=\"\nbecame more formal as the National Security Council became\ninvolved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the\nNational Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the\nearly 1960s, the Sptcial Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy\nSecretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military\nAdviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell\nTaylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his\nplace on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the\nPresident's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 50\nBefore requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2\nmission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission\ngiving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the\ntargets to be photographed. flight times, and emergency landing sites.\nSuch submissions came to be known as \"black books\" because they\nwere placed in black. looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special\nGroup was generally final, although on occasion controversial issues\nwere presented to the President for his decision.\nThis approval process did not come into play immediately after\nMay 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the\ndetachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October\n1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred. this time over Cuba. By\nthis time the full approval procedure had been established, and the\nSpecial Group approved the mission (sec chapter 5).\nThe approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program\nthat changed after May l 960. The process for establishing require­\nments for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more for­\nmal. In August 1960 the US Intelligence Board took over the Ad Hoc\nRequirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence\nRequirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead\nReconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the '·coor­\ndinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for\noverhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas.\" The DCID\ndefined \"overhead reconnaissance'' to include \"all reconnaissance\nfor foreign-intelligence purposes by satellite. or by any vehicle over\n'\" The Special Group. which had becn creatcd by NSC lntcl!igen,e Documt:nt 54 l 211 in\n1955 to ovcrsc.: covert a,tivitics. was originally known as the 54 l 2 Committ.:e. Later the\nSp,xial Group bccame known as the: 303 Committce and then thc 40 Committee. Unitcd\nStates Congress. Senate. Sckct Committee to Study Governmental Operations with\nRcspcct to lntt:lligcnce Activities. Foreign and .Wiliwry l111elligence. book l. (Washington.\nDC: US Government Printing Office. 1976). pp. 4S-53."
  },
  {
   "n": 202,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p202.jpg",
   "text": "189\ndenied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared,\nRADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of\nresponsibility was \"reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct\nsupport of actively combatant forces.\" s,\nBy this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead re­\nconnaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa­\nsionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of\nCOMOR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The\nAir Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed\nthat the While House had given responsibility for peripheral recon­\nnaissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was\nalways reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in\nthe military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim. and the\nAd Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for\nperipheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study.\nwhich sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho­\ntography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.\n5\n! The last CIA\nU-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June\n. 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA\nwere those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and\nAfghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange­\nments with the host governments.\nUntil the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of\nmilitary reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.\nEach commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command\nconducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the\ngrowing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na­\ntional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint\nReconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint\nStaff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval\nfor approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk fac­\ntor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routine. The JRC then prepared\na monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions\nand briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The\nC[A received a copy of the Activities Book.\n\" DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S).\n·'' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chairman. COMOR. \"Proposo::<l\nProcedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. \" 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls\n(TS Co<kwor<l).\nSee. et NOFORN\nChapter 4\nSeerct"
  },
  {
   "n": 203,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p203.jpg",
   "text": "190\nSec, et NOfiO~N\nChapter 4\nMost military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap­\nproved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit­\nted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for\napproval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the\nmilitary services could also submit requirements through the DCI us­\ning their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser­\nvices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the\nSpecial Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR. 51\nThe main conflicts between the requirements committee and the\nmilitary services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early\nI 960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the\nUS Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan\nmissions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however,\ncame very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore,\ncame under COMOR·s area of responsibility. Once the war in\nSoutheast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re­\nsponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).\nTo reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA\nand Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing\nsatellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro­\nvide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national\nlevel. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961,\nand it was followed by three additional agreements during the next\nfour years. 50\nInterest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military\nservices and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpre­\ntation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May\n1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence\nActivities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency\ngroup to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community.\nFormed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign\nIntelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead­\nership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the\nstudy group's key recommendations in the report it issued in\nDecember 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation\n'' Ibid (TS Codeword).\n\" Problems of classitication prevent a more detailc:d discussion of this aspect of the recon­\nnaissance program. which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at\na higher level of classification.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 204,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p204.jpg",
   "text": "191\ncenter that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency\nand the military services. The report further recommended that the\nCIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims\nthat it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the\nreport's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security\nCouncil Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the\nNational Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the\ndirector of NPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by\nthe Secretary of Defense, and the deputy director would come from\none of the military services. The first director of NPIC was Arthur S.\nLundahl, head of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. 55\nOne additional major change in the U-2 program in the years im­\nmediately following the May Day incident-although not directly re­\nlated to the loss of Powers' U-2-was the departure of Richard\nBissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the\nAgency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of\nBissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became\nDeputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets\nin .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais­\nsance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the\nOXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously\nindependent Development Projects Staff became the Development\nProjects Division (DPD) of the DDP and now controlled all Agency\nair operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result,\nU-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to sup­\nport DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering\nstrategic and tactical intelligence.\nAlthough the reorganization made sense in terms of increasing\nthe efficiency of Agency air operations, the use of the U-2 to support\ncovert action disturbed Bissell's backers among the scientists advising\nPresidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, especially James Killian and\nEdwin Land. They were concerned that Bissell was becoming too in­\nvolved in covert action and was not able to devote sufficient time to\nthe overhead reconnaissance program. Then came the disastrous Bay\nof Pigs invasion in April 1961, which discredited Bissell with the\nKennedy administration in general and the two scientists in particular.\nLater that year, Bissell lost another important source of support when\nAllen Dulles resigned as DCI in November 1961. During his final\n\" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).\nSec, et NOF'ORl<J\nChapter 4\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 205,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p205.jpg",
   "text": "192\nSec, et NOFORl'd\nChapter 4\nmonths as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself in­\nvolved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving\non President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (succes­\nsor to the Eisenhower administration's President's Board of\nConsultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities). These two influential\nPresidential advisers strongly advocated removing the Agency's over­\nhead reconnaissance programs from the DDP and placing them in a\nnew, science-oriented directorate. but Bissell resisted this proposal.\nWith his position in the Agency becoming increasingly untenable,\nBissell resigned on 17 February 1962, after turning down an offer\nfrom the new DCI, John A. McCone, to become the CIA's first\nDeputy Director for Research. 56\nTwo days after Bissell's departure, the new Directorate came\ninto existence, and it absorbed all of the Development Projects\nDivision's special reconnaissance projects. Only conventional air sup­\nport for the Clandestine Services remained with the DDP in the new\nSpecial Operations Division. The U-2 program was no longer con­\nnected with covert operations.\nThe first half of 1962 was a confusing period for the\nDevelopment Projects Division. After losing the individual who had\ncreated and supervised it for seven years, the DPD also lost its feeling\nof autonomy when it was transferred from its own building to the new\nCIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli,\nwho had headed the DPD since 1960, returned to the Air Force. Then\non 30 July 1962, the overhead reconnaissance projects underwent a\nmajor reorganization with the formation of the new Office of Special\nActivities (OSA) to replace the DPD. The original organization of\nOSA with IO division or staff heads reporting directly to the director\nof the office (at that time known as the Assistant Director for Special\nActivities) proved too cumbersome, and, on 30 September 1962, a re­\norganization divided most of these offices between two major\nsubordinates, the Deputy for Technology and the Deputy for Field\nActivities (see chart, page 193). The Office of Special Activities\n(OSA) continued to control reconnaissance activities and related re­\nsearch and development after the Directorate of Research was en­\nlarged and renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and\nTechnology (DDS&T) on 5 August 1963 (along with the other\n'\" Killian interview (S); Land interview (TS Codeword); Richard M. Bissell to John A.\nMcCone, 7 February 1962. DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 18. folder 10 (S).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 206,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p206.jpg",
   "text": "193\nSecret NOF'OAN\nChapter 4\nSpecial Assistant\nfor Liaison\nSecurity Staff\nI\nDeputy for Technology\nI\nAdvanced\nEngineering\nProjects\nAnalysis\nDivision\nDivision\nDevelopment\nContracts\nDivision\nDivision\nOffice of Special Activities\nAssistant Director for Special\nActivities\nDeputy Assistant Director\nExecutive Officer\nPrograms Staff\nI\nDeputy for Field Ac tivities\nI\nSupport\nIntelligence\nCommuni­\nDivision\nDivision\ncations\nDivision\nOperations\nMateriel\nDivision\nDivision\nDirectorates, DDS&T dropped the \"Deputy\" from its title in 1965\nand became known as the Directorate of Science and Technology). In\n1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special\nActivities. The Office of Special Activities remained in control of the\nCIA's overhead reconnaissance activities until 1974, when the\nAgency ended its involvement with manned reconnaissance aircraft. 57\n\" OSA Chronology, pp. 34-35 (TS Codeword).\n..Soe,er"
  },
  {
   "n": 207,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p207.jpg",
   "text": ".\n.....\n•· :··\n1lJ'Jf<0 .•.·.\n. r.\nt,bl"
  },
  {
   "n": 208,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p208.jpg",
   "text": "195\nSec, et N6f8AN\nChapter 5\nJ•.·\nl\n•\n.\n_,.\n· ..\nU-2 Operatiqns After\nMay 1960\nThe loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on l\nMay 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc.\nSoon after the May Day incident. President Eisenhower ordlered an\nend to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25\nJanuary 1961 press conference, \" I have ordered that the flights not be\nresumed, which is a continuation of the order gi ven by President\n.. .. Eisenhower in May of last year.\" This was not a bind_ing pledge, as\nJohn A. McCone (who became DCI in November 1961) pointed out\nto President Kennedy's successor. Lyndon 8 . Johnson, on 15 January\n1964 in response to the new President's request for information on\nU-2 overflight policies:\nContrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not\nmake any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly. that\nthere would be no further overflights. He limited his response to\na statement that he had ordered that the flights not be r,':?sumed.\nAn order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'\nTechnically, McCone was correct, but no President was likely to\norder a resumption of overflights of the Soviet Union without very\ngood reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because\nsatellite photography gradually began to fill the gap left by the end of\nU-2 coverage.\nAlthough there were several proposals to resume overflights of\nthe Soviet Union in the years that followed, none reached the mission\nplanning stage. The Kennedy administration came closest to resuming\n' Memorandum for President Johnson from DCI McCone...Response to Query\nConcerning U-2 Overflight Policy:· 15 January 1964. DCI records. job 80-8-1676R. box\n17. folder 14 (TS Codeword).\nSeerec"
  },
  {
   "n": 209,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p209.jpg",
   "text": "Sec1et NOFOAN\nChapter 5\n196\noverflights of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer\nand fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his\nproject log:\nHave had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means\nfor increasing safety of the U-2 on probable overflights . ... It\nseems that President Kennedy, who publicly stated that no U-2 '.s\nwould ever be over Russia while he was president, has requested\nadditional flights. Some poetic justice in this. 2\nOne week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up­\ngrade six older U-2s into U-2Cs with the more powerful engines on a\npriority basis, even if it meant taking people off the work on the suc­\ncessor aircraft in order to speed up the conversions.\nShortly thereafter, the resumption of overflights became a major\ntopic of discussion within the intelligence community. On 25\nSeptember 1961, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance pre­\npared a detailed \"Justification for U-2 Photography over the USSR,\"\nwhich argued in favor of U-2 missions over selected, high-priority\ntargets such as ICBM complexes. The COMOR paper stated that sat­\nellite photography did not provide sufficient detail to answer many\ncritical questions about the Soviet ICBM program. To back up this\ncontention, the report placed U-2 and satellite photography of the\nsame Soviet targets side by side, clearly demonstrating the far supe­\nrior resolution of the U-2's cameras. Not all members of COMOR\nsupported the resumption of overflights, however. When COMOR\nformally recommended this course of action to the USIB on 1\nOctober 1961, the State Department and CIA members dissented,\nhaving found \"insufficient justification for resuming U-2 overflights\nof the USSR at this time.\" 3\n' Johnson. \"Log for Project X,\" 14 September 1961. In preparation for the possible re­\nsumption of overflights. Kelly Johnson began thinking about what to do in a worst case\nscenario like that of I May 1960. He noted in the project log on 21 September 1961:\nOne ofthe greatest technical problems and. ofcourse. a great moral one, is how we insure\ndestroying the aircraft and the pilot should the mission fail. I have proposed a rime-alti­\ntude fusing setup for multitude bombs, that looks like it should do the trick. Beerli [Col.\nStanley Beerli, USAF. Director ofthe Office of Special Activities/ doesn 'r want anything to\ndo with this. bur we will go ahead and develop it in case someone decides it is necessary.\n·' Memorandum for USIB from COMOR. \"Justification for U-2 Photography over the\nUSSR.\" 25 September 1961, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T- l 23A. box 10,\n\"COMOR (General)\" (TS Codeword); Memorandum for USIB from COMOR, \"Require­\nments for Resumption of U-2 Overt1ights of the USSR,\" 1 October 1961, IC Staff.\nCOMIREX records, job 33-B- l l 9A, box I (TS Codeword).\n-\nSeerat"
  },
  {
   "n": 210,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p210.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nNothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of\n1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it,\nbut, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite\nphotography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet\nUnion remained tempting. In February 1962, the USIB seriously con­\nsidered a COMOR proposal to send a U-2 over Kamchatka to photo­\ngraph Soviet antiballistic-missile facilities but finally decided to wait\nfor the results of an Air Force peripheral mission. The board later ac­\ncepted DCI McCone's recommendation to seek satellite rather than\nU-2 coverage of the area.4\nWith both the CIA and the State Department strongly opposed to\nsending the highly vulnerable U-2 over the Soviet Union, prospects\nfor resuming flights remained slight unless the international situation\n197\nworsened to such a degree that overflights would be worth the risks\ninvolved. Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l\nMay 1960 proved to be the last CIA overflight of the Soviet Bloc.\nYet, the U-2 remained useful, for it could operate successfully in\nother areas with less developed radar and air defense systems. After\nMay 1960, the main focus of U-2 activity shifted to two new areas:\nLatin America, where U-2s would play an extremely important role\nduring the early 1960s, and the Far East, where CIA U-2s were active\nfrom 1958 until 1974, when the Agency's involvement in manned re­\nconnaissance finally ended.\nU-2 OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA\nU-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion\nDuring late summer 1960, the Directorate of Plans was planning a\ncounterrevolutionary invasion of Cuba for the following year. To sup­\nport this effort, the Agency asked the National Security Council's\n' Memorandum for the Special Group from COMOR, \"Illustrations of Policy Restraints\non the Collection of Information through Overflight of Denied Areas during 1962,\" 14\nDecember 1962, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-8-1 I 9A, box 1 (TS Codeword);\nJames S. Lay, \"The United States Intelligence Board, 1958- I 965,\" (draft) CIA History\nStaff MS-2, 1974, p. 385 (TS Codeword). One year later Saryshagan was the topic of US\nIntelligence Board deliberations. In October 1963 the board asked COMOR to prepare\nrecommendations on the need for an electronic intelligence-gathering mission against the\nSoviet ABM installations at Saryshagan. The proposed mission would not, however, vio­\nlate Soviet airspace; instead, the U-2 would fly over the portion of the People's Republic\nof China closest to Saryshagan. Lay, \"USIB History,\" pp. 393-94 (TS Codeword).\nSHret\n-"
  },
  {
   "n": 211,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p211.jpg",
   "text": "198\nSeu et NOFORN\nChapter 5\nSpecial Group to approve U-2 overflights of Cuba. Known as\nOperation KICK OFF, these flights were designed to obtain intelli­\ngence on Cuban air and ground order of battle and to provide geo­\ngraphic data for choosing an invasion site.\nTo allay fears that mechanical problems could lead to the loss of\na U-2 over Cuba, the submission to the Special Group for overflights\nemphasized that, if a U-2 had a flameout anywhere over Cuba, it\ncould still glide back and make a safe landing in Florida. The Special\nGroup approved Operation KICK OFF but stipulated that only two\noverflights could be made. Detachment G staged the Cuban missions\nfrom Laughlin AFB near Del Rio, Texas, a base used by SAC U-2\naircraft. Agency photointerpreters went to Del Rio to read out the\nphotography after these missions. The two flights, on 26 and 27\nOctober 1960, were very long missions, covering 3,500 miles and\nlasting over nine hours. Because of cloud cover over Cuba, the results\nof both missions were poor. The Agency, therefore, asked the Special\nGroup to approve additional missions. After receiving authorization,\nDetachment G conducted three missions (Operation GREEN EYES)\non 27 November and 5 and 11 December 1960 with good results.\nOverflights of Cuba continued under the new administration of\nPresident Kennedy. Under the codename Operation LONG GREEN.\ntwo overflights on 19 and 21 March 1961 photographed Cuba exten­\nsively to aid the final preparations for the invasion. Two weeks later\nDetachment G again deployed from Edwards AFB, California, to\nLaughlin AFB. Texas. Beginning on 6 April, Detachment G U-2s\nmade 15 flights over Cuba to provide photographic coverage of the\nill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and its aftermath. These flights were\nknown as Operation FLIP TOP. 5\nAerial Refueling Capability for the U-2\nLong missions conducted over Cuba in late 1960 and over Southeast\nAsia in early 196 l pointed out the need to increase the range of the\nU-2. In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that\nthey could be refueled in flight to extend their operating range. The\nsix Agency aircraft that were modified to achieve this capability re­\nceived the designation U-2F. All Agency U-2 pilots then underwent\ntraining in the techniques of in-flight refueling.\n' OSA History, chap. 16, pp. I 3-15 (TS Codeword).\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 212,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p212.jpg",
   "text": "199\nSec, el NOFORN\nChapter 5\nAftermath of the Bay of Pigs\ninvasion, 20 April 1961\nRefueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully\nloaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed\n• w-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s,\nthey were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at\n200 knots because their frail wings could not stand much stress. As a\nresult, U-2 pilots had to approach the KC-135 tankers very carefully\nin order to avoid the vonexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the\nturbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few\nyears of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings\nbroke off as they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tai11kers;\none of the pilots was killed.\"\nThe in-flight refueling capability was a useful modificati.on to\nthe U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The\nmain limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions\nfrom lasting longer than approximately 10 hours.\nU-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis\nCuba remained a high-priority target even after the Bay of Pigs inva­\nsion failed in April 1961. Soon afterward, Detachment G U-2s ibegan\nflying monthly missions over Cuba in a program known as Project\n• Ibid .. p. 11 -12 (TS Cod~word)."
  },
  {
   "n": 213,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p213.jpg",
   "text": "200\nSecret NOfOflN\nChapter 5\nIn-flight refueling of a U-Z\nNIMBUS. Most of the flights were s1taged from Laughlin AFB, Texas,\nbut three were flown from Edwards AFB, California, using in-flight\nrefueling to extend the range of the aircraft. By the spring of 1962,\nhaving received reports of increased Soviet activity in Cuba. the CIA\nrequested permission for additional photographic coverage of the is­\nland. The Special Group authorized increasing the number of Cuban\noverflights to at least two per month, beginning in May 1962. At the\nsame time, the National Photographic Interpretation Center began\npublishing a Photographic Evaluation ofInformation on Cuba series.\n7\nBy early August 1962, CIA analysts had noted a substantial in­\ncrease in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba during the preceding weeks.\nThe first U-2 overflight in August, mission 3086 on the 5th, flew too\nsoon to detect the Soviet construction program just getting under way\nat various sites in Cuba. A second mission (3088) was originally set\nfor 8 August, but bad weather forced repeated postponements until 29\nAugust. This mission's photography provided the first hard evidence\n' Ibid .. pp. 19-20 (TS Codc:word).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 214,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p214.jpg",
   "text": "201\nChapter 5\nof the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mis­\nsion, the CIA reported in the President '.s Intelligence Checklist that\nthere were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites in the\nwestern half of Cuba.\n8 (The map on page 202 shows the routes taken\nby the two August overflights.)\nOn 5 September the next U-2 overflight (mission 3089) provided\nmore evidence of the Soviet buildup. The mission's photography\nshowed three more SAM sites and also revealed a MiG-2 I, one of the\nnewest Soviet fighter aircraft. at the Santa Clara airfield.\nThe discovery of SAMs in Cuba had a twofold effect on the US\nreconnaissance effort over Cuba. First, it added substance to DCI\nMcCone·s fears that Cuba might become a base for Soviet medi­\num-range ballistic missiles (he argued that SAM sites would only be\nset up to protect high-priority facilities such as missile bases). Al this\ntime. however. McCone's suspicions were not shared by other offi­\ncials in the Agency or the administration. The second and most signif­\nicant effect of the discovery of SAMs in Cuba was to make the\nadministration far more cautious in its use of U-2s for reconnaissance\nDC/ John A. McCone\n. o_f_the island. As the loss of Francis Gary Powers· U-2 in May 1960\nhad demonstrated, the U-2 was very vulnerabk to the SA-2 missile.\nWithin the administration. concern mounted about the U-2's vul­\nnerability to SAMs in Cuba and the possibility that a loss could cause\na major diplomatic crisis. Such fears increased as the result of two\nincidents in other parts of the world. On 30 August 1962, a SAC U-2\non a peripheral reconnaissance mission overflew Sakhalin Island in\nthe Far East, prompting a Soviet protest on 4 September. The United\nStates apologized for the intrusion. Then on 8 September. a U-2 with\na Nationalist Chinese pilot was shot down over the People's Republic\nof China (this CIA reconnaissance program is discussed later in this\nchapter in the section on Asian operations). Increasing concern about\nU-2 vulnerability led to an impromptu meeting on lO September 1962\nof Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser\nMcGeorge Bundy, and DDCI Marshall S. Carter (in place of the DCI,\nwho was on his honeymoon in France). The Secretary of State ob­\njected to the CIA's plans for two extended overflights covering the re­\nmaining areas of Cuba not covered by the last two missions. Rusk\nwanted peripheral flights over international waters kept separate from\n• Richard L.:hman. ··CIA Handling of the Soviet Buildup in Cuba. I July-16 October\n1962.\" 14 November 1962 (Hereafter cited as Lehman Report). DCI rc:cords. job\n80-B-1676R. bol\\ 17. folder I 8 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 215,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p215.jpg",
   "text": "·.· ·,\n... ... ...\nU-2 Overflights of Cuba, August - October 1962\n..... ...\nGulf\nof\nMexico\n.....\n..._\nHA\n...\nCaribbean Sea\nW- Caymanlsl\"\"\"5\nI_U.\"-i\n~,... ~\n_''-),.,,\n.\";!:-,\n-\nMission 3086\n5 August\nMission 3088 29 August\n.....\nNORTH ATLANTIC\nOCE..AN\n~---~-~=~\nU $ Ntw.JI 8-1.:S~\nG u,1n:,u i.tmo 8,w\n0\n100\n200 K.&ometers\n0\n100\n200Mi,...\n--- Mission 3089\n5 September\n-\n-\n-\nMission 3093 26 September\nl\n-\n- -\nMission 3095 29 September\ni\nGulf\n.;\n. i\nof\nMexico\nNORTH A Tl.ANTIC\nOCEAN\nCaribbean Sea\n·-::,·\n.\n'\n___,\ni\n;,... -­ ...... ...\n100\n200 l(jfome1:en\n'\n.\n'\n100\n200M...\n0\nI!:C'===================\nSec.et t40FOAN\n. ·-· ."
  },
  {
   "n": 216,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p216.jpg",
   "text": "United\nSlates\n-..,,,~, -,~,,------------------,\n---­\n--­ Mission 3098\n5 October\n7 October\n14 October\nNORTH ATI..ANnC\n)\nOCEAN\nI\n' \\\n0-,\nCaribbean Sea\nlOOKiloml.it•~\n100\n200 Mff.-s\nGuvt\nof\nMex~co\n\\\n\\\n\\ I \\\nCaribbean Sea\nMultiple missions, 15-22 October I\n\\\nNORTH ATLANnc\nOCEAN\n.,._\n100\n?OOMiln\n'24163 iR004261 4•92"
  },
  {
   "n": 217,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p217.jpg",
   "text": "• • •\n.•.· ...\n, ·\n· ·., '·\nSAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962\nGulf\nof\nMexico\nn Islands\n.,\nCayma\n~\n(\\J.K.J\nNORTH\nATLANTIC\nOCEAN\n!)\n•.\n♦­\n.· ;•\n100Ktl~1e,s\nlflQO MII-.\n•I ••\n· ··, :\n... ...\nt~OFOAN\n.:· ·.. ;:·\n7247S4(R004Z9'.· 4-<I~ : . •\n...\n....\n·,: ·. ; ·:·•·: ;,. ···:. ~'.\n. . ,.\n1 :\n."
  },
  {
   "n": 218,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p218.jpg",
   "text": "205\noverflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on\na mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult\nfor the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international wa­\nters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed recon­\nnaissance program into four missions: two overflights and two\nperipheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights\nwere thus designed to be quick \"in-and-out\" operations across the\nnarrow width of the island instead of flights along the entire length of\nCuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illus­\ntrates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the\nlength of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would\nbe laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes\ngreatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of\ninformation on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's\n9\ncoverage.\nTo ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of\nthe highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the\nweather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast.\nWeather proved to be a major problem during the month of\nSe.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of\nU-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) pre­\nvented the launching of any missions from 6 through 16 September.\nMoreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the fa­\nvorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds pre­\nvented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather\ncontinued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission\n3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites.\nThree days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle of Pines and Bay of\nPigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise\nmissile site. 10\nThe cautious series of U-2 flights in September had turned up\nmany more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of\nsurface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions\n' Lehman Report, pp. 12-13 (TS Codeword).\n'\" DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, ··U-2 Overflights of Cuba. 29\nAugust through 14 October 1962,\"\" 27 February 1963, DCI n:cords, job 80-8-1676R. box.\n17, folder 18 {S). Although this DCI memo states that ··the delay in completing the photo­\ngraphic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period,\"\na more contemporary COMOR memo re~orted a standdown of U-2 overtlights until 16\nSeptember as a result of the loss of mission No. GRC-127 over China on 8 September.\nMemorandum for DOC! Carter from James Q. Reber. Chairman, COMOR. \"Historical\nAnalysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba,\"\" 24 October 1962. IC Staff. COMIREX records. job\n33-B- I 22A. box I. \"Cuba Requirements. 1961-63\" (TS Codeword).\nSec, el NOFORN\nChapter 5\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 219,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p219.jpg",
   "text": "206\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nthat had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told\nthe Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding\nSAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's\nsoutheastern quadrant. He questioned \"whether this was a reasonable\nrestriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost cer­\ntainly not operational.\" 11 The Special Group then requested the\npreparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time\nfor its next meeting on 9 October.\nIn the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance pro­\ngram that the Special Group had approved in September. In early\nOctober two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast\non 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see\nmap on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This\nbrought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of sur­\nface-to-surface missiles.\nEvidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the\nSeptember and early October missions had avoided was the most\nlikely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).\nOn 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance rec­\nommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in partic­\nular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:\nThe absence of coverage of the western end since August 29,\ncoupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means\nthat there may well be many more sites now being built of which\nwe are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent in­\nstances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4\n(SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or\ndenied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a\nlist of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.\nOn 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's rec­\nommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the\n..suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits.\" This mission was\nalso designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to\nbe most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2\n\" Minutes of the Special Group meeting. 4 October 1962. in Memorandum for DC!\n:\\lcCone from J. S. Earman. Inspector General, ··Handling of Raw Intelligence\nInformation During the Cuban Arms Buildup.\" 20 November 1962, DC! records, job\n80-B- 1676R. box I 7 (TS Codeword).\n\" Lehman Report. p. 30 (TS Codc::word).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 220,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p220.jpg",
   "text": "207\ndefenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction.\nthe study recommended \"maximum coverage of the western end of\nthe island by multiple U-2s simultaneously.\" u Because the danger\nposed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special\nGroup meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford\n(USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a\nvulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over\nCuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight\nover San Cristobal.\nAs the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy\nSecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre­\nsentative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which\nwas that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to\nPuerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it\nwould be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis­\nhap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance\nmission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel\nLedford\"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the\n.DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were\nmuch more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior\nelectronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford\nthen suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv­\ning familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting.\nMcCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the\nSan Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots.'\"\nTwo days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives\nmet to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA\nDeputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air\nForce cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot\nshould not be used until he had received adequate training. The con­\nversation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission,\nthe CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the\nU-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI\nMcCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left\n'·' Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword).\n\" Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington.\nDC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr..\nDeputy Director (Research). \"The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans for of Cuban\nOverflight Responsibility,\" 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17.\nfolder 18 (S).\nSec, el PdOfOFmi\nChapter 5\nSeara~"
  },
  {
   "n": 221,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p221.jpg",
   "text": "208\nsecret 1\\JoFonra\nChapter 5\nDOC/ Marshall S. Carter\nWashington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air\nForce control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,\nwhen President Kennedy transferred \"responsibility, to include com­\nmand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re­\nconnaissance overflights of Cuba\" from the CIA to the Department of\nDefense.\n05 The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.\nThe Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted\nstrongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one\npoint he remarked, \" I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's\nperfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act.\"\n16 In a\nseries of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra­\ntion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of\nthe flights at such a crucial cimi::. The Agency operation, Carter\npointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air\nForce lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly\nwith the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also\nemphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more\npowerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, \"To put\nin a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue\nsuit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu­\nnication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn't\nmake a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary.\" \" DDCI Carter admit­\nted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's\nbut suggested at one point. \"Let's take one of my boys and put him in\na blue suit.•· •~Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have\nto come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying\nto convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly\ntransition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few\nweeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing\nover command and control. Carter's efforts were in vain. The Air\nForce insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra­\ntion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they\n\" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. \"'Reconnaissance Overflights\nof Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.\n•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.\nDCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).\n'' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.\nDCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).\n\" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October\nI962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 222,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p222.jpg",
   "text": "209\nperceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for\nNational Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that\n\"the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children.\" 19\nFurthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the\nPresident had already made.\nOnce the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its\ncomplete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming\noverflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the\nCIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and\nthe CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to\nfamiliarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the\nweather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the\nisland took place.\nWhen the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National\nPhotographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October,\nphotointerpreters had found evidence of the presence of MRBMs in\nthe San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately\nnotified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI\nMcCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evi­\ndence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser\nBundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of\nIntelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean\nRusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed\nthe President on the results of the 14 October mission.\"0\nNow that the presence of Soviet medium-range surface-to-sur­\nface missiles in Cuba had been confirmed, the rules for U-2 mission\napproval changed. The Strategic Air Command received blanket ap­\nproval to fly as many missions as needed to cover Cuba completely,\nwithout again consulting the Special Group. During the week that fol­\nlowed the discovery of the missiles, SAC U-2s conducted multiple\nmissions each day (see map on page 203). U-2 photography was sup­\nplemented by low-level photography taken by high-performance\nNavy and Air Force aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the Cuban\nMissile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 pilots remained idle, but the\nphotointerpreters at NPIC did yeoman service in studying the\n,., Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 12 October 1962,\nDCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo\" 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).\n,. For a more detailed account of NPIC's discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. see\nDino Brugioni. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I. 29 August-16 October 1962, DDS&T\nHistorical Series. NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC. 1971) (S).\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 223,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p223.jpg",
   "text": "210\nSec. et NOFORN\nChapter 5\nSoviet MRBM site in Cuba,\n1 October 1962\nthousands of feet of film returned by Air Force and Navy reconnais­\nsance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate\nhis address to the nation on 22 October I 962. when he revealed lhe\nSoviet missile buildup in Cuba and declared his \" naval quarantine\"\nto prevent the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba.\nOn 27 October, at the height of the crisis, one of the U-2Cs knt\nby the Agency to the Air Force was shot down over Cuba. killing rthe\npilot, Maj. Rudolph Anderson. This loss again illustrated the U-2's\nvulnerability to the SA-2 missile. Nevertheless, SAC U-2 overflights\ncontinued, both during and after the crisis. Responsibility for photo­\ngraphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots\nnever flew another mission over the island.\nAlthough SAC carried out most of the U-2 activity during the\nCuban Missile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 missions had made vital con­\ntributions during the initial stages of the crisis. In all. Proj,ect\nIDEALIST pilots had spent 459 hours overflying Cuba during 19161\nand 1962. They had provided concrete evidence of the Soviet buildlup\non the island, evidence that was simply not available through any\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 224,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p224.jpg",
   "text": "211\nSec,et NOfORN\nChapter 5\nother means. Although by late 1962 photographic satellites had be­\ncome an integral part of the overhead collection program, only U-2s\ncould provide the highly detailed photography that photointerpreters\nneeded to spot the early stages of work on missile sites. Attempts had\nbeen made to photograph Cuba with satellites, but to no avail because\nthe satellites' normal orbits placed them over Cuba at the wrong time\nof day, after clouds had formed.\nU-2s Over South America\nAgency U-2s again conducted operations in the Western Hemisphere\nin December 1963. The Directorate of Plans had requested photo­\ngraphic coverage of Venezuela and neighboring British Guianm be­\ncause of guerrilla acti vities conducted by a pro-Castro movement\ninside Venezuela. Supplies for this movement appeared to be coming\nacross the border from British Guiana. On 30 November 1963, the\nNSC Special Group approved overflights of the British Guiana­\nVenezuela border to determine the scope and rate of buildup of guer­\nrilla forces. The Special Group stipulated that the entire effort w:as to\nbe conducted without the knowledge of either the British or the\nVenezuelans.\nWithin three days, several Detachment G aircraft and pilots de­\nployed to Ramey AFB. Puerto Rico, from which they made: six\nflights over the border areas between 3 and I 9 December 1963 in an\noperation known as SEAFOAM. The results of the effort were in­\nconclusive, and the task force returned to Edwards AFB on 22\nDecember.z,\nU-2 OPERATIONS IN ASIA\nDetachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958\nU-2 operations in Asia began even before the end of overflights of the\nSoviet Bloc. By 1958 the Eisenhower administration, although very\nreluctant to approve U-2 flights over or near Soviet and East\nEuropean borders, was not averse to using the spyplanes in the Third\nWorld, where radar detection was unlikely. Thus. in the spring of\n1958, Agency U-2s from Detachment C conducted a major reconnais­\nsance effort over Indonesia. Operation ROBIN HOOD.\n'' OSA History. chap. 16. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).\n6ee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 225,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p225.jpg",
   "text": "212\nSeeret NOFOftN\nChapter 5\nLong unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sym­\npathy to Communism and his institution of \"guided democracy\" in\nIndonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, be­\ngan in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident\nIndonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September\n1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the\ncourse of events in Indonesia and on its recommendation President\nEisenhower authorized the Agency to \"employ all feasible covert\nmeans\" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all\ntypes began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment\nfor the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situa­\ntion came to a head. While Sukarno was out of the country on a state\nvisit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA,\norganized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and de­\nmanded the abolition of President Sukarno's \"guided democracy.\"\nFive days later, this council proclaimed itself the new \"Revolutionary\nGovernment\" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces re­\nsponded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air\nForce began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March gov­\nernment forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against\nthe rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels\nwere falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away\nin the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supply­\ning weapons to these dissidents, too. 11\nIncreasingly involved in Indonesia, the Agency urgently needed\naccurate information on the situation there. As in previous crises,\nU-2s flew reconnaissance missions. On 24 March 1958, the\nDevelopment Projects Staff moved the entire complement of\nDetachment C's pilots and planes from Japan to a base more easily\naccessible to Indonesia: Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the\nPhilippines. Cubi Point was far from any facility that could develop\nand interpret the U-2 photographs, so two Photo-Intelligence Division\nemployees went to Clark Airfield, just 30 minutes by air from Cubi\nPoint, to establish a forward processing center. They arrived on 28\nMarch and had the photo lab ready to go on the following day.:?J\n\"I\nFovert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government. /957-1958.\n2 vols., Clandestine Service Historical Series, CSHP-53 (CIA: History Staff, 1970) (S):\nJohn Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World\nWar I/ (New York. William Morrow: 1986). pp. 133-144.\n0' OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 226,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p226.jpg",
   "text": "f.\n0\n0\nIND/AN OCEAN\n300 --\n300\nIIOOMlloo\n.·'\nPhilippine\nSea"
  },
  {
   "n": 227,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p227.jpg",
   "text": "214\nSechH rdOFORP•\nChapter 5\nThe first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March\n1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C\nU-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia.\nSanitized photos from these missions were used to brief members of\nthe DDP's Covert Action Staff (CAS), who were in charge of a small\nforce of World War II-vintage aircraft such as P-5 ls and B-26s used\nto support the rebel troops. The CIA's proprietary, Civil Air\nTransport, supplied the aircraft, which were based on the Indonesian\nisland of Morotai and flown by mercenary pilots. Desperately short of\npilots, the CAS asked if some of the U-2 pilots with experience in\nWorld War II aircraft could be detailed to the Morotai effort.\nAlthough such a request represented an improper use of the highly\ntrained U-2 pilots and posed a potential threat to the entire U-2 pro­\ngram if one of them were captured, Richard Bissell agreed to send pi­\nlots James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito to help. Both were expe­\nrienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the\nrebels' fighter aircraft, the P-51 Mustang. After arriving on Morotai,\nCherbonneaux explained to Vito how to fly the fast and powerful\nMustang while the two were sitting at a makeshift bar on the edge of\nthe airfield.\nSeveral days later, when Cherbonneaux was off the island on an­\nother mission, a flight of Indonesian twin-engine bombers of\nCzechoslovak manufacture was spotted making its way toward the is­\nland. Exclaiming, \"I'm not going to sit around and wait to be\nbombed,\" Vito had a Filipino mechanic start up a P-51 sitting on the\ntarmac. In his first and only flight in a P-51, Vito managed to get the\nplane off the ground. Once he was airborne and turned in the direction\nof the lumbering bombers, they all took flight in as many directions\nas there were aircraft. After firing a few . SO-caliber rounds in the di­\nrection of the closest bomber, Vito circled the field and landed the air­\ncraft safely. 1\"\nAgency efforts in support of the rebel government proved fruit­\nless. By early May, Central Government forces had taken most of the\nremaining rebel strongholds, and the Sumatran rebellion was deterio­\nrating into small-scale guerrilla activity. Then on 18 May, an\nAmerican mercenary pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down on a\nbombing mission over Ambon Island. Pope's capture ended Allen\nDulles's enthusiasm for the effort, and President Eisenhower also\n\" Information supplied by Carmine Vito and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.\nWelienbach, May 1986.\n&ee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 228,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p228.jpg",
   "text": "215\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nwanted no more part of it. The US Government rapidly withdrew its\nsupport, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four\nyears later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert\nKennedy personally appealed to President Sukarno.\nWhen the revolt ended, the U-2s returned to Atsugi. On the way\nback, one of the planes, which was equipped with a System-Y elec­\ntronic intelligence unit, flew along the coast of China to gather data\non Communist Chinese radars. ' 5\nChina Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958\nDuring the summer of l 958, tension between the People's Republic of\nChina and Nationalist China (Taiwan) increased to such an extent that\non 18 June Detachment C mounted a U-2 mission to film the Chinese\nmainland coast and adjacent island areas. On 11 August, People's\nLiberation Army (PLA) artillery began bombarding the offshore\nislands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy, where the Nationalists had\nstationed large numbers of troops to ward off any invasion. On 23\n~!,!gust the Communists increased the shelling. After five days of\nintense bombardment, which made resupply of the islands from\nTaiwan impossible, the PLA commander ordered the Nationalist\ngarrisons to surrender, intimating that an invasion was imminent.\nThe Nationalists refused to surrender and received support from\nthe United States in the form of warships from the 7th Fleet, which\nbegan escorting Nationalist ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered\ngarrisons.\nDuring this period, Detachment C U-2s flew four missions over\nthe mainland, searching for troop movements that would indicate that\nthe PRC was planning to invade the islands. Photos from these mis­\nsions showed no evidence of a PRC buildup, but the atmosphere in\nthe region remained tense. Detachment C U-2s flew two more mis­\nsions (9 September and 22 October) to monitor PRC troop move­\nments and again found no indications of preparations for an invasion.\nThe Offshore Islands Crisis receded in late October 1958 after the\nPRC learned that it would not receive support from the Soviet Union\nif the crisis escalated into a confrontation with the United States. \"6\n\" Mission folder 1773, (10 June 1958), OSA n:cords, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS\nCodeword): OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).\n,. OSA History. chap. 15, p. 27 (TS Codeword).\n-Seeret _"
  },
  {
   "n": 229,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p229.jpg",
   "text": "216\nSeu et NOi-ORN\nChapter 5\nSe&Fat\nWhile the Offshore Islands Crisis was still in progress,\nDetachment C began conducting flights in support of its weather re­\nconnaissance cover story. On 14, 15, and 16 July 1958, U-2s flew\nhigh above Typhoon Winnie, which was causing great damage on\nTaiwan. These missions provided the first photography ever obtained\nof such a massive storm system. Photographs of the storm were the\nsubject of articles in the magazine Weatherwise and the 21 July edi­\ntion of Aviation Week. In September, Detachment C aircraft photo­\ngraphed two more typhoons.\nU-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet\nThe consolidation of all Agency air activities under the DDP in l 959\nled to increased involvement of the U-2 program with clandestine ef­\nforts against Communist governments. One important area of DDP\nactivity during this period was Tibet. In March l 959, the PLA\nsuppressed an uprising against the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and\nseveral thousand Tibetans fled the country along with their spiritual\nleader, the Dalai Lama. Afterward, Agency operatives from the\nDDP's Far East Division began training some of these Tibetan refu­\ngees for paramilitary operations inside Tibet. Once the Tibetans com­\npleted their training, FE Division planned to parachute them back into\nTibet. Such missions, however, required detailed maps and aerial pho­\ntographs of the areas of operation. Richard Bissell, therefore, obtained\npermission from the President to use Detachment C U-2s to provide\nthe necessary photography.\nOperation MILL TOWN, as the reconnaissance missions over\nTibet were known, consisted of two missions staged from Cubi Point\nNaval Air Station on 12 and 14 May 1959. The photography revealed\nthat Communist China had built new roads with supply and defense\npoints. Agency photointerpreters also discovered two large new air­\nfields at elevations above 13,000 feet. Later in the year, the Far East\nDivision needed photographs and maps of another area of Tibet. To\nconceal the target of this new operation, which was codenamed\nSOUTH GATE, the Development Projects Division planned and flew\na total of six missions coverinf. much of Southeast Asia-Vietnam,\nLaos, Cambodia!\nas well as the desired area in Tibet.\nOnly four of the m1ss1ons involved the area of operational interest.\nFive of the flights took place between 29 August and 9 September,\nand one additional flight (Operation QUICK KICK) followed on 4\nNovember. All of these missions were \"Fast Move\" operations in\nwhich necessary supplies and personnel flew to a remote staging area\nin a C-130, where they rendezvoused with a U-2 that had been ferried"
  },
  {
   "n": 230,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p230.jpg",
   "text": "217\nSec. et NOfllOlltN\nChapter 5\n,,;_>·\n,,\n_-e\n~ .\n......., ....\n,-·. .\nin. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand. These flights\nU-2 photography of Typhoon\ndid not go unnoticed; on 13 September 1959, Hong Kong's China\nWinnie, July 1958\nPost published a story headlined \"U-2 of USAF Said Reconnoit,ering\nRed China at Unreachable Altitude.\"~\nU-2Cs for Detachment C\nLate in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining\nU-2s with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13 jet engine.\nThe first of these U-2Cs arrived at Detachment C in the summer of\n1959. During a test flight of this aircraft (article 360) on 24\nSeptember 1959, the pilot decided to set a new altitude re,:ord.\n\" Ibid .. chap. 18. pp. 6-7, 12; chap. 15. p. 29 (TS Codeword).\nSce,ef"
  },
  {
   "n": 231,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p231.jpg",
   "text": "Secfei NeF8AN\nChapter 5\n218\nA lthough the plane was equipped with a camera. it carried no film\nLhasa, Tibet, November 1959\nand did not have a full load of fuel, which made it considerably\nlighter than an operational U-2C. As a result, the plane reached\n76.400 feet-the highest altitude achieved by any of the original U-2\naircraft. In the process. however, the aircraft consumed more fuel\nthan was called for in the test flight plan, causing the engine to flame\nout during the return to base. The pilot then made an emergency\nwheels-up landing at a glider-club strip near Fujisawa. south of\nAtsugi.\nThe crash did not cause any injuries or serious damage 10 the air­\ncraft, but it did bring unwanted publicity to the U-2 program. Much of\nthe publicity resulted from the actions of Detachment C's security\nunit. whose conspicuous Hawaian shirts and large pistols drew the"
  },
  {
   "n": 232,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p232.jpg",
   "text": "219\nSeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nattention of Japanese reporters. One reporter even flew over the area\nin a helicopter, taking pictures of the U-2. These photographs ap­\npeared in many Japanese newspapers and magazines. 18\nU-2 Crash in Thailand\nFlights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China contin­\nued during the first half of 1960 under Operation TOPPER. The first\nmission on 30 March was very successful. The second mission on 5\nApril took good photographs but encountered mechanical problems.\nAt the start of the mission, the landing-gear doors failed to close com­\npletely, resulting in increased drag and higher fuel consumption. With\nno fuel gauge to warn the pilot of the critical fuel situation, the air­\ncraft ran out of fuel far short of Ta Khli, forcing the pilot to make a\ncrash landing in a rice paddy. The area was inaccessible to large vehi­\ncles, and the plane, article 349, had to be cut into pieces in order to\nremove it. With the help of local villagers, the retrieval team\ndissassembled the aircraft for transport to the base, where the pieces\nwere loaded onto a C-124 under cover of darkness. The crash and\nsubsequent recovery of the U-2 did not attract the attention of the\np~e.ss; there was only one report in a local Thai newspaper, which\nsimply referred to the crash of a jet plane. In appreciation for the as­\nsistance provided by the villagers, the Agency's Thailand Station\ngave the headman funds to build a new school.19\nEnd of Detachment C Operations\nThe loss of two aircraft in slightly more than six months left\nDetachment C with just two aircraft. Fortunately, the level of mission\nactivity remained low because Detachment C was no longer conduct­\ning overflights of the Soviet Union.\nOne important remaining mission was high-altitude air sampling\n(HASP), in which specially equipped U-2s gathered upper-altitude air\nsamples to look for evidence of Soviet nuclear testing. The direction\nof the prevailing winds made Detachment C ideally situated for this\nactivity, which began in the fall of 1958 and continued in 1959. In\nlate April 1960, Detachment C was preparing to stage to the\nPhilippines to conduct additional air-sampling missions, when the\nloss of Powers' U-2 temporarily halted all U-2 activities.\n\" Ibid.. chap. 15, p. 30 (TS Codeword).\n'\"' Ibid.. chap. 15. pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword).\nSearet­"
  },
  {
   "n": 233,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p233.jpg",
   "text": "220\nsecret i'JOFORN\nChapter 5\n:.·.·,·;-...._· .;..\n.._\\.. . . •,...•~..,. •.........\n. ,. :.>'.';... . .. ... . .....-.' -~.:.. ... ~ ..~ ..;,\n... ...•\nRecovery of Article 349,\nApril 1960\nThe publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred consider.able\ncontroversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the\ncontinuing presence of U-2s in Japan. On 6 June 1960, project h,ead­\nquarters decided on a phased-out withdrawal of Detachment C\nbetween 15 July and l September, but this timetable had to be ac:cel­\nerated when the Japanese Government formally requested the re­\nmoval of the U-2s on 8 July.\n3\n\"\n\" Ibid.. chap. 15, pp. 33-36 (TS Codeword).\n-Seere1"
  },
  {
   "n": 234,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p234.jpg",
   "text": "221\nSeei et PdOFOF\\1'1\nChapter 5\nDetachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam\nIn the aftermath of the Powers loss, both of the overseas U-2 detach­\nments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel\nwere incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in\nCalifornia. This detachment was now responsible for providing cover­\nage in Asia, and its first mission came in Laos. After the neutralist\nLaotian Government of Souvanna Phouma collapsed in early\nDecember 1960, reports began circulating that leftist antigovernment\nforces were using Soviet arms. Then on 30 December, a new Laotian\nGovernment appealed for UN aid against what it said was an invasion\nfrom North Vietnam and possibly Communist China. Alarmed over\nthe possibility of the civil war expanding because of the introduction\nof foreign troops, the Eisenhower administration ordered Detachment\nG to gather more information on the events in Southeast Asia.\nFive Detachment G pilots and planes were ferried to Cubi Point\nNaval Air Station in the Philippines to conduct an operation known as\nPOLECAT. During the period 3 to 18 January 1961, these U-2s made\n. s~yen flights over Laos and North Vietnam. To search for the reported\nforeign troops, these missions concentrated on the lines of communi­\ncations leading into Laos from North Vietnam and China. In addition,\nthe U-2s scanned North Vietnamese airfields for Soviet aircraft to\ndetermine the magnitude of the airdrop operation allegedly supporting\nthe Pathet Lao troops. NPIC sent photointerpreters to Clark Air Force\nBase in the Philippines to obtain an immediate readout of the results\nof each mission. The photography did not substantiate the Laotian\nclaims, and on 26 January the Laotian Government retracted its\ncharges of a foreign invasion. Detachment G's U-2s returned to\nCalifornia in early February l 96 I. 31\nDuring the final stages of Operation POLECAT, there was a ma­\njor threat to the security of the mission. The film from the flights\nmade on 16 and I 8 January had been sent to the United States for du­\nplicate processing. Afterward the film was put aboard an Agency\nC-47 on 14 March to ferry it to Washington. During the flight one of\nthe aircraft's engines failed, forcing the crew to jettison 43 boxes of\nhighly classified film over mountainous terrain around Williamsport,\nPennsylvania, to keep the craft airborne. After making an emergency\n\" Ibid., chap. 16. p. 17 (TS Codeword).\nSeeFat"
  },
  {
   "n": 235,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p235.jpg",
   "text": ",\nSec.et NOFORN\nChapter 5\n222\nlanding at the Scranton-Wilkes-Bame Airport. the pilot reported the\nincident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con­\ntacted the Pennsylvania State Police, who sealed off the wooded area.\nAgency security officers soon arrived to search for the boxes. They\nrecovered all 43 containers; not one had broken.\n32\nDetachment G's only other activity during the summer of 196 l\nwas a solitary overflight of North Vietnam, known as Operation\nEBONY. In preparation for this mission, a U-2 deployed to Cubi\nPoint on 13 August l96 l. Two days later it successfully conducted\nthe overflight and subsequently returned to the United States.JJ\nNew Detachment on Taiwan\nLong before the Nationalist Chinese became involved in the U-2 pro­\ngram, they were flying covert reconnaissance missions for the CIA. In\n1952 the CIA began recruiting Nationalist Chinese crews to replace\nUS personnel from the proprietary ti.rm Civil Air Transport, who had\n_been flying Agency aircraft to drop leaflets. agents, and supplies over\nthe Chinese mainland. This •project (BGMARQUE) aJso provided\nphotographic coverage of the rail li.ne from Shanghai to the border\nwith French Indochina. CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance over the\nmainland increased substantially in 1955 with the establishment of\nProject STPOLLY. which used Agency aircraft with Nationalist\nChinese crews to gather Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and conduct\npsychological warfare against the Pe,ople's Republic of China. At first\nthe SIGlNT equipment was installed in World War II-vintage aircraft\nsuch as PB-4Ys and B-17s, but in 1958 the project received a new\naircraft procured covertly by the Agency from Lockheed, the P2V7,\nwith an extremely sophisticated airborne SIGINT system. STPOLLY\nadded the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and\n1967, when the CIA terminated the project, STPOLLY conducted 399\noverflights of the People's Republic of China, losing a total of eight\naircraft and crews.\nIn addition to CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance projects, the\nNationalist Chinese Air Force had ii:s own reconnaissance capability\nwith US-supplied RB-57 aircraft. ln 1958 the US Air Force proposed\n\" Ibid.. chap. 7. p. 24 (TS Codeword).\n·'·' Ibid.. chap. 16. p. 18 (TS Cod.:word).\nSu,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 236,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p236.jpg",
   "text": "223\n!ec, et NOFORN\nChapter 5\nsupplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most ad­\nvanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The C[A opposed a\nNationalist Chinese U-2 program because such flights would des.troy\nthe existing unclassified cover for the U-2. In discussions with the, Air\nForce, DDCI Cabell only consented to having Nationalist p.ilots\ntrained to fly U-2s so that they would be ready in case they were\nneeded in the future; he opposed any Nationalist overflights. The\ntraining of the Nationalist Chinese pilots began in March 1959 .. By\nthe end of the year, there was a group of trained pilots ready for oper­\nations, and DCI Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to dis,cuss\nthe program's future. Dulles reaffirmed the Agency's opposition to\nNationalist Chinese U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had\nLockheed P-2V7 and P3A\nreconnaissance aircraft"
  },
  {
   "n": 237,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p237.jpg",
   "text": "224\nSec.et NOFORN\nChapter 5\n-SeeFet\nwanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly\nagreed to wait until conditions were favorable.'\"' The situation\nchanged radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 de­\nstroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. Now there was no\nlonger any reason not to use the Nationalist pilots. In addition, the\nAgency soon found itself in need of a base of operations in the Far\nEast after Detachment C had to leave Japan.\nDuring discussions with Nationalist officials on 6 May 1960, the\nCIA's Chief of Station in Taipei, Ray Cline, raised the possibility of\nassigning U-2s to the Chinese Air Force. Two weeks later, Gen.\nChiang Ching-kuo, head of the National Security Bureau, approached\nCline informally to propose that the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be\nmoved to Taiwan. This was followed three days later by an official\noffer on behalf of General Chiang's father, Generalissimo Chiang\nKai-shek. President Eisenhower learned of Nationalist China's pro­\nposal on 18 June. Several weeks later, Richard Bissell suggested that\ntwo U-2s be turned over to the Nationalists for use in overflying the\nmainland. The project would be conducted along the lines of Project\nSTPOLLY. 35\nOn 26 August l 960, President Eisenhower and the State\nDepartment approved Bissell 's proposal to tum U-2s over to the\nNationalist Chinese rather than move an American detachment to\nTaiwan. Using Nationalist pilots for overflights had the advantage of\nproviding complete deniability for the United States, even if an air­\ncraft was lost over hostile territory. The U-2s would belong to\nNationalist China and would have Nationalist pilots, and there was no\novert US involvement with the overflights. In reality, however, the\nUnited States would maintain strict control over the missions to be\nflown. 36\nOn 7 December l 960, two U-2s were officially licensed for ex­\nport to Nationalist China as part of a new effort codenamed TACKLE.\nThese planes came from the Agency's U-2 inventory and arrived in\n'\" Andrew J. Russo, Low-Level Technical Reconnaissance Over Mainland China\n( 1955-1966) (draft), Clandestine Services Historical Program, CSHP-2.348 (CIA: History\nStaff, 1972) (S).\n'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).\n'• Ibid., chap. 17. pp. 12-13, 44 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 238,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p238.jpg",
   "text": "225\nSaaret N0FORN\nChapter 5\nTaiwan on 14 December. Within the Agency the Nationalist pilots and\naircraft were known as Detachment H, and they were based a1t the\nNationalist Chinese Air Force Base at T'ao-yuan. One of the U-2s\nwas painted with the Nationalist Chinese insignia, and the other was\nleft unmarked so that it could also be used by Agency pilots as need­\ned. The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con­\ntract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to maintain at least two U-2s\nin Detachment H, so lost or damaged aircraft were replaced from the\n·Agency's inventory.\nDuring 1961, Detachment H conducted training missions with\nboth U-2s, and one Nationalist pilot was killed in a crash on 19\nMarch. Although the detachment was ready to begin operations, the\nnew Kennedy administration was not yet ready to authorize over­\nflights of the PRC. In a 3 March 1961 meeting between S tate\nDepartment and CIA officials to discuss the possibility of such over­\nflights, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles noted that \"the\nPresident was feeling his way on the international scene, and time\nwas needed to evaluate the new Sino-Soviet posture with relation to\nthe United States.\"\n37 In July 1961 the USIB considered the possibility\nof conducting overflights of the PRC, but the State Department re­\nmained opposed.\nBy the fall of 196 l , interest in overflights of the PRC was grow­\ning because of indications that the Chinese were making progress in\nnuclear energy and missile development. As a result, on 4 Oc1tober\nDetachment H U-2 at T'ao-yuan\nAirfield\n\" James A Cunningham. Jr., Assistant Chief, DPD-DD/P, Memorandum for the Record.\n··TACKLE STPOLLY Briefing for State Depanment Officials,\" 6 March 1961, IC Staff,\nCOMIREX records, job 33-B-119A. bol( I, \" IDEALISTffACKLE. 1961\" (S).\nGearet"
  },
  {
   "n": 239,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p239.jpg",
   "text": "Seeret NOFO\"N\nChapter 5\n226\n1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number of U-2\nphotographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President ap­\nproved the board's recommendation.\nBecause the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project\nTACKLE) was a joint effort, both countries participated in the ap­\nproval process and also shared in the results of the missions. The\nUSlB COMOR established the requirements for Detachment H's\noverflights, which had to be approved by the NSC's Special Group\n(5412 Committee) and the President. The Nationalist Chinese\nGovernment also approved all missions flown by its pilots. Under the\nterms of an agreement reached with the Nationalist Chinese\nGovernment, film from the overflights of the mainland would be pro­\ncessed in the United States, with a duplicate positive copy returned to\nNationalist China within IO days. NPIC was responsible for the initial\nreporting on these missions.'\"\nProject TACKLE overflights began early in 1962. Following a 5\nJanuary Special Group decision to approve three missions, a\nDetachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot flew its first mis­\nsion over the PRC's missile-testing range at Shuangchengzi on 12\nJanuary 1962. Unfortunately, because of faulty navigation or faulty\nmaps, the aircraft was poorly positioned and obtained only oblique,\nrather than vertical, photography of the range. En route to and from\nShuangchengzi, the U-2 overflew Fukien and Chekiang Provinces\nlooking for suspected deployed missiles, but none could be found in\nthe mission photography. 39\nThe second Project TACKLE mission took place on 23 February\n1962, when a U-2 overflew the PRC's nuclear weapons establishment\nat Lan-chou. Photography from this mission revealed that the installa­\ntion was at least two years away from operational capacity. Two more\nmissions on 13 and 26 March flew over K'un-ming and central China\ncovering numerous airfields that had been discovered in satellite pho­\ntography. The U-2 photographs showed more detail than the satellite\npictures, thereby, providing additional intelligence data, particularly\n\" OSA History, chap. 17, pp. 18-19, annex 107 (TS Codeword).\n,., Ibid., chap. 17, p. 45 (TS Codeword); Mission folder GRC I 00 ( 12 January 1962), OSA\nrecords.job 67-B-972, box 19 (TS Codeword). Note: The numbers for missions flown by\nNationalist Chinese pilots began with GRC (Government of the Republic of China).\n~ecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 240,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p240.jpg",
   "text": ".. ~,;t .] .. ·.::_ •\n,,\n.\n. .\n·.\nInitial Overflights of China, January - March 1962\n.;.:,·•....\nMission GRC 100 13 January 1962\nMission GRC 102 23 February 1962\nMission GRC 104 13 March 1962\n··~N~f~: .. .\n··:~~:;~.•\n' : :c'\n~\n·'\". '. ••··►:'-­\nfsf~trtr<,,;·\n.:.\"th:i-~ifii~ifilf<--:­\n).'./·-~-~:- ... :~\nJ:~j;~.....\nSea of\nPEIPING\n_/)\nJapan\nll'EKIHCI\n*\n.,,.,,\nrJ ~\nI \\.\n.....?u-~-'\",\n\"'/\n~\nYellow\n~=')\n',\n;f\nl\"'\nSea\n~\n~\n1.Hlla•\n~~\\\\\n'-\n\\\n0\nu '\n:> •\n\\\n~\\\n\\\n\\\n01\nhaneflai\n\\\n\\\n::,\nEast\n\\\n~--­\n~'Q\n\\\nChina\n~ ­\nJ .\nSea\nt\n.\n,..\nPhilippine\nSea\nSouth China\nSea\nPhilippines •\nSeGFet NOFOAl<J\n72<1~ (IU)0428J 4o92"
  },
  {
   "n": 241,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p241.jpg",
   "text": "228\nChapter 5\nLan-chou, PRC, 23 February 1962\nfor air order of battle. In addition to the primary targets already de­\nscribed, the initial series of Project TACKLE missions obtained pho­\ntography of the submarine construction facilities at Shanghai and\nWu-ch'ang, which showed a low levd of activity. Other photographs\nrevealed tremendous expansion of the industrial complexes at\nNanking and Ch'ang-sha and the pre:sence of a previously unknown\nindustrial area at Chiang-yu.•\n0\nEncouraged by the success of the first TACKLE missions,\nCOMOR recommended in May 1962 that Detachment H cover as\nmany as possible of the highest priority industrial and airfield targets\nin northeast China and the missile! test ranges in north China.\nCOMOR noted that, with the exception of the areas around Peiping\nand the Shuangchengzi missile test range, the chances of a U-2 being\ndowned were low. The USIB concurred with COMOR's recommen­\ndations, and Detachment H therefore conducted three more over­\nflights of the PRC during the month of June:'\n~• OSr\\ History. chap. 17. p. -l5 (TS Codeword;,: Mission folders GRCI02 (23 February\n1962). GRCIO-l ( 13 March 1962). and GRCI06 (26 March 1962). OSA records. j ob\n67-8-972. box 19 (TS Codeword).\n\" Lay, \"USIB History.\" vol. 2. pp. 385-386 (T:S Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 242,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p242.jpg",
   "text": "229\nBefore the month was over, however, another confrontation be­\ntween Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted.\nThe Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC\ntroops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationalist-held\nQuemoy and Ma-tsu Islands. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara\nimmediately ordered U-2 coverage of the Strait area to determine the\nextent of the PRC buildup. In response, Detachment H flew six mis­\nsions over the Strait between 25 June and 28 July 1962. To speed up\nthe readout of this photography, the films were processed at the Asian\nPhotographic Interpretation Center (ASPIC) at Yokota, Japan, a joint\nmilitary-CIA endeavor. The U-2 coverage ended in late July when it\nbecame apparent that the PRC did not intend to mount an invasion of\nthe offshore islands:~\nThe pace of Detachment H m1ss10ns slowed considerably in\nAugust 1962; the sole Project TACKLE overflight covered Peiping\nand Manchuria. The following month the detachment mounted two\nmissions. one over south China on the eighth and the second over\nKiangsu Province on the ninth. Unfortunately, mechanical difficulties\nled to the loss of the latter aircraft near Lu-shan. A flameout forced\n- the U-2 down to an altitude where PRC interceptors were able to hit\nthe U-2 with an air-to-air rocket. The Nationalist Chinese pilot para­\nchuted and was captured. At this point, President Kennedy ordered a\nstanddown of overflights of the PRC.\"'\nFollowing the capture of the Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot, the\nPeople ·s Republic of China accused the\nUnited States of\nmasterminding the overflights, but the State Department denied any\ninvolvement. Nationalist China then revealed that the United States\nhad granted it a license to purchase two U-2 aircraft. In a l 3\nSeptember 1962 response to the Chinese protest, President Kennedy\ndenied any responsibility for the sale of the U-2s to Taiwan. noting\nthat the sale had occurred under the previous administration. He\nstated that there were no current plans to sell any more U-2s to\nNationalist China. Eight months later, however, the President ap­\nproved an export license for the delivery of another U-2 to Taiwan.\nSuch licenses were needed only for cover purposes. The Agency con­\ntinued to maintain two U-2s on Taiwan, bringing new ones in to\nreplace aircraft lost in training or on missions.\n'' OSA History, chap. 17, p. 46 (TS Codeword).\n'·' Ibid.. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 125 ( 11 August 1962). GRC 126\n(8 September 1962), and GRC 127 (9 September 1962), OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes\n20 and 21 (TS Codeword).\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nSec1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 243,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p243.jpg",
   "text": "230\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nDetachment H resumed overflights of mainland China in\nDecember 1962, but its missions now concentrated on the southern\nportion where there were fewer radars and SAM sites. During\nDecember l 962 and January 1963., the detachment conducted two\nsuccessful overflights of Sichuan, but a mission over south China had\nto be aborted prematurely. The results of Detachment H's continuing\ncoverage of the People's Republic of China remained of considerable\ninterest to the United States. On 17 December 1962, the Special\nGroup approved plans for fiscal year 1963/64 that included require­\nments for photo coverage of mainland China and for maintaining at\nleast two operational U-2 aircraft in Detachment H .....\nUse of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots\nDetachment H's importance did not lie solely in the missions carried\nout by its Nationalist Chinese pilots against targets in mainland\nChina; the detachment also provided! aircraft for use by American pi­\nlots flying missions in other parts of Asia. Indochina was an area of\nparticular interest as American involvement there began growing dur­\ning the early 1960s. Beginning in February 1962, Detachment G pi­\nlots went to Tao-yuan to use the unmarked Project TACKLE U-2 for\noverflights of North Vietnam. During the first half of 1962,\nDetachment G pilots made seven overflights of North Vietnam from\nthe Tao Yuan base. Thereafter, Detachment G pilots could use their\nown aircraft because the unit began staging teams and aircraft from\nEdwards AFB to Ta Khli AFB in Thailand.\nBetween 1962 and 1964, Agency U-2s staged a total of 36 pho­\ntographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964,\nhowever, photographic requirements were changing from strategic re­\nconnaissance to tactical support as the Viet Cong became more active,\ntaking advantage of the weakness of the South Vietnamese central\ngovernment following the coup tha1t overthrew President Ngo Dinh\nDiem in 1963 and subsequent coups by disgruntled army officers.\nDuring this period the South Vietnamese \"strategic hamlet\" concept\nbegan breaking down, and the Viet Cong forces stepped up the pace\nof their attacks. As a result of the: increasing level of combat in\nIndochina, the USIB gave responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of\nthe areas where fighting was taking; place to the SAC. Henceforth,\nSAC U-2s would be used over South Vietnam. parts of Cambodia\n.. OSA History. chap. 17. pp. 48-49 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 134 (25\nDecember 1962). GRC136 (28 December 1962). and GRC138 {20 January 1963). OSA\nrecords. job 67-B-972. bo;,c 21. and job 66-8-664, bo;,c I (TS Codeword).\nSe&reL"
  },
  {
   "n": 244,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p244.jpg",
   "text": "231\nSect et NOFOFll'\\I\nChapter 5\nwithin 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and\nall of North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or the coast.\nThe remaining portions of Indochina remained the responsibility of\nthe Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of\nTonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of\nIndochina:5\nU-2s in India\nIn October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of\nmassive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western\nprovinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier\nAgency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north\nof the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.\nThe Indian Government appealed to the United States for mili­\ntary aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that\nIndian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could\nnot be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith,\ntherefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial recon­\n_naissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with\na more accurate picture of the Communist Chinese incursions. On 11\nNovember 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the\nproposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel\nthe reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace:6\nIn late November, Detachment G deployed to Ta Khli, Thailand,\nto carry out the overflights of the Sino-Indian border area. Since the\nU-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the tar­\nget area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, re­\nquired midair refueling.\nBecause of severe winter weather conditions, the first flight did\nnot take place until 5 December. Poor weather and air turbulence\nhampered the mission, and only 40 percent of the target area could be\nphotographed. A second mission on 10 December was more success­\nful, but the U-2 experienced rough engine performance because of\nicing of the fuel lines.47\n\" OSA History, chap. I6, pp. 18- I 9 (TS Codeword).\n\"' Ibid., chap. 16, pp. 26-27 (TS Codeword).\n\" Ibid., p. 28 (TS Codeword); Mission folders 320 I (5 December 1962 and 3203 ( I 0\nDecember 1962), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 26 (TS Codeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 245,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p245.jpg",
   "text": "232\nSec, et NOFORP~\nChapter 5\nDetachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the\nSino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest\nto India. Photography from these missions was used in January and\nagain in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then in­\nformed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop move­\nments along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of\nhis intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had\nbeen obtained by U-2s.\nThe United States had provided photographic coverage of the\nborder area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers\nwanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intel­\nligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights\nfrom India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in\nIndia for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM\nsite at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions\nof western China that were out of range of Detachment H. In April\n1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief of Station at New Delhi\nmade the first official request to India for a base. The following\nmonth, President Kennedy agreed to DCI McCone's suggestion to\nraise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with India's\nPresident Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted\nin an Indian offer of an abandoned World War II base at Charbatia.\nsouth of Calcutta.48\nThe Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed consider­\nable renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on\nthe base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so\nDetachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties\nover Tibet from 29 September to l O November 1963. In addition to\nthe coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights,\nthe U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of\nthe border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During\none of these photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the lon­\ngest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- I I hours and 45 minutes.\nAt the end of this flight on IO November 1963, the pilot was in such\npoor physical condition that project managers prohibited the schedul­\ning of future missions longer than IO hours.'''\n\"' OSA History: chap. 16. p. 30 (TS Codeword).\n·• Mission folder 3238 (l O November !963 ). OSA records. job 67-B-971. bo)( 29 (TS\nCodeword).\nSeo,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 246,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p246.jpg",
   "text": "233\nSec, et NO!iORN\nChapter 5\nCharbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964\nDetachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission\nout of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days\nlater Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post­\nponed. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment re­\nmained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when\nSino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G re­\nturned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions,\nsatisfying all of COMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border\nregion. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for\nDetachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a\nforward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967.50\nIncreasing Responsibilities, Inadequate\nResources in Asia\nThe main focus of Agency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of\nDetachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to\nconsider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance of Laos, North\n__Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. All of\nCOMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 be­\ncause heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photogra­\nphy of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting of the Special Group,\nDCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to\nmeet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelli­\ngence on the atomic energy facilities of the PRC. The Special Group\nthen established a \"bank\" of four authorizations for overflights of the\nPRC, subject to monthly review by the Group. 51\nAs a result of the increasing intelligence community interest in\nthe Far East, both Agency U-2 detachments became very active in the\nregion. Detachment G conducted a number of missions over the bor­\nder areas of China, North Vietnam, and Laos during April and May of\n1963. At the same time, Detachment H became more adventurous,\nsending U-2s deeper and deeper into the PRC. These missions in­\ncluded renewed overflights of the missile test range near Baotou and\nthe Lan-chou nuclear facilities, as well as targets in northern China,\nManchuria, and west-central China (as far as Koko Nor).\n\" OSA History. chap. 16, pp. 30-3-1 (TS Codeword).\n\" Lay, \"USIB History,\" vol. 3, pp. 391-392 (TS Codeword).\n6eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 247,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p247.jpg",
   "text": "234\nSec,et N6FOfU\\1\nChapter 5\nThe increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the\nspring of 1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and\nTACKLE, a shortage of aircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable\nU-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in January\n1962, and one of these aircraft had already been lost during an over­\nflight in September 1962. To deal with this shortage, DCI McCone\nasked Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on\nIO June 1963 to transfer two U-2s from the Air Force to the CIA. The\nDefense Department quickly approved this request. Before the two\nAir Force aircraft were placed in service, however, the Agency had\nthem upgraded with J75/P- l 3A engines and various electronic de­\nvices, a process that took more than four months. 52\nAs overflights over the PRC increased, so did concern about the\ngrowing number of Chinese surface-to-air missile sites. The Office of\nSpecial Activities, therefore, got permission from the Defense\nDepartment to equip Project TACKLE aircraft with System-XII\nSAM-warning units. These devices alerted the pilot that his aircraft\nwas being tracked by the FAN SONG acquisition radar, part of the\nSA-2's electronic targeting system. The System-XII units also re­\ncorded each radar-tracking sequence. Analysis of these recordings re­\nvealed changes in the FAN SONG radar's characteristics, information\nthat proved useful in designing electronic-countermeasure (ECM) de­\nvices for US aircraft operating over Vietnam during the late l 960s.51\nDespite the addition of System-XII in the spring of 1963, the\nNationalist Chinese-piloted U-2s of Project TACKLE had far fewer\nECM devices than other Agency U-2s. Project IDEALIST aircraft\npossessed a complete suite of ECM gear in addition to the previously\nmentioned System-XII unit. Among this ECM equipment was a de­\nvice that told the pilot that an SA-2 missile had been launched\n(nicknamed the \"Oscar-Sierra\" unit, which was the acronym for the\nexpletive U-2 pilots used when they learned that an SA-2 missile was\non the way: \"Oh, shit!\") and a System-XIII unit that produced\nfalse-angle returns to the homing radar aboard the approaching mis­\nsile in an effort to steer it away from the aircraft. The Defense\nDepartment opposed installing such devices aboard Detachment H's\nU-2s, for fear they could fall into Communist hands.\n\" OSA History, chap. 16, p. 10 (TS Codeword).\n\" Ibid., chap. 17, p. 50 (TS Codeword).\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 248,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p248.jpg",
   "text": "235\nThe danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the\nPRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second\nProject TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on\nits way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile\ntest range. As was the case after the first operational loss over China\nin September 1961, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of over­\nflights of mainland China. This standdown lasted almost five months.\nAs a result of this second loss over the PRC, the Office of\nSpecial Activities began installing a new 30-channel telemetry system\naboard Detachment H U-2s to monitor various aircraft functions.\nKnown as BIRDWATCHER, this unit periodically broadcast a burst\nof data to the airbase that launched the U-2. This data burst contained\na status report on all the major systems aboard the plane, such as air­\nspeed, altitude, exhaust temperature, fuel supply, film supply, and ox­\nygen supply. BIRDWATCHER provided project managers with a\nbenchmark of aircraft performance that could be used to determine if\na lost plane had been shot down at altitude or had suffered mechanical\nfailure. 54\nBIRDWATCHER's first operational use came on 16 March\n1964, when overflights resumed with a mission over southern China.\nThe PRC was now a high-priority target for the U-2 because more\ndata were needed to prepare National Intelligence Estimates due in\nthe autumn. Of particular concern was the PRC's nuclear program.\nDespite the high priority of its missions, Detachment H's resources\nremained scarce. It was short of both pilots and planes and never had\nmore than three U-2s or six qualified Nationalist Chinese pilots at any\none time. By the spring of 1964, crashes during training and the two\nlosses over the mainland had reduced Detachment H to only two qual­\nified pilots, one of whom suffered from ulcers and a nervous disorder.\nIndeed, this pilot had every reason to be nervous; he flew three of the\nnext four Detachment H overflights and became the third Nationalist\nChinese pilot to be shot down over the mainland.\nThis loss came on 7 July 1964. The Nationalist Chinese pilot's\nlast transmission was that his System-XII unit had alerted him that he\nwas being tracked by the FAN SONG radar. BIRDWATCHER data\nrevealed that the aircraft was at penetration altitude and all systems\n'\" Ibid., p. 51. 53 (TS Codeword).\n6eeret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nSea,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 249,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p249.jpg",
   "text": "236\n6eeFet AJOl=OSN\nChapter 5\nwere normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers pre­\nsumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an\nSA-2 missile. 55\nPresident Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the\nPRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nationalist Chinese\nGovernment, which told the Taiwan Chief of Station that it wanted\n··to let some time go by\" before more overflights were scheduled.\nThe Nationalists pointed out that the only remaining qualified U-2 pi­\nlot had \"disqualified\" himself because of nervous tension. No new\npilots could be qualified for U-2 flights before mid-August.\nThe Nationalists then demanded faster and higher flying aircraft\nas well as better antimissile equipment for the planes. This request led\nsome CIA personnel to suspect that Nationalist China had learned\nabout Project OXCART, the successor to the U-2 that was still under­\ngoing testing. Despite the Nationalists' request for better ECM equip­\nment, the Defense Department remained reluctant to authorize the use\nof the System-XIII false-angle radar jammer on Project TACKLE\nU-2s. The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with\nits highly advanced traveling-wave tube (TWT) would enable\nCommunist Bloc technicians to devise countermeasures and also\nlearn how to produce the highly efficient TWT themselves. As an in­\ncentive for the Nationalist Chinese to agree to more overflights. the\nCIA agreed to permit them to process the U-2 film on Taiwan and to\nuse their own photointerpreters to exploit the film along with US\nphotointerpreters.\nTo counter the shortage of pilots in Detachment H, DCI McCone\nsuggested to the Special Group on 6 August 1964 that civilian CIA\npilots be used to fly missions over mainland China. The group agreed\nthat the matter should be taken up with President Johnson. On the fol­\nlowing day, however, Presidential National Security Assistant\nMcGeorge Bundy informed McCone that, because Secretary of State\nRusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed the idea. he\nwould not take it up with the President.5~\n\" OS,\\ History. chap. 17, pp. 53-55 (TS Codeword): Mission folder Cl 74C (7 July I 964),\nOSA records, job 66-8-664, box 7 (TS Codeword). Note: beginning in 1964 Nationalist\nChinese mission numbers began with \"C\" instead of \"'GRC. ••\n'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 58-59 (TS Codeword).\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 250,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p250.jpg",
   "text": "237\n6ee1 el l\\16t-OFU'\\1\nChapter 5\nAdvanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H\nDemand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow,\nspurred in part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the\npresence of Soviet-made MiG-2ls in the PRC. In addition, there were\nindications that Communist China might be producing its own SAMs.\nFurthermore, satellite photography revealed that preparations for the\nfirst Chinese nuclear test were almost complete at the Lop Nor test\nsite.\nThe need for photographs of the Lop Nor site was considered so\nurgent that the Defense Department finally relented and permitted the\nSystem-XIII false-angle device jammer to be installed in Project\nTACKLE aircraft, with the proviso that it not be turned on until after\nthe pilot had been alerted by System-XII that he was being tracked by\nFAN SONG radars. Photographing Lop Nor, however, was not a sim­\nple task. Located more than 2,000 miles west-northwest of Taiwan,\nLop Nor lay beyond the round trip range of T'ao-yuan-based U-2s and\nin-flight refueling was not possible. Lop Nor was closer to Ta Khli,\nThailand, only 1,650 miles northwest of that base, and much closer to\nCharbatia, India, which lay only 1,200 miles south of the testing site.\nAfter refusing DCI McCone's suggestion to stage a Lop Nor\noverflight from Charbatia using a CIA civilian pilot, President\nJohnson approved a proposal to send a Project TACKLE unit to Ta\nKhli for the mission to Lop Nor. A Detachment H U-2 with a\nNationalist Chinese pilot deployed to Ta Khli in mid-October to pre­\npare for the overflight. Before mission preparations could be complet­\ned, however, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon on 16\nOctober 1964, and the mission was canceled. 57\nThe first overflight of Communist China since the 7 July 1964\nloss was a 31 October mission over Lan-chou. By mid-November,\nthree more overflights had taken place, one over North Korea and\nnorthern China and two over southern and central China. An over­\nflight of Manchuria on 9 December 1964 brought back photos of a\nG-class ballistic-missile submarine. By this time, the mass of data be­\ning provided by Project TACKLE overflights was overwhelming the\nanalysts of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). An ORR\nmemorandum from 11 January 1965 reported that analysis of the\n\"large backlog of unexploited photography on Chinese Communist\n'' Lay, \"USIB History,\" vol. 6, pp. 751. 753-755.\n--6ec1er"
  },
  {
   "n": 251,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p251.jpg",
   "text": "238\nSetret PdOFQRl)I\nChapter 5\nground force installations .. . would require about two man-years\nwork, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation ef­\nfort.,, S3\nUse of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants\nPhotographic missions were not the only method used by the Agency\nto gather information on the PRC's progress in developing nuclear\nweapons. fn fact, standard overhead photography was of little value in\ndetermining whether or not various nuclear-related facilities were\nproducing weapon-grade materials. Such information could onl1y be\nobtained from agent reports or infrared imaging of the targets. which\nwould reveal the heat associated with nuclear-refining activity. Early\nin 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de­\nvelop a high-resolution infrared scanner for the U-2 in order to ascer­\ntain the operntional status of Chinese nuclear reactors. After this\nrequest was turned down. the Agency decided to fund the develop­\nment of such a scanner itself. In the spring of 1963, the Office of\nResearch and Development (ORD) signed a contract with the Texas\nInstruments C'Jmoration for the :roduction of an infrared scanner that\nwould operat ~----:---,.~--\n~\nTo conceal the intended\npurpose of the scanner, the devices were called forest fire dete,ctors\nand assigned model numbers such as \"FFD-I ...\nTests conducted in Septe\n~3 oro...-ed that model FFD-2\nwas ca •\nf reveal incr activit\n·-------- -~~\nI\n~\nFurther im­\nprovements followed, and on 26 October 1964 ORUcleclarecl the\ninfrared unit operational. In reporting the successful results of the in­\nfrared testing to DCI McCone. ORD Director Robert Chapman men­\ntioned that there was only one such unit in existence. McCone\nimmediately told Chapman to order more, and the Agency then pur­\nchased several for Project TACKLE and a stereo-configured FFD-4\nfor Project OXCART.\nDC[ McCone reviewed these infrared detection developments\nwith Defense Secretary McNamara and his new deputy, Cyrus Vance,\non 30 October. being careful to point out that the new device was a\nE..-ncv-snnnsored R&D because the Pentagon had ref~\n'• ORR. M.:moran<lum tor tho: R.:cord. 11 January 1965, OSA records (TS Co<l.:wonJ).\nSo5ret"
  },
  {
   "n": 252,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p252.jpg",
   "text": "239\n~eeret NOFORN\nChapter 5\nThe FFD-2 unit was installed in a U-2C[\nNn mnre U-2 fli2:hts over Lnma usea tne mrrareo\nI\nscannerj\nThe loss of yet another U-2 and its pilot made Nationalist\nChinese officials reluctant to resume overflights of the mainland.\nThey insisted that their U-2 pilots be given permission to turn on the\nSystem-XIII false-angle device during the entire time they were over\nhostile territory, not just after they had been alerted by the System-XII\nradar-detection device. The Defense Department acceded to these de­\nmands in order to keep the TACKLE flights going. In addition, the\nProject TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM\n•\n60\nequipment.\n•• Mission folders C284C (22 November 1964), C304C (25 November 1964), C344C (19\nDecember 1964), and C0l5C (8 January 1965), OSA records, job 66-B-664, box 8, job\n69-B-404, bait 2, and job 66-8-597, bait I; USIB History, vol. 6, p. 758 (TS Codeword).\n\"' Ibid.. chap. 17, pp. 59-61 (TS Codeword).\nSeoret"
  },
  {
   "n": 253,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p253.jpg",
   "text": "240\nSecret NOFORl'3\nChapter 5\nWith their demands met, Nationalist Chinese officials again con­\nsented to overflights by Detachment H, and operations resumed in\nFebruary 1965 with three missions over the mainland. By this time\nUS interest in the People's Republic of China was very high because\nof the PRC's development of nuclear weapons. The Special Group,\ntherefore, approved an extensive reconnaissance program directed\nagainst the PRC. By the end of the year, Detachment H had flown 30\nmissions, the highest annual total during the entire program.\nThe level of activity declined during 1966, with only IO missions\nflown over the mainland. Detachment H also suffered the loss of two\nmore aircraft and pilots in crashes during training missions in 1966.\nIn the fall of that year, joint US-Nationalist Chinese relations in the\nfield of overhead reconnaissance were further strained by the unilat­\neral US decision to kill the longstanding program of low-altitude\nnighttime overflights of the mainland (STPOLL Y).61\n\" Ibid., chap. 19. annex 120, pp. 22-24; chap. 17. p. 69 (TS Codeword).\n-Sesret.."
  },
  {
   "n": 254,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p254.jpg",
   "text": "Sec, et r~ot=ORl'l1\nChapter 5\n241\nSec,ct­"
  },
  {
   "n": 255,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p255.jpg",
   "text": "242\nSec, el N6fiOFU'<J\nChapter 5\n,--------------------------------------------~\nI\n:Ihe nw missi:r mounted by Project TACKU\nook place on 8 September 1967. The U-2C air­\ncraft overflew centr; China and fell victim to a SAM in the vicinity\nof Shanghai; the fate of the pilot was unknown. This loss reduced the\nnumber of U-2s in the Agency's inventory to five.''\nThe entire U-2 overflight program was temporarily halted in\nearly November l 967 after an Air Force U-2 in Vietnam was discov­\nered to have cracks in its wing. All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or­\ndered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of the wings and\nother stress points to check on metal fatigue. Upon completion of this\ninspection, both the Air Force and the Agency resumed their over­\nflight activity.(,.!\nThe End of U-2 Overflights of Mainland China\nProject TACKLE mounted a mission over northeastern China on 13\nDecember 1967 and an overflight of central China on 5 January 1968.\nLater that month the Far East became very tense when North Korea\nseized the US electronic intelligence ship Pueblo on 23 January. One\n\"' Ibid.. chap. 17. p. 72 (TS Codeword).\n\" Mission folder C297C (8 September 1967). OSA records (TS Codeword).\n~ OSA Histor:,:. chap. 16. p.•q (TS Codeword).\n-Seeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 256,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p256.jpg",
   "text": "243\nweek later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet of­\nfensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the\nSpecial Group after 1964) decided on l February 1968 to suspend a\ngroup of overflights scheduled for February and called for mis­\nsion-by-mission approval \"during this period of tension.\" The com­\nmittee approved one additional overflight of southern China, which\nwas flown by Detachment H on 16 March 1968, and two overflights\nof Cambodia, carried out on 27 March and 3 April 1968 by\nDetachment G in its first operations since early 1966. These three\nmissions turned out to be the last overflights by U-2s in the Far East.\nBy this time U-2 flights over the PRC had become so dangerous that\nthe State Department opposed further overflights, and on lO April\n1968 the 303 Committee decided not to approve any mission that\nwould fly closer than 20 miles from the coast of China.\nOne reason why Detachment H's overflights were stopped was\nthe steady increase in the PRC's ability to track and engage U-2s, as\nevidenced by its success in downing five U-2s. By 1968 PRC radars\nalong the coast opposite Taiwan were keeping a close watch on U-2\nactivity from the T'ao-yuan base and actively tracked U-2s as soon as\nthey became airborne. The U-2s then had to face a growing PRC air\ndefense system that not only consisted of SA-2 missiles but also the\nfast and high~flying MiG-21. The PRC's MiG-21 pilots had become\nadept at the power-zoom technique and were threatening almost every\nU-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great.65\nThe decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the\nJohnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in\nIndochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President\nlimited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the\nchances for peace talks. The end of flights over the People's Republic\nof China was viewed as another way to improve the peace process.\nDuring its six years of overflight operations, Project TACKLE\nhad been extremely active, staging a total of 104 flights over the\nPeople's Republic of China (see table, page 244). These missions had\nbrought back huge amounts of data about the PRC but not without a\nprice: five Project TACKLE aircraft had been downed by the PRC,\nwith two of the pilots killed and the other three captured (although\nlater returned). In addition, five other Nationalist Chinese pilots had\nbeen killed in training accidents.\n\" OSA. \"Chronology of Events Leading to Present Impasse on Resumption of TACKLE\nOverflights of Mainland China.\" December 1968, OSA records (TS).\nSec, et NOFORl\\,I\nChapter 5\n6eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 257,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p257.jpg",
   "text": "244\n~eeFet NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nOverflights by Project TACKLE\nFiscal Year\nOverflights\nTotal\n104\n1961\n18\n1963\n17\n1964\n13\n1965\n30\n1966\n10\n1967\n14\n1968\n1\nPeripheral Missions by Detachment H\nDetachment H did not cease its activities following the termination\nof overflights of mainland China. Its next U-2 mission took place on\n18 May 1968. This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac­\ncordance with the new guidelines, never came closer than 20 miles to\nthe Chinese coast. All future Detachment H missions against the\nPRC also conformed with this restriction but were still the target of\ninterception attempts by PRC MiG-2ls or hastily erected SAM sites\non offshore islands. The use of peripheral missions prevented any\nfurther losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea from un­\nknown causes shortly after taking off to start a mission on 5 January\n1969. Another pilot was killed on 24 November 1970 in a crash dur­\n•\n.\n•\n.\n•\n.\nf,(,\nmg a routine training m1ss10n.\nThe level of activity gradually increased during the remaining\nyears of Project TACKLE, as can be seen in the table on page 245.\nThe U-2s flying these missions were generally equipped with the\nB or the newly designed 48-inch H cameras to obtain oblique pho­\ntography and with various signal-intelligence-gathering systems.\nBeginning in May 1971, Project TACKLE began using a new com­\nmunications-intelligence collection package known as\nLONG\nSHAFT. This system was used on 32 occasions through 12 December\n1973, when the LONG SHAFT collection program ended.\n\"\" ·•oftice of Special Activities History. April 1969 to Phase-Out.\" (draft: hereafter cited\nas \"OSA History-2\") (CIA: DS&T, 1974). chap. 3. pp. 36-41 (TS Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 258,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p258.jpg",
   "text": "245\n..,See,,e:t NOFORN\nChapter 5\nProject TACKLE Peripheral Missions. 1969-1974\nDisplay of downed detachment\nH U-2s in Peiping\nFiscal Year\nMissions\n1969\n1970\n1971\n1972\n1973\n1974\n9\n14\n19\n23\n31\n17\nOnce the United States began seeking a rapprochement with the\nPeople's Republic of China. Detachment H U-2s came under more\nand more restrictions. Soon after the impending visit of President\nRichard M. Nixon to the PRC was announced, U-2 missions were\nordered to stay even farther away from the mainland: 25 nautical\nmiles instead of the previous 20. During the months of February and\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 259,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p259.jpg",
   "text": "246\nSec, et NOfOPIN\nChapter 5\nNationalist Chinese U-2R\nMarch 1972. when the President's: visit took place, Detachment H\nceased all operational missions.~'\nIn March 1973, the TACKLE agreement with the Nationalist\nChinese was renegotiated. Although no end date was set, the agree­\nment contained a termination clause that would become effective three\nmonths after notification by either party. This clause provided more\nflexibility to the United States, which could now end the Nationalist\nChinese U-2 program whenever US foreign policy considerations\nmade such a step desirable.\nOperation SCOPE SHIELD Ovm North Vietnam\nIn addition to the Project TACKLE peripheral missions against the\nPRC. Detachment H (with Agency rather than Nationalist Chinese pi­\nlocs) flew a series of missions known as Operation SCOPE SHIELD\nto gather intelligence on activities in North Vietnam. The Indochina\narea had become the responsiblity of the Air Force in 1964. but, under\nthe terms of the cease-fire agreement negotiated with North\n., lbi<l.. pp. 44-45 (TS Co<lcwor<l).\nSee.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 260,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p260.jpg",
   "text": "247\nChapter 5\nVietnam in January 1973, US military flights in the area were forbid­\nden. The Nixon administration, therefore, tasked the CIA with moni­\ntoring North Vietnam's compliance with the cease-fire accords.\nThe Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover\nof Lockheed employees working on a government contract to check\nweather conditions. Their highly sensitive missions had to remain at\nleast 15 nautical miles away from the North Vietnamese coast, and\nthey initially flew at low altitude in a deceptive direction in order to\navoid PRC radars. These constraints made the missions diffic­\nult because at low altitude the U-2 consumed more fuel and encoun­\ntered more turbulence and the pilocs· pressure suits tended to\noverheat.\nThe first mission on 30 March 1973 was only marginally suc­\ncessful because of cloud cover and haze, which prevented it from\nphotographing most of its targets. A second mission on the following\nday had somewhat better luck with the weather. but problems with the\nfilm processing reduced the mission·s coverage. Afterward, the mon­\nsoon season prevented any further missions until 21 July 1973. This\n·mission obtained usable photography of SAM sites and North\nVietnamese supply operations, although the resolution was not as\nhigh as it should have been because the H camera lens had not been\nproperly focused. The last SCOPE SHIELD mission, on 6 January\n1974. finally succeeded in obtaining high-quality photography. The\nmission provided complete coverage of shipping in Haiphong Harbor.\nSAM defenses, and North Vietnamese naval order of battle.M\nIMPROVEMENTS IN U-2 TECHNOLOGY\nModification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment\nIn mid-1963, the Office of Special Activities set in motion Project\nWHALE TALE to examine the possibility of adapting the U-2 aircraft\nfor operations from an aircraft carrier. In the past, protest notes from\nthe Soviet Union to Turkey and Pakistan and from Communist China\nto India had been responsible for interrupting overflight operations.\nCIA planners believed that. if U-2s could be modified to operate from\naircraft carriers, the United States could avoid the political problems\n~ Ibid .. pp. 48-51 (TS Codeword)."
  },
  {
   "n": 261,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p261.jpg",
   "text": "•\n·\n248\nSec.et NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nr-------..,•••••••-.-.-;-\n•-.: ·< :; -~~..i{~~1:;}{~~f:~}'::.••\n·····,~--;)~~t~1i· ~·;;:t..,f;~..\\;;.;..,~:.~·~~~:::S\n··~~~ii::'.\n- ·· -\n-~­\n~--\n-\n,_ ..\n~ ...\n~\n-\n~\n:.\n·\"\"!-··· .­\n...\n,>,, •\n•\n-·..,.,- . _;~\n~ -;_\ninvolved in seeking permission to bw;e U-::!s in other nations. Kelly\nU-2 on the USS Kitty Hawk,\nJohnson began working on changes to the aircraft. and Office of\n5 August 1963\nSpecial Activities Deputy Director James A. Cunningham, Jr.. a for­\nmer Marine Corps aviator. asked the Navy for assistance.\nThe first test of the U-2's capability for carrier operations took\nplace in August 1963 from the USS Kitty Hawk operating in the\nPacific Ocean off San Diego. California. A U-2C, which had been\nloaded aboard the carrier at North ls.land Naval Base. took off from\nthe flight deck with a full load of fuel and was airborne within 32 1\nfeet. No assistance from catapults was necessary. Although the\ntakeoff was very successful. the attempted landing was not. The air­\ncraft bounced, hit hard on one wing tip. and then just barely\nmanaged to become airborne again before reaching the end of the\ndeck. Kelly Johnson realized that the airframe would have to be al­\ntered in order to make carrier landings possible. These alterations in­\nvolved strengthening the landing gear. installing an arresting hook at\nthe rear of the fuselage, and fining '\"spoilers\" on the wings to cancel\nthe aerodynamic lift once the aircraft was over che tlighc deck.\nAircraft thus modified were designat,ed U-2G. While several aircraft\nSee.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 262,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p262.jpg",
   "text": "249\nSec, ,et NOFOFIN\nChapter 5\nunderwent these modifications. Detachment G pilots began undergo­\ning training in landing on aircraft carriers. The first successful carrier\nlanding took place on 2 March l 964.\n69\nU-2 on the USS Kitty Hawk,\n5 August 1963\nUse of Carrier-Based U-2 To Film a\nFrench Nuclear Test Site\nWithin a few months after the completion of carrier testing. one of the\ncarrier-modified U-2s conducted an operation in the Pacitic. Its mis­\nsion was to gather information on the activities of an ally. In\n~ .. U-2 Aircraft Carri.:r Operations: Proj.:ct ·WHALE TALE.\" Op,:racion FISH HAWK.\"\nOS&T. 1964. pp. 1-13 (TS Co<l.:wordl : Johnson. ··Log for Proj.:ct x.-· 5 August 1963\nand 2 March 1964.\nS:eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 263,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p263.jpg",
   "text": "250\nSec, et PJOFORPJ\nChapter 5\nDecember 1963, France had announced its intention to detonate a hy­\ndrogen device over Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago area\nof French Polynesia but had given no specific date for the event. The\nCommittee on Overhead Reconnaissance had been following French\nnuclear developments since September 1963, when it had apprised the\nUSIB of the need for overflights of this South Pacific area. At that\ntime the USIB decided against recommending such overflights be­\ncause of State Department concern about potential political difficul­\nties with France in the event the mission was discovered.\nFollowing reports of a buildup of French troops and technical\npersonnel in neighboring Tahiti, the Special Group on 24 April 1964\napproved a mission to overfly the atoll to check for activity. This re­\nquired photography with a resolution better than the 3 to 5 feet possi­\nble with the standard B-model camera that had been in use since\nOctober 1956. Work on a very-high-resolution camera had begun in\nearly 1963, when the Agency contracted with the Itek Corporation to\nmodify for placement in the U-2 a camera that had been developed\nfor the satellite program. Known as the Delta-II, or the 112A, this de­\nvice could photograph a 28-kilometer swath with 26° convergent ste­\nreoscopic lenses, resulting in a 70° lateral coverage and a ground\nresolution of 10 inches. This camera was installed in a Detachment H\nU-2 and used on two missions conducted over Indochina in late\nDecember 1963. Resolution was not as high as had been expected,\nand the unit was returned to Itek for modifications. By early 1964, the\n112A had been reworked and was now known as the 112B. In tests it\nhad proved capable of providing photography with resolution in the\nI 0- to 12-inch range.\nDetachment G conducted Operation FISH HAWK in May 1964\nby sending two pilots, an NPIC photointerpreter. and a U-2G\nequipped with the Itek 112B camera to make the first operational U-2\nflights from an aircraft carrier. On 19 May the U-2 took off from the\nUSS Ranger and overflew the French atomic test area. As soon as the\naircraft returned to the Ranger, the film was developed in the carrier's\nphoto lab, and the NPIC photointerpreter then read out the film to see\nif the photography met the requirements for resolution and quality. A\nsecond U-2 flight carried out a similar mission on 22 May. The pho­\ntography provided all the detail needed to identify the preparations for\nthe nuclear test that occurred later that year. 111\n\"' \"U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operations: Project 'WHALE TALE,' Operation FISH HAWK,'.\nDS&T. 1964, pp. 17-25.\nSee.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 264,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p264.jpg",
   "text": "251\nSeu et NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nThere was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft\ncarrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political\nsensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor­\nmously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to\nprotect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big\nships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while\nthe deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place\novernight.\nA New Version of the U-2\nBy the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had\ndwindled to six-two at Detachment H in Taiwan and four at\nDetachment G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo­\ning repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55\n(the Air Force had purchased another 31 of these planes), and Kelly\nJohnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four\nadditional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable\nsections of crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac­\nquired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost of $812.500 each.\nAt this point, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense on I August\n1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for eight more aircraft\nto be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs-a completely\nnew version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways\nto improve the performance of the U-2 since early I 965 because he\nwas concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft\nover the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its\nrange and several thousand feet in cruising altitude.11 The new model,\nknown as the U-2R, had a longer fuselage and a wider wingspan than\nthe original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000\nsquare feet of lifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings\nwith only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage of the U-2R made it\npossible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic\nmeters of equipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu­\ntion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per­\nforming aircraft. No longer did the U-2 pilot have to worry about\nkeeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the\nstall/buffet corner of the flight envelope. The envelope was now ex­\ntended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.\n\" Johnson, \"Log for Projc::ct X,\" 2 F.:bruary 1965. June: to Octobc::r 1965. 20 Octobc::r\n1965: Johnson, \"U-2R Log,\" January to August 1966.\nSeoFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 265,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p265.jpg",
   "text": "252\n3ec.et NOFOfUd\nChapter 5\n· •' -'-'It •.·· · ····-·...\n~ --~~\n..~,\n.,.\n~ ~ f-fi•\nU-2C and U-2R\nThe U-2R used the upgraded Pratt & Whitney J75/P- l 3B erngine\nand was able to fly higher-in excess of 74,000 feet-and faster­\nMach 0.72 (410 knots). which is 12 knots faster than the U-2C. When\nflying at the higher altitude. however. the U-2R·s range was less than\nthe U-2Cs. T he restart capability of the P-13B engine was signifi­\ncantly better than the P- l 3A power plant As a result. the U-2R could\nbe restarted at 54.000 feet. which was I 0.000 feet higher tham the\nU-2C. Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who\nchecked out this new aircraft when it first took to the air on 28 Auigust\n1967. The last of the U-2Rs was delivered on 11 December 1968.\nThe increa:-;ed performance of the U-2R did not come cheaply.\nAt $7. 1 million per aircraft. the new models cost almost 10 times as\nmuch as the original U-2s. Much of the increased cost was dUte to\ninflation. but some was the result of technological advances. The ini­\ntial order for eight of the new version of the U-2 was followed on 23\nNovember 1966 by an order from the DCI and the Secretary of\nDefense for four more. This brought the total number of U-2Rs pur­\nchased by the CIA and the Air Force to 12.n\nIn addition to a new aircraft. the U-2 program received a new\ncamera. Agency managers felt that. because the B camera was now I0\nyears old. the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im­\nportant advances that had occurred in recent years. The 112B--the\nmodified version of the satellite program ·s stereo camera that had\nbeen used in the U-2G-had not proved totally successful. Despite its\nstereo capability. this camera's shorter focal length could not provide\n'' OSr\\ ffistory. c.:hap. 5. pp. 34-36 (TS Co(kword): \"OSA Hiswry-2.\"' c.:hap. 5. pp. 1-2\n(TS Codcwon.l).\nSeeFat"
  },
  {
   "n": 266,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p266.jpg",
   "text": "253\nSee, et rdOFORN\nChapter 5\nthe scale of imagery needed to obtain the highly technical data de­\nsired by analysts. As a result, the Office of Special Activities asked\nthe Hycon Manufacturing Company of Pasadena, California, to adapt\nits successful high-resolution 48-inch 9- by 9-inch format camera de­\nveloped for the OXCART aircraft for use in the U-2R. This camera\nwas actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a\nnew lens designed by James Baker. The new camera was designed to\nresolve objects smaller than 4 inches.\nHycon began work on the HR-333 camera in 1966. Unlike the\nOXCART camera, the new unit was to use the split 18- by 18-inch\nformat of the B camera, so the lens had to be redesigned. James\nBaker's contribution to this effort was a 48-inch f/5.6 system that pro­\nvided remarkably sharp imagery. Hycon completed the camera in\ntime for it to be installed in the first U-2Rs delivered to the Agency in\n1968; it is known as the H camera.71\nReplacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs\nAs the new U-2Rs began coming off the production line at Lockheed\n_in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the_ Department of Defense had to\ndecide who would get the new aircraft. At a meeting on 13\nNovember, DCI Richard Helms and Secretary of Defense Robert\nMcNamara agreed that the Air Force and the Agency would each get\nsix U-2Rs. The six older U-2s remaining from the original 1954-55\nproduction were to be kept in flyable condition and be used as re­\nplacements if newer models were lost.\nDespite the greatly increased capabilities of the new model of\nthe U-2, the era of overflights of hostile territory was over. The U-2R\nwould have six years of useful service with the Agency, but its mis­\nsions did not include penetration flights over hostile territory.\nTHE FINAL YEARS OF THE U-2\nWhen the OXCART's brief operational career with the Agency ended\nin 1968, the U-2 was once again the center of the Agency's manned\nreconnaissance program. But by this time, reconnaissance aircraft had\ndeclined in importance as collection systems. Overflights were a thing\nof the past. Although Project TACKLE U-2s with Nationalist Chinese\n\" \"OSA History-2,\" chap. 5. pp. 10-l2.\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 267,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p267.jpg",
   "text": "254\n6eeret NOFORN\nChapter 5\npilots were still flying missions targeted against the People's Republic\nof China, these missions did not overfly PRC territory. Increasingly,\nAgency U-2s flew missions that did not involve intelligence collec­\ntion requirements.\nSupport to Other Agencies\nBeginning in 1964, the Agency conducted a program known as RED\nDOT for the Department of Defense. RED DOT involved the devel­\nopment and testing of various color, black and white, and infrared\nfilms. emulsions. and processing techniques for use in manned and\nunmanned high-altitude reconnaissance systems. From 1968 until\n1974. Detachment G U-2s photographed areas within the United\nStates that were analagous to portions of the Soviet Union in order to\ntest films and techniques for spotting certain targets. This analogous\nfilming was particularly valuable in connection with agricultural areas\nand nuclear test sites.\nSome U-2 missions supported agencies outside the intelligence\ncommunity. In I968 and 1969, Detachment G U-2s flew high-altitude\nphotographic missions in conjunction with the Apollo VII and IX\nspaceflights in response to a NASA request. These flights provided\nphotography of the western United States for comparison with the\nphotography taken by the Apollo crews. The Department of the\nInterior also requested U-2 support in early 1969 to help determine\nthe extent of damage caused by a leak in an offshore oil well in\nCalifornia's Santa Barbara Channel. After preliminary assessment of\nthe film at NPIC, the mission photography was given to the US\nGeological Survey for further study.\nAlso in early 1969, Detachment G began providing coverage of\nthe western United States at the request of the Department of\nCommerce. U-2s filmed the Sierra snowfield to aid hydrologists in\nforecasting snowmelt and nooding potentials. Later that year,\nDetachment G supported the Office of Emergency Preparedness by\nphotographing 6 l .000 square miles of the southern United States as\npart of a Hurricane Baseline Survey. These photographs could be used\nfor future damage assessment following a major hurricane. A subse­\nquent mission in fiscal year 1971 continued the Hurricane Baseline\nSurvey by photographing the Gulf Coast. When a major earthquake\nstruck the Los Angeles area on 9 February 1971, Detachment G U-2s\nflew four sorties to obtain damage-assessment photos. 70\n\" lbiJ.. chap. 3. pp. 3-29 (TS CoJc:worJ).\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 268,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p268.jpg",
   "text": "255\nSet, et PdOFORPI\nChapt er 5\n..\n~-. .,- ..,\n,.,\n.\\\n.......=..\n'\n.\n.\n. ..\n-: ·--:-:::---- .\n,, , ~-. ·;,,.-. ~ -3 If': •\n-~\n-~\n.\n~</ '\n•,\n~\n#'\nT\n~\n~ ~,,-\n,:\", I •\n...... .\n•\n-. .. i\n,e:·\nh'•-:.;\n#\n,.(_·.,\n-·\nr,;·f :; t1= ..\n·It·:.,\n\\ -~ '\n.-:, -~\n•.\n-\n.,_\nJ,~:·-t, \\\ni\n•\n.· ~\n.\n•\n·v-\n.\nSubsequent missions in support of Federal agencies included\nEarthquake damage, San\nCOMPASS TRIP in fiscal year 1973, when Agency U-2s photo­\nFernando Valley, 1971\ngraphed poppy fields that had been planted by the Bureau of\nNarcotics in order to provide a standard for comparison with sate:llite\nimagery. In the following year, U-2s assisted the Corps of Engirneers\nin conducting a geological survey.\nOverseas Deployment Exercises and Missions\nWith the exception of the Chinese Nationalist-piloted U-2!; of\nDetachment H, all of the Agency's U-2 assets were concentrated in\nDetachment G in California. To test the ability of Detachment G to\nrespond to a crisis in Europe or the Middle East, the Agency staged\nan overseas deployment exercise known as SCOPE SAINT each year\n(unless there was an actual operational deployment, as was the -case\nin 1970, 1973, and 1974). The first of these exercises, SCOPE\nSAINT-I, took place o\ne 19\nwhen Detachment G de­\nloved a ~\nG to the\n~\nhe\n-\ncon ucted several training flights and then returned\nto California. SCOPE SAINT-II followed in April 1969 and dennon­\nstrated the feasibility of employing a C-14 I aircraft to accompainy a\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 269,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p269.jpg",
   "text": "256\n•\n•\n•\nSecret NOFOAN\nChapter 5\nU-2 ir;t- tlil!ht to its destination. The C-I41 carried support equipment\nto theL\n] In October I\n[\nes\n__· t_ ◊o _\n_\n_\na_\nl_\nk_\nce _\n,_ 11 a_\n_\nf_\nd i_\nion\n__\nfe en\nlo\n_\nt\nc·a\n___\nt__\n_\nr_\n_\n. _________,\nNo overseas deployment exercise was necessary in 1970, for ele­\nments of Detachment G actually deployed overseas to provide photog­\nraphy of the Middle East. At the time. President Nixon's National\nSecurity Adviser. Henry A. Kissinger, was mediating between the\nArabs and lsraelis in order to obtain a cease-fire along the Suez Canal.\nwhere a virtual undeclared war was taking place. Once agreement was\nreached in August, Kissinger promised both sides that the United\nStates would monitor the agreed upon 32-mile pullback from the wa­\nterway. Originally, Kissinger intended for photosatellites to do the\nmonitoring. One satellite was tasked to photograph the Suez Canal\narea on 10 August, but the quality of its imagery lacked the detail\nneeded to discover such small targets as gun emplacements and jeeps.\nIn early August, Kissinger asked the Air Force to provide U-2s\nto overtly the Canal, but the Air Force demurred, saying it would take\nseveral weeks to move a U-2 detachment from Del Rio, Texas. to the\nMiddle East. At this point. DCI Helms told an NSC meeting that the\nAgency's Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base could deploy air­\ncraft to~-------------' and begin ti I ming the Suez\narea within the week. and it did. In fact. the first U-2 arrived in\nr---Jonly 71 hours after receiving notification to deploy. Between\n~st and 10 November 1970. Agency U-2s flew 29 missions over\nthe cease-fire zone as part of Project EVEN STEVEN. Most flights\nused the B camera. but 12 were equipped with the new, high-resolu­\ntion H camera. The EVEN STEVEN U-2s also employed a dozen\nelectronic-intelligence-collection\npackages.\nfrom\nSystem-X\nto\nSystem-XXIV. After 10 November 1970. Air Force SR-71s took over\nthe task of photographing the cease-fire zone.\n76\nThe M iddle East was again the cause of a Detachment G deploy­\nment in October I97~ wbea aoorbec Acab-lscaeli war bcol,e anr Two\nU-2s d,eployed to the~----------------'~n 7\nand 8 October 1973. to be ready for possible coverage of the conflict.\nDetach rnent G received no such tasking. however. and the last of the\naircraft returned to California on 13 November. The 1973 war did\n\" Ibid .. pp. 5-6. 10- 11 tTS Co<.l.:word).\n,. Ibid.. pp. 15-20 (TS Cod.:worJL\n-Sec, cl-­"
  },
  {
   "n": 270,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p270.jpg",
   "text": "257\nlead to the overseas deployment of Detachment G U-2s in 1974, when\nthe CIA was tasked to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian and lateir the\nIsraeli-Syrian disengagement areas. On 21 April l 974, a Detachment\nG U-2 with appropriate support elements arrived at Akrotiri, Cyprus,\nto conduct Operation OLIVE HARVEST. Between l2 May and 28\nJuly, the detachment conducted six overfli ghts of the disengagement\nareas. During these missions the electronic warning systems of the\nU-2 registered numerous radar lockons, but no surface-to-air mis:siles\nwere fired. On l August 1974, responsibility for the OUYE\nHARVEST missions as well as the aircraft itself came into the hands\nof the Air Force as part of the transfer of the entire Agency U-2 pro­\ngram at that time.\n77\nThe Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities\nThe Agency's U-2 program had been under review since the autumn\nof l 969 to detennine if it should be continued along with the larger\nAir Force U-2 program. In December 1969, President Nixon decided\nto keep the Agency's program in existence through l 971 and asked\nfor a formal review by the 40 Committee (the new name for the 303\n·Committee/Special Group). ln August 1970, the committee recom­\nmended continuing the program through fiscal year 1972. On 12\nAugust 1972, the 40 Committee again favored continuation of the\nCIA U-2 program. This recommendation was motivated primarily by\na desire not to alienate the Nationalist Chinese Government by el.imi­\nnating Project TACKLE. In June 1973, however, DCI Jame:s R.\nSchlesinger informed the 40 Committee that this project could be ter­\nminated without causing major difficulties with the Nationalist\nChinese. On 30 August 1973, the 40 Committee approved the C:IA's\nplans to tenninate the U-2 program effective I August 1974. The: Air\nForce would assume funding responsibility for the four U-2R airicraft\nassigned to the Agency and would take physical possession of them\nthen or shortly thereafter. On l April l 974, Ambassador Walter P.\nMcConaughy informed the Nationalist Chinese Government of the\nUS intention to end the U-2 project, and the two countries then\nworked out a schedule for phasing out Project TACKLE.\n73\nThe transfer of all Agency U-2s to the Air Force eliminated\nDetachments G and H. Their parent organization, the Office of\nSpecial Activities, began its phaseout immediately thereafter. The\n20-year career of the U-2 with the CIA had come to an end.\n,., Ibid.. pp. 31-H (TS Codeword).\n,. Ibid.. chap. 10, pp. 1-4 (TS Codeword).\nSecret NOfOftN\nChapter 5"
  },
  {
   "n": 271,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p271.jpg",
   "text": ""
  },
  {
   "n": 272,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p272.jpg",
   "text": "259\nChapter 6\nThe U-2's Intended Successor:\nProject OXCART,\n1956-1968\nBefore the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi­\ncials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the\nSoviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After\noverflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of\ntracking and attempting to intercept the U-2. this estimate seemed\ntoo optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned\n·a6out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid\ndestruction for six months, let alone two years.\nTo extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first\nattempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet\nradars. Project RAINBOW's efforts 10 mask the radar image of the\nU-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more\nvulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude.\nBecause Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s\nequipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project\nRAINBOW in May 1958.\nLong before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell\nand his Air Force assistant. Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for\na more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection-an\nentirely new aircraft. {n the late summer of 1956, the two officials\nvisited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas.\nAmong the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi­\ngantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be\nmade of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its\nupper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 273,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p273.jpg",
   "text": "Setiel NOFOfitN\nChapter 6\n260\naltitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just\nenough to keep it airborne. 1\nThe slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of\nradar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic de­\nsigns. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI), a\nCIA proprietary firm that had been working on ways to reduce the\nU-2's vulnerability to radar, began to investigate the possibility of\ndesigning an aircraft with a very small radar cross section. SEI soon\ndiscovered that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of de­\ntection by radar.1 From this point on, the CIA's attention focused in­\ncreasingly on the possibility of building an aircraft that could fly at\nboth extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating\nthe best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques.\nTHE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR\nA SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2\nBy the autumn of 1957, Bissell and Gibbs had collected so many\nideas for a successor to the U-2 that Bissell asked DCI Dulles for per­\nmission to establish an advisory committee to assist in the selection\nprocess. Bissell also felt that the support of a committee of prominent\nscientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask\nfor funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the\nchairman of the new committee, which included some of the scien­\ntists and engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for\noverhead reconnaissance: Edward Purcell, Allen F. Donovan, H.\nGuyford Stever, and Eugene P. Kiefer. The Air Force's chief scientist,\nCourtland D. Perkins, was also a member. The committee first met in\nNovember 1957 and held six more meetings between July 1958 and\nthe late summer of 1959. The meetings usually took place in Land's\nBoston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant\nSecretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, and\nhis Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air­\ncraft manufacturers also attended some of the meetings.3\n' Donovan interview (S).\nMinnich, \"The OXCART Story,\"' Studies in Intelligence 15 (Winter 1971 ):2 (S).\n'Clarence L. Johnson, Report No. SP-1362, \"History of the OXCART Program,\"\nLockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. I July 1968, p. I (TS Codeword).\nSacr:at"
  },
  {
   "n": 274,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p274.jpg",
   "text": "261\n--&ec-ret NOFORN\nChapter 6\nA-1 , 23 April 1958\nA-1, 26 June 1958\n;:j\nJohnson's first drawing ofthe \"U-3\"\n(A-1); revised version of the A-1\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 275,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p275.jpg",
   "text": "262\n6eeret NOFORN\nChapter 6\nThe two most prominent firms involved in the search for a new\naircraft were Lockheed, which had designed the successful U-2, and\nConvair, which was building the supersonic 8-58 \"Hustler\" bomber\nfor the Air Force and also working on an even faster model known as\nthe B-588 \"Super Hustler.\" Early in 1958, Richard Bissell asked of­\nficials from both finns to submit designs for a high-speed reconnais­\nsance aircraft. During the spring and summer of 1958, both fiirms\nworked on design concepts without government contracts or funds.\nFollowing extended discussions with Bissell on the subject of a\nsupersonic successor to the U-2, Lockheed's Kelly Johnson begani de­\nsigning an aircraft that would cruise at Mach 3.0 at altitudes above\n90,000 feet. On 23 July 1958, Johnson presented his new high-speed\nconcept to Land's advisory committee, which expressed interest in the\napproach he was taking. At the same meeting. Navy representatives\npresented a concept for a high-altitude reconnaissance vehicle that ex­\namined the possibility of developing a ramjet-powered, inflatatble,\nrubber vehicle that would be lifted to altitude by a balloon and 1then\n•be propelled by a rocket to a speed where the ramjets could produce\nthrust. Richard Bissell asked Johnson to evaluate this concept, and\nthree weeks later, after receiving more details from Navy repre­\nsentatives. Kelly Johnson made some quick calculations that showed\nthat the design was impractical because the balloon would have to be\na mile in diameter to lift the vehicle, which in tum would need a wing\nsurface area greater than one-seventh of an acre to carry the payload:\nBy September 1958, Lockheed had studied a number of possible\nconfigurations, some based on ramjet engines. others with both ram­\njets and turbojets. Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to\nthese aircraft concepts as \"Archangel-I,\" \"Archangel-2,\" and so\nfonh, a carryover from the original nickname of \"Angel\" given tci the\nU-2 during its development. These nicknames for the various des:igns\nsooo became simply \"A-l,\" \"A-2,\" etc.\nIn September 1958, the Land committee met again to review all\nthe concepts then under consideration and to winnow out the few that\nwere most practicable. Among the concepts rejected were the Navy's\nproposal for an inflatable, ramjet-powered aircraft, a Boeing proposal\nfor a 190-foot-long hydrogen-powered inflatable aircraft, and a\n'Clarence L. Johnson. '\"Development of the Lockheed SR-7 I Blacl.bird:· Srudi.es in\nIntelligence 26 (Summer 1982):4 (U); Johnson. \"Archangel log.\"\" 23 July 1958. 1.i\nAugust I958.\niiiel.lret"
  },
  {
   "n": 276,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p276.jpg",
   "text": "263\nSee, et NOFORN\nChapter 6\nLockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The\ncommittee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this\nmeeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross sec­\ntion (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)-and did not\naccept either one, the former because of its slow speed and the latter\nbecause of its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjets and its over­\nall high cost. The committee approved the continuation of Convair's\nwork on a ramjet-powered Mach 4.0 \"parasite\" aircraft that would be\nlaunched from a specially configured version of the B-58B bomber.\nThe design was termed a parasite because it could not take off on its\nown but needed a larger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to\nthe speed required to start the ramjet engine. The Convair design was\ncalled the FISH.5\nTwo months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet\nanother Lockheed design for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft (the\nA-3), the Land committee concluded in late November 1958 that it\nwould indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude\nwould make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee,\ntherefore, recommended that DCI Dulles ask President Eisenhower to\n-\n~ approve further pursuit of the project and to provide funds for addi­\ntional studies and tests. 6\nOn 17 December 1958, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed\nthe President on the progress toward a successor to the U-2. Also\npresent were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee,\nPresidential Science Adviser James Killian, and Air Force Secretary\nDonald Quarles. DCI Dulles reviewed the results of the U-2 missions\nto date and stated his belief that a successor to the U-2 could be used\nall over the world and \"would have a much greater invulnerability to\ndetection.\"\nBissell then described the two competing projects by Lockheed\nand Convair, noting that the chief question at the moment was\nwhether to use air launch or ground takeoff. The next phase, he add­\ned, would be detailed engineering, at the end of which it was pro­\nposed that 12 aircraft be ordered at a cost of about $100 million.\n'OSA History, chap. 20, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson. \"Archangel log.\" 17-24\nSeptember 1958.\n• OSA Chronology. p. 21 (TS Codeword); Minnich, \"OXCART Story,\" p. 3 (S); OSA\nHistory. chap. 20. p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson, \"Archangel log,\" 12 November 1958.\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 277,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p277.jpg",
   "text": "264\nSecret NOPOftN\n._,\nChapter 6\n444\" (37')\n---=E\nConvair FISH\nSeee:et"
  },
  {
   "n": 278,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p278.jpg",
   "text": "_\n:.,_ ,_\n.\n'\n'\n1 l !\n-:--\n•\n,\n. • ,\n\":77~ _ _:\n:\n'\n'\n•\nI\n'\n•\nI\n';ff:\"- '' !\nI :,\n: -;- .;..\"7\n- .\n,- ·: ... :\n_j_ : -:\nhapter 6\n265"
  },
  {
   "n": 279,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p279.jpg",
   "text": "-\nChapter 6\n266\n~\n~\n~\nKelly Johnson's A-3 Qesign\n~ -\n.s~\n.q •\n~wt--\n/7' ~=,t.\n~\n..1- ,-,~· -\n13. 2.-00\n2...-\n.A, 6. J T-1-LA\nz..-\n'30 ..\nlee.-~­\n.Jd1l#\" ~.\nM -\n..3• .zl\n@\n/t>e,, ~\nI\n( .]. t-.')\n-\n~4<A' ~\n- C..-s-.\nr\n-z:- SP -\n~-- .L.,-(.:_ ~Sr"
  },
  {
   "n": 280,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p280.jpg",
   "text": "267\nSecret NOF'OFU~\nChapter 6\nAlthough President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this\ntype of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had\nbeen tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat­\nter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that\nCIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were\nworking on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested\nthat the Air Force \"could support the project by transferring some re­\nconnaissance money.\" At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked\nthe group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss\nfurther stages of the project with him. 7\nCOMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR\nWith funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,\nRichard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro­\nposals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair\nworked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis­\ntance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.\nlri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome­\nnon that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon­\nnaissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to\nas the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the\nstrength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated\nby the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar\nscreen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).\nMost tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to\n45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this\narea reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its\nsize-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.\nThis return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a\nspot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also\ndepended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger\nobjects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and\nearly 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and\nkept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of\nview.\n'Andrew J. Goodpaster. \"Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December\n1958. 10:26 a.m.,\" 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).\nSee.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 281,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p281.jpg",
   "text": "268\nSecret NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nRodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to\nthree times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small\nblip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great\ndifficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers esti­\nmated that for an aircraft to take advantage o!· this Blip/Scan Ratio\nphenomenon it must fly at altitudes approaching 90,000 feet and have\na radar cross section of less than 10 square meters, preferably not\nmuch over 5 square meters. However, for a Mach 3.0 aircraft to\nachieve such a small radar cross section, its designers would have to\nmake many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics.•\nBy the summer of 1959, both firms had completed their propos­\nals. In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched\naircraft known as the A-11. It would have a speed of Mach 3.2, a\nrange of 3,200 miles, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and a completion date\nof January 1961. Kelly Johnson had refused to reduce the aerodynam­\nics of his design in order to achieve a greater antiradar capability, and\nthe A-11 's radar cross section, although not great, was substantially\nlarger than that of the much smaller parasite aircraft being designed\nby Convair.\"\nThe Convair proposal called for a small, manned, ramjet-pow­\nered, reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one of two spe­\ncially configured Convair B-58B Super Hustlers. The FISH vehicle, a\nradical lifting body with a very-small-radar cross section, would fly at\nMach 4.2 at 90.000 feet and have a range of 3,900 miles. Two\nMarquardt ramjets would power its Mach 4.2 dash over the target\narea. Once the FISH decelerated, two Pratt & Whitney JT-12 turbojets\nwould bring it back to base. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges\nwould be constructed of Pyroceram, a ceramic material that could\nwithstand the high temperatures of very high speeds and would ab­\nsorb radiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the\nFISH could be ready by January I 961.\"'\nConvair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors. First and\nforemost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the time,\nno aircraft in existence could carry a large, ramjet-powered craft into\nthe sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines\n'Unnumbered Convair document on the Blip/Scan Ratio or Rodgers· Effect (TS).\n,, Johnson, \"Archangel log.\" Dt:l:ember 1958-July 1959.\n'\" OSA History. chap. 20. p. 12 (TS Codeword); Convair Division. General Dynamics\nCorporation, \"Pniject FISH Status Review,\" 9 June 1959 (S).\nSeere;t"
  },
  {
   "n": 282,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p282.jpg",
   "text": "269\n~,et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nto be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun­\nnels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would\nwork in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain\nfactor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2\nbefore launching the FISH above 35,000 feet. This version of the\nB-58 was still in the design stage.\nConvair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when\nthe Air Force canceled the 8-58B project. Conversion of the older,\nslower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was\nruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties invol ved.\nMoreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from\nthe small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588\nprogram not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba­\nbly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the\nadded weight of the FISH would prevent the B-588 from achieving\nthe speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.\nThe Convair proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed\ndesign with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the\nLand committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both\nLockheed A· 11\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 283,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p283.jpg",
   "text": "270\nSecret NOfiOftN\nChapter 6\ndesigns and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work\non developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and\nConvair received a new C[A contract to design an air-breathing\ntwin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being\nd 11\nfollowed by Lockhee .\nFollowing recommendations by the Land committee, both\nLockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt & Whitney 158 power\nplant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed\nfor the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the Glenn L. Martin\nCompany's P6M Seamaster, and was the most powerful engine\navailable. [n 1958 the Navy had canceled the Seamaster program,\nwhich had left Pratt & Whitney without a buyer for the powerful 158\n•\nI~\nengine.\nAlthough the Land committee had not yet found an acceptable\ndesign, it informed President Eisenhower on 20 July 1959 that the\nsearch was making good progress. Concerned about the U-2's vulner­\nability to detection and possible interception and aware that the\nphotosatellite project was encountering significant problems, the\nPresident gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance\naircraft project. 13\nTHE SELECTION OF THE LOCKHEED DESIGN\nBy the late summer of 1959, both Convair and Lockheed had com­\npleted new designs for a follow-on to the U-2. Convair's entry, known\nas the KINGFISH, used much of the technology developed for the\nF-102, F-106, and B-58, including stainless steel honeycomb skin,\nplaniform wing design, and a crew capsule escape system, which\neliminated the need for the pilot to wear a pressurized suit. The\nKfNGFISH had two side-by-side 158 engines inside the fuselage,\nwhich significantly reduced the radar cross section. Two additional\n\" OSA History, chap. 20, p. I 5 (TS Codeword).\n\"Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); Joseph V. Charyk. interview\nby Donald E. We[zenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC, 5 December 1984 (TS\nCodeword).\n\"Andrew J. Goodpaster. \"Memorandum of Conference with the President,\" 20 July [ 959.\nWHOSS. ALPHA. DDEL (TS).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 284,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p284.jpg",
   "text": "271\nSect et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\n--- 60'0\"---------­\nimportant design features that contributed to a small radar return were\nConvair K!NGFISH\nfiberglass engine inlets and wings whose leading edges were made of\n.\n..., -\n,.,\nPyroceram.\nLockheed's new entry was much like its first, but with several\nmodifications and a new designator, A-12. It, too, would employ two\nof the powerful J58 engines. Lockheed's major innovation in reducing\nradar return was a cesium additive in the fuel, which decreased the\nradar cross section of the afterburner plume. This improvement had\nbeen proposed by Edward Purcell of the Land committee. Desiring to\nsave weight, Kelly Johnson had decided not to construct the A- 12 out\nof steel. Traditional lightweight metals such as aluminum were out of\nthe question because they could not stand the heat that would be gen­\nerated as the A-12 flew at Mach 3.2, so Johnson chose a titanium\nalloy.\nOn 20 August 1959, Lockheed and Convair submitted their pro­\nposals to a joint Department of Defense, Air Force, and CIA selection\npanel. As the table shows, the two aircraft were similar in performance\n\" Convair Division. General Dynamics Corporation. \" KINGFISH Summary Re:port.\"\n1959 (S). Kelly Johnson was very skeptical of the Convair design. noting in the Archangel\nproject log on 1-20 August 1959: ·'Convair have promised substantially reduced radar\ncross seclion on an airplane the size of our A-12. They are doing this, in my view. with\n. lOtal disregard for aerodynamics. inlet and afterburner p,:rformance ...\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 285,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p285.jpg",
   "text": "272\nSecret NOFOFM\nChapter 6\nWind tunnel test of A-12 model"
  },
  {
   "n": 286,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p286.jpg",
   "text": "273\nSecret NOFORN\nChapter 6\ncharacteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were\nslightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer­\nable in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar\ndetection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size\nand internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section\nthan the Lockheed A-12. 15\nComparison of Lockheed and\nConvair Designs\nLockheed A-12\nSpeed\nRange (total)\nRange (at altitude)\nCruising Altitude\nStart\nMidrange\nEnd\nCost summary (for 12\naircraft without engines)\nMach 3.2\n4,120 nm\n3,800 nm\n84,500 ft.\n91.000 ft.\n97,600 ft.\n$96.6 million\nConvair KINGFISH\nMach 3.2\n3,400 nm\n3,400 nm\n85.000 ft.\n88.000 ft.\n94,000 ft.\n$ I 21.6 million\nSome of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair\nKINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they\nwere eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air\nForce members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over­\nruns and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in\nthis new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under\nbudget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.\nLockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the\nSkunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared\nby the Agency.\nDespite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection\npanel remained concerned about the A-12 's vulnerability to radar de­\ntection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for\nreducing the A-l2's radar cross section by l January 1960. On 14\nSeptember 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed\n\" OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 287,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p287.jpg",
   "text": "274\nSec1 et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nto proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and en­\ngineering designs. This research and all later work on the A-12 took\nplace under a new codename. Project OXCART. established at the end\nof August 1959 to replace its more widely known predecessor, Project\nGUSTO.'\" The CfA's project manager for OXCART was John\nParangosky, who had long been associated with the U-2 program.\nEFFORTS TO REDUCE THE A-12'S\nRADAR CROSS SECTION\nDuring the spring of 1959, Kelly Johnson's Skunk Works crew­\nwhich then numbered only 50-had begun building a full-scale\nmockup of the proposed aircraft. The mockup was to be tested for its\nradar cross section by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in\ncooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small testing\nfacility at Indian Springs. Nevada. Lockheed objected to this site be­\ncause its pylon would not support the full-scale mockup and because\nthe facilities were in full view of a nearby highway. On IO September\n1959, EG&G agreed to move its radar test facility to the former U-2\ntesting site at Area 51 of the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada\nProving Grounds. 11\nWhen the new radar test facility with its larger pylon was ready.\nJohnson put the A-12 mockup on a specially designed trailer truck\nthat carried it from Burbank to Area 5 I. By 18 November 1959, the\nmockup was in place atop the pylon. and radar testing could begin.\nThese tests soon proved that Lockheed's concept of shape. fuel addi­\ntive, and nonmetallic parts was workable, but it would take more than\n18 months of testing and adjustment before the OXCART achieved a\nsatisfactory radar cross section.\nIt was in the course of this radar testing that the OXCART\nreceived its characteristic cobra-like appearance. Edward Purcell and\nFranklin Rodgers had come up with a theory that a continuously\ncurving airframe would be difficult to track with a radar pulse be­\ncause it would present few corner reflectors or sharp angles from\nwhich pulses could bounce in the direction of the radar. To achieve\nthe continuously curving airframe, Kelly Johnson added thin. curved\nextensions to the engine housings and leading edges of the wings and\n'\"Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 19-21 (TS Codeword).\n,· OSA History, chap. 20. p. 22 (TS Codeword).\n-SesreL"
  },
  {
   "n": 288,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p288.jpg",
   "text": "275\nSettee NOPORN\nChapter 6\nRadar testing of A-72 mockup\nSea,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 289,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p289.jpg",
   "text": "276\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nL=-=-3=\nWing tooth\nFin\nSpike\nAntiradar features of the A-12"
  },
  {
   "n": 290,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p290.jpg",
   "text": "277\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 6\neventually to the fuselage itself, creating what is known as a chine on\neach side. At first Johnson was concerned that these additions might\nimpair the airworthiness of the plane, but wind tunnel testing deter­\nmined that the chines actually imparted a useful aerodynamic I ift to\nthe vehicle. Because titanium was very brittle and therefore difficult\nto bend, Johnson achieved the necessary curvature by combining tri­\nangular-shaped pieces of titanium called fillets. These fillets were\nglued to the framework of the chines with a special adhesive, epoxy\nresin.\nOn later OXCART modds the fillets were made from electri­\ncally resistive honeycomb plastic with a glass-fiber surface that\nwould not melt at high speed. When struck by a radar pulse, the com­\nposite chines tended to absorb the pulse rather than reflect it. A simi­\nlar approach was used for the leading edges of the wings. Again\nelectrically resistive honeycomb material was fabricated into tn.J1ngu­\nlar shapes, known as wing teeth, and fitted into the titanium wings.\nBoth the metal and composite fillets and teeth were held in place with\nthe newly developed epoxy cements.\n_. The greatest remaining area of concern in the A- l 2's radar cross\nsection was the two vertical stabilizers. To reduce radar ·reflections,\nKelly Johnson canted the stabilizers inward 15° and fabricated 'them\nout of resin-impregnated nonmetallic materials. Once these changes\nwere completed, the only metal in each vertical stabilizer was a s.tain­\nless steel pivot. The Air Force, which later ordered several versions of\nthe OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated\nvertical stabii izers.\"\nTHE OXCART CONTRACT\nBy mid-January 1960, Lockheed had demonstrated that its concept of\nshape, fuel additive, and nonmetallic parts would reduce the\nOXCART's radar cross section substantially. Richard Bissell, howev­\ner. was very upset to learn that the changes had led to a reduction in\nthe aircraft's performance. which meant it would not be able to aiuain\nthe penetration altitude he had promised to President Eisenhower.\nKelly Johnson then proposed to reduce the aircraft's weight by 1,000\npounds and increase the fuel load by 2.000 pounds, making it possible\n\"Johnson. ··D,:veloprnc:n1 of Lo<:khcci.l SR-71 : · pp. 6-7: OSr\\ Hiswry. chap. '.!O. p. ~;5 (TS\nCodeword).\n$ee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 291,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p291.jpg",
   "text": "Secret i<JOFOHl'iJ\nChapter 6\n278\nto achieve the desired target altitude of 91,000 feet. Afterward. he\nnoted in the project log: ··we have no performance margins left; so\nthis project. instead of being 10 times as hard as anything we have\ndone, is 12 times as hard. This matches the design number and is ob­\nviously right.\" ,,,\nThese changes satisfied Bissell, who notified Johnson on 26\nJanuary that the CIA was authorizing the construction of 12 of the\nnew aircraft. The actual contract was signed on 11 February l 960.\nLockheed's original quotation for the project was $96.6 million for l2\naircraft, but technological difficulties eventually made this price im­\npossible to meet. Recognizing that fabricating an aircraft from tita­\nnium might involve unforeseen difficulties, the CIA included a clause\nin the contract that allowed costs to be reevaluated. During the next\nfive years. this clause had to be invoked on a number of occasions as\nthe A-12's costs soared to more than double the original estimate.\"'\nNEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED\nBY OXCART'S HIGH SPEED\nAccording to the specifications. the OXCART aircraft was to achieve\na speed of Mach 3.2 (2.064 knots or 0.57 miles per second. which\nwould make it as fast as a rifle bullet). have a range of 4.120 nautical\nmiles. and reach altitudes of 84.500 to 97,600 feet. The new aircraft\nwould thus be more than five times as fast as the U-2 and would go\nalmost 3 miles higher.\nOne major disadvantage of the OXCART's great speed was high\ntemperatures. Flying through the earth's atmosphere at Mach 3.2\nheated portions of the aircraft's skin to almost 900°F. An aircraft op­\nerating at these high speeds and high temperatures required fuels. lu­\nbricants, and hydraulic fluids that had not yet been invented. The\nOXCART's fuel requirement called for a low-vapor-pressure fuel\nwith a low volume at operating temperatures; the fuel would also be\nused as a heat sink to cool various parts of the aircraft. The 158 en­\ngines required lubricants that did not break down at the very high op­\nerating temperatures of Mach 3.2 speeds. This requirement led to the\n,., Johnson... Archangc I log,\" 2 I January I 960.\n'\" OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. pp. 27-29. 33-34, 36 (TS Colkword).\n6ee1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 292,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p292.jpg",
   "text": "279\nSec1et NOFORN\nChapter 6\ninvention of synthetic lubricants. Lockheed also had to search long\nOXCART production facilities\nand hard for a hydraulic fluid that would not vaporize at high speed\nbut would still be usable at low altitudes. Finding a suitable hydraulic\npump was just as difficult. Kelly Johnson finally modified a pump\nthat was being developed for North American's B-70 bomber\n.\n: 1\nproJect.\nSome of the greatest problems related to the high speeds and\nhigh temperatures at which the OXCART operated resulted from\nworking with the material chosen for the airframe-titanium. After\nevaluating many materials. Johnson had chosen an alloy of titanium\n:, Johnson. --Devdopm.:nt ot Lockh.:.:<l SR-71.\" pp. I 1- I2."
  },
  {
   "n": 293,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p293.jpg",
   "text": "280\nSecret NOF8RN\nChapter 6\nOXCART pilot suit\n(B-120) characterized by great strength. relatively light weight. and\ngood resistance to high temperatures. bur high in cost As strong as\nstainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much.\nObtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for\nfabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because me1thods\nfor maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium\nwere not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries\nfrom Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until\n1961 . when company officials were informed of the objectives and\nhigh priority of the OXCART program, that problems with the tita­\nnium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was\nreceived, Lockheed·s difficulties with the metal were not over.\nTitanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication\nbroke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line produc­\ntion was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well\nabove original estimates.!~\nThe high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also\nnecessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort becaus,e the\ninside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save\n\"Minnich. ··OXCART Story:· p. 5 (S): OSA Hiswn-. chap. :!O. p. 3J (TS Co<l.:wu,rd)."
  },
  {
   "n": 294,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p294.jpg",
   "text": "281\n~eeFet PJOFORN\nChapter 6\nweight, Kelly Johnson did not attempt to insulate the interior of the\naircraft. The pilot would therefore have to wear a type of space suit\nwith its own cooling, pressure control. oxygen supply, and other\nnecessities for survival.\nDESIGNING THE OXCART'S CAMERAS\nProviding cameras for the A-12 posed a number of unique problems.\nIn late 1959, OXCART managers asked Perkin-Elmer, Eastman\nKodak, and Hycon to develop three different photographic systems\nfor the new aircraft. These cameras would provide a range of photog­\nraphy from high-ground-resolution stereo to extremely-high-resolu­\ntion spotting data.\nThe Perkin-Elmer (P-E) entry. known as the Type-I camera. was\na high-ground-resolution general stereo camera using an f/4.0 18-inch\nlens and 6.6-inch film. It produced pairs of photographs covering a\n. s~ath 71 miles wide with an approximately 30-percent stereo overlap.\nThe system had a 5,000-foot film supply and was able to ·resolve 140\nlines per millimeter and provide a ground resolution of 12 inches.\nTo meet severe design constraints in the areas of size, weight.\nthermal environment, desired photographic resolution, and coverage,\nPerkin Elmer's Dr. Roderick M. Scott employed concepts never be­\nfore used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting\ncube rather than a prism for the scanner, a concentric film supply and\ntakeup system to minimize weight shift. a constant-velocity film\ntransport that provided for the contiguous placement of stereo images\non one piece of film, and airbars for the film transport and takeup\nsystems.c3\nEastman Kodak's entry, called the Type-II camera, was a\nhigh-convergent stereo device using a 21-inch lens and 8-inch film. It\nproduced pairs of photographs covering a swath 60 miles wide with\nan approximately 30-percent stereo overlap. It had an 8,400-foot film\nsupply and was able to resolve 105 lines per millimeter and provide a\nground resolution of 17 inches.\n'' OSA History. chap. 20. p. 26 (TS Codc:word): Minnich, \"OXCART Story,\" p. ~ (S).\nSec;et"
  },
  {
   "n": 295,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p295.jpg",
   "text": "282\nSec, et NOF0RN\nChapter 6\nThe Hycon entry. designed by James Baker and known as the\nType-IV camera, was a spotting camera with extremely-high-ground\nresolution. In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable\nB camera developed for the original U-2 program. It used a 48-inch\nBaker-designed f/5.6 lens to focus images onto 9.5-inch tilm. Like the\nB camera it could provide seven frames of photography covering a\nswath 41 miles wide with stereo overlap on 19 miles of the swath.\nThe Hycon camera carried the largest film supply of the three\ncameras, 12,000 feet. It was able to resolve 100 lines per millimeter\nand provide a ground resolution of 8 inches. A version of this 48-inch\nHycon camera. known as the H camera, later saw service in u-2R air­\ncraft.\nEach of the three camera systems had unique capabilities and\nadvantages, so all three were purchased for the OXCART. Before\nthey could be effectively employed in the aircraft, however, new\ntypes of camera windows were needed. The OXCART's camera win­\ndows had to be completely free from optical distortion. Achieving\nthis goal was difficult in a window whose exterior would be sub­\njected to temperatures of 550\"F whik the interior surface would be\nonly IscrF. After three years and the expenditure of 52 million in re­\nsearch and development, the Corning Glass Works, which had joined\nthis effort as a Perkin-Elmer subcontractor, solved the problem of\nproducing a camera window that could withstand tremendous heat\ndifferentials. Its quartz glass window was fused to the metal frame\nby an unprecedented process involving high-frequency sound\n~.\nwaves.\nLater in the program, the OXCART received yet another camera\nsystem. In 1964 the Texas Instruments Corporation developed an in­\nfrared camera for Project TACKLE U-2s that were being used to de­\ntermine whether the People's Republic of China was producing\nweapons-grade nuclear material. This stereo device, known as the\nFFD-4. was adapted for use in OXCART. The camera had an effective\nfocal length of 50 inches and a 150-foot supply of 3.5-inch film. The\ncamera's resolution was 3°C thermally, I milliradian spatially. and 60\nfeet on the ground. It could be used for both day and night imagery\ncollection.\n'' Baker intcrvicw (S); Minnich. \"OXCART Stury.\" pp. 5-o ISl.\nsec1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 296,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p296.jpg",
   "text": "283\nSeerct NOFORN\nChapter 6\nCHOOSING PILOTS FOR OXCART\nJust as in the U-2 program, the Air Force provided considerable sup­\nport to Project OXCART, including training, fuel storage, and weather\nservice. One of the most important areas of support was the provision\nof pilots; all of the OXCART pilots came from the Air Force.\nProspective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters\nand be emotionally stable and well motivated. In contrast to 1955,\nwhen cover considerations had limited the U-2 pilot selection process\nto individuals with reserve commissions, the Air Force was able to\ndevise personnel and cover procedures that enabled both regular and\nreserve officers to volunteer to become OXCART pilots. Because of\nthe limited size of the A-12 cockpit, they had to be under six feet tall\nand weigh less than 175 pounds. Following extensive physical and\npsychological screening, 16 potential nominees were selected for in­\ntensive security and medical screening by the Agency. By the end of\nthis screening in November l 961. only five individuals had been ap­\nproved and had accepted the Agency's offer of employment on a\nhighly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. A second\nsearch and screening raised the number of pilots for the OXCART to\neleven. The thorough screening process produced an elite group of pi­\n•tots; all but one of these 11 officers eventually became generals. The\nnew pilots transferred from military to civilian status and received\ncompensation and insurance arrangements somewhat better than those\nof the U-2 pilots.15\nSELECTION OF A TESTING SITE FOR THE OXCART\nFrom the very beginning, it was clear that Lockheed could not test the\nOXCART aircraft at its Burbank facility, where the runway was too\nshort and too exposed to the public. The ideal testing site would be far\nremoved from metropolitan areas, away from civil and military air­\nways, easily accessible by air, blessed with good weather, capable of\naccommodating large numbers of personnel, near an Air Force instal­\nlation, and having a runway at least 8,000 feet long. But no such place\nwas to be found.\nAfter considering 10 Air Force bases programmed for closing,\nRichard Bissell decided to upgrade the Area 51 site in Nevada where\nthe U-2 had been tested. Although its personnel accommodations, fuel\n'' Minnich. --OXCART Story.\"· pp. 6-7 (S); OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. pp. -l8-50 (TS\nCodeword); Geary interview with Pedlow (S).\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 297,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p297.jpg",
   "text": "284\nGeeret NOFORN\nChapter 6\nstorage capacity, and runway lelllgth were insufficient for the\nOXCART program. the site's remot,e location would greatly ease the\ntask of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc­\ntion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in\nSeptember 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from\nBurbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.\nThe new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November\n1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force\nrunway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the\njoints wou ld set up undesirable vibirations in the speedy aircraft At\nhis suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of\nsix 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag­\ngered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di­\nrection of airer-aft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.\nAdditional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of\nhighway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in\nthe necessary fuel. The need for additional buildings on the base was\nmet by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled.\nmo\\'ed, and reassembled on the north side of the:: base. and more than\n100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to Area 51.\nAll essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery\ndate of the first A- I 2 on I August 1961.~\"\nUnfortunately. this delivery date began to slip further and further\ninto the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and lacer the J58 en­\ngines. caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.\nEventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project officials decided to be­\ngin testing without waiting for the J58 engines by using Pratt &\nWhitney J75/l 9W engines. designed for the Convair F- 1.06. to test the\nA-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such\na change, however, meant that the engine compartment of the first air­\ncraft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 engine. Lockheed\nhoped that this substitution would petrmit the delivery of the first A-12\nby 22 December l 961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.\nLockheed ran into so many technological problems with the\nOXCART effort that by October 196 I its costs had swollen to $ 136\nmillion and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done\n\"· OSA History. chap. :!O. pp. 39-10. 4). 51 1TS CoJcword): Minnich. ··oxCART Story:·\npp. ,.9 (SJ.\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 298,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p298.jpg",
   "text": "285\nto reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de­\ncided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No.\n11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a\ntotal cost of $16 l.2 million. 21\nThe cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force\norder for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the\nA-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier\ninterceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the\nassistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force\nentered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air­\ncraft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew­\nman and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project\nKEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de­\nsigned to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the\nUnited States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to\nI 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes\nwere built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because\nSecretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut­\nting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro­\njecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write \"black\" contracts. 2~\nLockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble\ncontaining costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle.\nIn mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire\nOXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the\noffice of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy\nto assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and\nHolcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air­\ncraft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel\nCommand that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the\ntransfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep­\ning the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was\nnever used in a Navy aircraft.\n\"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. \"OXCART Story ...\np. 10 (S).\n\"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).\n,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this\nperiod. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158.\nparticularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine\nwould be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, \"Archangel log.'' 11 September\n1961.\nSee, et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nSeeaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 299,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p299.jpg",
   "text": "286\nSeeret NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nDELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART\nThe first A- l 2, known as article 121, was assembled and tested at\nBurbank during January and February 1962. Since it could not be\nflown to the Nevada site, the aircraft had to be partially disassembled\nand put on a specially designed trailer that cost nearly S 100,000. The\nentire fuselage, without the wings, was crated and covered, creating a\nload 35 feet wide and 105 feet long. To transport this huge load safely\nover the hundreds of miles to the site. obstructing road signs were re­\nmoved, trees were trimmed, and some roadbanks had to be leveled.\nThe plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at Area 51\ntwo days later.\nAfter the fuselage arrived in Nevada, its wings were attached and\nthe 175 engines were installed. but the aircraft was still not ready to be\ntested. This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem\nthat would never be solved completely. Because the A- I 2's high\nspeeds heat the titanium airframe to more than 500°F. Lockheed\ndesigners had to make allowances for expansion. When the metal was\ncold, the expansion joints were at their widest. In the fuel tanks. these\ngaps were filled by pliable sealants. but the fuel for the A-12's engines\nacted as a strong reducing agent that softened the sealants. causing\nleaks. Thus. when fuel was first poured into the aircraft, 68 leaks\ndeveloped. Lockheed technicians then stripped and replaced all the\nsealant, a tedious and time consuming procedure because the sealant\nrequired four curing cycles, each at a different temperature over a\nperiod of 30 to 54 hours. The engineers were never able to discover a\nsealant compound that was completely impervious to the jet fuel while\nremaining elastic enough to expand and contract sufficiently. The\nA- I 2's tanks continued to leak, so when it was fueled, it only received\nenough fuel to get airborne. The plane would then rendezvous with a\ntanker, top off its tanks, and immediately climb to operating altitude.\ncausing the metal to expand and the leaks to stop. 10\nCHANGES IN THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT\nRichard Bissell, whose concern for the viability of the U-2 in 1956\nhad led to the establishment of Project OXCART and who had di­\nrected its growth all along, was no longer in charge when the first\n\"' OSA fiistorv. chap. 20. p. 62 (TS C0<.!t:worJJ: \\linnich...OXCART Story.\" p. 11 (S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 300,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p300.jpg",
   "text": "287\nsecret NOFORN\nChapter 6\nDelivery of OXCART aircraft to\nArea 51\nOXCART aircraft took to the air. He resigned from the Agency in\nFebruary 1962, and his departure brought a major reorganization of\nthe reconnaissance program. The Development Projects Division of\nthe Directorate of Plans. with its two aircraft (OXCART and U-2)\nand its satellite project. were transferred to the new Directorate of\nResearch headed by Herbert (Pete) Scoville. The following year\nScoville resigned and this Directorate was reorganized and its name\nchanged to the Directorate of Science and Technology, with A lbert\n(Bud) Wheelon. Jr. as its first head. The overhead reconnaissance\nGeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 301,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p301.jpg",
   "text": "288\n6eeret NQI-Omj\nChapter 6\nIn-flight refueling of the OXCART\nprojects belonged to the Office of Special Activities, headed by\nCol. Jack C. Ledford, who now had the title of Assistant Director for\nSpecial Activities. These project management changes in the ClA\nhad no immediate impact on the OXCART project because the air­\ncraft was still in the development stage, handled mainly by the con­\ntractors. Moreover, a good deal of continuity was provided by\nofficers who had served for a numbe:r of years with the U-2 program\nand were now involved with OXCART: James Cunningham, the\nDeputy Assistant Director for Special Activities: Col. Leo Geary, the\nAir Force's project officer for the two aircraft; and John Parangosky,\nwho oversaw the day-to-day affairs ,of the OXCART project.\nOXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS\nWith new sealant in its fuel tanks, the prototype OXCART was ready\nto take to the air. On 25 April 1962, test pilot Louis Schalk took \"ar­\nticle 121\" for an unofficial, unannounced tlight. which was an old\nLockheed tradition. He flew the cratft less than two miles at an alti­\ntude of about 20 feet and encountered considerable problems\nbecause of the improper hookup c,f several controls. These were\npromptly repaired and on the next day, 26 April, Schalk made the\nofficial 40-minute maiden flight. After a beautiful takeoff, the air­\ncraft began shedding the triangular fillets that covered the frame­\nwork of the chines along the edge: of the aircraft body. The lost\nSec,;ret"
  },
  {
   "n": 302,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p302.jpg",
   "text": "289\nieeret NOFORN\nChapter 6\nfillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin. had\nto be recovered and reaffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the\nnext four days.\nOnce the fillets were in place, the OXCART'S official first flight\nt0ok place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of Agency per­\nsonnel including DOR Scoville. Richard Bissell was also present, and\nKelly Johnson noted in the project log, ·•1 was very happy to have\nDick see this flight, with all that he has contributed to the pro­\ngram ... ·'' This official first flight was also the first flight with the\nwheels up. Piloted again by Schalk, the OXCART took off at 170\nknots and climbed to 30.000 feet. During the 59-minute flight, the\nA-I2 achieved a top speed of 340 knots. Kelly Johnson declared it to\nbe the smoothest first test flight of any aircraft he had designed or\ntested. On 2 May 1962, during the second test flight, the OXCART\nbroke the sound barrier, achieving a speed of Mach l.1.)\n1\nFour more aircraft. including a two-seat trainer, arrived at the\ntesting site before the end of the year. During the second delive,y on\nJohn Parangosky\n. 2~.June 1962. the extra-wide vehicle carrying the aircraft acciderntally\nstruck a Greyhound bus traveling in the opposite direction. Pr-oject\nmanagers quickly authorized payment of $4,890 for the damage done\nto the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the\nOXCART delivery vehicle was so wide.\nOne of the biggest problems connected with flight testing the\nA-I2 was keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation's air\ntraffic controllers would be among the first unwitting people to llearn\nabout the plane, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities,\nJames Cunningham, had called on Federal Aviation Administrator\nNajeeb E. Halaby in early 1962 to brief him about the craft's existence\nand ask his assistance in keeping it secret. Halaby cooperated fully\nwith the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how\nto handle reports of unusually fast, high-tlying aircraft. Air contrcillers\nwere warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written\nreports of sightings or radar truckings. The Air Force gave similar\nbriefings to NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command:''\n'' Johnson. •• Archangel log:· 30 April 1962.\n'' OSA History. chap. 20. p. 63 (TS CoJewor<l); Minnich. \"OXCART Story:· pp. 11-12 (S).\n\"Minnich. ··OXCART Story:· pp. 10-11 (S): OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. p. 60 (TS Co<lcworJ).\nGee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 303,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p303.jpg",
   "text": "290\n6ee1 et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nFirst flight of the A-12,\n30 April 1962\nInitial testing could not explore the A-12·s maximum potential,\nsince the J58 engine was stil l not ready. Developing this power plant\nto OXCART specifications was proving much more difficult than\nhad been expected because the J58 had to reach performance levels\nnever before achieved by a jet engine. while operating under ex­\ntremely difficult environmental conditions. To simulate the stress\nthat the J58 would undergo during maximum power output (Mach\n3.2 at 97,000 feet), the power plant was tested in the exhaust stream\nof a 175 engine. ln the course of this extremely severe testing, the\nJ58• s problems were gradually overcome. By January 1963, Pratt &\nWhitney had delivered 10 J58 engines to the Nevada testing site.\nThe first flight of an A- 12 with two J58 engines took place on\n15 January 1963. µ\nSPEED-RELATED PROBLEMS\nAs 158-equipped A-12s reached higher and higher speeds. more diffi­\nculties arose. Major problems developed at speeds between Mach 2.4\nand 2.8 because the aircraft's shock wave interfered with the flow of\nair into the engine. greatly reducing its performance. Solving this\nproblem required long and often highly frustrating experimentation\n•· William H. Brown. ··J58/SR-7 I Propulsion lntt!gration.\" Studies i11 /ntellis:,·11c,e 26\n(Summt!r 1981):pp. 17-18 (U): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 5~. 67 (TS Co<lc:wor<l)."
  },
  {
   "n": 304,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p304.jpg",
   "text": "291\nSeeFet NOFOfU'il\nChapter 6\nthat ultimately required a complete redesign of the air-inlet system\nthat controlled the amount of air admitted to the engine. In the new,\nadjustable inlet the cone-shaped projection at the front-known as a\nspike-was designed to move in or out as much as three feet in order\nto capture and contain the shock wave produced by the aircraft at high\nspeeds, thus preventing the shock wave from blowing out the fire in­\n.\n.de the engine.·1s\ns1\nAnother 158 engine problem in early 1963 was foreign object\ndamage. Small objects such as pens, pencils, screws, bolts, nuts, and\nmetal shavings that fell into the engine nacelles during assembly at\nBurbank were sucked into the power plant during initial engine testing\nat Area 5 1 and damaged impeller and compressor vanes. To control the\nproblem Lockheed instituted a program that included X-rays, shaking\nof the nacelles, installing screens over various air inlets to the engine,\nand even having workers wear coveralls without breast pockets.\nAnother source of foreign object damage was trash on the runways.\nThe giant 158 engines acted like immense vacuum cleaners, sucking in\nanything lying loose on the paving as they propelled the A-12 down\nthe runway for takeoff. To prevent engine damage, Area 51 personnel\nh~~ to sweep and vacuum the runway before aircraft takeoff. 10\nNEW VERSIONS OF THE OXCART\nIn 1962 the Agency and the Air Force ordered two more versions of\nthe OXCART (in addition to the A-12 and the YF-12A). One was a\nmodification of the A-12 to carry and launch ramjet-powered,\n43-feet-long drones capable of reaching Mach 3.3 The two-seater\nmothership received the designation M-12; the drone was called the\n0-21. This project was known as TAGBOARD. The original develop­\nment of the drones and mothership was sponsored by the CIA, but in\nJune 1963 the project was turned over to the Air Force, which had\noverall responsibility\nfor\nunmanned\nreconnaissance\naircraft.\nDevelopment of the M-12/0-21 combination continued until 1966,\nwhen an unsuccessful D-21 launch caused the loss of its mothership\nand the death of one of the crew members. Afterward the Air Force\nturned to B-52 bombers to carry the drones.·11\n\" OSA History, chap. 20. p. 67 (TS Codeword).\n'• Johnson. '\"Development of Lockheed SR-71,'\" p. 12.\n\"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 71; Jay Miller, Lockheed SR-71 (A/2/YF/2/D-2//, Aerofax.\nMinigraph I (Arlington. Texas: Aerofax. Inc.. 1985), p. 3.\n-Secre~"
  },
  {
   "n": 305,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p305.jpg",
   "text": "292\nSec, et PdGfORN\nChapter 6\nThe second new version of the OXCART was another recon­\nnaissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six\n\"reconnaissance/strike\" aircraft, which were designed to conduct\nhigh-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territory after a\nnuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from other A-12 versions in\nthat it was longer, had a full-blown two-seat cockpit, and carried a\nlarge variety of photographic and electronic sensors. The additional\nweight of all this equipment gave the Air Force craft a slower maxi­\nmum speed and a lower operating ceiling than the Agency's A-12. In\nAugust 1963, the Air Force added 25 more aircraft to this contract,\nfor a total of 31. 3'\nTHE QUESTION OF SURFACING\nA VERSION OF THE OXCART\nAs the funds being spent on Air Force versions of the OXCART in­\ncreased dramatically, the Defense Department became concerned that\nit could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At\nthe same time, Agency and Defense Department officials recognized\nthe growing danger that a crash or sightings of test flights could com­\npromise the program. This led the Defense Department in late 1962\nand early 1963 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptor ver­\nsion of the A-12 to provide a cover for OXCART sightings or crashes\nand an explanation for the rise in Air Force spending. Some journal­\nists had also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern\nthat the secret would eventually come out in the press. Agency offi­\ncials remained reluctant to reveal the existence of any version of the\nA-12, and the issue soon came to the attention of the PFIAB. James\nKillian and Edwin Land strongly opposed disclosing OXCART's ex­\nistence, and in January 1963 they presented their views to President\nKennedy at a meeting attended by DCI McCone and Defense\nSecretary Robert McNamara. Killian, Land, and McCone succeeded\nin persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the\nOXCART's existence a secret for the time being.\nLater that year supporters of the idea of surfacing the OXCART\nfound a more powerful argument for their proposal-the need to dis­\nseminate the supersonic technology that had been developed for the\n'' OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 71-72 (TS Co1kword) .\nSeeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 306,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p306.jpg",
   "text": "-\n293\nChapter 6\n:J·;~:~t';.ft~(:.t;;:~;:''.J::tt,. -; :;<\nOXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air Force pro­\njec!s such as the 8-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic trans­\n.po.rt (SST) then being discussed in Congress. [n the fall of 1963,\nseveral Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCI McCone\nthat Lockheed had received a $700 million headstart in the develop­\nment of supersonic technology, giving the firm a tremendous ad.van­\ntage over other aerospace companies working on a supersonic\ntransport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy on\n12 November 1963, just 10 days before the fateful trip to Dallas. The\nPresident instructed CIA and the Defense Department to develop a\nplan for surfacing the OXCART but to await further discussions with\nhim before taking any action.\n30\nPresident Lyndon B. Johnson received a detailed briefing on the\nOXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Bundy, and Rus:k on\n29 November, after just one week in office. McNamara strongly ad­\nvocated surfacing a version of the OXCART. McCone was more cau­\ntious, calling for the preparation of a statement that could be 1USed\nwhen surfacing became necessary but arguing that such a step was not\n\"John A. McCool!...Memorandum of !vketing in Cabinet Room for the Purpose of\nDiscussing the Surfacing of the ox:· 21 January 1963. DC! records (TS Codeword);\nidem. Memorandum for the Record. Discussion with the President-October 21 st--6:00\np.m.. 22 October 1963. DCl records {S): OSA fliswry. chap. 20. pp. 73-7-' (TS Codeword).\nIt !1~~1~,i~~if_i_!fif~~1, ::•:½i!:~~}r0t···\n\"~:.'\".:~\n.•.\n~\n.\n.\nM-12 carrying D-21 Drone\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 307,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p307.jpg",
   "text": "294\nSecret NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nyet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said\nthe issue should be reviewed again in February.\"'\nOne additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was\nthe realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected\nover the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware\nof the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL\nKING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut\none of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption\nthat radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic\ntargets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By\ncoupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in­\ndividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying,\nvery fast objects.·'\nBy February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur­\nfacing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar\nsystem had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be\nable to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the\nUSSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART\ncame at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at\nwhich all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That\nsame day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an­\nnounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental\njet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more\nthan 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.\".~\nPresident Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the\nAgency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub­\nlic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already\nbeen canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of\n\"'John A. McCone. \"Memorandum for the Record. Meeting with the President. Secretary\nMcNamara. Mr. Bundy and DC!.\" 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS); OSA History.\nchap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword).\n\"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. I-n-149 (TS Codeword).\n'' John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record. \"Discussion at the NSC Meeting.\nAttended by the President. all members and the four members of the President's personal\nstaff. 29 February 1964,\" 2 March 1964. DC! records (S); Minnich, \"OXCART Story,\" p.\n14-erroneously identifies the date as 24 February-(S).\n\" President Johnson ·s use of the designator A-11 at the press conference has sometimes\nbeen called an error, but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this\ndesignator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that\nlacked the radar-defeating modifi1.:ations of the A-12. Johnson, \"Archangel log,\" 25\nFebruary 1964.\n6eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 308,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p308.jpg",
   "text": "295\nSect et NOFORN\nChapter 6\nthese aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base. From\nthis point on, the Air Force versions of the OXCART were based at\nEdwards and provided a diversion so that the faster and higher flying\nA- l 2s at the Nevada site could continue testing out of the public eye.\nThe President's announcement did not mention the CIA's in­\nvolvement in the project, which remained classified, but keeping the\nAgency's extensive role in the OXCART a secret was not an easy task.\nThe first step had been to separate the Air Force's versions of the A-12\nfrom the Agency's by moving the Air Force aircraft to California.\nNext, those firms that were to be given the new technology had to be\nbriefed on the program and agree to abide by the same secrecy agree­\nments then in force with Lockheed. Moreover, everyone witting of\nOXCART (including those no longer associated with the program,\nsuch as Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell) had been\nbriefed about the impending Presidential announcement, so that they\nwould not think that the need for secrecy about OXCART had ended .....\nThe process of surfacing versions of the OXCART continued on\n. 25.J uly 1964. when President Johnson revealed the existence of a new\nAir Force reconnaissance aircraft, which he called the SR-71.\nActually. the President was supposed to say RS-71 (for ··reconnais­\nsance-strike\"). Deciding that renaming the aircraft was easier than\ncorrecting President Johnson. the Air Force invented a new category­\n\"strategic reconnaissance\"-to explain the SR-7l's designation.\nADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING\nThe first A-12 crash occurred on 24 May 1963, when a detachment\npilot, realizing the airspeed indication was confusing and erroneous,\ndecided to eject. The pilot was unhurt, but the plane was destroyed\nwhen it crashed near Wendover, Utah. A cover story for the press de­\nscribed the plane as an F-105. All A-l 2s were grounded for a week\nwhile the accident was investigated. The malfunction was found to be\ncaused by ice that had plugged up a pitot-static tube used to determine\n.\nd ~5\natrspee . •\n.. OSr\\ Hi~wry, chap. 20. p. 76 (TS Cod~word).\n'' Ibid.. pp. 69-70 (TS Codeword).\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 309,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p309.jpg",
   "text": "So&Fet NOFORN\nChapter 6\n296\nTwo more A- l 2s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti­\ncle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device\nfroze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an\naltitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft.\nAlthough he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open\nand he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was\nunhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen\nmonths later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately\nafter takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation\nsystem. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there\nwas no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered\nby DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from\nnegligence, not sabotage.'6\nThe A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27\nJanuary 1965. The flight lasted I 00 minutes. 75 minutes of which\nwere flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1. and the aircraft covered\n2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time.\nthe OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau­\nlic, navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable\nreliability.\nNevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and\nhigher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problems in­\nvolved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con­\ntrols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit\ninstruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec­\ntors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F,\nstructural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more\nthan the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems\ncould be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials\nbelieved that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con­\ntributed to malfunctions.\"\nConcerned that Lockheed would not be able to meet the\nOXCART's schedule for operational readiness, the Office of Special\nActivities' Director of Technology, John Parangosky, met with Kelly\nJohnson on 3 August 1965 to discuss the project's problems. Johnson\nnot only assigned more top-level supervisors to the project but also\n'\" Ibid.. pp. 80-81 {TS Codeword): Minnich. ··OXCART Story,\"' pp. 17-18 tS).\n\"OSA History. chap. 20. p. 9-4 (TS Codr:word).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 310,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p310.jpg",
   "text": "297\n~eeret NOFOPU''l\nChapter 6\ndecided to go to Nevada and take charge of the OXCART's develop­\nment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in\nhis notes in the project log:\nI uncovered many items ofa managerial, materiel and design na­\nture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera­\ntion.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,\ngoing over in detail all problems on the aircraft .... Increased the\nsupervision in the electrical group by 500% .... We tightened up\nthe inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.\nIt appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer­\ning.... The addition of so many systems to the A-12 has greatly\ncomplicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problem.\"''\nThese improvements in on-site management got the project back on\nschedule.\nBy 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART\ndeployment were finished. During these tests. the OXCART achieved\na maximum speed of Mach 3.29. an altitude of 90,000 feet. and sus­\ntained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum\n- errdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22 November.\nKelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the\nOffice of Special Activities, stating. \"'The time has come when the\nbird should leave its nest. .. \"\"\nThree years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962.\nthe OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find\nwork for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.\nDISCUSSIONS ON THE OXCART'S\nFUTURE EMPLOYMENT\nAlthough the OXCART had been designed to replace the U-2 as a\nstrategic reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the Soviet Union, this use\nhad become doubtful long before the OXCART was ready for\noperational use. The U-2 Affair of 1960 made Presidents very reluc­\ntant to consider overflights of the Soviet Union. Indeed. Presidents\nEisenhower and Kennedy had both stated publicly that the United\nStates would not conduct such overflights. In July 1962. Secretary of\n\"Johnson, .. Archangel log,\" 5 August-30 April 1965.\n''' Minnich, \"'OXCART Story... p. 23 (S).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 311,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p311.jpg",
   "text": "298\nSect et NOP'ORN\nChapter 6\n.\n•_,.,,,._~\n'\n:/<'.•: ~.,-;_h • ,:s; =;:::~.:....-,---• :-:••: •\n~ •-r\"\":\">=~..;-..\n. \":-, --\nA-12s at Area 51\nDefense McNamara told DCI McCone that he doubted that the\nOXCART would ever be used and suggested that improvements in\nsatellite reconnaissance would very likely eliminate the need for the\nexpensive OXCART program. Strongly disagreeing, McCone told\nMcNamara that he had every intention of using OXCART aircraft to\nfly over the Soviet Union.\nMcCone raised this issue with President Kennedy in April 1963.\nat a time when the nation's photosatellites were experiencing a great\nnumber of failures and the intelligence community was clamoring for\nbetter photography to confirm or disprove allegations of the existence\nof an antiballistic missile system at Leningrad. Unconvinced by\nMcCone·s arguments for OXCART overflights. President Kennedy\nexpressed the hope that some mean:, might be devised for improving\nsatellite imagery instead.\n50\n'\" John A. McCone. i\\,kmorandum fur the Rccord. \" Summary of meeting wi1h Secre1ary\nMcNamara and Secretary Gilpa1ric. Gencr.11 Career and Mr. McCone on 5 July 1962.''\n6 July 1962. DCI records (S): McCone. Memorandum for the File. \"Meeting wi1h 1he\nPresident-5:30-1 5 Apr 1963 in Palm Beach. Florida:· DCI records (SJ."
  },
  {
   "n": 312,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p312.jpg",
   "text": "299\nAlthough overflights of the Soviet Union appeared to be out of\nthe question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the\nworld remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban\nMissile Crisis of October 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for\nmanned strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Since satellites had not been\nable to supply the kinds of coverage needed, U-2s had carried out nu­\nmerous overflights of Cuba. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained vulnera­\nble to surface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by\nthe downing of a SAC U-2 during the Missile Crisis), and project\nheadquarters had even briefly considered sending the A-12 over Cuba\nin October 1962, even though the aircraft still lacked the required 158\nengines and would have had to use much less powerful ones.'' After\nthe Missile Crisis ended, Air Force U-2s continued to photograph\nCuba under a tacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of\nthe withdrawal of the missiles would proceed without interference.\nBut the possibility of future Soviet or Cuban action against the U-2s\nremained, raising the dismaying prospect that the United States would\nnot be able to tell if the Soviet Union was reintroducing ballistic mis­\nsiles into Cuba.\nSuch fears became acute in the summer of 1964 after Soviet\nPremier Nikita Khrushchev told foreign visitors such as columnist\nDrew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime\nMinister Jens Otto Krag that, once the US elections had been held in\nNovember, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. Project head­\nquarters therefore began preparing contingency plans (Project\nSKYLARK) for the possible employment of OXCART over Cuba,\neven though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations. On 5\nAugust 1964, the Acting DCI, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the\nproject staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of the\nOXCART by 5 November 1964, in case Premier Khrushchev actually\ncarried out his threat to shoot down U-2s. 5z\nTo meet this deadline, the Office of Special Activities organized\na detachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct flights to val­\nidate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations.\nSimulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment\n\"On 23 October 1962 Johnson noted in his \"Archangel log\": that the performance of an\nA-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for possible use over Cuba)\nwould be \"hardly spectacular.\"\n'' Johnson, .. Archangel log,.. 17 August 1964; Minnich, \"OXCART Story,.. p. 19 (S );\nOSA History, chap. 20. p. 81 (TS Codeword).\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 6\n&ee,ct"
  },
  {
   "n": 313,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p313.jpg",
   "text": "300\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 6\ndemonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5\nNovember deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the\nSoviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa­\nbility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these\npreparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even\nthough the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.\nSince U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the\nA- l 2s were reserved for more critical situations.\nWhen the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer­\ngency operational status on 5 November 196-+. the aircraft was still\nnot prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned\nelectronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless. a\nsenior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct\ninitial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and\njamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.\nOne reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic\nwarfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use\nof existing ECM devices c_ould, in the event of the loss of an\nOXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment\nused by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCART's ECM\ndevices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force\nstill worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to\nwork out countermeasures.\nSuch concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach\nto antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to\ndevelop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen­\nerate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar\ncross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also\ndeveloped a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the\nOXCART. 53\nAs the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im­\nprove, there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft\noverseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas­\ning. On 18 March 1965, DCI McCone, Secretary of Defense\nMcNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the\n\" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 1-49-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by\nJohn Parangosky. OSA records (TS Codeword).\nSeer:at"
  },
  {
   "n": 314,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p314.jpg",
   "text": "301\ngrowing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the People's\nRepublic of China. In three years the Agency had lost four U-2s over\nChina, and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones.\nThe three men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps\nneeded for the OXCART to operate over China so that it would be\nready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.\nProject BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations.\ncalled for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on\nOkinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown to Okinawa\nfor 60-day periods, twice a year, an operation which would involve\nabout 225 personnel. Later there would be a permanent detachment at\nKadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the\nDefense Department spent $3.7 million to provide support facilities\nand real-time secure communications on the island by early autumn\nI 965. 5\"\nIn the summer of 1965, after the United States had begun intro­\nducing large numbers of troops into South Vietnam. Southeast Asia\nbeca!Ue another possible target for the OXCART. Because the contin­\nued use of U-2s for reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam was\nthreatened by the deployment of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles.\nMcNamara asked the CIA on 3 June 1965 whether it would be possi­\nble to substitute OXCART aircraft for U-2s. The new DCI, Adm.\nWilliam F. Raborn, replied that the OXCART could operate over\nVietnam as soon as it had passed its final operational readiness tests. 55\nFormal consideration of proposed OXCART missions involved\nthe same approval process that was used for U-2 overflights. In late\nNovember 1965, after the OXCART had passed its final validation\ntests, the 303 Committee met to consider a proposal to deploy the\nOXCART to Okinawa to overfly Southeast Asia and China. Although\nthe committee did not approve deployment, it ordered the develop­\nment and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability, ready to deploy\nto Okinawa within 21 days after notification.\nThere the matter remained for more than a year. During the first\nhalf of I 966, DC[ Raborn raised the issue of deploying the OXCART\nto Okinawa at five separate 303 Committee meetings but failed to win\n\" OSA Hiswry. chap. 20, pp. 90-91 (TS Codeword).\n\"Minnich, \"OXCART Story,\" p. 21 (S).\nSee, et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\n6ccaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 315,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p315.jpg",
   "text": "Secret fdOFORN\nChapter 6\n302\nsufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advo­\ncacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department of­\nficials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft\nin Okinawa-which would almost certainly disclose it to the\nJapanese-outweighed any gains from the intelligence the OXCART\nmight gather. On 12 August I 966, the divergent views were presented\nto President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opin­\nion against deployment for the time being. 5'\nThe CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order\nto test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15\nSeptember the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on\nthe grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba \"would disturb the ex­\nisting calm prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs.\" 57\nWith operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training re­\nmained the main order of business. This led to improvements in mis­\nsion plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the\ntime requi~ed to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records con­\ntinued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed\ntest pilot tlew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental\nUnited States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of\n2,670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at\nspeeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for\nspeed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft. 58\nTwo weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel\ngauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out of fuel short of the run­\nway. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not\nbecome separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of\nthe OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an\nSR-71 was missing and presumed down in Nevada. This loss, like the\nthree preceding crashes, did not result from difficulties caused by\nhigh-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in­\nherent in any new aircraft.\nProposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in\nMay 1967 the CIA forwarded a detailed request to the 303 Committee\nto use the OXCART to collect strategic intelligence about a new\n'• Minnich ...OXCART Story:· p. 23 (S): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 110-111 (TS\nCodeword).\n\"OSA History, chap. 20. p. 112 (TS Codeword).\n\"Minnich. \"OXCART Story:· p. 24 (S).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 316,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p316.jpg",
   "text": "303\nSoviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community\nbegan to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal­\nlations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along\nthe northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo­\ngraph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by\nthe prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu­\nrate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence\nof views within the intelligence community about their purpose.\nThese views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con­\ntained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate­\ngic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites\nrepresented a deployed antiballistic missile system.\nPhotointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to\n18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,\nand configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys­\ntem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about\nthe Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni­\ntor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.\nMoreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and\nlockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre­\nquencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.\nTo settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations.\nOffice of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would\nuse the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the\nU-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un­\nclassified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was\nOperation UPWIND.\nThe proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air­\ncraft from Area 51 in Nevada and flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous\nwith a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great\nBritain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south\nalong the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12\nwould head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of\nEstonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading\nwest to return to Area 51. The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti­\ncal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re­\nfuelings.\nAlthough the A-12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this\ndash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed\nfor an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was\n6ee1 et NOFOFUil\nChapter 6\n&eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 317,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p317.jpg",
   "text": "304\n~eerct PJOHHU~\nChapter 6\nhoped that the A- 12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per­\nsonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift\nOXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its\nType-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an­\nalysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de­\nsigned to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the\nOXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic.\nNevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air­\ncraft's speed and suite of electronic countermeasures would keep it\nsafe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.\nWhile the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the\nBaltic coast of Eastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to\nsea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be\nable to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.\nAgency and Defense Department officials supported the pro­\nposed mission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it\nand the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President\nJohnson. 5\" The Tallinn radar installation remained of great interest to\nthe intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted\nto develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho­\ntograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was\nabandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).\nFIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD\nAlthough the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967,\nanother possible employment for the OXCART came under discus­\nsion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical\nrather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in\nWashington about the possible undetected introduction of sur­\nface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson\nasked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the\nOXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were\nstill examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms\n\"Memorandum for DOC! R. L. Taylor from C. E. Duckett. DDS&T...Collection of Photo\nand ELINT Data on Tallinn Sites Utilizing the OXCART and the U-2... 4 May 1967.\nDS&T records (TS Codeword).\nSec, el"
  },
  {
   "n": 318,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p318.jpg",
   "text": "305\nraised the issue at President Johnson's \"Tuesday lunch .. on 16 ~lay.\nHelms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK\nSHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later\nthat same day.''0\nThe airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17\nMay 1967, and on 22 May the first A-12 flew nonstop from Area 51\nto Kadena in six hours and six minutes. A second aircraft arrived on\n24 May. The third A-12 left on 26 May, but the pilot had trouble with\nthe inertial navigation system and communications near Wake Island.\nHe made a precautionary landing at Wake. where a pre-positioned\nemergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected\nand the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.\nBefore the start of the operation, the CIA briefed a number of\nkey US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US\nAmbassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Phillippines. Formosa.\nThailand, South Vietna~\n!he High C[:·:·::\ninner::_an_d_\nChief of Station on Okinawa: the Pnme Ministe\n7\nThailand; the President and Defense Minister of t e _epu 1c~\nChina: and the Air Force chiefs of Thailand and the Republic of\nChina. All of these officials favored the operation.\nBy 29 May 1967, 13 days after President Johnson's approval,\nBLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. On 30\nMay, the detachment was alerted for a mission on the following day.\nAs the takeoff time approached, Kadena was being deluged by rain.\nbut, since weather over the target area was clear, flight preparations\ncontinued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,\ntaxied to the runway and took off.\nThis first BLACK SHIELD mission flew one flight path over\nNorth Vietnam and another over the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The\nmission was flown at Mach 3.1 and 80.000 feet and lasted three hours\nand 39 minutes. While over North Vietnam. the A-12 photographed\n70 of the 190 known surface-to-air missile sites and nine other prior­\nity targets. The A- I2's ECM equipment did not detect any radar sig­\nnals during the mission, which indicated that the flight had gone\ncompletely unnoticed by both the Chinese and North Vietnamese.\n\"Minnich. \"OXCART Story.\" p. 25 (Sl.\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 319,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p319.jpg",
   "text": "306\nSecret NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nDuring the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK\nSHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de­\ntected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD\nmissions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude\nthat no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North\nVietnam. 61\nProject Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all\noperational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica­\ntions between Headauarters and KadenaJ\nI\nA typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south\nof Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas­\nses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand\narea before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it\nspent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a \"single-pass\" mis­\nsion, and 21.5 minutes during a \"two-pass\" mission. Because of its\nwide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into\nChinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.\nAfter the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent\nby special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late\nsummer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do­\ning the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands\nof US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of a mission's com­\npletion.\nBLACK SHIELD activity continued unabated during the second\nhalf of 1967. From 16 August to 31 December 1967, 26 missions\nwere alerted and 15 were flown. On I 7 September one SAM site\ntracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful\nwith its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not until 28 October that a\nNorth Vietnamese SAM site launched a missile at the OXCART.\nMission photography documented the event with photographs of mis­\nsile smoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and\nits contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the\nOXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger the air­\ncraft.\n•• Minnich. '\"OXCART Story:· pp. 25-28 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 119-124, ann.:x\n152 (TS Cod.:word).\nieeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 320,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p320.jpg",
   "text": "307\nSec, et NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nThe only time the enemy came close to downing an OXCART\nwas on 30 October 1967. During his first pass over North Vietnam,\npilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar tracking. Two SAM sites pre­\npared to launch missiles but neither did. During Sullivan's second\npass the North Vietnamese fired at least six missiles at the OXCART,\neach confirmed by vapor trails on mission photography. The pilot saw\nthese vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations near but be­\nhind the A-12, which was traveling at Mach 3. l at about 84,000 feet.\nPostflight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had\npenetrated the underside of the right wing, passed through three lay­\ners of titanium, and lodged against a support structure of the wing\ntank. The fragment was not a warhead pellet but probably debris from\none of the missile detonations that the pilot observed. 61\nBLACK SHIELD missions continued during the first three\nmonths of 1968, with four missions flown over North Vietnam out of\n14 alerts. The last OXCART overflight of Vietnam took place on 8\nMarch 1968. During this same three-month period, the OXCART\nmade its first overflight of North Korea after the USS Pueblo was\nseized on 23 January 1968. The goal of this mission was to discover\nwh_ether the North Koreans were preparing any large-scale hostile\n•move in the wake of this incident. When NPIC photointerpreters ex­\namined OXCART photography taken onf 26 January, they found the\nmissing USS Pueblo in Wonsan harbor.\nSecretary of State Dean Rusk was reluctant to endorse a second\nmission over North Korea for fear of diplomatic repercussions should\nthe aircraft come down in hostile territory. The Secretary was assured\nthat the plane could transit North Korea in seven minutes and was un­\nlikely to land in either North Korea or China. The 303 Committee\nthen endorsed a second mission over North Korea, which was flown\non 19 February. A third and final overflight of North Korea on 8 May\n1968 proved to be the last operational deployment of the OXCART\naircraft.6·'\nTHE END OF THE OXCART PROGRAM\nAlmost a decade had elapsed between the time when the concept for\nthe OXCART aircraft was first examined and the first A-12 was oper­\nationally deployed. Now after only 29 operational missions, the most\n'' Minnich. \"OXCART Story,\" p. 28 (S).\n'·' Ibid .. pp. 28-29 (S).\nioePet"
  },
  {
   "n": 321,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p321.jpg",
   "text": "308\nSectet NOF6RN\nChapter 6\nUSS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor\nadvanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban­\ndonment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the\naircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pn:ssures and competition between\nthe reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.\nThroughout the OXCART program. the Air Force had been ex­\nceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling\nprogram. provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airlifted\nOXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and\nKorean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12­\nthe YF- I 2A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft-had\nhelped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.\nNevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of recon­\nnaissance aircraft, budgetary expert:s began to criticize the existence\nof two expensive fleets of similar aiircraft.\nIn November 1965, the very month that the A- 12 had been de­\nclared operational, the Bureau of thte Budget circulated a memoran­\ndum that expressed concern about 1:he coses of the A-12 and SR-71\nprograms. It questioned both the total number of planes required for\nthe combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The\nmemorandum recommended phasiing out the A-12 program by\nSeptember 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71\nSeere+­"
  },
  {
   "n": 322,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p322.jpg",
   "text": "309\nmodels. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation. pre­\nsumably because the SR-7 l would not be operational by September\n1966.\"\"'\nIn July 1966, at the Bureau of the Budget's suggestion, a study\ngroup was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the\nOXCART and SR-7 l programs. The study group consisted of C. W.\nFischer from the Bureau of the Budget, Herbert Bennington from the\nDepartment of Defense, and John Parangosky from CIA. The study\ngroup listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets,\nmothball the A-12s but share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air\nForce, or mothball the A- l 2s and assign all missions to Air Force\nSR-71 s. On 12 December 1966, four high-level officials met to con­\nsider these alternatives. Over the objections of DCI Helms, the other\nthree officials-Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Bureau of\nthe Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, and Presidential Scientific\nAdviser Donald F. Hornig-decided to terminate the OXCART fleet.\nConcerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of its super­\nsonic reconnaissance capability, Helms then asked that the SR-71\nfleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force.''\nFour days later. Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for\nthe President requesting a decision either to share the SR-71 t1cet be­\ntween CIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capability en­\ntirely. Having just received new information indicating that the\nSR-71 ·s performance was inferior to that of the A-12. Helms asked\nfor another meeting to review this data. His concern was that the\nSR-71 could not match the photographic coverage that the A-12 could\nprovide. Only one of the SR-71 's three camera systems was working\nanywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational\nObjective system which could only photograph a swath 28 miles wide\nwith a resolution of 28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera\ncould photograph a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12\nto 18 inches and oblique resolution of 54 inches. Thus, the A-l2's\ncamera covered three times as much territory as the SR-71 's camera\nand did so with better resolution. In addition. the A-12 could fly\n2.000 to 5.000 feet hig:her than the SR-71 and was also faster, with a\nmaximum speed of M';ch 3.1 compared with the SR-71 's Mach 3.0.\"\"\n~ OSA Hisron. ch:1p. 20. p. 130 (TS Codeword); Minnich. --oXC.-\\RT Story:· p. 30 (S).\n,. OSA Hiswn: ch:1p. 20. pp. 130-133 (TS Cmkword): Minnich...OXCART Swry:· pp.\n30-31 (5).\n= Minni<:h. '\"OXCART Story:· p. 31 (SJ: OS.\\ Histon·. pp. 133-13-+ (TS Codeword).\nSec, et NOFORM\nChapter 6\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 323,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p323.jpg",
   "text": "310\nSecret NOEQBN\nChapter 6\nIn spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the\nBureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President\nJohnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina­\ntion of the OXCART program by I January l 968.\nThis decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an\norderly phaseout of the A- l2. This activity was known as Project\nSCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense\nSecretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l 2s would gradually\nbe placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of\nJanuary 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7ls would as­\nsume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would\nadd responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by I December\n1967. Until these capabilities were developed, OXCART was to re­\nmain able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast\nAsia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67\nAll these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con­\nducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 3 l May\nI 967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.\nthe OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.\nSoon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders\nbegan to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue\nwas reopened.\nThe CIA contended that the A- l 2 was the better craft because it\nflew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main­\ntained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three\ndifferent cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de­\ntectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef­\nfort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each\nother in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an\nA-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by\none hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.\nThe data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre­\nsentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli­\ngence organizations.\nThe results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro­\nvided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I\ncamera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe­\nrior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and\n., Minnich. \"OXCART Story,\" p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codi:word) .\n..See.at"
  },
  {
   "n": 324,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p324.jpg",
   "text": "311\n3,300-foot film supply. On the other hand, the SR-71 's infrared,\nside-looking aerial radar, and ELINT/COMINT equipment provided\nsome unique intelligence not available from the A-12. Air Force plan­\nners admitted, however, that some of this equipment would have to be\nsacrificed in order to provide the SR-71 with ECM gear. 68\nAlthough the flyoff had not settled the question of which aircraft\nwas superior, the OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late\nNovember 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep both\nfleets for the time being, particularly because the OXCART was actu­\nally flying missions over North Vietnam. With expenditures for the\nVietnam war rising steadily, the question of reducing the costs of\ncompeting reconnaissance programs was bound to surface again. In\nthe spring of 1968, there was yet another study of the OXCART and\nSR-71 programs. On 16 May 1968, the new Secretary of Defense,\nClark Clifford, reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the\nOXCART program and store the aircraft. President Johnson con­\nfirmed this decision on 21 May.\"9\n- -- Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possi­\nble date for phasing out all OXCART aircraft. Those A-12s already\nat the Nevada site were placed in storage, and the aircraft on\nOkinawa were scheduled to return by 8 June. Unfortunately, tragedy\nstruck before this redeployment took place. On 4 June 1968 during a\ntest flight from Kadena to check out a new engine, an A-12 disap­\npeared 520 miles east of Manila. Search and rescue missions found\nno trace of the plane or its pilot, Jack W. Weeks. Several days later\nthe remaining two A- l 2s left Okinawa to join the other eight\nOXCART aircraft in storage at Palmdale, California. Because the\nA-12s were smaller than either of the Air Force's versions, the only\nparts that could be salvaged for Air Force use were the J58 engines.\nThe OXCART's outstanding Perkin-Elmer camera cannot be used in\nthe SR-71 because the two-seater Air Force aircraft has a smaller\ncamera compartment than that of the A-12. Constructed from one of\nthe most durable metals known to man but unable to fly for want of\nengines, the OXCART aircraft are fated to remain inactive at\nPalmdale for many, many years.\n\"\" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach.\n\"\"Minnich. .. OXCART Story,\" pp. 32-33 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 143-146 (TS\nCodeword).\n~eeFet PWFORN\nChapter 6"
  },
  {
   "n": 325,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p325.jpg",
   "text": "312\n6eeret NOFOAN\nChapter 6\nInitial storage arrangements for\nA-12s at Palmdale\nPOSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO lrHE OXCART\nThe OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro­\nduced for the CIA. although the Office of Special Activities did\nbriefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during\nthe mid- I960s. The first of these. known as Project ISINGLASS. was\nprepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its\nConvair Division's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-I I I fighter in\norder to create an aircraft capable of Mach ~-5 at I 00,000 feet.\nGeneral Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,\nand OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would\nstill be vulnerable to existing Soviet ,countermeasures. In l 965 a more\nambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration\nas Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have\ncome under the ISINGLASS designation as well). This proposal fea­\ntured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52\nmother ship and ultimately reach spe:eds as high as Mach 20 and alti­\ntudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because building this aircraft would have\ninvolved tremendous technical chall.enges and correspondingly high\ncosts, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a\ntime when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted\nfrom aircraft to satellites. As a resuilt. when the OXCART program\nended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait­\ning in the wings-only the veteran U-2.\n5iee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 326,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p326.jpg",
   "text": "313\n~asret PJOFORPd\nChapter 6\nSUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM\nfntended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the\nOXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was\nstrictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product\ncontributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.\nBy the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had\nfilled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft\nof the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever\n•\n11\n70\nused operatwna y.\nThe OXCART did not even outlast the U-2. the aircraft it was\nsupposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa­\nbility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight. and\nwithin a week it could deploy abroad. fly sorties. and return to home\nbase. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel\nand emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems\nneeded several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers\nhad to be deployed in advance along an OXCART's flight route and\nb_e _p.rovisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the J58 en­\ngines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort ·or several\nhundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a\nthird fewer personnel.\nAlthough the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais­\nsance aircraft with unprecedented speed, range. and altitude. the pro­\ngram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic\ndesign, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic\ncountermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices. use of\nnonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies. and improve­\nments in milling, machining. and shaping titanium. In all of these ar­\neas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology\nand helped lay the foundation for future \"stealth\" research.\n\"'On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his \"Archangel log\":\nI think buck to /959, beji,re we sturred this airplu11e, to disc11ssio11.1· with Dick !Jis.\\'ell\nwhere we seriously considered the problem of 11'/zerlzer there would he one more mum! of\naircraji be}<Jrl! the sute/lites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.\nand nor rwo. That seems ro huve heerz a 1·ery accurate evaluariim, as it seems rlrcll JO\nSR-71 '.I· !(ive us erwugh overflight recormais.1·a11t·e capahi/iry and we dort 't need tlze adcfi­\ntional IV Oxcart aircraft.\n'-ee1el"
  },
  {
   "n": 327,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p327.jpg",
   "text": ".\n.\n.\n..\n.\n."
  },
  {
   "n": 328,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p328.jpg",
   "text": ":·i·:.,..,., .:, ' .\n.\n.•\n. .\n.\n+\n•\n•\n+\n. .\n. ..\n-: :\n,.-··\nConclusion\nSee, el N01'0Afl1\nChapter 7\n315\nU-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION\nBefore the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man­\n.agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over\nthe Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very\nlong, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develolP ef­\nfective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.\nRecognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers\nplanned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of\nthe Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program\nfocused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.\nOnce operations began, however, project managers found them­\nselves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex­\npectations, the U-2 could not fl y undetected. Its overflights led to\nSoviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not\nwishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to\nharm relations during more favorable intervals. President Eisenhower\nplaced strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one\nand greatly limiting their number. Yet. the President never went so far\nas to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf, he\nvalued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at\ntimes when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was\nfalling behind the Soviet Union militarily, fi rst in bombers and then in\nmissiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over­\nfl ights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which\nno overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity."
  },
  {
   "n": 329,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p329.jpg",
   "text": "316\nSec, et NOFORN\nChapter 7\nThe low level of overflight activity did not prevent the U-2 from\naccomplishing a lot in the four years it flew over the Soviet Union\nand Eastern Europe. Twenty-four U-2 missions made deep penetra­\ntion overflights of the Soviet Union: six by Detachment A from\nGermany, three by Detachment C from the Far East and Alaska, and\n15 by Detachment B from Turkey and Pakistan, including the unsuc­\ncessful Powers mission.\nThe amount of information these missions gathered was impres­\nsive. By the summer of 1960, the U-2 project had developed more\nthan 1, 285,000 feet of film-a strip almost 250 miles long. The U-2s\ncovered more than 1,300,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, ap­\nproximately 15 percent of its total area. [nformation from U-2 photo­\ngraphs was used to prepare 5,425 separate photoanalytical reports. 1\nNumbers alone cannot describe the importance of the U-2 over­\nflight project. [n a 28 May 1960 memorandum, after Powers was shot\ndown, DCI Allen W. Dulles described the program's accomplish­\nments: '\"Five years ago, before the beginning of the U-2 program, ...\nhalf knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of its true power\nposition posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were\nfaced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or\nof needlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on misdi­\nrected military preparations of our own.\" Dulles went on to describe\nthe U-2's contribution in gathering information on four critical as­\npects of the Soviet Union's power position: its bomber force, its mis­\nsile force, its atomic energy program, and its air defense system.1\nThe first major contribution of intelligence collected from U-2\noverflights was the exposure of the \"bomber gap\" as a myth. Contrary\nto the US Air Force's claims, the Soviet Union was not building a\nlarge force of long-range bombers. Armed with information from U-2\noverflights, President Eisenhower was able to resist pressure to build a\nlarge US bomber fleet to meet a nonexistent Soviet threat.\n' DCI Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. \"Statistics\nRelating to the U-2 Program.\" 19 August 1960, Operation MUDLARK tiles, OSA re­\ncords. job 74-8-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).\n'The original draft of this document was probably written by James Q. Reber. It was then\nrevised by DCI Dulles. \"Accomplishments of the U-2 Program,\" 27 May 1960. Operation\nMUDLARK tiles, OSA records, job 74-B-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).\nSeeFot"
  },
  {
   "n": 330,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p330.jpg",
   "text": "317\nThe ·'bomber-gap\" controversy was soon followed by a \"mis­\nsile-gap\" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda\ncampaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and\ndeploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet\nUnion along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside\nthe known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA\nto conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that \"the\nSoviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program;\ninstead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at\nachieving an early ICBM operational capability.\" 3 As with the\ncontroversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2\nphotography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac­\ncelerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent\nliquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop­\nment of more reliable solid-fueled missiles.\nU-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet\nUnion's atomic energy program, including the production of fission­\nable materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the\nlocation and size of nuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such. U-2 pho­\ntography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated\nthe nuclear testing moratorium.\nOne of the greatest contributions of the U-2 program was to in­\ncrease the capabilities of the US deterrent force. Before the U-2 over­\nflights, most target information was based on obsolete materials\ndating back to World War II or shortly thereafter. With the assistance\nof U-2 photography, the Defense Department could allocate weapons\nand crews more efficiently and identify many new targets. U-2 photos\nalso proved invaluable in determining the precise location of targets.\nOne further contribution to the capabilities of the US deterrent force\nwas the information that U-2s collected on the Soviet air defense sys­\ntem. U-2 photography located Soviet fighter airfields and gained in­\ntelligence on new fighter models. Special electronic intercept and\nrecording equipment carried on many U-2 missions enabled the CIA\nto analyze the technical characteristics, operational techniques, and\nradar order of battle of the Soviet Union's electronic defenses. This\ninformation was vital both for planning the routes for US deterrent\nforces and for developing electronic countermeasures.\n' Ibid.. p. 3 (TS Codeword).\nSecret ~OFORl<J\nChapter 7\n-Scc,er"
  },
  {
   "n": 331,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p331.jpg",
   "text": "318\nSee. et NOFORN\nChapter 7\nThe U-2 program not only provided information on individual\nSoviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet\nintentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in\nMay 1960:\nWhenever the international situation becomes tense because of\na problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether\nthe situation might get beyond control-that someone on the\nother side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. ...\nOur knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result­\ning from the overflight program. has given us an ability to dis­\ncount or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have\nbeen able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori­\ncal than threatening and that our courses of action could be\ncarried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet\ninterference. 4\nDulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put­\nting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelli­\ngence effort, noting that \"in terms of reliability, of precision, of\naccess to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has\nbeen unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and\nof the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been,\nto put it simply. invaluable.\"\nThe impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is\nharder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered\nwas a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a\ncostly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s\nby showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups\nof strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the\nother hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations\nwith Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit\nmeeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower\nrelations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2,\nthe Soviet Cnion's strategic military capabilities would have\nremained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist\npressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out\nmajor increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned\nrelations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of\noverflights did.\n' Ibid.. pp. 9- IO (TS Codeword).\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 332,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p332.jpg",
   "text": "319\nSec, el NOFORN\nChapter 7\nPARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM\nFrom the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided\nvaluable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan\nplayed a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India,\nThailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in\nAsia. Two Allies-the United Kingdom and Nationalist China-made\nan even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots\nand conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958\nand conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late\n1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the\nneed for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew\nonly training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis­\nsions was considered on several occasions.\nThe end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the impor­\ntance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new\nsource of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic­\nintelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China.\nThe United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint\nr~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the\nmid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese\nwith the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12\nyears, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back\nlarge quantities of information on the development of Communist\nChina's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such\ninformation was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist\nChina paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2\nprogram: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on\noverflights), and another three were captured.\nU-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE\nThe low level of mission activity over the project's original target­\nthe Soviet Union-was initially very frustrating for CIA project man­\nagers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned\nfor the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often\non hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli­\ngence during crisis situations.\nBeginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub­\nsequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian\nborder fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US\n-ieerct"
  },
  {
   "n": 333,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p333.jpg",
   "text": "320\nSec, el NOI-O\"N\nChapter 7\ninvolvement in fndochina, U-2 photography provided accurate and\nup-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and tield commanders, as­\nsisting them in crisis management and the planning of military opera­\ntions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitoring cease-fire agreements\nin the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war\nin 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.\nBy the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned\nstrategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was no longer seriously\nconsidered. The political risks were too high. especially since the\nquality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing\nsteadily. Thus, the OXCARTs only operational use was for collecting\ntactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART gath­\nered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus. in January\n1968. OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo\nand showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any\nlarge-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.\nADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY\nOne very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance\nprogram was the many advances in technology that it generated.\nThanks to simplified covert procurement arrangements and the lack\nof detailed and restricting specifications, creative designers such as\nKelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The\nU-2, designed to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at\nbest, proved so successful that, even after its original area of activity\nbecame too dangerous for overflights at the end of four years, the air­\ncraft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service\nwith other government agencies.\nThe OXCART is an even better example of the technological ad­\nvances generated by the CIA's reconnaissance program. Although the\nOXCART was designed almost 30 years ago and first flown in 1962.\nits speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of\nthis aircraft also led to the use of new materials in aircraft construc­\ntion. Unfortunately. the technological breakthroughs that made the\nOXCART possible took longer than expected. By the time the aircraft\nwas ready for operations, the missions originally planned for it were\nnot practicable. The tremendous technological achievement repre­\nsented by the OXCART ultimately led to the aircraft's demise by in­\nspiring the Air Force to purchase its own version of the aircraft. The\nSee1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 334,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p334.jpg",
   "text": "321\nSeeret NOFORN\nChapter 7\ngovernment could not afford to maintain two such similar reconnais­\nsance programs. The elimination of the Agency's OXCART program\ndid not, however, spell the end of the usefulness of the world's most\nadvanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR-71, is still in service.\nIn addition to the aircraft themselves, many other items associ­\nated with the reconnaissance program have represented important ad­\nvances in technology. The flight suits and life-support systems of the\nU-2 and OXCART pilots were the forerunners of the equipment used\nin the space program. Camera resolution improved dramatically as the\nresult of cameras and lenses produced for the CIA's reconnaissance\nprogram.\nCOOPERATION WITH THE AIR FORCE\nIn this history, which concentrates on the CIA's involvement in over­\nhead reconnaissance, it is easy to overlook the important role that the\nUS Air Force played in the U-2 and OXCART programs. From the\n. v_ery beginnings of the U-2 program in 1954, the Agency and the Air\nForce were partners in advancing the state of the art in overhead re­\nconnaissance. Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon­\nnaissance program, from project headquarters to the testing site and\nfield detachments. The Air Force supplied the U-2's engines, at times\ndiverting them from other high-priority production lines. Perhaps\nmost important of all, the Air Force provided pilots for the U-2s after\nthe Agency's original attempt to recruit a sufficient number of skilled\nforeign pilots proved unsuccessful. Finally, the day-to-day operations\nof the U-2s could not have been conducted without the help of Air\nForce mission planners, weather forecasters, and support personnel in\nthe field detachments. The cooperation between the Agency and the\nAir Force that began with the U-2 and continued with Project\nOXCART remains a major feature in US reconnaissance programs\ntoday.\nIMPACT OF THE OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE\nPROGRAM ON THE CIA\nCIA's entry into the world of overhead reconnaissance at the end of\n1954 ultimately produced major changes in the Agency. Classical\nforms of intelligence-the use of covert agents and clandestine\noperations-gradually lost their primacy to the new scientific and\n&ec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 335,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p335.jpg",
   "text": "322\nSeeret NOFOflN\nChapter 7\nSeePet\ntechnical means of collection. As soon as the U-2 began flying over\nthe Soviet Union, its photographs became the most important source\nof intelligence available. The flood of information that the U-2\nmissions gathered led to a major expansion of the Agency's\nphotointerpretation capabilities, which finally resulted in the creation\nof the National Photographic Interpretation Center to serve the entire\nintelligence community.\nThe U-2's tremendous success as an intelligence-gathering sys­\ntem led the Agency to search for follow-on systems that could con­\ntinue to obtain highly reliable information in large quantities. Thus,\nthe CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced\naircraft-the OXCART-and also pioneered research into photo­\nsatellites. Less than a decade after the U-2 program began, the\nAgency's new emphasis on technical means of collection had brought\nabout the creation of a new science-oriented directorate, which would\nultimately rival in manpower and budget the Agency's other three\ndirectorates combined.\nThe negative aspect of this new emphasis on technology is\nexploding costs. The Agency's first strategic reconnaissance aircraft,\nthe U-2, cost less than $1 million apiece. With the U-2's successor,\nthe OXCART, each aircraft cost more than $20 million, and the cost\nexplosion has continued with each new generation of reconnaissance\nsatellites.\nPerhaps the greatest significance of the CIA's entry into the\nworld of overhead reconnaissance in December 1954 was the new na­\ntional policy that it signaled. Although US military aircraft had fre­\nquently violated Soviet airspace in the decade after World War II,\nsuch shallow-penetration overflights, concentrating primarily on or­\nder-of-battle data, had been authorized and controlled by US field\ncommanders, not by the President. In the autumn of 1954, however,\nPresident Dwight D. Eisenhower-determined to avoid another Pearl\nHarbor-authorized the construction of a new aircraft designed solely\nto fly over the Soviet Union and gather strategic intelligence.\nPeacetime reconnaissance flights over the territory of a potential en­\nemy power thus became national policy. Moreover, to reduce the dan­\nger of conflict, the President entrusted this mission not to the armed\nforces, but to a civilian agency-the CIA. From that time forward,\noverhead reconnaissance has been one of the CIA's most important\nmissions."
  },
  {
   "n": 336,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p336.jpg",
   "text": ""
  },
  {
   "n": 337,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p337.jpg",
   "text": "----\n:·.,·\n.•.."
  },
  {
   "n": 338,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p338.jpg",
   "text": "325\nAPPENDIX A\nAcronyms\nAEC\nAFB\nAFDAP\nAMO\nARC\nARDC\nASPIC\nATIC\nBSAP\nBUORL\nCOMINT\nCOMIREX\nCOMOR\nDB\nDCI\nDCID\nDDCI\nDOI\nDDP\nDDS&T\nDPD\nDPS\nECM\nEG&G\nELINT\nFCRC\nHASP\nIAC\nIAS\nICBM\nIR\nISP\nJRC\nMATS\nAtomic Energy Commission\nAir Force Base\nAir Force office symbol for the Assistant for\nDevelopment Planning under the Deputy Chief\nof Staff for Development\nAir/Maritime Division\nAd Hoc Requirements Committee\nAir Research and Development Command\n(USAF)\nAsian Photographic Interpretation Center\nAir Technical Intelligence Center (USAF)\nBoston Scientific Advisory Panel\nBoston University Optical Research Laboratory\nCommunications Intelligence\nCommittee on Imagery Requirements and\nExploitation\nCommittee on Overhead Reconnaissance\n\"Dirty Bird\"\nDirector of Central Intelligence\nDirector of Central Intelligence Directive\nDeputy Director of Central Intelligence\nDeputy Director for Intelligence\nDeputy Director (or Directorate) for Plans\nDeputy Director for Science and Technology\nDevelopment Projects Division\nDevelopment Projects Staff\nElectronic Countermeasures\nEdgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Incorporated\nElectronic Intelligence\nFederally Controlled Research Center\nHigh-Altitude Air Sampling Program\nIntelligence Advisory Committee\nIndicated air speed\nIntelligence community\nIntercontinental ballistic missile\nInfrared\nIntelligence Systems Panel (USAF)\nJoint Reconnaissance Center\nMilitary Air Transport Service (USAF)\n11,soFet NOFORN\nAppendix A\nSee,et\nIC"
  },
  {
   "n": 339,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p339.jpg",
   "text": "326\n6ee1 et NOFORN\nAppendix A\niearet\nMRBM\nNACA\nNAS\nNASA\nNIE\nNPIC\nNSA\nNSC\nNSCID\nODM\nORR\nOSA\nOSI\nPBCFIA\nP-E\nPFIAB\nPI\nPIC\nPID\nPSAC\nRAF\nRFP\nSAB\nSAC\nSAC\nSA/PC/DCI\nSAM\nSEI\nSENSINT\nSLAR\nTAS\nTCP\nUSIB\nWADC\nWRSP\nMedium-range ballistic missile\nNational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics\nNaval air station\nNational Aeronautics and Space\nAdministration\nNational Intelligence Estimate\nNational Photographic Interpretation Center\nNational Security Agency\nNational Security Council\nNational Security Council Intelligence\nDirective\nOffice of Defense Mobilization\nOffice of Research and Reports\nOffice of Special Activities\nOffice of Scientific Intelligence\nPresident's Board of Consultants on Foreign\nIntelligence Activities\nPerkin-Elmer Company\nPresident's Foreign Intelligence Advisory\nBoard\nPhotointerpreter\nPhotographic Intelligence Center\nPhoto-Intelligence Division\nPresident's Science Advisory Committee\nRoyal Air Force\nRequest for proposal\nScientific Advisory Board (USAF)\nScience Advisory Committee\nStrategic Air Command\nSpecial Assistant to the DCI for Planning and\nCoordination\nSurface-to-air missile\nScientific Engineering Institute\nSensitive intelligence (USAF)\nSide-looking aerial radar\nTrue air speed\nTechnological Capabilities Panel\nUnited States Intelligence Board\nWright Air Development Command (USAF)\nWeather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional"
  },
  {
   "n": 340,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p340.jpg",
   "text": "327\nSeeret NOFOAN\nAppendix B\nAPPENDIX B\nKey Personnel\nAYER, Frederick, Jr.\nSpecial assistant to Trevor Gardner in the Office of the Secretary of\nthe Air Force, Ayer was a strong advocate of overhead reconnaissance\nby balloons and an early supporter of Lockheed's CL-282 design.\nBAKER, James G.\nHarvard astronomer and lens designer, Baker was a leading designer\nof high-acuity aerial lenses during World War II and continued this\nwork after the war. He also headed the Air Force Intelligence Systems\nPanel and served on the Technological Capabilities Panel's Project\nThree committee that urged the development of the U-2 aircraft.\nBaker designed the lenses for the U-2's cameras.\nBISSELL, Richard M., Jr.\nHead of all CIA overhead reconnaissance programs from 1954 until\n1962, a former economics professor at MIT and high official of the\nMarshall Plan, Bissell became Allen W. Dulles's Special Assistant for\nPlanning and Coordination in January 1954 and received responsibil­\nity for the new U-2 project at the end of that year. Later he also\nheaded the first photosatellite project and oversaw the development of\nthe OXCART. In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but\nkept the reconnaissance projects under his control. He resigned from\nthe CIA in February 1962.\nCABELL, George Pearre\nAir Force general and DDCI from 1953 until 1962. Because of\nCabell's many years of experience in aerial reconnaissance, DCI\nDulles delegated most of the responsibility for the reconnaissance\nprojects to him.\nCARTER, Marshall S.\nAnny general who served as DDCI from 1962 until 1965. During the\nperiod leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Carter served as Acting\nDCI on a number of occasions while DCI McCone was out of town.\nIn October 1962 he fought unsuccessfully to keep the CIA involved in\nflying reconnaissance missions over Cuba. Carter became the\nDirector of the National Security Agency in 1965.\nCHARYK, Joseph R.\nAn aeronautical engineer who had followed careers first in academia\nand then the aerospace industry, Charyk became the Chief Scientist of\n-&ec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 341,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p341.jpg",
   "text": "328\nSec,st NOFORPd\nAppendix B\nSecret\nthe Air Force in January 1959. Five months later he moved up to\nAssistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development,\nand the following y~ar he became Under Secretary of the Air Force.\nIn these positions he was involved in coordination with the CIA on\nboth the U-2 and OXCART projects. In 1963 Charyk left government\nto become the first chairman of the Communications Satellite\nCorporation.\nCUNNINGHAM, James A., Jr.\nAn ex-Marine Corps pilot, he became the administrative officer for\nthe U-2 project in April 1955. Cunningham handled the day-to-day\nmanagement of the U-2 program and brought only the more complex\nproblems to Richard Bissell's attention. Later he served as the Deputy\nDirector of the Office of Special Activities and then Special Assistant\nto the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.\nDONOVAN, Allen F.\nAn aeronautical engineer who had helped to design the P-40 fighter\nwhile working at the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Donovan was one\nof the founders of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory after World\nWar IL He served on several Air Force advisory panels and was a\nstrong advocate of the proposed Lockheed CL-282 aircraft. Later he\nbecame vice president of the Aerospace Corporation.\nDOOLITTLE, James H.\nA vice president of Shell Oil Company and an Army Air Force re­\nserve general, Doolittle headed General Eisenhower's Air Staff dur­\ning World War II. After the war Doolittle served on many Air Force\nadvisory panels, and in 1954 he chaired a special panel investigating\nthe CIA's covert activities. Doolittle also served on the Technological\nCapabilities Panel and the President's Board of Consultants on\nForeign Intelligence Activities.\nDUCKETT, Carl E.\nHeaded the Directorate of Science and Technology from September\n1966 until May 1976, first as Acting Deputy Director and then as\nDeputy Director beginning in April 1967. During his tenure, the em­\nphasis in the CIA's overhead reconnaissance program shifted from\naircraft to satellites.\nDULLES, Allen W.\nDCI from 1953 until 196 l. Although initially reluctant to see the CIA\ninvolved in aerial reconnaissance, which he viewed as the military's\narea of responsibility, Dulles became a strong supporter of the U-2"
  },
  {
   "n": 342,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p342.jpg",
   "text": "329\nprogram when he saw how much intelligence it could gather on the\nSoviet Union. Because his own interests lay more in the area of hu­\nman intelligence, he left the management of the reconnaissance pro­\ngram in the hands of DDCI Cabell and project director Richard\nBissell.\nGARDNER, Trevor\nDuring World War II, Gardner worked on the Manhattan Project, and\nlater he headed the General Tire and Rubber Company before starting\nhis own research and development firm, the Hycon Company, which\nbuilt aerial cameras. Gardner served as the Secretary of the Air\nForce's Special Assistant for Research and Development and then as\nthe Assistant Secretary for Research and Development during\nEisenhower's first term of office. Gardner's concern about the danger\nof a surprise attack helped lead to the establishment of the\nTechnological Capabilities Panel. Gardner also urged the building of\nLockheed's CL-282 aircraft.\nGEARY, Leo P.\nAir Force colonel (later brigadier general) who was James\nCunningham's Air Force counterpart in the U-2 program. He was in­\nstrumental in diverting engines from other Air Force projects for use\nin the U-2, and his 10 years with the U-2 project provided a high de­\ngree of continuity.\nGOODPASTER, Andrew J.\nAn Army colonel who served as President Eisenhower's Staff\nSecretary from 1954 to 196 l. During this period, he was the CIA's\npoint of contact in the White House for arranging meetings with the\nPresident on the subject of overhead reconnaissance. Goodpaster's\nlater career included service as the supreme commander of NATO and\nthen commandant of the US Military Academy at West Point.\nHELMS, Richard M.\nDCI from 1966 to 1973. During his tenure as DCI, the CIA's manned\nreconnaissance program came under heavy pressure because of com­\npetition from the Air Force's reconnaissance program.\nJOHNSON, Clarence L. (Kelly)\nOne of the nation's foremost aeronautical designers, Kelly Johnson\ngraduated from the University of Michigan's School of Aeronautics\nin 1933 and began working for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.\nDuring World War U he designed the P-38 fighter, and after the war\nhis design successes continued with the F-104 jet fighter, the\nConstellation airliner, and the CIA's two strategic reconnaissance air­\ncraft, the U-2 and the OXCART A-12.\n~eeret NOF'ORN\nAppendix B\nSecaer"
  },
  {
   "n": 343,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p343.jpg",
   "text": "330\n6ee1 et NOFORN\nAppendix B\nSecaet\nKIEFER, Eugene P.\nAn Air Force officer with a degree in aeronautical engineering who in\n1953 informed a friend at Lockheed of the Air Force's search for a\nhigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, thus, leading to the initial de­\nsign of the CL-282. After leaving the Air Force, Kiefer became\nRichard\nBissell's\ntechnical\nadviser\nfor\nthe\nOXCART and\nphotosatellite programs.\nKILLIAN, James R., Jr.\nPresident of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Killian\nheaded a high-level and very secret study of the nation's ability to\nwithstand a surprise attack. While this project was still under way, he\nand Edwin Land persuaded President Eisenhower to support the de­\nvelopment of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. Later,\nKillian headed Eisenhower's Board of Consultants for Foreign\nIntelligence Activities, served as his Cabinet-level science adviser,\nand chaired the President's Science Advisory Board. Killian was also\nchairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board un­\nder John F. Kennedy.\nLAND, Edwin H.\nAn extremely talented inventor famous for the development of polar­\nizing filters and the instant-film camera. Land also devoted consider­\nable time and energy to voluntary government service. During World\nWar II, Land worked for the Radiation Laboratories, and after the war\nhe served on numerous Air Force advisory panels. As the head of the\nTechnological Capabilitites Panel's study group investigating US in­\ntelligence-gathering capabilities, Land became a strong advocate of\nthe development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the\nCL-282) under civilian rather than Air Force control. Land and James\nKillian persuaded President Eisenhower to approve the U-2 project\nand later the first photosatellite project. Land also served on the\nPresident's Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities.\nLEGHORN, Richard S.\nAn MIT graduate in physics, Leghorn joined the Army Air Force in\nI 942 and went to work for reconnaissance expert Col. George\nGoddard. By the time of the invasion of Europe, Leghorn was chief of\nreconnaissance for the 9th Tactical Air Force. After the war, Leghorn\nbegan preaching the need for \"pre-D-day\" reconnaissance in order to\ngather intelligence on the Soviet Bloc. He returned to the Air Force\nduring the Korean war and later worked for Harold Stassen 's\nDisarmament Office. In 1956 he became the head of the Scientific"
  },
  {
   "n": 344,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p344.jpg",
   "text": "331\nEngineering Institute, an Agency proprietary working on ways to re­\nduce the U-2's vulnerability to radar detection. In 1957 he founded\nItek Corporation.\nLUNDAHL, Arthur E.\nA Navy photointerpreter during World War II and afterward. Lundahl\nbecame the chief of the Photo-Intelligence Division in I 953. To sup­\nport the U-2 project, he established a separate photointerpretation\ncenter under Project HTAUTOMAT. Under his leadership the Photo­\nIntelligence Division grew rapidly and achieved office status as the\nPhotographic Intelligence Center in 1958. In 1961 Lundahl became\nthe first head of the National Photograhic Interpretation Center, which\ncombined the photointerpretation efforts of the CIA and the military\nservices.\nMcCONE, John A.\nDCI from 1961 to 1965. A strong supporter of the CIA's manned re­\nconnaissance program, McCone presided over the OXCART's main\nperiod of development and pushed for a greater role for the CIA in its\njoint reconnaissance programs with the Department of Defense.\nMILLER, Herbert I.\nMiller worked in the Office of Scientific Intelligence's nuclear branch\nand became Richard Bissell's first deputy for the U-2 project. He later\nleft the Agency to work for the Scientific Engineering Institute.\nNORTON, Garrison\nAn assistant to Trevor Gardner, Norton became an early supporter of\nthe Lockheed CL-282 and started the CIA's interest in overhead re­\nconnaissance by informing Philip Strong about the aircraft. Norton\nlater became Navy Assistant Secretary for Research and Development\nand was involved with the OXCART program.\nOVERHAGE, Carl F. J.\nAfter working on the development of Technicolor, Overhage went to\nwork for Kodak. He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later\nbecame director of Lincoln Laboratories.\nPARANGOSKY, John N.\nParangosky worked for Richard Bissell's Development Projects Staff\nin the mid- I 950s. He served as deputy chief of the Adana U-2 unit in\n1959 and became project manager of the OXCART program from its\ninception through the test flight stage.\n~eerct NOFORN\nAppendix B\n6ec:et"
  },
  {
   "n": 345,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p345.jpg",
   "text": "332\nSec,et NOFOAN\nAppendix B\nGs&ra1i\nPERKIN, Richard S.\nPresident of the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Perkin was a close friend\nof James Baker and was also a member of several advisory panels,\nincluding the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what\ncameras to use in the first U-2 aircraft.\nPOWERS, Francis Gary\nAn Air Force Reserve Officer who became a CIA U-2 pilot in 1956,\nPowers flew 27 successful missions before being shot down over the\nSoviet Union on l May 1960. After his return to the United States in\nexchange for Soviet spymaster Rudolf Abel in 1962, Powers was\ncleared of all allegations of misconduct in his mission, capture, trial,\nand captivity. He became a test pilot for Lockheed and later piloted\nlight aircraft and helicopters for radio and television stations. He died\nin a helicopter crash on l August 1977.\nPURCELL, Edward M.\nA physicist who won a Nobel prize in 1954 for his work in nuclear\nresonance, Purcell served on a number of advisory bodies, including\nthe USAF Scientific Advisory Committee and Edwin Land's\nTechnological Capabilities Panel study group. It was Purcell's ideas\nfor reducing the radar cross section of the U-2 that led to the\nOXCART program. Purcell also contributed to the satellite pro­\ngrams.\nRABORN, William F., Jr.\nDCI from 1965 to 1966, Raborn pushed for the deployment of\nOXCART to the Far East but failed to sway the top officials of the\nJohnson administration.\nREBER, James Q.\nAfter serving as the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination\nin the early 1950s, Reber became the chairman of the Ad Hoc\nRequirements Committee in 1955 and continued to chair this commit­\ntee after it was taken over by the US Intelligence Board in 1960 and\nrenamed the Committee on Overhead Requirements. In 1969 he be­\ncame the chairman of the USIB's SIGINT Committee.\nRODGERS, Franklin A.\nr\nFormerly of MIT, Rodgers was the chief engineer at the Scientific\nEngineering Institute who converted the theories of Edward Purcell\ninto practical systems to reduce the radar image of the U-2 and espe­\ncially the OXCART."
  },
  {
   "n": 346,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p346.jpg",
   "text": "333\nSCHLESINGER, James R.\nDCI from February to July 1973, Schlesinger supported the Nixon ad­\nministration's proposal to terminate the Agency's U-2 program.\nSCOTT, Roderic M.\nAn engineer with Perkin-Elmer who worked with James Baker in de­\nsigning the first cameras for use in the U-2. Scott helped design the\n30001 camera for the OXCART.\nSCOVILLE, Herbert, Jr.\nIn February 1962 Scoville became the first Deputy Director for\nResearch, which took over control of the Agency's reconnaissance\nprograms from the Deputy Director for Plans. Frustrated by the lack\nof support from the DCI and the other directorates, he resigned in\nJune 1963.\nSEABERG, John\nAn aeronautical engineer who was recalled to active duty with the Air\nForce during the Korean war, Seaberg drafted the first specifications\nfo~ _a high-flying jet reconnaissance aircraft in 1953.\nSTEVER, H. Guyf ord\nA professor of aeronautical engineering at MIT, Stever served on nu­\nmerous Air Force advisory panels and later became the Air Force's\nchief scientist.\nSTRONG, Philip G.\nChief of collection in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Strong kept\nhimself well informed on developments in overhead reconnaissance\nand attended many Air Force advisory panel meetings as an observer.\nIn 1954 he learned about the Lockheed CL-282 design and passed the\ninformation on to Edwin Land's study group investigating US intelli­\ngence-gathering capabilities.\nWHEELON, Albert (\"Bud\") D.\n, Wheelon became the Deputy Director for Science and Technology in\nAugust 1963 following the reorganization and renaming of the\nDeputy Director for Research. He held this position until September\n1966.\nSee1 et NOFOAN\nAppendix 8\n5ee1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 347,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p347.jpg",
   "text": ""
  },
  {
   "n": 348,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p348.jpg",
   "text": "335\nSec, et NOfiOF\\l'fJ\nAppendix C\nAPPENDIX C\nElectronic Devices Carried by the U-2\nFrom the beginning the U-2 was envisioned as more than a camera\nplatform. In fact, the U-2 would ultimately carry only five types of\nphotographic equipment but more than 20 different types of electronic\ndevices, some for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT), others\n(\"ferret\" equipment) for gathering intelligence on foreign radars, and\na few for self-protection--electronic countermeasures to defeat en­\nemy missile-control radars.\nThe various electronic, countermeasures and intelligence-gather­\ning systems designed for the U-2 received designations using Roman\nnumerals-Systems I through XXII. The first seven devices were\nbuilt by the Ramo-Wooldridge firm, now part of the TRW\nCorporation. System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect\nground-controlled intercept and air defense signals. Weighing only\n7. 7 kilograms, this system was aboard all U-2s from I 955 through\n1959. System-IL a communications and navigation system. never\nworked properly and was canceled. System-III. a 16-kilogram VHF\nrecorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used\nand was transferred to the Navy in 1958. System-IV, a ferret device\nthat recorded electromagnetic energy in the 150- to 4,000-MHz range\nwas used on 16 missions between 1957 and 1959, when it was given\nto the Air Force. System-V was similar to System-I but covered nine\nwave bands. The device was so heav·y that U-2s using it could not\ncarry a camera system. System-V was used on only three missions\nand was replaced by the lighter weight System-VI that covered the P-,\nL-, S-, and X-band frequencies and could be used with either the A or\nB camera. System-VI was used from 1959 through 1966.\nThe growing need for data on Soviet missile development led to\na contract with the firm of Haller-Raymond-Brown (HRB) to build a\nmissile-telemetry intercept system as quickly as possible. The result­\ning device (System-VII) could record up to 12 minutes of data from\nsix simultaneous frequencies. This unit first saw service on 9 June\n1959 and was used on another 22 missions during the next year.\nFollowing modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the\nNavy, the designation was changed to System-VIII.\nSystem-IX was an electronic-countermeasures (ECM) device for\ngenerating false-angle information in response to X-band radar pulses\nfrom surface-to-air missile radars. Also known as the Mark-30. the\nSee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 349,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p349.jpg",
   "text": "336\neeeret PmFOAN\nAppendix C\n--Seeret\nunit was manufactured by the Granger Company. One of these de­\nvices was aboard Gary Powers' U-2 when he was shot down.\nSystem-X was a modification of the HRB's System-VII that was\nspecially built in 1962 for a mission over the Soviet Union that never\ntook place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM devices used by U-2s\noverflying China and North Vietnam during the Vietnam war.\nSystem-XVI was a passive ELINT collector.\nSystem-XVII was built by HRB-Singer as a result of an October\nl 963 USIB requirement for the collection of antiballistic-missile\n(ABM) data from Saryshagan. The system was to be deployed in a\nU-2 that would fly over western China, along the Sino-Soviet border,\ncollecting data on the ABMs being tested at Saryshagan. By the time\nthe unit was completed in l 965, however, the tipoff time before test\nlaunches had been reduced from almost 24 hours to less than an hour,\nmaking it impossible to stage U-2 missions in time to collect the data.\nIn the late l 960s, additional ECM systems were needed to coun­\nter the increasing threats posed by more accurate SAMs and higher\nflying aircraft. System-XX was specifically designed to counter the\nacquisition and guidance radars used by MIG aircraft, and\nSystem-XXII was an infrared jammer to counter air-to-air missiles.\nSystem-XXI, a COMINT package that replaced the much older\nSystem-III, was originally developed for the OXCART program and\nwas later adapted for use aboard the follow-on U-2, the U-2R."
  },
  {
   "n": 350,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p350.jpg",
   "text": "See, et NOFORN\nAppendix D\n337\nAPPENDIX D\nU-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union,\n4 July 1954-1 May 1960\nDate\nMission Pilot\nAirfield\nUnit\nPayload Route\n4 July 1956\n2013\nStockman\nWiesbaden\nA\nA-2\nEast Germany, Poland, Minsk,\nLeningrad, Estonia, Latvia, Poland\n5 July 1956\n2014\nVito\nWiesbaden\nA\nA-2\nEast Germany, Warsaw, Minsk,\nMoscow, Estonia, Latvia,\nLithuania, Poland\n9 July 1956\n2020\nKnutson\nWiesbaden\nA\nA-2\nEast Germany, Poland, Minsk,\nPoland\n9 July 1956\n2021\nOverstreet\nWiesbaden\nA\nA-2\nCzechoslovakia, Vienna, Hungary,\nL'vov, Kiev, Minsk, Poland\n•10-July 1956\n2024\nDunaway\nWiesbaden\nA\nA-2\nPoland, Kishinev, Kerch•.\nSevastopol', Simferopol'. Odessa.\nRomania. Hungary\n20 November 1956 4016\nPowers\nAdana\nB\nA-2\nIran, Yerevan, Baku. Astara,\nCaucasus\n18 March 1957\n4020\nCherbonneaux\nAdana\nB\nSys-V\nSoviet border to Afghanistan,\nAzerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia\n20 June 1957\n6005\nRand\nEielson\nC\nB\nKhaylyulya. Ust'-Kamchatsk,\nKozyrevsk, Karaganskiy-Ostrov\n5 August 1957\n4035\nEdens\nLahore\nB\nB\nAfghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam,\nKazalinsk, Aral Sea\n11 August 1957\n4039\nMcMurray\nLahore\nB\nB\nAlma-Ata. Ust' -Kamenogorsk,\nSinkiang\n21 August 1957\n4045\nSnider\nLahore\nB\nA-2\nNovokuznetsk, Tomsk\n21 August 1957\n4048\nJones\nLahore\nB\nA-2\nLake Balkhash, Karaganda, Omsk.\nAlma-Ata\nSaa,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 351,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p351.jpg",
   "text": "338\nSecret NOFOAN\nAppendix D\nAPPENDIX D\nU-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union,\n4 July 1954-1 May 1960 (continued)\nDate\nMission\nPilot\nAirfield\nUnit\nPayload Route\n22 August l 957\n4049\nBirkhead\nLahore\nB\nA-2\nMerket Bazar, Kuldja, Abakan,\nKrasnoyarsk, Kansk, Sinkiang\n22 August l 957\n4050\nCherbonneaux:\nLahore\nB\nA-2\nLake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,\nBarnaul, Prokop'yevsk,\nNovokuznetsk, Leninogorsk\n28 August 1957\n4058\nJones\nLahore\nB\nA-2\nDushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam,\nKazalinsk, Aral Sea\n10 September 1957 4059\nHall\nAdana\nB\nA-2\nKrasnovodsk, Gur'yev,\nAstrakhan', Tbilisi\n16 September 1957 6008\nBaker\nEielson\nC\nA-2\nKamchatka Peninsula, Milkovo\n13 October 1957\n2040\nStockman\nGiebelstadt\nA\nA-2\nNorway, Finland, Murmansk,\nKandalaksha\nI March 1958\n601 l\nCrull\nAtsugi\nC\nA-2\nDal' nerechensk, Khabarovsk,\nBlagoveshchensk, Belagorsk,\nKomsomolsk, Sovetskaya Gavan'\n9 July 1959\n4125\nKnutson\nPeshawar\nB\nB\nTyuratam for suspected Sputnik\nlaunch\n6 December 1959\n8005\nRobinson•\nPeshawar\nB\nB\nKuybyshev, Kapustin Yar,\nCaucasus\n5 February l 960\n8009\nMacArthur•\nPeshawar\nB\nB\nTyuratam, Kazan\n9 April 1960\n4155\nErickson\nPeshawar\nB\nB\nLake Balkhash, Semipalatinsk,\nKyzylespe, Dzhezhkazgan,\nTyuratarn\nI May 1960\n4154\nPowers\nPeshawar\nB\nB\nTyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk;\ndowned by SAM\na RAF pilot\nSec1 et"
  },
  {
   "n": 352,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p352.jpg",
   "text": "339\nSecret NOFORN-\nAppendix E\nAPPENDIX E\nUnmanned Reconnaissance Projects\nAQUILINE\nIn the early l 960s, there were many problems in obtaining coverage\nof hostile territory. The U-2 was too vulnerable to Soviet sur­\nface-to-air missiles, as had been demonstrated by losses over the\nSoviet Union, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China. The\nOXCART was still under development and even when completed\nmight prove vulnerable to Soviet radars and missiles. Although safe\nfrom interception, the newly developed photosatellites could not pro­\nvide coverage of a desired target on short notice. Because several of\nthe intelligence community's primary targets such as Cuba and the\nnew Soviet radar installation at Tallinn (Estonia) were not located\ndeep in hostile territory, CIA scientists and engineers began to con­\nsider the possibility of using small, unmanned aircraft for aerial\nreconnaissance. They believed that recent advances in the minia­\nturization of electronic technology would make possible the\ndevelopment of a reconnaissance vehicle with a very-low-radar cross\nsection and small visual and acoustical signatures. Such a vehicle\ncould reconnoiter an area of interest without the hostile country real­\nizing that it had been overflown.\nIn mid-1965, David L. Christ, chief of the Office of Research\nand Development's Applied Physics Division, and Frank Briglia of\nthe same office began working on the concept of a small, inexpensive\naircraft that would be about the size of a large bird and could carry\nvarious payloads for photography, nuclear sensing, and ELINT collec­\ntion. ORD soon formed a Special Projects Group to develop the air­\ncraft with Briglia as the project manager. Only one firm-the Douglas\nAircraft Company-responded favorably to a request for proposal\nto study the feasibility of a low-altitude reconnaissance system. On\n15 November 1965, Douglas received a study contract. This was\nfollowed by two Agency contracts on 21 November 1966 for the\ndevelopment of an operational low-altitude intelligence-gathering\nsystem. Further contracts followed in 1968 and 1969.\nThe AQUILINE prototype developed by Douglas Aircraft\n(which became part of McDonnell-Douglas in 1969 as the result of a\nmerger) was essentially a powered glider with an 8.5-foot wingspan.\nThe aircraft weighed only 105 pounds. AQUILINE's tail-mounted en­\ngine drove a two-bladed propeller. Powered by a small 3.5-horse­\npower two-cycle engine originally developed by the McCullough\n5-eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 353,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p353.jpg",
   "text": "Secret ~OFORl'J\nAppendix E\n340\nProject AQUILINE\nCorporation for chainsaws. the aircraft's designed speed was 60 knots\nat an altitude of 1.000 feet with a 15-pound payload. The air•::raft\ncould fly at this speed for up to 30 hours, thanks to the engine's ex­\ntremely high fuel efficiency: 480 nautical miles per gallon of fuel.\nIn 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on\nthe US Navy's Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake,\nCalifornia, showed that the aircraft was extremely difficult to see:. To\nassist pilots of chase aircraft in keeping AQUILINE in sight, its entire\nupper surface was painted bright orange: even so. sighting remained\ndifficult.\nThe 1esting process was very hard on AQUILINE because it was\nrecovered by flying it into a net close to the ground. which almos:t al­\nways caused some damage to the wings or propeller. As a result, one\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 354,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p354.jpg",
   "text": "341\nor more of the aircraft was always being repaired, and eventually\nthree of the five AQUILINE prototypes were destroyed in testing.\nAlthough AQUILINE's visual and accoustic signatures were\nvery small, its radar cross section continued to cause problems. The\nradar cross section at low frequencies was less than one-tenth of a\nsquare meter, giving it a radar signature smaller than that of an eagle,\nbut there were flares in the VHF region that increased the likelihood\nof detection.\nStudies indicated that the radar cross section problems could\neventually be reduced to acceptable levels, but the greatest weakness\nof the AQUILINE project was its navigational system. AQUILINE\ndid not have a programmable autopilot; it had to be flown by remote\ncontrol from the ground. Once the aircraft flew over the horizon. all\nnavigational commands had to be relayed to it by high-flying aircraft.\nA DC-6 loitering at 25,000 feet would give AQUILINE a range of\n250 nautical miles: use of a U-2 at 70,000 feet could increase this to\n350 nautical miles.\n- -Such a range was suitable for the targets originally conceived for\nAQUILINE, but the need for intelligence on targets located much\ndee er in the Soviet Union and the Peo le's Re ublic of China\nand the development time and costs for\n~~~~~-c---~\nAQUILINE began to soar. By l971 ORD had spent six years and $33\nmillion on AQUILINE but still had many important problems to re­\nsolve.\nAt this point the project was turned over to the Office of Special\nActivities for operational testing at Area 51 in Nevada. Flight tests\nshowed the aircraft to be successful by the standards originally set for\nthe project in l 967, as it flew l 30 miles and obtained very high reso­\nlution photography of a target before returning successfully to the\noriginal launchsite. However, improving AQUILINE sufficiently to\nmake it a practical long-range reconnaissance system was estimated\nto cost another $35 million and take two to three years. On the recom­\nmendation of DDS&T Carl Duckett on I November l 971, Project\nAQUILINE was canceled. The project's aircraft and equipment were\neventually transferred to the US Army for use in a battlefield manage­\nment system known as AQUILA, which has yet to be deployed be­\ncause of continuing developmental problems.\nSectet NOfORN\nAppendix E\nSec.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 355,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p355.jpg",
   "text": "342\nGee,et AIO~ORN\nAppendix E\nProject AXILLARY\nAXILLARY\nWhile Project AQUILINE was still under development, its chief aero­\ndynamicist, Charles N. Adkins, left the program because he believed\nthat its escalating costs would prev,ent it from ever producing a de­\nployable aircraft. He wanted to build a small. inexpensive re­\nmote-controlled aircraft to test a low-cost lightweight autopilot\ncurrently being developed by ·oRD. Under a $5,000 time-and-materi­\nals contract with Melpar. Incorporatt:d. Adkins hired a local model\naircraft builder to assemble and modify a standard Hawk-750 glider\nkit and power it with a rear-mounted engine and pusher propeller.\nFollowing a series of successful test flights. Adkins installed a small\ncamera and took a number of aerial photographs.\nBy this time the effort to build a \"Miniature Multi-Purpose\nAirborne Vehicle\" had become known as Project AXILLARY.\nMelpar, Inc., received a second contract for $50,000 to install ORD's\nautopilot in the aircraft. and the projject managers now began search­\ning for a use for their vehicle. The two main possibilites were ( I) as a\nshort-range reconnaissance vehicle for use in a peace-monitoring or\nintelligence-gathering system and (2) as a short-range warhead deliv­\nery system. In 1971 the Office of Special Activities evaluated\nAXILLARY flight-testing and determined that the small model air­\ncraft was not suitable for use as a covert reconnaissance vehicle be­\ncause of its large radar cross secition and significant accoustical\nsignature. The aircraft's radar signature made it potentially useful as a\nweapons systems, however. ORD suggested that AXILLARY be\nequipped with a radar-homing unitE\nwhich would\nmake it an inexpensive means for\n.----;---.--..---~ -\n~ ---..JJ\nsurface-to-air missile systems in North Vietnam. The Director of"
  },
  {
   "n": 356,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p356.jpg",
   "text": "343\nDefense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and\nprovided DOD funding for ORD to develop two versions of\nAXILLARY, one with a radar-homer and one with a television recon­\nnaissance package. The radar homing system proved successful as\nAXILLARY sought out and destroyed a radar during testing at China\nLake Naval Air Station. However, the end of US involvement in\nVietnam in early 1973 led to the cancellation of further DOD funding,\nand AXILLARY was placed on the shelf. Melpar, Inc., continued to\nwork on the radar-homing version and eventually sold some\nAXILLARY-type aircraft to [srael, which used them to destroy Syrian\nradars in Lebanon in 1982.\nPINE RIDGE\nWhile work was still in progress on low-altitude, short-range recon­\nnaissance systems like AQUILINE and AXILLARY, CIA scientists\nand engineers were also working on a high-altitude recoverable un­\nmanned reconnaissance vehicle with an extremely-low-radar cross\nsection that would enable it to fly undetected over hostile territory.\nDuring the 1960s there had been a study conducted by the Teledyne\nRyan Aeronautical Company of San Diego on the construction of an\n.unaetectable drone known as SANDY HOOK. This 44-foot long\ndrone would operate at 120,000 feet at Mach 0.9, with a range of\n5,000 nautical miles. Its radar cross section 07zwould be 0.0 I square\nmeters. Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop­\nment; projected high costs and substantial technical risks led to its\ncancellation in December I 969.\nSome of the concepts in SANDY HOOK were carried over into a\nnew project known as PINE RIDGE, which was a proposal for an un­\nmanned reconnaissance vehicle with an even lower radar cross sec­\ntion (0.001 square meter). Research on SANDY HOOK had indicated\nthat a radar cross section this low was attainable and would prevent\ndetection and tracking by existing radar defense systems. The PINE\nRIDGE proposal called for a delta-shaped vehicle, approximately\n17 feet long with a 21-foot wingspan. Two vertical stabilizers would\ngive the vehicle an overall height of three to four feet. An existing\nTeledyne J- lO0-CA-100 Turbojet engine could have been used to\npower the vehicle at Mach 0.9 at the operating altitude of 65,000 to\n75,000 feet. Range was estimated at 3,300 nautical miles.\nDespite interest within the CIA and the Air Force for an unde­\ntectable reconnaissance vehicle, PINE RIDGE was never funded. In\nJanuary 1971 high-level representatives from DOD and CIA rejected\na proposal for a feasibility study to be conducted by Ryan Aircraft.\nS98FCt NOfOF\\N\nAppendix E\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 357,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p357.jpg",
   "text": "344\nSee, et NOfORN\nAppendix E\nThe following year, the Director of the Office of Special Activities,\nBrig. Gen. Harold F. Knowles, wrote a memorandum to the DCI pro­\nposing that the ClA develop a clandestine low-radar-cross-section\nvehicle like PINE RIDGE. but this proposal also failed to attract sup­\nport. With all the improvements in satellite reconnaissance that had\ntaken place during the previous decade, neither CIA nor the Air Force\nwas willing to invest substantial funding in a project to send aircraft.\nmanned or unmanned, over the .Soviiet Union."
  },
  {
   "n": 358,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p358.jpg",
   "text": ""
  },
  {
   "n": 359,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p359.jpg",
   "text": "• 3~~ .\n.\\_· elewL ~ •."
  },
  {
   "n": 360,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p360.jpg",
   "text": "347\nSeeFet NOFOAN\nBibliography\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\nPublished Works Cited\nAart, Dick van der. Aerial Espionage, Secret Intelligence Flights by\nEast and West. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, 1985 .\n.. AF Cites Red Bomber Progress.\" Aviation Week, 24 May 1954,\np. 14.\n\"'Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes.\" US\nDepartment of State Bulletin, vol. 36, 28 January 1957, p. 135.\n.. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July 10, 1956\nwith U.S. Reply.\" US Department of State Bulletin, 30 July 1956,\npp. 191-192.\nAlsop, Stewart. The Center. New York: Popular Library, 1968.\nAmbrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. Vol. 2, The President. New York:\nSimon and Schuster, 1984.\nAndrew, Christopher. Her Majesty s Secret Service: The Making of\nthe British Intelligence Community. New York: Viking, 1986.\n•• Aviation Week Story Spurs Debate on US, Red Airpower\nPositions.\" Aviation Week, 30 May 1955, pp. 13-14.\nBeschloss, Michael R. Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2\nAffair. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.\nBrown, William H. \"J58/SR-7 l Propulsion Integration.\" Studies in\nIntelligence 26 (Summer 1982): pp. 17-18 (Unclassified).\nBrugioni, Dino. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I, 29 August-16\nOctober 1962. DDS&T Historical Series, NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC,\n1971) (Secret).\nBurrows, William E. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National\nSecurity. New York: Random House, 1987.\n\"Can Soviets Take the Air Lead? What LeMay, Wilson, Ike Say.\" US\nNews and World Report, 11 May 1956, pp. I 08-114.\nChronology of the Office of Special Activities, 1954-1968. (CIA:\nDS&T, 1969) (Top Secret Codeword).\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 361,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p361.jpg",
   "text": "348\nSeerct NOFORN\nBibliography\nSee1ct\nCoughlin, William. \"Gardner Defends Greater R&D Spending.\"\nAviation Week, 26 September 1955, p. 14.\nEastman, Ford. \"Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag.\" Aviation\nWeek, 9 February 1959, pp. 26-27.\nEdwards, Philip K. \"The President's Board: 1956-60.\" Studies in\nIntelligence 13 (Summer 1969): p. 118 (Secret).\nEisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, NY:\nDoubleday, 1965.\nFreedman, Lawrence. US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.\n2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 986.\nGeorge, A. L. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights,\n1930-/953. Rand Study RM-1349. Santa Monica: Rand, 1955\n(Secret).\nThe Defector Reception\n~------,------------c---,--~~\nCenter Germany. /951 to 1967. Clandestine Service Historical\nSeries CSHP-41. CIA: History Staff, 1972 (Secret).\nHotz, Robert. \"Firing of 900-Mile Russian Missile Spurs US\nChanges.\" Aviation Week, 20 February 1956, pp. 26-28.\n---. \"Russian Air Force Now Gaining in Quality.\" Aviation\nWeek, 12 March 1956, pp. 286-291.\n---. \"Russian Jet Airpower Gains Fast on US.\" Aviation Week,\n23 May 1955, pp. 12-15.\n\"Is Russia Ahead in Missile Race?\" US News and World Report,\n6 September 1957, pp. 30-33.\n··rs Russia Really Ahead in Missile Race'?,. US News and World\nReport, 4 May 1956, pp. 34-35.\n\"ls Russia Winning the Arms Race?\" US News and World Report,\n18 June 1954, pp. 28-29.\n\"Is US Really Losing in the Air?\" US News and World Report,\n18 May 1956, pp. 25-27."
  },
  {
   "n": 362,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p362.jpg",
   "text": "349\nJohnson, Clarence L. \"Development of the Lockheed SR-71\nBlackbird . ., Studies in Intelligence 26 (Summer 1982): p. 4 (Un­\nclassified).\nJohnson, Clarence L. with Maggie Smith. Kelly: More Than My Share\nof It All. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985.\nKhrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament.\nBoston: Little, Brown, & Co., l 974.\nKillian, James R., Jr. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir\nof the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and\nTechnology. Cambridge: M[T Press, l 977.\nKistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge:\nHarvard University Press, l 976.\nKleyla, Helen H., and Robert D. O'Hern. History of the Office of\nSpecial Activities, DS& T I 6 vols. Directorate of Science and\nTechnology Historical Series OSA-1. CIA: DS&T, 1969 (Top\n-Secret Codeword).\nLay, James S. \"The United States Intelligence Board, 1958-1965.••\nCIA History Staff MS-2 (draft), 1974 (Top Secret Codeword).\nLicklider, Roy E. \"The Missile Gap Controversy.\" Political Science\nQuarterly 85 (1970): pp. 600-615.\nLinehan, Urban J. The National Photographic Interpretation Center.\nVol. l, Antecedents and Early Years. Directorate of Science and\nTechnology Historical Series NPIC-2. CIA: NPIC, 1972 (Secret).\n---. National Photographic Interpretation Center: The Years of\nProject HTAUTOMAT, 1956-1958. 6 vols. Directorate of Science\nand Technology Historical Series NPIC-3. CIA: NPIC, 1974\n(Secret).\nMiller, Jay. Lockheed U-2. Aerograph 3. Austin, Texas: Aerofax,\nl 983.\nMinnie~\nl'The OXCART Story.\" Studies in Intelligence\n15 ( mter 19/l): pp. 1-34 (Secret).\n\"Missiles Away.\" Time, 30 January 1956, pp. 52-55.\nSee, et NOFORN\nBibliography\n~eeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 363,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p363.jpg",
   "text": "350\nSec, et NOFORN\nBibliography\nieeFet\n\"Mystery of the RB-47.\" Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37.\n\"Nikita and the RB-47.'' Time, 25 July 1960, pp. 30-3 I.\n\"Office of Special Activities History, April 1969 to Phase-Out.\"\n(draft) (CIA: DS&T, 1974), chap. 3, pp. 36-42 (Top Secret\nCodeword).\nPero. Richard K. \"Message Received-Unfortunately.\" Studies in\nIntelligence 27 (Winter 1983): p. 29 (Secret).\nPocock, Chris. Dragon lady: The Histor_v of the U-2 Spyplane.\nShrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989.\nPowers, Francis Gary, with Curt Gentry. Operation Overflight. New\nYork: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson. 1970.\nPowers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and\nthe CIA. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.\nPrados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert\nOperations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986.\n---. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian\niHilitary Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982.\n~----____J Covert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary\nGovernment, 1957-/958. 2 vols. Clandestine Service Historical\nSeries, CSHP-53. CIA: History Staff, 1970 (Secret).\n\"Red Air Force: The World's Biggest.\" New.rn·eek, 23 August 1954,\npp. 28-33.\nRichelson, Jeffrey. American Espionage and the Soviet Target. New\nYork: William Morrow, 1987.\n\"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick':· Aviation Week, 28 June\n1954, p. 15.\nRusso, Andrew J. low-level Technical Reconnaissance over\nMainland China ( 1955-66). Clandestine Services Historical\nProgram, CSHP-2.348. CIA: History Staff, 1972 (Secret).\nStanley, Roy M., II. World War II Photo Intelligence. New York:\nScribners, 1981."
  },
  {
   "n": 364,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p364.jpg",
   "text": "351\nSturm, Thomas A. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First\nTwenty Years, 1944-1964. Washington, DC: USAF Historical\nOffice, 1967.\nTwining, Nathan F. Neither Liberty nor Safety. New York: Holt,\nRinehart & Winston, 1966.\nUnited States Air Force. Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report:\nProblems of Air Force\nIntelligence and Reconnaissance.\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June 1952 (Secret,\ndowngraded to Confidential).\nUnited States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee.\nExecutive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee\n( Historical Series), vol. 12, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, \"Report\non the U-2 Incident,\" 6 March 1962 (declassified 1982).\nUnited States Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study\nGovernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.\nForeign and Military Intelligence. Book l. Washington. DC: US\n• Government Printing Office, 1976.\nUnited States Office of Defense Mobilization. Science Advisory\nCommittee. Technological Capabilities Panel. Meeting the Threat\nof Surprise Attack, 14 February 1955. (Top Secret/Restricted Data,\ndowngraded to Secret).\n\"US Representations to the Soviet Government on C-130 Transport\nShot Down by Soviet Fighter Aircraft.\" US Department of State\nBulletin, 23 February 1959, pp. 262-27 l.\nWeber, Karl H. The Office of Scientific Intelligence, 1949-68.\nDirectorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSI- l.\nCIA: DS&T, 1972 (Top Secret Codeword).\nWelzenbach, Donald E.\n\"Observation Balloons and Weather\nSatellites.\" Studies in Intelligence 30 (Spring 1986): pp. 21-28\n(Secret).\nWhite, James J. \"Francis Gary Powers-The Unmaking of a Hero,\n1960-1965.\" (draft) CIA: History Staff, 1974 (Secret).\nWise, David and Thomas B. Ross. The U-2 Affair. New York:\nRandom House, 1962.\nSeeret PWFQR~\nBibliography\nSe«.Fet"
  },
  {
   "n": 365,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p365.jpg",
   "text": "352\nSecret PJOFORl:iJ\nBibliography\nWitze, Claude. \"Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining\nWarns Congress,\" Aviation Week, 27 February 1956, pp. 26-28.\n\"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake,\" Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 3, no.\n7, 16 February 85.\nInterviews and Speeches\nInterview with Robert Amory, Jr., by Donald E. Welzenbach and\nGregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 22 April 1987 (Secret).\nInterview with James G. Baker by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington, DC, 24 April 1985 (Secret).\nSpeech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October\n1965 (Top Secret Codeword).\nInterview with Joseph V. Charyk by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington, DC, 5 December 1984 (Top Secret Codeword).\nInterview with fonner U-2 pilots James Cherbonneaux, Cannine Vito,\nand Hervey Stockman, by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington,\nDC, May 1986 (Secret).\nInterview with James A. Cunningham, Jr., by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington, DC, 4 October 1983 (Top Secret Codeword).\nInterview with Allen F. Donovan by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona\nde! Mar, California, 20 May 1985 (Secret).\nInterview with Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary, USAF (Ret.), by Donald E.\nWelzenbach, 3 April 1986 (Secret).\nInterview with Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster by Donald E. Welzenbach\nand Gregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 8 July 1987 (Secret).\nSpeech by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Halloran (fonner Air Force U-2 pilot)\nat the National Air & Space Museum, 24 April 1986 (Unclassified).\nInterview with James R. Killian, Jr. by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nCambridge, Massachusetts, 2 November 1984 (Secret).\nInterview with Edwin H. Land by Donald E. Welzenbach, Cambridge,\nMassachusetts, 17 and 20 September 1984 (Top Secret Codeword).\n-&ec,er"
  },
  {
   "n": 366,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p366.jpg",
   "text": ".\n353\nInterview with Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. USAF (Ret.), by Gr,egory\nW. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 20 February 1987 (Secret).\nInterview with Richard S. Leghorn by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington. DC, 19 August 1985 (Secret).\nInterview with Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni by Don2tld E.\nWelzenbach, Washington. DC, 14 December 1983 (Top Secret\nCodeword).\nInterview with Garrison Norton by Donald E. Welzenbach,\nWashington, DC, 23 May 1983 (Secret).\nInterview with John Parangosky by Donald E. Welzenbach. 6 March\n1986 (Secret).\nInterview with James Q. Reber by Donald E. Welzenbach and\nGregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 21 May 1987 (Secret).\n. J1_1terview with Carmine Vito by Don~ld E. Welzenbach, Washington,\nDC, 7 May 1986 (Secret).\nInterview with John S. Warner, Office of the General Counsel, by\nDonald E. Welzenbach, Washington. DC, 5 August 1983 (Top\nSecret Codeword).\niearet NOFORN\nBibliography\n&ea,at"
  },
  {
   "n": 367,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p367.jpg",
   "text": ":.. ·.\n.•.\n' .."
  },
  {
   "n": 368,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p368.jpg",
   "text": "355\nSeeret NOFORN\nIndex\nA\nA-I camera\n50\nA-2 aircraft\n262-263\nA-2 camera\n53, 77. 100, 104-105. 108\nA-3 aircraft\n263\nA-II\n268. 294\nA-12\n271, 273-274, 277-278. 28 I,\n283-286. 289-292. 294-297, 299.\n302-305. 307-311, 329\nAbel. Rudolf\n183, 332\nAd Hoc Requirements Committee\n81. 114, 188-189, 332\nAdana. Turkey\n113\nAde11auer. Konrad\n-\n101\nAdkins. Charles N.\n342\nAdministration (East) Building\n42\nadvanced antiballistic-missile (ABM)\n139\naerial cameras\n13, 31. 49. 329\naerial lenses\n327\naerial photography\n3. 13, 33. 49, 96, 119\naerial tankers\n313\naerodynamic lift\n248. 277\naerodynamic structural tests\n274\naerodynamicist\n342\nAerospace Corporation\n328\nAfghanistan\n126. 170. 176. 189\nafterburner plume\n271\nailerons\n47, 69\nAir Research and\nDevelopment Command\n5. 8\nAir Staff for Intelligence\n154\nAir Weather Service\n89. 94\nair-cooled reactor\n239\nair-inlet system\n291\nair-to-air missiles\n285,336\nair-traffic controllers\n72-73. 289\nAir/Maritime Division (AMO)\n73\naircraft carrier\n145, 247, 250\nairfields\n82, 95-96, 105. 117. 153. 216,\n221,226,317\nairframe\n5, 8. 10. 24, 26. 48. 56, 71,\n105. 132-133, 248. 259. 274, 279.\n286. 289\nairframe contractors\n259\nairspace\n3-4, 19. 127. 134. 142. 144-147.\n152-153. 182. 231. 239,241,\n303. 306. 318. 322\nairspeed\nI\n6& 16 I gg ?35 .,.,\nAlaska\n133-134. 145. 316\nSec,et\"\""
  },
  {
   "n": 369,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p369.jpg",
   "text": "356\niieeret NOFOAN\nIndex\nAlbania\n140, 157\nAlbuquerque, New Mexico\n74, 78-79\nAllen, Edward L.\n21\nAlmaza Airbase, Egypt\n119\naltimeters\n59-60\naltitude\nI, 4-6, 7, 8-11, 12, 13-19, 22-26,\n33-35, 39, 46-47, 49, 52, 54-55, 59,\n61-64, 71-72, 74, 76, 79-80, 84, 87,\n89. 93-94, 97, 101, 108, 125, 132,\n142, 145, 148-149, 152, 156-157, 168,\n175-179, 185,207, 217-219, 229. 235,\n240-241, 246-247, 251, 254, 259-260,\n262, 263, 267, 268, 273, 277, 278-279,\n284,286,288,292,294, 296-297, 304,\n312-313, 320, 330, 339, 340, 343\naluminum\n271\nAmbon Island\n214\nAmerican Civil War\nI\nAmory, Robert\n114\nAnderson, Rudolph\n210\nAndaya, Norway\n172\n\"Angel\",\n45, 50, 66,262\nAnglo-French bombing campaign\n117\nAnglo-Soviet relations\n94\nAnkara, Turkey\n135, 178\nantiaircraft missile\n168\nantiaircraft weapons\n93, 148\nantiballistic missile system\n298,303\nantiradar studies\n267,274\nApollo VII\n254\nApplied Physics Division\n339\nAQUATONE\n40-43, 59. 62, 66, 74, 77, 82, 88,\n93, 96, 100, 108, 113, 115,\n122, 134, 155\nAQUILA\n341\nAQUILINE\n304, 339-343\nArabs\n256\nAral Sea\n135\nArbenz, Jacobo\n16\n\"Archangel-I\"\n262\n\"Archangel-2\"\n262\nArea 51,\n56. 72. 74-75, 77-78, 130-131,\n133. 274, 283-284, 286, 291.\n303, 305. 341\nArizona\n80\nArkansas\n78\nArmenia\n124. 144. 146\narms limitation negotiations\n147\narms race\n318\nArmy Air Corps\n21. 56\nArmy Air Force\n50,328,330\narticle 121\n286, 288\narticle 126\n296\narticle 133\n296\narticle 341\n66. 71, 131-132\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 370,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p370.jpg",
   "text": "357\narticle 345A\n79\narticle 346\n80\narticle 347\n104\narticle 349\n219\narticle 354\n80\narticle 357\n80\narticle 360\n175,217\narticle number\n59\narticles\n20, 59, 99,216\nAshford, Douglas E.\n30\nAsia\n135, 190,198,211,216,221,\n230,233, 300-301, 310,319\nAsian Photographic Interpretation\n229\naspheric lens\n53\nASPIC\n229\nAswan Dam\n112\natmosphere\n278, 25, 152, 182,215\natmospheric testing\n147\natomic bomb\n19\nAtomic Energy Commission\n56, 133, 182, 241-242, 274\natomic energy facilities\n233\nATR (Air Transport Rating)\n187\nAtsugi, Japan\n134, 215, 218\nautopilot\n76, 341-342\nAviation Week\n216\nAXILLARY\n342\nAyer, Frederick, Jr.\n14-15, 36,327\nB\nB model camera\n53\nB-17 bomber\n222\nB-26 bomber\n214\nB-36 bomber\n22, 50\nB-47 bomber\n72\nB-52 bomber\n20, 111, 291, 3 12\nB-57 bomber\n5, 8-9, 13, 15, 24, 35, 72\nB-58 bomber\n262, 269-270, 273\nB-58 \"Hustler\" bomber\n262\nB-58A bomber\n269\nB-588 \"Super Hustler\"\n262\nB-58B bomber\n263. 269\nB-70 bomber\n279. 293\nBACKFIN\n167\n\"badlands\"\n71\nBaikal, Lake\n128\nBaird. Walter\n56\nBaird Associates\n56\nBaker, James G.\n18, 21-25, 29-31. 46, 50-56,\n108,253,282.327, 332-333\nBalkhash, Lake\n138, 139\nballistic missiles\n2,201,206,299,318\nSee1et NOF8RN\nIndex\nSaeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 371,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p371.jpg",
   "text": "358\n&ee,et NQFQRN\nIndex\nBaltic Sea\n3, 303\nBaltic states\n104\nBaltimore; Maryland\n6, 9\nBarents Sea\n140, 142, 172\nBamesi~rcv\nbarrel roll,.._s____,\n76\nBatlin, Alex\n66\nBay of Bengal\n231\nBay of Pigs\n191. 197-199, 205\nBaykonur. Soviet Union\n137\nBeacon Hill\n17-19. 21. 24, 31-32. 331-33'.!\nBEACON HILL Report\n17. 19. 21. 24\nBEACON HILL Study Group\n18, 21\nBeechcraft\n56. 187\nBeerli. Stanley W.\nI9'.?. 196\nBeijing, China (see Peiping. China)\n228-229\nBell Aircraft Corporation\n9\nBell Laboratories\n18\nBell Telephone Laboratories\n29\n\"bends\"\n64\nBennington. Herbert\n309\nBenton, William\n299\nBerezovskiy. Soviet Union\n138\nBerlin, Gennany\n16. 20. 127, 147, 162. 183. 196\nBerlin crisis\n147, 196\nBGMARQUE\n222\nbhangmeter\n240\nBIRDWATCHER\n235\nBison bomber\n20-21. 27, 31, 98. 105. 111\nBissell. Richard M .. Jr.\n15- 16. 30. 39-41. -B-44. 56. 59.\n61. 66, 69-70. n, 74, 78, 81-82. 89,\n93, 95. 100-101. 104-106, 109-110,\n121-122. 124. 127-128. 135. 139. 148..\n154-1 57. 162. 168. 170. 172. 174, 178-179.\n187. 191-192. 196. 214. 216. 224, 259-260,\n262-263. 267. 277-278. 283. 285, 286-287.\n289, 295. 327. 328-329, 330-331\nBissell's Narrow-Gauge Airline\n72\n\"black books\"\n188\n\"black\" contracts\n285\nBL ACK KNIGHT\n126. 134\nBlack Sea\n85. 126. 133. 1-1-l. 153\nBLACK SHIELD\n301\nBlip/Scan Racio\n267-268\nBLUE BOOK\n72-73\nBoard of Inquiry\n184\nBodo AFB. Norway\n142. 172. 176- 177\nBoeing RB-47\n3\nBoeing KC-1 35\n7 1\nbomb damage\n49\nbomber\n2-3. 5. 20-23. 26. 31. so, 66, 98, 105.\n109. 111. 140. 167, 214. 262-263.\n269. 279, 293. 316-317\nBomber Gap\n31.111.316"
  },
  {
   "n": 372,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p372.jpg",
   "text": "359\nborax\n121\nBoston, Massachusetts\n13. IS. 22. 24, 27. 52. 56.\n110. 260\nBoston camera\n13\nBoston University\n22. 24. 52\nBowles. Chester\n225\nBrahmaputra Valky\n231\nbridges\n82\nBriggs School\n42\nBriglia. FrJnk\n339\nBritish and French fleets\n116\nBritish Guiana\n211\nBritish Guiana-Venezuela border\n211\nBritish overflight of the Soviet Union\n. . . • 23-24. I€H\nBritish Parliament\n94. 232\nBritish radar network\n9-1\nBrugioni. Dino\n135. 137\nBudapest. Hungary\n123\nBudget. Bureau of the\n267. 308-310\nBudget. Direcwr of the\n40\nBuffalo. New York\n9. 63\nBulganin. Nikolai\n94, 120\nBulgaria\n10 1. 124- 125. 1-W\nBundy. McGeorge\n188. 201. 205. 209. 236. 293\nBUORL\n22\nBurbank. California\n45\n&eeret NOFe\"N\nIndex\nBurke. William\n168 120 114\nByeloruss1a\n104. 106\nc _ _ _________\nC model camera\n54\nC- 118 aircra ft\n144\nC-1 24 cargo planes\n66. 135. 181. 219\nCabell. Charles P.\n30. 36. 43. ,88. IO I. 122-123. 127.\n139. 183. 223. 295. 327, 329\nCairo. Egypt\n117. 119\nCalcutta. India\n232\nCalifornia\n9. 13, 24. 26. 36, 45. 50. 54. 56.\n• 133. 182. 198. 200. 208. 22 1. 247.\n251-252. 254-256. 295. 311. 3-10\nCalifornia Institute of Technology\n26\nCambodia\n216. 230. 243\ncamera lenscs\n93\ncamera technicians\n78\ncamera-carrying balloons\n14. 18. 23. 84, 145\ncameras\nI. 3-4, 12-13. 21-22. 3I. 44, 49-51.\nS3-55. 60. 77. 87. 196. 244. 281-282.\n310,313.321. 327. 329. 332. 333\nCanberra\n5. 9. 23-24. 67. 109. 117, 162\nCannon. Clarence\n88\nCapp, A l\n45\ncardiovascular system\n62\nliaewet"
  },
  {
   "n": 373,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p373.jpg",
   "text": "360\nSec, et NOFORN\nIndex\nCarey, Howard\n80, 140\nCarter, John H. (Jack)\n9-10\nCarter, Marshall S.\n186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327\nCaspian Sea\n126\ncatheterized\n64\ncathode-ray tube\n267\nCaucasus Mountains\n179\ncelestial \"fixes\"\n76\nCentral Asia\n135\nCentral Asian republics\n176\nCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA)\n29, 32, 59\nAir Force competition\n308\nair operations\n157, 191\nGeneral Counsel\n44\nInspector General\n190\nproprietary\n260, 129\nproprietary firm\n110, 129, 222, 260\nU-2 program\n257, 181\ncentrifugal force\n177\nCHALICE\n155, 170, 182\nChamoun. Camille\n152\nChance Vought Corporation\n8\nCh'ang-sha, China\n228\nChapman, Robert\n238\nCharbatia. India\n232-233, 237, 239\nCharyk, Joseph V.\n260, 327-328\nChekiang Province\n235\nChelyabinsk, Soviet Union\n176\nCherbonneaux, James\n127, 138, 214\nChiang Ching-kuo\n224\nChiang Kai-shek\n224\nChiang-yu. China\n228\nChicago Daily Tribune\n132\nChief of Station for Germany\nIOI\nChief of Station in Taipei\n224\nChief of the German General Staff\nI\n\"chimney\"\n71\nChina\n5, 85, 135, 148, 157, 174, 190, 201,\n211, 215-217, 219. 221-222. 224-226.\n228-233. 235-237, 239-240, 242-243,\n245, 247, 253. 282. 301. 305, 307, 319.\n336. 339-341. 343.\nSee also Nationalist China and\nPeople's Republic of China (PRC)\nChina Lake, California\n340\nchine\n277\nChinese Communist nuclear tests\n240\nChinese mainland\n319. 215,222.226\nChinese nuclear reactors\n238\nChinese nuclear test\n237\nChrist, David L.\n339\nChristian Science Monitor\n18\nCivil Air Transport\n214, 222\ncivilian supersonic transport (SST)\n293\nSecact"
  },
  {
   "n": 374,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p374.jpg",
   "text": "361\nCL-282 Project\n10-17, 24-27, 29-37, 66. 327-331. 333\nCL-400 aircraft\n263\nclandestine operations\n16,321\nClandestine Services\n192\nClark Airfield. Philippines\n212\nClifford, Clark\n311\nCline, Ray\n209. 224\n\"coffin comer\"\n76\nCold War\n17\ncollection requirements\n80-81, 189. 253, 300\nColumbia Broadcasting System\n18\ncombat aircraft\n6. 26. 45\nCombined Shipping Adjustmenc Board\n15\nCommerce. Depanment of\n254\ncommercial airliners\n72\ncommunications intelligence (COMINT)\n189. 311. 335-336\nCommunications Satellite Corporation\n328\nCOMPASS TRIP\n254\ncompetitive bidding\n44\ncompressor vanes\n291\ncomputer-controlled radar\n294\ncomputers\n52\nCongress, United States\n44, 88, 98, 111. 159-160. 170, 293,\n315, 317-3 18\nconstant-velocity film transport\n281\nConstellation airliner\nIO. 329\nContingency Reserve Fund\n40,44\nSecret NOFORN\nIndex\ncontractors\n42, 72. 259. 288\ncontrails\n152\nConvair\n262-263. 267-271. 273. 284. 312\nConvair F- 106\n284\nconvective clouds\n94\nCornell Aeronautical Laboratory\n18. 24-25. 328\nCorning Glass Works\n282\ncosmic-ray effects\n94\ncover officer\n89\ncoven activities\n2. 6, 40. 43-44. 73. 80. 88. 134.\n157, 189. 191-192. 212. 214.\n222. 320-321. 328. 342\nCovert Action Staff (CAS)\n214\ncovert funding\n43\nCrabb. Lionel\n,94\nCrete\n116\nCrick. Alan\n154\nCrick Commiuee\n154\nCrimean Peninsula\n108\nCuba\n188. 197-201. 205-211. 299-300.\n302. 310. 327. 339\nCuban air and ground order of battle\n198\nCuban Missile Crisis\n55. 199. 209-210. 299. 327\nCubi Point Naval Air Station. Philippines\n212. 216. 221\nCulbertson. Allma.n T.\n66\nCunningham. James A .. Jr.\n40. 66. 69. 72. 78-i9. 125. 247.\n288-289. 328-329\nCurrent Intelligence. Office of\n81\n~eoret"
  },
  {
   "n": 375,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p375.jpg",
   "text": "362\nSecret rllOFOAN\nIndex\nCurtiss-Wright Corporation\n328\nCzechoslovakia\nIOI\nD ________\nD-21 aircraft\n291\nDalai Lama\n216\nDallas. Texas\n293\nDamage Assessment Team\n183\nDavid Clark Company\n62\nDavis, Saville\n18\nDayton. Ohio\n4. 8\nDC-6 aircraft\n341\ndeep penetration overflights\n316. 123\nDefector Reception Center (DRC)\n\")\ndefectors\nDefense. Department of\n33. 61. 122. 145, 154, 161. 234,\n236-237, 239, 267, 292-293. 301-302.\n304. 310. 317\nDefense. Deputy Secretary of\n81, 127, 144. 161, 188, 207. 300. 309\nDefense. Secretary of\n161. 298\nDefense Mobilization, Office of\n17, 26\nScience Advisory Committee\n37\nDel Rio, Texas\n256, 198\nDelta-rI camera\n250\ndenied territory\n174, 188. 190\nDeputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)\n30. 36. 43. 327,329.88. 101, 122-123.\n127, 139, 186-187, 201, 208-209, 223\nDetachment A\n94-95, !00-101, 106. 114, 116, 124-125,\n139-140, 142-143, 181,316\nDetachment B\n113, 116, 120-121, 124-126, 133,\n135, 139, 142-143. 152-153, 155-157.\n164, 167, 181-182. 187. 316\nDetachment C\n133-134, 139, 143-144, 152, 157,\n182, 211-212. 214-220. 224. 316\nDetachment G\n133. 181-182. 198-199. 211. 221-222.\n230-233. 243. 248, 250-251, 254-257\nDetachment H\n225-226, 228-230. 232-237. 239-241,\n243-246, 250-251, 255\nDevelopment. Deputy Chief of Staff for\n7. 11. 17. 35\nDevelopment Planning. Office of\n12\nDevelopment Projects Division (DPD)\n157. 191\nDevelopment Projects Staff\n40. 55-56, 132. 157, 191. 212,331\nDirty-Birds\n128. 130. 135\nDonovan. Allen F.\n18. 21. 24-26. 29-31, 35. 260. 328\nDonovan. James\n183\nDoolittle, James H.\n61. 167. 328\nDouglas Aircraft\n339\nDRAGON\n2\nDRAGON LADY\n77\ndrivers\n59\ndrone\n291. 343\nDryden. Hugh\n89, 182\nDuBridge, Lee\n26-27\n8ecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 376,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p376.jpg",
   "text": "363\nSeeret PdOF6PU'<J\nDulles. Allen\n16-17, 30, 32-37, 39-40, 43-44, 56,\n60, 73, 76, 80, 82, 86, 88, 93, 95, 97.\n105-106, 109-111, 117. 120, 124, 127,\n154, 161-162, 164-165, 167, 170, 180,\n184, 189, 191,214, 223-224, 260, 263,\n295. 316-318. 327-328\nDulles, John Foster\n20, 86, 109, 117, 122-123, 126\ndummy corporations\n44\nDunaway, Glendon\n65\nE\nEarman, J. S.\n206\nearth's atmosphere\n278\nEast Berlin riots of June 1953\n16\nEast Germany\n100-101, 142, 147,183,303\nEastern Europe\n-\n2, 84. 88-89. 100-101, 106. I IO.\n123-124, 126-127, 139-140. 142,\n144. 304. 316\nEastman Kodak\n4, 31-32\neavesdropping\n2\nEBONY\n222\nEden. Anthony\n93-95\nEdens, Buster\n135\nEdgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G)\n130, 274\nEdwards AFB. California\n133, 149, 181. 198. 200,211,230\nEielson AFB. Alaska\n133-134\nEisenhower, Dwight D.\nI9, 26-27, 33-37, 39, 44, 56. 60. 73,\n85-86. 88. 94-101, 104-106, 109-110,\n112. 114, 116-117, l19-120.122-124,\n126-129, 135, 139, 143-147, 152-156,\nIndex\n159-164. 167-168, 170-172, 180-181,\n187, 191-192, 195. 211-212, 214. 221,\n224, 263, 267, 270. 277, 297, 315-317,\n322. 328-330\nelectromagnetic energy\n335\nelectromagnetic pulse indicator\n240\nelectronic countermeasures (ECM)\n207. 239,304.313, 317, 335-336\nelectronic intelligence (ELINT)\nI14. 126, 144. 146, 153, 162-163.\n175. 182, 215, 242. 244, 303, 335\nelectronic intercept\n126,317\nelectronic sensors\n292\nelectronic warfare\n300\nELINT collection\n142, 339\nELINT emanations\n304\nELINT-collection gear\n310\nELINT-collection unit (System VI)\n170\nEmergency Preparedness, Office of\n254\nengine nacelles\n291\nengineers\n9-10. 12. 17. 25. 43. 45. 55. 61.\n71. 255,260,269.286. 339,343\nEnglish Electric Company\n5, 23\nepoxy resin\n277. 289\nEQUINE\n82\nEricson, Robert J.\n80\nespionage\nI\nEstonia\n303. 339\nEurasian landmass\n145\nEurope\n2, 4, 20. 23, 84-85. 88-89, 93. 100-101.\n106, 110. 115, 123-124, 126-127, 139-140.\n142. 144, 148, 178,255,304,316.330\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 377,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p377.jpg",
   "text": "6ec1 el NOFORN\nIndex\n364\nEvang, Vilhelm\n142\nEVEN STEVEN\n256\nExecutive Branch\n109\nexotic fuels\n263\nF\nF-100 fighter\n71\nF- I02 fighter\n270\nF- I 04 fighter\n10-1 I, 45, 329\nF- I06 fighter\n270, 284\nF- I08A Rapier\n285\nF-111 tighter\n312\nFairbanks. Alaska\n134\n-\nFairchild K-19 aircraft\n49\nFAN SONG acquisition radar\n234\nFar East\n3, 110, 133-134. 140, 144. 190,\n197. 201. 216. 224, 233-234. 242-243.\n301,305.316. 320, 332.\n\"Fast Move\" operations\n216\nFederal Aviation Administrator\n289\nFederal procurement cycle\n44\n\"ferret\" equipment\n3, 335\nferret flights\n123\nFFD-1\n238\nFFD-2\n238-239\nFFD-4,\n282. 238\nFICON\n22\nField Activities, Deputy for\n192\n5412 Committee\n188, 226\nfighter\n4, I 0, 14, 22. 66, 74-75. I 08, I 24,\n146, 177. 182. 201. 214,312,317,\n328-329\nfighter conversion\n22\nFili airframe plant\n105\nfillets\n277, 288-289\nfilm\nI. 31-32, 49. 51-53, 55. 60, 100.\n108, 114-115. 119-121. 145,153,179,\n209, 215, 218. 221-222, 226. 235-236,\n239,241,247, 249-250. 254, 281-282.\n306, 310-311. 316. 330\nfilm processing\n60, 121. 247\nfilm-transport system\n55\nFirewel Company\n63\nFirst Weather Reconnaissance Squadron,\nProvisional (WRSP-1)\n94\nFischer, C. W.\n309\nFISH\n250. 263. 268-269, 312\nFISH HAWK\n249-250\nFlickinger, Donald D.\n62\nFLIPTOP\n198\n\"Flit\"\n62\nFlorida\n198\nflying boat\n270\nfocal-length cameras\n13\nfocal-length lenses\n51\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 378,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p378.jpg",
   "text": "365\nFollow-On Group (FOG)\n77\nFord Foundation\n15\nForeign Intelligence Advisory Board\n192,226,292,302,330\nforest fire detectors\n238\nFormosa\n305 (See also Taiwan)\nFort Worth, Texas\n50\n40 Committee\n188, 257\nforward processing center\n212\nFoster, John\n343\nFrance\n113, 116-117, 120,201,249\nFranco-Prussian War\nI\nFrankfurt, Germany\n2\nFree Europe Committee\n88\nFrench atomic test area\n250\nFrench Indochina\n222\nFrench Mediterranean\n116\nFrench Mystere\n116\nFrench nuclear developments\n249\nFrench Polynesia\n249\nFrogman Incident\n94\nFujisawa, Japan\n218\nFukien Province\n226, 229\nG\nG-forces\n79\nG2A aircraft\n263\nGalbraith, John Kenneth\n231-232\nGardner, Trevor N.\n11, 13-15, 26-27, 32, 36, 40,\n66, 81, 99,327,329,331\nGates, Thomas\n164\nGaza Strip\n114\nGeary, Leo P.\n61, 66, 71, 73-74. 78, 152,\n186, 196, 288, 329\nGeneral Dynamics\n312\nGeneral Electric 173/GE-3\n11\nGeneral Tire and Rubber Company\n329\nGENETRIX\n84-85, 87-88\nGeneva, Switzerland\n96, 147, 159\nGeneva Conference on Surprise Attack\n159\nGeneva summit conference\n96\ngeological survey\n254-255\nGerman Luftwaffe\n22\nGerman scientists\n2\nGettysburg, Pennsylvania\n120\nGibbs. Jack A.\n61, 259-260\nGiebelstadt Airbase, West Germany\n95, 124, 140\nGilpatric, Roswell\n207-208\nGlennan. Keith\n182\ngliders\nII\nGlienecke Bridge\n183\nGlobke. Hans\n101\nGoddard, George\n330\nSec,et NOFOAN\nIndex\nieeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 379,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p379.jpg",
   "text": "366\nSec, el \"10FOAl\\i\nIndex\nGoering, Hermann\n66\nGoldmark, Peter C.\n18\ngolf balls\n-\n50\nGoodpaster. Andrew J.\n89. 97. 100. 105-106. 109, 120. 126\n128, 144. 146. 167. 172,187,329\nGrace. Frank G.\n80\nGRANDSLAM\n170. 172. 174-175\nGranger Company\n336\nGRC-127\n205\nGreat Britain\n3. 7, 23. 93-95. 112-113. 115. 117.\n120. 153-156. 181. 303. 319\nAir Ministry\n94. 155\ncounterintelligence operative\n94\n­\nGreyhoun<I bus\n289\nGroom Lake\n56. 66. 133\nGroton\n15\n!!round resolution\n-\n281-282. 250\nGuatemala\n.\n157\n\"guided democracy\"\n212\nGulf Coast\n254\nGulf of Finland\n142\nGulf of Tonkin Resolution\n231\n2ust control\n-\n47\nGUSTO\n274\nH\nH camera\n244. 247. 253. 256. 282\nHagerstown, Maryland\n9\nHaiphong Harbor\n247\nH:ilaby. Najeeb E.\n289\nHall. Wiliam\n117. 119. 143\nHaller-Raymond-Brown (HRS)\n335\n\"handing off'\n87\n[__\n\"hanger queen\"\n175\nHarvard University\n18. 21-22. 29, 50-51. 327. 129\n!Harvard College Observatory\n21\nIHawk-750 glider kit\n342\nhaze filters\n105\nIHBJARGON\n175-176\nIHBJGO\n176\nheavy water\n19\nHelms. Richard M.\n253. 256. 304-305, 309-310. 329\nHEN HOUSE\n168\nHEN ROOST installations\n168\nHener. Christian\n127. 163\n\"hiding in the open\"\n55\nhigh-acuity cameras\n2 1, 50-51. 327\nhigh-altitude air sampling (HASP)\n219\nhi!!h-altitude aircraft\n-\n4. 8. 16. 24. 59. 148. 304\n..Seecet"
  },
  {
   "n": 380,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p380.jpg",
   "text": "367\nhigh-altitude balloon program\n22\nhigh-altitude photography\nI, 55, 84\nhigh-altitude photoreconnaissance\n7\nhigh-altitude reconnaissance\nI, 4-5, 8-9, 13-14, 17, 19, 22-25,\n33-34, 39, 49, 52, 55, 254, 262,\n292, 312, 330\nhigh-altitude weather plane\n178\nhigh-impact plastics\n313\nhigh-resolution cameras\n4\nhigh-resolution infrared scanner\n238\nhigh-speed buffet\n76\nhigh-speed reconnaissance aircraft\n262-263, 270\nHIGH WIRE\n164\nHitsman, Roger\n209\nHitchcock, Alfred\n29\nHokkaido, Japan\n4\nHolcomb. William\n285\nHollywood, California\n29\nHong Kong\n217\nHoover, Herbert, Jr.\n123-124\nhorizontal stabilizers\n47\nHorner, Richard\n70\nHornig, Donald F.\n309\nHOT SHOP\n162\nHouston, Lawrence R.\n44\nHR-333 camera\n253\nHRB-Singer Corporation\n336\nHTAUTOMAT\n83,115,331\nHTNAMABLE\nl l0-111\nhuman intelligence sources\n2\nHungarian uprising\n123\nHungary\n101, 123\nHurricane Baseline Survey\n254\nHycon Manufacturing Company\n13, 50. 252\nhydraulic fluid\n279\nhydraulic pump\n279\nhydrogen bomb\n19-20, 242\nhydrogen weapons\n164\nhydrogen-powered aircraft\n263\nhydrologists\n254\nI\nIBM CPC (card-programmed calculator)\n52\nIDEALIST\n182. 210. 234, 303\nIDEALIST U-2\n303\nlgarka, Soviet Union\n3\nileitis\n96\nimagery\n116, 179. 252-253, 255-256, 282,\n298. 303,310\nimpeller\n291\n\"in-and-out\" operations\n205\nin-flight refueling\n198-200, 237, 302\nSec, et NOFORN\nIndex\n.$eeret="
  },
  {
   "n": 381,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p381.jpg",
   "text": "368\nSec1 et NOFORN\nIndex\nlncirlik Airbase, Turkey\n113, 181\nIndia\n148, 231-232, 237, 247, 319\nIndian Parliament\n232\nIndian Springs, Nevada\n274. 130, 132\nIndonesia\n211-212, 214,319\nIndonesian Air Force\n212\ninertial guidance systems\n313\ninflatable aircraft\n262\ninfrared camera\n282\ninfrared jammer\n336\ninfrared scanner\n238-239\ninland waterways\n82\ninstant-film camera\n330\nintelligence. collection of\n16, 31-32. 80-81, 142. 146. 153.\n162. 170, I 82. 189. 211, 245. 253,\n256. 282. 300,303.310. 315. 319.\n322. 333. 336, 339\nIntelligence and Research. Bureau of\n209\nintelligence community\n2. 20. 33, 81. 138, 153, 160. 164-165.\n170-171, 190. 196, 232-233, 254, 298.\n303-304, 322. 339\nIntelligence Coordination, Office of\n81\nintelligence requirements\n25-26, 80-82, 114, 122, 154, 188-190,\n226. 230,233.250, 253,300,332\nIntelligence Requirements Officer\n81\nIntelligence Star\n186\nIntelligence Systems Panel (ISP)\n21-22, 24-26, 30-32. 35, 327\nintercept\n87. 108, 124, 126-127, 142, 148,\n162. 168, 170. 174, 176-177. 259,\n285,317.335\ninterceptor aircraft\n93. 109, 124, 148, 176\nintercontinental ballistic missile\n137. 159\nInterior, Department of the\n254\ninternational date line\n134\nInternational Geophysical Year\n85\ninternational law\n110\ninterrogation\n2-3. 183, 241\nintruder\n109\n\"invisible\" dirigible\n18\nion cloud\n300\nionosphere\n175\nIran\n124. 133. 189\nIraq\n133. 153\nIron Curtain\nI. 17. 93. 95. Ill. 126. 146\nISINGLASS\n312\nIsle of Pines\n205\nIsrael\n113-114. 116-117, 120, 343\nIsraeli paratroop\n117\nIsraeli-Egyptian conflict\n257. 117\nIsraeli-Syrian disengagement\n257\nItek Corporation\n331. 250\nIX spaceflights\n254\nSecaet"
  },
  {
   "n": 382,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p382.jpg",
   "text": "369\nJ\nJ-3 (Operations)\n189\n175 power plant\n152\njamming devices\n300\nJammu and Kashmir\n231\nJapanese airspace\n4\nJapanese Government\n134, 182, 221\njet stream\n94, 145\njet-propelled glider\nII, 25\nJohnson, Clarence L. (Kelly)\n10-12, 13-14, 17, 24-26, 29-31,\n34-36, 43-48, 50, 54, 56-57, 59,\n64, 66-70, 76, 108, 130, 132. 149.\n179. 185, 196, 247-248. 251, 262-263.\n268,271,274, 277-279, 281, 284. 289,\n293-297, 320, 329\nJohnson. Lyndon B.\n195. 236-237, 243, 293-295. 302.\n304-305, 310-311, 332\nJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)\n122, 124, 126, 161, 187-190, 223,\n234,302\nJoint Intelligence Committee\n154\nJoint Priorities Committee\n154\nJoint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)\n189\nJones,· Edwin K.\n138\nJordan\n117, 153\nJP-7 fuel\n62\n6eeret NOFOAN\nIndex\nK\nK-21 framing cameras\n49\nK-38 camera\n50-5 I, 53\nKadena Airbase, Okinawa, Japan\n301\nKaliningrad missile plant\n105\nKamchatka Peninsula\n128, 134, 197\nKandalaksha, Soviet Union\n176\nKapustin Yar, Soviet Union\n16, 23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164\nKara Sea\n142\nKazakh language\n135\nKazakhstan\n135\nKazan', Soviet Union\n167\nKC- I35 tankers\n71, 199\nKEDLOCK\n285\n\"Kelly's Angel\"\n66\nKEMPSTER\n300\nKennedy, John F.\n186, 191-192, 195-196, 198. 207-208,\n2 I0. 225, 229, 232, 235. 292-293,\n297-298, 330\nKennedy, Joseph W.\n29\nKennedy, Robert\n215\nKennedy administration\n191, 195, 225\nkerosene fuel\n62\nKhan, Ayub\n135\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 383,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p383.jpg",
   "text": "370\nSec, et NOFOAN\nIndex\nKhimki rocket-engine plant\n105\nKhrushchev, Nikita\n94, 96, I00-101, 147, 160, 163-164,\n168, 179-180, 299\nKiangsi Province\n235\nKiangsu Province\n229\nKICK OFF\n198\nKickapoo Joy Juice\n45\nKiefer, Eugene P.\n7, 9, II, 260, 330\nKillian, James R.\n27, 29-30, 33-34, 89, 100, 191-192,\n263, 292, 330\nKINGFISH\n270, 273\nKirkpatrick, Lyman B.\n190\nKirov, Soviet Union\n172,- T76\nKirtland AFB\n79\nKissinger, Henry\n256\nKistiakowsky, George\n171\nKlein, Burton\n11\nKlyuchi, Soviet Union\n134 143\nKNIFE E~E\n167\nKnowles, Harold F.\n344\nKohler, Foy D.\n112\nKoko Nor\n233\nKola Peninsula\n182\nKollman Instrument Company\n59\nKoon, Ralph E.\n79\nKorea, demilitarized zone (DMZ)\n305 (See also North Korea)\nKotlas, Soviet Union\n172\nKrag, Jens Otto\n299\nKratt, Jacob\n65, 79, I 16\nKremlin\n123\nKunming, China\n2\"6\nKuybyshev, Soviet Union\n164\nKWCORK\n113\nKWEXTRA-00\n59\nKWGLITTER-00\n59\nKyshtym, Soviet Union\n176\nL\nL'il Abner\n47\nL-pills\n66, 125\nLahore, Pakistan\n135\nLakenheath AFB, England\n93\nieeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 384,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p384.jpg",
   "text": "Land. Edwin H. (Din)\n18, 21, 25, 29-34, 36, 80-81, 89, 96,\n100. 110, 19 1-192, 260, 262-263, 269-27 1,\n292,307,330, 332-333\nLand Panel\n37\nLangley, Virginia\n43, 192, 306,\nLangley AFB. Virginia\n23\nLaos\n2 I 6, 22.1. 231. 233\nLas Vegas. Nevada\n284\nLatham, Allen. Jr.\n29\nLatvia\n303\nLaughlin AFB, Texas\n198,200\nLebanon\n114, 117, 152-153, 343\nLedford, Jack C.\n207, 288. 297\nLeghorn, Richard S.\n• - • 4-8. 18, 23. 110, 330\nLeMay, Curtis E.\n11-12. 14. 60\n\"Lemon-Drop l(jd\"\n124\nLend-Lease\n7\nLeningrad, Soviet Union\n104-106. 109, 142, 298. 303\nlens\nI. 18. 21-22, 30. 49-55, 93.\nI08. 250. 247. 253, 281-282.\n321, 327\nlens curvatures\n52\nlens designs\n52, 55\nLeVier. Tony\n56, 68-7 1, 75\nLF-lA fuel\n62\nLibya\n121\nSec, et NOFOftN\nIndex\n37 1\nlightweight film\n32\nLINCOLN\n18\nLindsey Air Force Base. Wiesbaden. West Gennany\n80\nliquid-fueled missiles\n161,317\nlithium deut,eride\n19\nLithuania\n303\nLittle, Arthur D., Inc.\n29\nLiule Quem1:ly\n215\nLloyd, Selwyn\n93\nLockheed A:ircraft Corporation\n9, 24, 329\nLockheed D:ay Fighter\n14\nLockheed m,echanics\n66, 13,0, 225\nLondon School of Economics\n. 15\nLONG GREEN\n198\nlong-range bombers\n20, 81. 98-99, 316\nLONG SHAFT\n245\nLop Nor test site\n237\nLos Angeles., California\n186, 254\nLovelace, W. Randolph, III\n62, 74\nLovelace Foundation for Medical\nEducation antd Research\n74\nlow-radar-cross-section vehicle\n344\nlow-level phmography\n209\nlow-vapor-pressure fuel\n278\nLuke AFB. Arizona\n74"
  },
  {
   "n": 385,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p385.jpg",
   "text": "372\nSeeret ~QlzOR~\nIndex\nLuna 2 rocket\n163\nLundahl, Arthur C.\n82, 114-115. 117,119,121,135,\n142, 154, 191,209,241, 331\nM\nM Building\n83\nM-12 aircraft\n291\nM-195 aircraft\n9\nMacArthur, John\n167\nMacdonald. Duncan E.\n22, 154-155\nMacmillan, Harold\n155-156, 164. 167, 187\nMalaya Sazanka, Soviet Union\n144\nMalinovsky, Rodion\n160\nMalta\n114, -116\nManchuria\n229. 233. 237\nMandrake\n148\nManhattan Project\n329\nManila, Philippines\n311\nmanned space program\n62\nMarch AFB, California\n75\nMark-30\n335\nMarquardt ramjets\n268\nMarr, William H.\n72\nMars\n7:\nMarsna1 Plan\n15,327\nMartin. Glenn L., Aircraft Corporation\n5, 8-9. 24, 270\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)\n4, 15, 18, 27, 30, 110, 129-130, 327,\n330, 332-333\nMatomic Building\n42, 104\nMATS\n72\nMatsu Islands\n229\nMay Day\n20. 176, 191. 195\nMC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits\n64\nMcConaughy, Walter P.\n257\nMcCone. John A.\n184-186, 192, 195, 197, 201, 206-207,\n209, 232-234, 236-238, 240, 292-294,\n296,298,300,327,331\nMcCoy, Frederick\n95\nMcCullough Corporation\n339\nMcDonnell Aircraft\n312\nMcElroy, Neil\n146, 161-162\nMcFadden. William\n54\nMcMahon, John N.\n186\nMcNamara, Robert\n229, 234, 236, 238, 253, 285, 292-293,\n298, 300-301\nmechanical fuel totalizer/counters\n68\nMediterranean Sea\n114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153\nmedium-range ballistic missiles\n201,206\nMelpar. Incorporated\n342\nMenderes. Adnan\n112, 181\nmercenary pilots\n214\nmetal fatigue\n242\nSHret"
  },
  {
   "n": 386,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p386.jpg",
   "text": "373\n~eeret NOFORN\nmeteorologists\n42, 87\nMI-6\n93, 154\nMichigan, University of, School of Aeronautics\n329\nmicrowave reconnaissance\n19\nMiddle East overflights\n114, 116\nMiG aircraft\n336\nMiG-15\n108, 148\nMiG-17\n5, 108, 148\nMiG-19\n148\nMiG-21\n148, 237, 244\nMilitary Adviser to the President\n188\nMilitary Air Transport Service\n72\nMILL TOWN\n216\n. Miller, Stewart E.\n18. 21. 39-40, 55-56, 331\nI\n\"million-dollar\" photography\nIll\nminiaturization\n339\nmirrors\n54-55\nMirza\n135\n\"missile gap\"\n157, 159,317\nmissiles\n2, 22, 81, 98-99, 137, 139, 149,\n160-161, 165, 167,171,201, 205-206,\n209, 226, 239, 243, 257, 285, 299, 301,\n303-304, 306-307, 315, 317-318, 336,339\nMississippi River\n78,310\nMKNAOMI\n66\nMonthly Activities Book\n189\nIndex\nmoon\n163\nMorotai\n214\nMoscow, Soviet Union\n3, 20. 85, 94, IOI, 105-106, 109,\n124, 143, 145, 160, 167, 177, 179,318\nMUDLARK\n178\nmultiengine aircraft\n12, 24-25\nmultiple sensors\n22\nMurmansk, Soviet Union\n_140, 142, 172, 174, 176\nMururoa Atoll\n250\nMyasishchev-4 (see Bison bomber)\nN\nNagy, lmre\n123\nNank.ing. China\n228\nNarcotics. Bureau of\n254-255\nNasser, Gama! Abdel\n112. 153\nNational Advisory Committee on Aeronautics\n89, 94\nNational Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA)\n178-179, 254\nNational Air & Space Museum\n64\nNational Intelligence Estimates\n19. 235\nnational intelligence objectives\n81\nNational Security Agency\n81,114,134,185,327\nNational Security Bureau\n224\nNational Security Council\n27, 294, 161, 167, 187-188, 191, 197, 212\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 387,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p387.jpg",
   "text": "SeoFet NOF6ftrq\nIndex\n374\nNational Security Council Intelligence\nDirective (NSCID)\n191\nNationalist China\n319,215,224,226,229,236\nNationalist Chinese\n201, 205, 222-226,\n229-230, 234-237, 239-240,\n243, 245-246, 253,257,319\nAir Force\n223,225\ninsignia\n225\npilots\n319,223,230,235,243,246,253\nU-2\n205, 223-224, 229, 246\nNavajo missile\n22\nNaval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan\n134\nnaval quarantine\n210\nNehru, Jawaharlal\n231~233\nNelson, Nonnan\n68\nNevada\n56-57, 341, 113, 130-131, 133, 149,\n182, 241, 274, 283, 286, 290, 295,\n297, 302-303, 31 I\nNevada Proving Ground\n56,241\nNew Delhi, India\n232\nNgo Dinh Diem\n230\nNICE GIRL\n310\nnickel-cadmium batteries\n240\nNile River\n119\nNIMBUS\n200\n1973 Middle East war\n256,320\n9th Tactical Air Force\n330\nnitrogen\n64\nNixon, Richard M.\n245-246, 256-257, 333\nNobel Prize\n332\nNorth American Air Defense\nCommand (NORAD)\n289\nNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization\n(NATO)\n20, 329, 87, 148, 172\nradars\n87\nNorth Island Naval Base, California\n248\nNorth Korea\n4,233,237,242,307\nNorth Vietnam\n190, 221-222, 230-231, 233, 243,\n246-247, 301, 304-307, 311,336,342\nNorth-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)\n231\nNorthrop Aviation\n259\nNorton, Garrison\n14-15, 31, 70,260,331\nNorwalk, Connecticut\n50\nNorway\n140, 142, 172, 176-177, 303,319\nNorwegian Defense Staff\n142\nNorwegian Intelligence Service\n142\nNotre Dame University\n7\nNovaya Zemlya\n172\nNovokuznetsk, Soviet Union\n138\nnuclear energy\n39, 81, 225\nNuclear Energy Division\n39\n-seOfeL"
  },
  {
   "n": 388,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p388.jpg",
   "text": "0\n375\nnuclear fireball\n240\nnuclear resonance\n332\nnuclear strike\n292\nnuclear testing moratorium\n317\nnuclear tests\n133, 147, 240\nnuclear weapons\n2, 19-20, 99, 147, 226,\n238,240,317\nGARFISH\n44\nO'Donnell, Emmett (Rosy)\n7J.\noblique photography\n__ -- 135. 189,244\nOffshore Islands Crisis\n215-216\nOILSTONE\n60-61\nOkinawa\n301-302, 305-306, 308. 311\nOld Executive Office Building\n27\nOLIVE HARVEST\n257\nOmaha, Nebraska\n60\n112A camera\n250\n112B camera\n250, 252\n\"Open-Skies\"\n96\nOperation Overflight\n186\noptical distortion\n282\n~&Gret NQFQRN\nIndex\nOptical Research Laboratory\n21-22\noptical systems\n52\norder-of-battle\n82, 134, 322\n\"Oscar-Sierra\" unit\n234\nover-the-horizon radar\n241\nOverhage, Carl F. P.\n18, 21, 331\noverhead photography\n82, 87. 172, 237-238\noverhead reconnaissance missions\n188\nOverstreet, Carl K.\n100\nOXCART\n61, 73, 157, 191,236.238, 252-253,\n259,274, 277-313. 320-322, 327-333,\n336, 339\noxygenation\n62\np\nP-38 fighter\nIO, 329\nP-40 fighter\n328\nP-51 Mustang\n214\nP-80 fighter\n10, 45\nP-80 Shooting Star\n45\nP2V7\n222\nP3A\n222\nPacific Ocean\n247\nPadang. West Sumatra\n212\n6ee,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 389,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p389.jpg",
   "text": "376\n6eeret NOFORN\nIndex\nPakistan\n128, 135. 139, 148, 163, 167-168.\n170, 172, 174, 178. 189,247,316,319\nPaksane, Laos\n231\nPalmdale, California\n31 I\npanoramic-type framing camera\n53\nParadise Ranch\n57, 66\nPARAMOUNT Committee\n114, 116, 120\nParangosky. John\n274,288.296, 309. 331\n\"parasite\" aircraft\n263\nParis Summit\n172. 181-182\nPasadena, California\n13. 50,252\nPathet Lao\n221\nPB-4Y aircraft\n222\nPearl Harbor\n322 _\nPearson. Drew\n299\nPeenemunde rocket project\n2\nPeiping. China\n228-229\nPellegrini. Joseph J.\n6\nPennsylvania State Police\n222\nPentagon\n5, 7, 9, ll. 13-14, 39, 78-79, 238\nPeople·s Liberation Anny (PLA)\n215\nPeople's Republic of China (PRC}\n85, 135. 201, 215, 222, 225-226,\n228-247, 253. 282, 301, 319. 339. 341\n(See also China)\nradars\n215\ntroop movements\n215\nnuclear plants\n238\nnuclear weapons establishment\n226\nShuangchengzi missile-test range\n235\nperiscope\n56. 76\nPerkin. Richard S.\n18, 31. 50-52. 281-282, 31 I. 332-333\nPerkin-Elmer (P-E) Company\n18. 31. 50. 281\nPerkin-Elmer tracking camera\n52\nPerkins. Courtland D.\n260\nPersonnel (USAF). Deputy Chief of Staff for\n74\nPeshawar. Pakistan\n135. 163-164. 167-168, 172, 174-!76\nPhilippines\n305\nPhoto-Intelligence Division (PID)\n82. 100. 135\nphotographic chemicals\n121\nPhotographic Evaluation of /n/onniltion on Cuba\n200\nphotographic resolution\n281\nphoto interpreters\n83. 108. Ill. 114-116. 120-121. 135,\n138. 153. 172. 191, 198. 209. 2! l.\n2 I 6. 221. 236. 303, 307\nphotomapping\nI. 232\nphotoreconnaissance\nI. 4-5. 7. 22\nphotosatellite\n270, 3 I3. 327. 330, 157\nPhouma. Souvanna\n221\nPID's Special Projects Branch\nll5\nPINE RIDGE\n343-344\n\"pioneer\" photography\n87\npitot-static tube\n295\nPittsburgh-Corning Glass Company\n55\nPlans, Deputy Director for\n157, 191-192, 327. 333"
  },
  {
   "n": 390,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p390.jpg",
   "text": "377\nPlans, Directorate of\n73, 81, 157,197,211,287\nPlesetsk, Soviet Union\n176\nPoland\nI00-101, l04, I 10, 123, 145,303\npolarizing filters\n330\nPolaroid Corporation\n18, 24, 29\nPOLECAT\n221\nPolish Ambassador to the US\n109\nPolyarny Ural\n172\npolygraph examination\n185\nPope, Allen L.\n214-215\npoppy fields\n254\nPort Said, Egypt\n120\nPortsmouth Harbor\n94\n. P9tassium cyanide\n66. 125\npowered glider\n14, 25. 339\nPowers. Francis Gary\n88,117,124, 174-178, 181-187,\n190-191, 195, 197,201.219, 221.\n224,252,316,322.332, 336\nPoznan, Poland\n104\nPR3 aircraft\n5\nPratt, Perry W.\n31\nPratt & Whitney\n12, 31. 35, 40, 48, 67, 71. 152,217,\n251,268,270, 284-285, 290\nPratt & Whitney J58 power plant\n270\nPratt & Whitney J75-Pl3 jet engine\n152\nPratt & Whitney J75/19W engines\n284\nPratt and Whitney J57\n12\nPresident's Board of Consultants on\nForeign Intelligence Activities\n37, 127, 167, 170, 190, 192,328,\n330\nPresident's Foreign Intelligence\nAdvisory Board\n37\nPresident's Intelligence Checklist\n201\nPresident's Science Advisory Committee\n37\npressure suits\n64, 247\npressurized \"spacesuit\"\n63\nPrettyman. E. Barrett\n184-185\nPrettyman Board\n185\nPrinceton University\n29\nprocessing and interpretation centers\n115\nProject Director\n61. 82. 329\nProject Officer. AFCIG-5\n61\nProject Staff\n40-43. 56, 72-73. 82, 89,\n170. 299\nProject Three\n27, 29-34. 327\npropaganda\n88, 160, 162. 183. 186. 317\nPryor. Frederick\n183\npsychological warfare\n186. 222\nPueblo\n242. 307,320\nPuerto Rico\n207,211\nPulse-Position Indicator display\n267\nPurcell. Edward M.\n18, 29, 110-111. 129,260,263.\n271, 274. 332\nPutt, Donald L.\n• 11. 35-36. 40\nPYO [Soviet Air Defense]\n174\nSec, et NOfOAl'I\nIndex\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 391,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p391.jpg",
   "text": "378\nSeu et NOfOfUd\nIndex\nPyroceram\n268, 271\nQ\nQuarles, Donald\n81, 127, 144-145, 161-162, 263, 267\nQuarters Eye\n42\nquartz glass window\n282\nQue Building\n83, 111\nQuemoy\n215, 229\nQUICK KICK\n216\nquick-reaction capability\n301,313\nR\nRaborn, William F., Jr.\n240, 301, 332\nradar\n3, 7, 15, 19, 23,, 82, 87, 94, 97, 101.\n104-106, 110-111, 123, 128-130, 132-134,\n139, 142, 144, 148, 168, 175-176, 178,\n197, 211,215,230, 234-237, 239, 241-243,\n247,257, 259-260, 263, 267-271, 273-274,\n277,289,294,300, 303-307, 310-311, 317,\n331-332, 335-336, 339, 341-342\nradar camouflage\n128\nradar cross section\n15,260,263, 267-270, 271, 273-274,\n277, 300, 332, 339, 341-343, 110\nradar deception\n130\nradar defense systems\n343\nradar image\n259,332\nradar pulses\n87, 110, 130, 175, 268, 335\nradar signature\n341-342\nradar technology\n7\nradar-absorbing\n111, 260\nradar-deflecting\n260\nradar-homing unit\n342\nRadford, Arthur W.\n122-124, 126\nRadhakrishnan, Savepalli\n232\nRadiation Laboratories\n330\nRADINT\n189\nradio\n2, 7, 19, 75, 87, 175-176, 186,\n268, 289, 332\nRAINBOW\n111. 129-130, 259\nRamenskoye, Soviet Union\n20. 105\nRamey AFB, Puerto Rico\n211\nramjet-powered\n262-263. 268. 291\nRamo-Wooldridge firm\n335\nRAND Corporation\n20, 26, 85\nRandolph AFB, Tex.as\n73\nRandsburg Wash\n340\nRay, Walter\n302\n\"ray-tracing\" programs\n52, 55\nRB-29 aircraft\n3-4\nRB-47 aircraft\n3, 22. 182. 186\nRB-52 aircraft\n22\nRB-57 aircraft\n26, 35, 40, 134. 223\nRB-57D aircraft\n6, 126. 162\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 392,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p392.jpg",
   "text": "379\nRB-58 aircraft\n22\nReber. James\n81. 114-115. 154,332\nreconnaissance\n1-9. 12- 19. 21-25, 27, 30-37,\n39, 41. 43. 46, 49, 52. 55. 59,\n61-62, 66, 80, 84, 94, 96, 98, 109.\n113, 115- 116, 119, 122, 126- 127.\n133. 153-154. 161-162. 188-193.\n196-197, 201, 205-206, 208, 2!0-212.\n216. 222-223, 226, 228, 230-233. 240,\n249, 253-254, 260. 262-263, 267-268.\n270. 287. 291 -292, 295. 297-299, 301.\n303-304. 308-309. 311-313. 319-322.\n327-331, 333,339, 341-344\nreconnaissance aircraft competition\n9\nreconnaissance drones\n301\nreconnaissance satellite project\n161\n\"reconnaissance strike\"\n295\nReconnaissance Systems Branch\n4\nrecords. altitude\n302\nrecords. speed\n302\nRED DOT\n254\nreflecting cube\n281\nreflective system\n55\nrefueling\n114. 198-200. 231. 237, 241.\n302. 306. 308\nrefugees\n2\nRepublic RF-84F Thunderflash\n22\nResearch, Directorate of\n192. 287\nResearch and Development, Director of\n66\nResearch and Reports (ORR). Office of\n21. 81. 237\nReturnee Exploitation Group (REG)\n2\nRevolutionary Council\n212\n-Secret NOFORN\nIndex\nRhodes\n116-117\nRidenour, Louis N.\n18\nRidenour Associates. Inc.\n18\nRieland, Osmond\n56, 61, 70, 78\nROBIN\n23\nROBIN HOOD\n21 I\nRobinson. Robe1t\n164\nrocket planes\n60\nrocket-powered ai1rcraft\n312\nRodgers. Franklin A.\n129, 267-268, 274, 332\nRodgers· Effect\n267\nRolls-Royce Avon-109 engines\n5, 23\nRomania\nIOI .\nRoO!, L. Eugene\n9. 24\nRose, Wilburn S.\nMl '70.l!Qj__________7\nrunway\n57, 68-69, 79-80. 108. 140, 176.\n283-284, 29•1. 302, 305\nRS-71\n295\nRuseckas, Joseph\n63\nRusk, Dean\n183. 201. 209. 236. 293. 304. 307\nSec.et"
  },
  {
   "n": 393,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p393.jpg",
   "text": "380\nSecret NOFORN\nIndex\nRussell, Richard B.\n88\nRyan Aircraft\n343\ns\nS-band radar\n87\nsailplane\n10-11. 24-26. 47\nSakhalin Island\n201\nSaltonstall. Leverett\n88\nSAM site\n177. 205. 306\nSan Cristobal. Cuba\n206-207. 209\nSan Diego, California\n2-P, 343\nSANDY HOOK\n343\nSanta Barbara Channel\n254 _ ­\nSanta Clara Airfield. Cuba\n201\nSaratov Engels Airfield. Soviet Union\nIM\nSaryshagan. Soviet Union\n139. 168, 232. 336\nsatellite imagery\n298, 255\nsatellite navigation systems\n341\nsatellite photography\n87. 195-197, 22~ 233. 237. 241\nsatellites\n22. 100. 104. 159. 162,211.299,\n303. 312. 320. 322. 328\nSaville. Gordon P.\n17-18\nSchalk. Louis\n288-289\nSchlesinger. James R.\n257. 333\nSchoech. William A.\n285\nSchriever, Bernard A.\n7, II\nSchultze, Charles L.\n309\nScience and Technology. Directorate of\nI 93, 287, 328\nScience and Technology, Special Assistant\nto the President for\n37\nScientific Advisory Board\n17. 23\nScientific Advisory Committee\n17, 89, 332\nScientific Engineering Institute (SE!)\n110- l I l, 129. 260. 267, 27-+. 331-332\nScientific Intelligence (OSI). Office of\n14, 21, 39, 81, 97,331,333\nSCOPE COTTON\n310\nSCOPE CRANE\n242\nSCOPE LOGIC\n303\nSCOPE SAINT\n255\nSCOPE SAINT-I\n255\nSCOPE SAINT-11\n255\nSCOPE SHIELD\n246-247\nScott. Roderick M.\n51, 53. 281. 333\nScoville. Herbert\n207,287,289.333\nSCR-270 radar\n7\nScranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport. Pennsylvania\n222\nSea of Japan\n3\nSeaberg, John\n8-9. 12. 35-36. 333\nSEAFOAM\n211\nsealant\n286. 288\nsecrecy agreements\n295\nSeeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 394,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p394.jpg",
   "text": "381\nsecurity\n2, 27, 40-41, 43, 55, 59-60, 72, 8 1,\n94, 112, 125, 127, 140, 161. 167,\n185. 187-188. 191. 197,201,209,\n212, 218, 221-222, 224, 236, 256,\n273, 283-284, 294, 318, 327\nSecurity, Office of\n59, 112, 222\nSemipalatinsk, Soviet Union\n128, 138-139, 147, 168\nSENSINT--Sensitive Intelligence\n3\nsensors\n11, 22. 241, 292, 3 I0\nSeventh Air Division\n89\nSeverodvinsk. Soviet Union\n172, 176\nShanghai. China\n222, 228, 242\nsheep-dipping\n74\nShell Oil Company\n62. 328\nshellfish toxin\n125\nShelton, William\n- - - 125, 176\nshock wave\n290-291\nshort-range reconnaissance vehicle\n342\nshow 1rial\n183\nShuangchengzi, China\n226, 228. 235\nshutter assemblies\n53\nSiberia\n3\nSichuan, China\n230\nSicily\n116\nSieker, Robert\n131\nSierra snowfield\n254\nSIGINT Committee\n332\nSignals Intelligence (SIGINT)\n222\nIndex\nSinai penins1ula\n117\n\"single-pass'\" mission\n306\nSino-Indian border\n231-2:33. 319\nSino-Soviet lborder\n336\n\"Skonk Works\"\n45\nSkunk Work:s\n45, 71, 132. 251. 262, 273-274\nSKYLARK\n299\nSmithsonian Institution\n55\n\"snap-up\"\n148\nSnark missil,:s\n22\nSnider, Sammy V. C.\n138\nsnowmelt\n254\nSOFT TOUCH\n135, 139, 143\nsoftware algorithms\n52\nsolar cells\n240\nsolid-fueled imissiles\n161.3 17\nsound barrier\n289\nSOUTH GATE\n2 16\nSouth Vietnam\n230-231, 243, 301. 305\nSoutheast Asia\n190,198,216, 221.301, 310\nSovetskaya Gavan'. Soviet Union\n144\nSoviet B loc\n1-2. 4, 6. 16-20. 87. 93. 112. 123.\n147. 152,159. 19~ 197,211.330\nSoviet Communist Party Congress\n160\nSoviet Far East\n134,144"
  },
  {
   "n": 395,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p395.jpg",
   "text": "382\nSec, el l'(IOFORl'.J\nIndex\nSoviet Union\n1-3, 4-7. 14-27. 31, 39, 65, 81-89,\n93-101. 104-106. 108-112. 120,\n122-124, 126-130, 133-135, 137­\n140, 142-149. 152-157, 159-165,\n167-168. 170-172. 174-183. 186-187,\n189, 195-197. 200-201, 205-206,\n209-211, 215. 219,221,225,232,237,\n247, 254, 259. 294, 297-299, 301,\n303-304, 312. 315-320, 322. 329-330,\n332. 335-336. 339,341,344\nactivity in Cuba\n200,201\nair defense system\n2. 3. I08. I68. I70, 317\nair power of the\n20\nair show\n98\natomic energy program\n317\nbomber\n21. 11 I. 167. 317\nborders\n123, 127, 143\ndiplomatic protests\n315- ­\nelectronic defenses\n317\nfighters\n3. 5. 23, 26. I27. 144\nG-class ballistic-missile submarine\n237\nguided missile and nuclear programs\n135\nguided missile research\n99\nguided missiles\n81. 99\nguided-missile test range\n16\nintentions\n4. 318\nintercept attempts\n142\ninterception of U-2\n19, 24-25. 47. 87. 106, 108. 110. 122.\n127, 134. 144. I70, 244. 270. 3 I5, 339\nmedium-range ballistic missiles\n201, 206\nmissile program\n128. I 59- I 61. 163-164\nmissile test range\n16. 23, 143, 164. 167, 176\noverflight operation\n110\npropaganda campaign\n317\nProtest Note\n109\nradar coverage\n106\nradars\n3. 7. 15, 97. 130, 134, 168. 176.\n259. 339\nrail network\n167\nstrategic capabilities\n2. 19\nSupreme Soviet\n179\nsurface-to-air missile (SAM)\n177, 168, 304\nsurprise attack\n19. 26-27, 89. 147, 159, 329-330\nSoviet-Finnish border\n303. 142\nSoviet-Iranian border\n124. 162-163. 168\nSpecial Activities. Director of\n193\nSpecial Activities (OSA). Office of\n43. 192-193, 207. 234-235. 242. 247.\n252. 257,288. 296-297, 299. 303. 312.\n328. 341-342. 344\nSpecial Assistant for National Security Affairs\n188\nSpecial Assistant to the DCI\n40\n\"special\" missions\n116\nSpecial Operations Division\n192\nSpica. Incorporated\n51\nspotting camera\n282\nSputnik\n159\nSQUARE DEAL\n168. 170\nSec,et"
  },
  {
   "n": 396,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p396.jpg",
   "text": "383\nSR-71\n295, 302, 308-31 I, 321\nSS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM\n206\nSS-6 ICBM\n[\n160, 165, 171-171\nstainless steel\n277, 280\nStassen, Harold\n330\nState Department\n81, 95, IOI, 146, 154, 163, 179, 186,\n196-197, 212, 224-225, 229,243,249\n\"stealth\" research\n313\nstereo camera\n281, 252\nstereoscopic lenses\n250\nSteuart Building\n83, Ill, 114\nSTEVER\n260. 333\nStockman, Hervey\n65. J-04-105\nSTPOLLY\n222,224,240\nStrategic Air Command (SAC)\n11, 14, 17, 20, 26, 42, 60, 74-76, 78,\n89, 93, 95, 198, 201, 207-210, 299, 230\nmeteorologists\n42\nstrategic bombing\n49\n\"strategic hamlet\"\n230\nstrategic intelligence\n82,115,152,302,304,313,315,\n319,322\nstrategic reconnaissance\n9, 122,230,295, 297, 299, 313,\n320,322,329\nStrauss, Lewis\n56\nStrong, Philip G.\n14-17, 21-22, 24-25, 29-30, 333\nsubsonic\n8, 14, 260, 263\nSeeret NOFORN\nIndex\nSuez Canal\n112-114, 117,120,256\nSuez Canal, Israeli-British-French attack on\n116\nSuez Canal Company\nI 12-113\nSuez Crisis\n152\nSuhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed\n135\nsuicide pill\n65\nSukarno, Achmed\n212,215\nSulawesi (Celebes)\n212\nSullivan, Dennis\n307\nSumatra\n212\nSUN SPOT\n171\nSuper Snooper\n132\nsupersonic designs\n260 ­\nsupersonic interceptor\n285\nsupersonic technology\n292-293\nSupport. Directorate of\n40, 83\nsurface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites\n201\nsurface-to-air missiles\n257,299,301,303,339\nsurface-to-surface missiles\n205-206, 209. 304. 306\nSverdlovsk, Soviet Union\n172, 176-179, 185\nSymington, Stuart\n99, 161\nsynthetic lubricants\n279\nSyria\n114, 120, 133, 153\nSyrian radars\n343\nSystem-I\n335\n&ee,er"
  },
  {
   "n": 397,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p397.jpg",
   "text": "384\nSee1 et NOFORN\nIndex\nSystem-II\n335\nSystem-III\n335-336\nSystem-IV\n335\nSystem-Y\n126. 215, 335\nSystem-YI\n335. 175\nSystem-VII\n335-336\nSystem-VIII\n335\nSystem-IX\n335\nSystem-IXB device\n175\nSystem-X\n256. 336\nSystem-XII units\n23-4\nSystem-XIII\n234. 236-237. 239\nSystem-XVI\n336\nSystem-XVH\n336\nSystem-XX\n336\nSystem-XX!\n336\nSystem-XXII\n336\nSystem-XXIV\n256\nT\nTaber. John\n88\nTACKLE\n224. 226. 228-230. 234-239. 241-246.\n2 53. 257, 282\ntactical intelligence\n304\ntactical reconnaissance\n9. 25, 115, 153\nTAGBOARD\n291\nTahiti\n250\ntailless subsonic aircraft\n263\nTaiwan\n215-216, 222. 224-225. 229,\n233, 236-237. 239, 241-243.\n2-46. 251\nTaiwan Strait\n229\nTa Khli. AFB. Thailand\n230\nlalbott. Harold E. ~\n13-14, 36\nTALL KING\n294\nTallinn. Estonia\n303\nTashkent. Soviet Union\n176\nTASS\n137\nTatar Strait\n144\nTaylor. Maxwell\n188\nTCP\n27\nTechnical Services Division (TSO)\n66. 125\nTechnicolor\n331\nTechnological Capabilities Panel\n26-27, 29-30. 35, 62, 80, 327­\n329. 332\nTechnology. Deputy for\n192\nTeheran, Iran\n144\nTeledyne J-100-CA-IOO Turbojet engine\n343\nTeledyne Ryan Aeronautical Company\n343"
  },
  {
   "n": 398,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p398.jpg",
   "text": "385\ntelevision reconnaissance package\n343\nTennessee\n78,238\ntent-ology\n116\ntest ban\n147\nTet offensive\n243\nTexas Instruments Corporation\n238, 282\nThird World\n211\nthree-camera trimetrogon unit\n52\nthree-dimensional movies\n29\n3000 I camera\n333\n303 Committee\n243, 257, 301-302, 304, 307\nThule, Greenland\n172\nTibet\n157, 216, 219, 232\n99\nTIME STEP\n172, 174\nTitan ICBM\n160\ntitanium alloy\n271\nTitanium Metals Corporation\n280\nTOKEN\n87\nTomsk, Soviet Union\n138\nTOPPER\n219\nTOUCHDOWN\n163\nToulon, France\n116\ntracker camera\n241\nSeoFet NOFORN\nIndex\ntracking\n3, 7, 52-53, 87, 97, 106, 128-129,\n144, 170, I 76, 178, 234, 259, 263,\n267-268, 303,307,343\ntracking radars\n7,267\nTrans-Siberian Railroad\n144\ntransport aircraft\n25, 45, 66\ntraveling-wave tube (TWT)\n236\ntrimetrogon K-17 mapping-camera system\n49\nTripartite Declaration, 1950\n117\ntropopause\n152\nTruman administration\n17\nTRW Corporation\n335\nTuamotu Archipelago\n249\n\"Tuesday lunch\"\n305\nTukey, John W.\n29\nturbojet engine\n8, 11, 262, 268, 343\nTurkey\n3, 112-114, 116, 121,135,146,\n152-153, 178, 181, 189,247,\n316,319\nTuslog Detachment I 0-10\n113\nTwining, Nathan\n60-61, 86, 88, 96, 99, 101, 127,\n134, 139, 161, 165\nTyler Building\n43\nType-I camera\n281, 304, 310\nType-II camera\n281\nType-IV camera\n282\nTyphoon Winnie\n216\nTysons Comer, Virginia\n43"
  },
  {
   "n": 399,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p399.jpg",
   "text": "Sec.et N6f'OPIN\nIndex\n386\nTyuratam, Soviet Union\n135, 137-138, 160, 163-165, 167-168.\n171- 172, 176\nu\nU- 1\n66\nU-2\naccomplishments\n316\nassembly\n45, 47, 66. 75. 164. 280, 284, 291\nbailout experiments\n64\nbases\n93\nbicycle-type landing gear\n47\nblue-black color\n149\nbrakes\n69\ncanopy\n80. 149. 177\ncockpit\n11. 63-64. 79, 125. 283. 292. 296\ncost\n34. 124. 149. 250-252. 263. 269. 273.\n280. 285-286, 309, 322. 341-342\ncover story\n60. 85. 89-90, 94, 99, 132, 156, 178-180.\n182, 207-208, 216,224,295\ncoverage\n316\ndeadstick landing\n79\ndeployment\n2, 74. 76. 78. 88-89. 93-94. 134. 161.\n165, 167, 247, 250. 255-257, 297.\n301-302. 304. 307,313,3 17.332\ndesign\n47\ndestruction device\n177\ndetachable pogos\n47\nejection seat\n64. 177, 302\nemergency landing\n78. 188. 222,313\nfilm exploitation\n115\nflameout\n71, 78-79, 131, 198. 229\nflight plans\n82. 177\nflights approval process\n187-188, 226. 30 I\nforeign pilots\n73-74, 321\nfuel\n5. 23. 47. 61-62. 68. 76. 133. 161. 175.\n199. 218-219. 231. 235. 241 , 247-248.\n271. 274. 277-278. 283-284. 286. 288.\n302. 313. 340\nfuel consumption\n68. 219\nfuel <>auae\n68, z\"19.~302\nfuselage\n10. 24. 47. 130,248.251, 270,277,286\ninspection procedures\n297\nlanding gear\n10-12. IS. 47-48. 69. 89. 248\nlow-speed stall\n76\nmaiden flight\n66. 288\nmission 1104\nI 14\nmission 1105\n114\nmission 1314\n117\nmission 2003\n100\nmission 2009\nIO I\nmission 2010\n101\nmission 2013\n104-105\nmission 2014\n105\nmission 2020\n106\nmission 2021\n106\nioe,at"
  },
  {
   "n": 400,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p400.jpg",
   "text": "387\nSec1 et NOFORN\nmission 2023\n108\nmission 2029\n124\nmission 3086\n200\nmission 3088\n200\nmission 3089\n201\nmission 3091\n205\nmission 3093\n205\nmission 3095\n205\nmission 3098\n206\nmission 3100\n206\nmission 4016\n124\nmission 40 18\n124\nmission 4019\n126\nmission 4030\n133\n- mission 4154\n175\nmission 4 I 55\n168\nmission 6011\n144\nmission length\n199\n~\nmission plotting\n60\nmission programmers\n78\nmissions\n59, 75, 82, 87, 106, I 14, 124, 127,\n129, 154, 164, 167, 179, 187, 196, 207,\n210,224,237,245,254,263, 316-317,\n322,336\nNationalist Chinese crews\n222\noleostrut\n47, 69\noperational altitude\n76, 79, 108, 152\nOperational Objective system\n309\nIndex\nOperational Readiness Inspection\n77\noutrigger wheels\n79\noverflights\n6, 32, 62, 74, 76-77. 84-86, 88-89,\n94-98, I 00-10 I, I 04-106, 108-111,\n114, l 16, 122-128, 135, 138-140,\n142-143, 146, 148, 152, 154-157,\n159, 161-165, 167-168, 170, 172,\n180-181, 195-198, 200-20 I, 205-206,\n208, 210-21 l, 219, 222-226, 228-237,\n239-240, 242-244, 249, 253, 257, 259,\n294, 297-301, 310, 315-317, 318-320,\n322\npaint penalty\n149\npayload\n262, 8, 11. 50, 54, 340, 87, 145, 152\nperipheral missions\nI89, 206, 244, 246\nphaseout\n257, 310\npilot fatigue\n199\npilot hypoxia\n80\npilot life-support system\n64\npilot selection\n60,283\npilot-survival gear\n62\npilot training program\n75\npilot urination\n64\npilots\n42, 299, 47, 56, 59-60,62-66, 68-69,\n71-77, 79-80, 94, 109, 113-114, 116,\n125, 127. 132-135. 140, 148-149, 153­\n156, 164. 175-176, 179. 181-183, 186-187,\n198-199, 207-212, 214, 221, 223-226,\n229-230, 233-236, 238-240, 243, 246-248.\n250-253, 256,283,319,321,332,340\npilots dessicated\n65\npitch-control servo device\n296\npogos\n47, 79, 108\nieeFet"
  },
  {
   "n": 401,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p401.jpg",
   "text": "388\nSec, et NOFORN\nIndex\nprebreathing\n64, 125\nprojects\n39-40. 42-44. 56, 59, 61-62. 71, 73.\n74, 81-82, 88-89, 97, 153-155, 157.\n186,257,316, 327-331\nrocking mount\n51, 53\nstall envelope\n71\nstalls\n80\ntail section\n47, 76\ntaxi trials\n68-69\ntraining\n302\nvertical stabilizers\n277,343\nvulnerability study\n97, 207\nU-28\n95\nU-2Cs\n152, 196, 208, 210, 217\nU-2F\n198\nU-2G\n248. 250, 252. 255\nU-2R\n251-253, 257, 282, 336\nU-3\n66\nUkraine\n106\nUnder Secretary of State\n188, 225\nUnidentified Flying Objects (UFOs)\n72\nUnited Arab Republic\n153\nUnited Kingdom (See Great Britain)\nUnited Kingdom Requirements Committee\n154\nUnited Nations\n20\nUnited Press International (UPI)\n232\nUnited States\n2-4, 7-8. 19-21. 26-27. 73. 77-78.\n85, 89-90. 96. 98- I 00. I 08-110. 112.\n117, 121, 124. 140, 142. 147-148. 153-156.\n159, 161. 163-164, 179. 181-183. 187,201.\n205,215. 221-222, 224-226. 229-232, 245­\n247. 254. 256. 285, 294. 297, 299. 301-302.\n306. 315. 60. 316, 318-319. 332\nunmanned reconnaissance aircraft\n'1QJ 304\nUPWIND\n303\nUrals\n22. 163\nuranium gaseous-diffusion plant\n239\nuranium-processing facility\n138\nUS Air Attache in Moscow\n177\nUS Air Force. Secretary of the\nI I. 32, 78, 81. 327-329\nUS Air Force\nAir Weather Service\n94\nChief of Air Scaff\n78\nEC-130. 146\nInspector General\n61\noxygen mask\n62\nRB-57D Canberra\n162\nThird Air Force\n89\nUS deterrent force\n317\nUS Geological Survey\n254\nUS House of Representatives\nAppropriations Committee\n88\nUS Marine Corps\n40. 153. 247, 328\nUS Marine Corps Reserve\n14\nUS Military Academy at West Point\n329\nUS Navy\nChief of Naval Materiel\n285\nSecret"
  },
  {
   "n": 402,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p402.jpg",
   "text": "389\nNeptune bomber\n3\nPrivateer patrol aircraft\n3\nNaval Ordnance Test Station\n340\nU.S. News and World Report\n99\nUS nuclear test monitoring system\n139\nUS nuclear tests\n147\nUS Senate, Anned Services Commiuee\n88. 99, 185\nUS Senate. Foreign Relations Committee\n165, 185\nUS 6th Fleet\n153\nUS 7th Fleet\n215\nUS lmelligence Board (USIB)\n196-197. 225,228,249, 332,336\nUSS Kitty Hawk\n247\nUSS Ranger\n250\nutility aircraft\n66\nV\nVance. Cyrus\n238. 300. 309-310\nVenezuela\n211\nvernier adjustment\n76\nvery-high-acuity lenses\n50\nViet Cong\n230, 243\nVietnam\n190. 216, 22 1-222, 230-231 , 233-234.\n242-243, 246, 30 I, 304-308, 311. 336.\n342-343\nVito. Carmine\n65. 105, 124-125, 214\nVladimirovka. Soviet Union\n171\nVladivostok, Soviet Union\n3. 126\nVogt, Richard\n8\nVoigt. Woldemar\n8\nVolga River\n22\nvon Fritsche, Wc:mer\nI\nw\nWADC's Bombardment Branch\n8\nWake Island\n305\nWalker, Christopher H.\n155\nwallpaper\n130\nWalter Reed Hospital\n96\nWarsaw Pact\n87·\nWashington University. St. Louis\n29\nWatertown Strip\n57\nWatton RAF Base. England\n156\n\"weather plane\" cover story\n179\nweather research\n85-86, 89-'90. I 32, 182\nWearherwise\n2 16\nWendover, Utah\n295\nWest Potomac P~irk\n42\nWestern Europe\n20, 85, 140\nWestern Hemisphere\n21 1\n\"wet-wing\" design\n68\nSec. et N6f6RN\nIndex\niuret:"
  },
  {
   "n": 403,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p403.jpg",
   "text": "390\nieeret NOFORN\nIndex\nWHALE TALE\n247,249\nWheelon, Albert (Bud)\n240, 287, 333\nWheelus AFB\n121\nWhite House\n33, 43, 97, 109, ll 1-112, 120, 122.\n128, 154, 172, 186, 189\nWienberg, Charles F. {Bud)\n7, 11-12\nWiesbaden, Gennany\n80, 95, 104-105, 108. l 14-ll5,\n120-121\nWiesner, Jerome B.\n37\nWilliams, John J.\n185\nWilliamsport, Pennsylvania\n222\nWilson. Charles\n126\nwind currents\n87\nwind tunnels\n269\nwing teeth\n277\nwings\n5, 8. 1 I. 23-25, 42, 45, 47, 66. 68.\n72. 75-76, 80. 89, 95. 129, 148-149,\n199. 242,248, 25!, 271. 274,277,\n286, 312, 340\nwiretaps\n2\nWonsan Harbor\n307\nWorcester, Massachusetts\n62\nworld press\n85, 122\nWorld Warr\nl\nWorld War II\n1-2. 4, 7-8. 13, 15. 17. 22. 42,\n49, 56, 62. 87, 95. 97, !24. 135,\n214, 222, 232. 317, 322. 327-33!\nWright Air Development Command\n4-5, 8, 12, 14, 18, 35, 73\nWright-Patterson\n73\nWRINGER\n2\nWS-461L\n144-145\nWu-ch'ang. China\n228\nX\nXF-104\n(See Lockheed Day Fighter)\nX-16\n9. 13, 15. 26, 34-35\nX-band radar pulses\n335\nX-rays\n291\ny\nYAK-25RM\n(See Mandrake)\nYAK-26\n(See Mandrake)\nYakov!ev\n148\nYakovlev-25\n148\nYale University\n15\nYancey, William f.\n75, 77-78\nYC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser\n13\nYerevan, Soviet Union\n124\nYF-!2A\n285, 291, 294, 308\n50z(See also AF-12)\nYokota AFB. Japan\n134\nSec1et"
  },
  {
   "n": 404,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p404.jpg",
   "text": "391\nSec, el NOFOAN\nIndex\nYur'ya, Soviet Union\n176\nYutzy, Henry\n31\n..Seeret"
  },
  {
   "n": 405,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p405.jpg",
   "text": ""
  },
  {
   "n": 406,
   "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/cia-uap-003/p406.jpg",
   "text": "... _ ........\n.. ~ ~.,..:.. .\n·#·•· :.<s.:-..:··\n.•. ;:·-"
  }
 ]
}