{ "slug": "dow-uap-d48", "title": "DOW-UAP-D48-Report-September-1996", "agency": "DoW", "year": "1996", "page_count": 181, "source_page": "https://wearenotalone.space/document/dow-uap-d48/", "original_file": "https://wearenotalone.space/Season 01/Release_1/DOW-UAP-D48-Report-September-1996.pdf", "license": "U.S. Government work — public domain. Text is machine OCR from the original scan; the page image is authoritative.", "pages": [ { "n": 1, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p01.jpg", "text": "== \u0016-==\n-=--=-\u0017=------===--====-==-=--=-=-==-__;;;;._ ____________ _\nRESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE\n/RTI\nContract No■-FO4703-91-C-0112\nRTI Report No. RTl/5180/77-43F\nSeptember 10, 1996\nModeling Unlikely Space-Booster\nFailures in Risk Calculations\n19961025 122\nFinal Report\nPrepared for\nDepartment of the Air Force\n45th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office - 45 SW/SE\nPatrick AFB, FL 32925\nand\nDepartment of the Air Force\n30th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office- 30 SW/SE\nVandenberg AFB, CA 93437\nDistribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/\noperational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space\nWing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925.\n'mJC QUALITY INSPECTED ff\n3000 N. Al1antic Avenue • Cocoa Beach, Flo0ida 329315029 US/1" }, { "n": 2, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p02.jpg", "text": "-\n--- ---------------------~-=,--\nContract No. FO4703-91-C-0112\nRTI Report No. RTI/5180/77-43F\nTask No. 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0\nSeptember 10, 1996\nModeling Unlikely Space-Booster\nFailures in Risk Calculations\nFinal Report\nPrepared by\nJames A. Ward, Jr.\nRobert M. Montgomery\nof\nResearch Triangle Institute\nCenter for Aerospace Technology\nLaunch Systems Safety Department\nPrepared for\nDepartment of the Air Force\n45th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office - 45 SW/SE\nPatrick AFB, FL 32925\nand\nDepartment of the Air Force\n30th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office - 30 SW /SE\nVandenberg AFB, CA 93437\nDistribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/\noperational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space\nWing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC)\nSafety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925." }, { "n": 3, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p03.jpg", "text": "Form Approved\nREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE\n0MB No. 0704-0188\nPublic tel)Ort1ng burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response. induding the time for reviewing instructions, searching exi5ting data sources.\ngathering and maintain in!,! the data needed, and completing and rev,ew,ng the collection of Information. Send comments r~ardlng tlils burden estimate or any other aspect of this\ncollection of Information, including suggestions tor reducing this burden. tO Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate or Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferwn\nDavis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 12202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project(0704-0188), Washington. DC 20503.\n1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) ~.• REPORT DATE\n1\n3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED\n.\neptember 10, 1996\nFinal\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\n5. FUNDING NUMBERS\nf.1odeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Galculations\nC: F04703-91-C-o112\nTA:10/95-TT\n6. AUTHORW\n•\nJames A.\nard, Jr.\nRobert M. Montgomery\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION\nREPORT NUMBER\nResearch Triangle Institute *\nACTA, Inc. **\nRTl/5180m-43F\n3000 N. Atlantic Avenue\n· Skypark3\n11\nCocoa Beach, FL 32931\n23430 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 300\nTorrance, CA 90505\n9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n10. SPONSORING/ MONITORING\nAGENCY REPORT NUMBER\nDepartment of the Air Force (AFSPC)\nDepartment of the Air Force (AFSPC)\n30th Space Wing\n45th Space Wing\nr\\~'1~.1\n-\n-m.-t1) from the launch point to the\npopulation center, but not directly on time from launch. The primary function does,\n\"'\nAs an aid to understanding, the supplement of (j), designated as 0, is used in plots and tables in this\nreport.\n9/10/96\nRTI" }, { "n": 17, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p17.jpg", "text": "however, involve the quantity R which is expressed explicitly as a function of R and only\nimplicitly as a function·of time. Values of R from the nominal trajectory are differenced to\ncomputeR.\nThe secondary Mode-5 impact-density function is circular normal in form and expressed by\nthe equation\n(2)\nwhere d is the distance from the impact point of the mean piece to the center of the target,\nand oc is the standard deviation (dispersion) for the debris class. The fact that the center of\nthe secondary impact-density function (or secondary MPI for a debris class) lies Off some\npopulation center does not necessarily mean that pieces in the class hit the center. The\nprobability that one or more pieces actually hits the pop center is determined by integrating\nthe secondaryimpact-density function over the center and combining results for all pieces\nin the class. The dispersions for the secondary function are computed by root-sum-\nsquaring individual dispersions• arising from the effects of winds, vehicle-breakup\nvelocities, and drag uncertainties for the class. They are computed from the nominal\ntrajectory, and cari be explicitly expressed as a function· of impact range. Since the pop\ncenter can also be hit if the MPI of the secondary density function lies outside the pop\ncenter, all possible mutually-exclusive locations of the secondary function that can result in\nimpact on the pop center must be considered. For each mutually-exclusive location, the\nprobability that one or more class pieces impacts on the pop center is calculated, and the\nresults combined to obtain the total hit probability for the class.\nThe Mode-5 primary impact-density function is modeled so· it is independent of how the\nimpact point arrives at a particular location For example, there are myriad paths that a\nvehicle can travel to impact at a location two miles crossrange left from the launch pad.\nFigure 1 shows one such way for a Joust vehicle that failed at 15 seconds, but four seconds\nlater had moved the impact point uprange and CTO$!ange to a position two miles\ncrossrange left from the launch point. Another way to place the impact point two- miles\n•crossrange left is for the vehicle to fly in the wrong direction (north instead of east) from\nliftoff.\nAlthough numerous failure mechanisms and vehicle behaviors can lead to a Mode-5\nresponse and impact in a particular area, the exact mechanism and behavior are irrelevant\nAll such possibilities are assumed to be accounted for by Eq. (1). Four specific failures that\nproduce Mode-5 responses are easily- described: (1) a re-orientation of the guidance\nplatform, (2) insertion of an erroneous spatial target into the guidance system, (3) locking of\nthe engine nozzle in a fixed position near null thus producing a near-constant angular\n* These dispersions are a subset of the Mode-4 impact dispersions.\n9/10/96\n8\nRTI" }, { "n": 18, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p18.jpg", "text": "acceleration of the vehicle body and a slow turn of the velocity vector, (4) erroneous\naccumulation of velocity bits by the guidance system. Many other Mode-5 responses are so\nconvoluted that they defy description or categorization\n3.1 Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constants\nThe primary part of the Mode-5 impact-density function was presented previously as\nEq. (1). As originally formulated, the function contained three shaping constants. If both\nnumerator and denominator of the equation are divided by the constant C, and B is\nsubstituted for D/C, one unnecessary constant disappears so that the function may be\nexpressed as follows:\n(3)\nThe values chosen for the shaping constants A and B that appear in Eq. (3) influence, but do\nnot change, the basic nature of the Mode-5 impact-density function For many years values\nof A = 2.5 and B = 1000 were used in the Eastern Range ship-hit computations, although in\nmore recent risk studies the value of A has been increased to 3.0. This increase resulted .\nfrom the observation that, in recent years, vehicles that experience Mode-5 failure responses\nseem less likely than earlier developmental vehicles to deviate significantly from the\nintended flight line. To see how A and B affect the distribution of Mode-5 impacts, and to\nfurther understanding of the function, the results of choosing various values of A and B are\nprovided in Appendix B.\n3.2 Effects of Shaping Constant on DAMP Results\nAs pointed out in the Introduction, two important types of constant parameters\nrequired by DAMP for risk estimations must be determined. They are: (1) probability\nof a Mode-5 failure response, and (2) valqes of the Mode-5 shaping constants A and B,\ncurrently set at 3.0 and 1000, respectively. As will be demonstrated later, DAMP\nresults are far more sensitive to changes in A than in B.\nThe following cases illustrate the effects that constant A has on calculated risks.\nCase 1: Baseline Risks for Atlas IIA\nIn the baseline risk analysis for Atlas IIAm, the probability of a Modew5 failure response\nwas estimated at 12.5% of the total failure probability during the first 120 seconds of\nflight. Even so, risks resulting from Mode-5 responses accounted for about 90% of the\ntotal risks for people inside the impact limit lines (ILL). Table 1 indicates the range of\nrisks inside the ILLs for day launches from Pad A using various estimates of the\nshaping constant A and a value of B = 1000.\n9/10/96\n9\nRTI" }, { "n": 19, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p19.jpg", "text": "Table 1. Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constant A on Atlas IIA Risks\nB= 1,000\nPercent of Mode-5\nIPs Uprange\n28.6\nCasualty Expectancv (x 10°') inside ILLs\nModes\nTotal for all Modes\n246\n259.9\nConstant A\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n20.7\n14.6\n10.0\n136\n149.4\n58.9\n72.7\n30.5\n44.3\nThe results in·the third column are directly proportional to the probability that a Mode­\n5 failure occurs. For the Atlas IIA analysis, a value of 1/200 = 0.005 was assumed.\nCase 2: Risk Contours for Atlas IIAS\nDefinitions of Flight Hazard Area and Flight Caution Area may be based on the risk\ncontours for inner-ear injury. Constant A can have a significant effect on the location of\nthe 10-6 contour, as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the Atlas IIAS. For these\nfigures, the Mode-5 absolute probability of occurrence was 0.005, constant A was 3.0\nand 3.5, and constant B was 1000.\n9/10/96\n10\nRTI" }, { "n": 20, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p20.jpg", "text": "lf)\nLo\n>i '°I\n\"q\"\"\n~ -\nI\n-~\n0\nI\n0\n...---f\nC\n...---f\n0\n1--1 II\n..--t\n(/.I\n<[ L<[\n1--1 d\n1--1wLn\nl/l L I\nd a., a.,\n_, C \"ZS\n.p C Q\nility\nTo- predict failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, the test results in\nAppendix D for representative configurations (i.e., \"l\" in last column) have been\nfiltered using three different weighting techniques described in Appendix C:\n(1) Equal weighting\n(2) Index-count .weighting\n(3) Exponential weighting\nIn computing filtered or weighted failure probabilities, a test is assigned a score of one\nto indicate the occurrence of a failure or some anomalous behavior, and a score of zero\nif no failure occurred. Admittedly, there may be disagreements about the classification\nof a few flights, since the launch agency may consider as successful or partially\nsuccessful some flights that are shown as failures in· Appendix D. To avoid such\ndisagreements, it is better to- think of some non-normal events, particularly those\noccurring late in flight, as anomalies rather than failures. The flight phases, as shown\nin column 2 of Table 2 and defined in Appendix D.1.3, are inclusive; e.g., flight phase\n\"0 - 3\" includes phases 0, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3. An 'NA' in the response-mode column in\nthe tables of Appendix D indicates that some failure or anomalous behavior has had an\n. effect on the final orbit or impact point without producing additional risks to people on\nthe ground or necessarily failing the mission. In the failure-probability calculations of\nTable 2 and Table 3, an 'NA' has been- considered as a success for all flight phases\nexcept \"0 - 5\", irrespective of the phase in which the failure or anomalous behavior took\nplace. Only in flight phase \"0- 5\" is an 'NA' response considered a failure. The\nfiltered results for representative configurations (defined in Appendix D.1.4) are given\nin Table 2 for six flight phases. For flights with multiple entries in the Response-Mode\nand Flight-Phase columns (e.g., see Appendix D.2.1, No. 257), the first listed value was\nused in the filtering process.\n9/10/96\n16\nRTI" }, { "n": 26, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p26.jpg", "text": "Table 2. Predicted Failure Probabilities for Representative Configurations\nVehicle\nFlight\nPhase\nFilter Technic ue\nSample\nFailures\n/Total\nEqual\nWeight\nIndex\nCount\nExpon.\nF =0.99\nExpon.\nF = 0.98\nExpon\nF = 0.97\nAtlas\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0/7\n0-1\n0.0256\n0.0253\n0.0245\n0.0219\n0.0186\n4/156\n0-2\n0.0449\n0.0385\n0.0387\n0.0313\n0.0243\n7/156\n0-3\n0.0769\n0.0715\n0.0714\n0.0643\n0.0568\n12/156\n0-4\n0.0833\n0.0811\n0.0801\n0.0740\n0.0663\n13/156\n0-5*\n0.1090\n0.1100\n0.1078\n0~1019\n0.0929\n17/156\nDelta\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0/125\n0-1\n0.0160\n. 0.0126\n0.0134\n0.0104\n0.0075\n2/125\n0-2\n0.0160\n0.0126\n0.0134\n0.0104\n0.0075\n2/125\n0-3\n0.0160\n0.0126\n·o.0134\n0.0104\n0.0075\n2/125\n0-4\n0.0160\n0.0126\n0.0134\n0.0104\n0.0075\n2/125\n0-5*\n0.0640\n0.0447\n0.0535\n0.0469\n0.0442\n8/125\nTitan\n0\n0.0306\n0.0210\n0.0225\n0.0292\n0.0352\n3/98\n0-1\n0.0234\n0.0305\n0.0314\n0.0403\n0.0470\n4/171\n0-2\n0.0409\n0.0496\n0.0514\n0.0642\n0.0750\n7/171\n0-3\n0.0526\n0.0581\n0.0597\n0.0689\n0.0773\n9/171\n0-4\n0.0526\n0.0581\n0.0597\n0.0689\n0.0773\n9/171\n0-5*\n0.1111\n0.1167\n0.1188\n0.1284\n0.1358\n19/171\n* Includes response mode 'NA'\nIt is apparent from the data in Table 2 that estimates of future vehicle reliability depend\non the filtering (i.e., weighting) technique applied. Since there are many ways to\nperform the filtering, all generally producing slightly different results, the choice of\nmethod to use in deriving empirical failure probabilities cannot be totally objective.\nSubjective decisions must also be made about which past configurations to consider as\nrepresentative of future vehicles, which flight tests to include_ in the sample, how to\nweight the individual flights, and, in unusual cases, whether to consider a flight a\nsuccess or a failure, and to which flight phase to attribute a failure. Except for data\nweighting (i.e., choice of filter), these decisions were made for Atlas, Delta, and Titan\nbefore computing the failure probabilities shown in Table 2.\n•\nFor Atlas and Delta, it can be seen from Table 2 that the predicted failure probabilities\ncomputed. with the exponential filter decrease as the value of F decreases. Since a\ndecreasing F means more emphasis on recent data and less emphasis on the old, the\nlaunch reliability for these vehicles is apparently improving. The reverse seems to be\ntrue for Titan, suggesting either that Titan reliability is not improving or, possibly, that\nimprovements that have been or are being made to the vehicle are not yet fully\nreflected in the test· results. For Atlas and Delta, the computed failure probabilities\nbased on equal weighting are higher than for all other filters, and the predicted failure\n9/10/96\n17\nRTI" }, { "n": 27, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p27.jpg", "text": "probabilities using index-count filtering are larger than those for exponential filtering.\nFor Titan, the results are mixed, further suggesting that Titan reliability has not\nimproved in recent years.\nFor comparison purposes, the same filtering techniques have been applied to all flight\ntests shown in the tables of Appendix D, regardless of configuration. The results are\npresented in Table 3.\nTable 3. Predicted Failure Probabilities for All Configurations\nVehicle\nAtlas\nDelta\nFlight\nPhase\n0\n0-1\n0-2\n0-3\n0-4\n0-5 •\n0\n0-1.\n0-2\n0-3\nFilter Technic ue\nSample\nFailures\n/Total\n0/7\n56/532\n91/532\n111/532\n114/532\n137/532\n0/196\n4/232\n6/232\n10/232\nEqual\nWeight\n0\n0.1053\n0.1711\n0.2086\n0.2143\n0.2575\n0\n0.0172\n0.0259\n0.0431\nIndex\nExpon.\nExpon\nCount\nF =0.99\nF=0.98\n0\n0\n0\n0.0641\n0.0422\n0.0273\n0.0990\n0.0555\n0.0311\n0.1261\n0.0802\n0.0559\n0.1330\n0.0873\n0.0627\n0.1671\n0.1150\n0.0866\n0\n0\n0\n0.0164\n0.0148\n0.0110\n0.0232\n0.0201\n0.0133\n0.0279\n0.0263\n0.0150\nExpon\nF =0.97\n0\n0.0190\n0.0204\n0.0455\n0.0511\n0.0725\n0\n0.0077\n0.0085\n0.0089\n0-4\n0-5*\nTitan\n0\n0-1\n0-2\n0-3\n0-4\n0-5·\n0.0431\n0.1078\n0.0306\n0.0534\n0.1424\n0.1632\n0.1662\n0.1958·\n0.0279\n0.0766\n0.0137\n0.0319\n0.0771\n0.0924\n0.0942\n0.1369\n0.0263\n0.0740\n0.0187\n0.0351\n0.0719\n0.0830\n0.0840\n0.1326\n0.0150\n0.0536\n0.0281\n0.0399\n0.0662\n0.0711\n0.0712\n0.1277\n0.0089\n10/232\n0.0459\n25/232\n0.0349\n3/98\n0.0467\n18/337\n0.0750\n48/337\n0.0770\n55/337\n0.0771\n56/337\n0.1346\n66/337\n• Includes response mode 'NA'\n. A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 shows that in most cases, but not all, exponential\nfiltering produces failure probabilities for the representative configuration samples that\nare smaller than the corresponding probabilities for the all-configuration samples. The\nfact that most differences between corresponding samples are relatively small attests to\nthe effectiveness of the exponential filter in down-weighting early launch failures. This\nis not the case for equal weighting of tests, where the predicted failure probabilities\nbased on all configurations are up to 3.6 times as large.\nWith respect to- the weighting of missile and space-vehicle performance data, RTI\nfavors an exponential filter over either the equal-weight or index-count filters.\nWeighting percentages for the three filters are given in Table 4 for sample sizes of 4 to\n1,000. Except for small samples, the percentages produced by equal weighting place\ntoo much emphasis on old data, thus failing to account for the learning process and\n9/10/96\n18\nRTI" }, { "n": 28, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p28.jpg", "text": "hardware improvements that have taken place through the years.\nFor samples\napproaching 100 or so, it seriously over-weights the old data and under-weights the\nmore recent events.\nAlthough equal weighting does not seem suitable for this\napplication, it could be appropriate in other large-sample situations, for example,\npredicting the failure probability of devices that are all manufactured at the same time\nby the same process, and tested to the same standards.\nTable 4. Comparison of Weicllting Percentages\nSample\nSize\nFilter*\nLast+\nPoint\nLast5\nPoints\nLast 10\nPoints\nLast 25\nPoints\n!Last 50\nPoints\nLast\nHalf\n4\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n25.8\n40.0\n25.0\n--\n-\n---\n---\n---\n51.0\n70.0\n50.0\n10\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n10.9\n18.2\n10.0\n52.5\n72.7\n50.0\n100.0\n100.0\n100.0\n---\n---\n52.5\n72.5\n50.0\n20\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n6.0\n9.5\n5.0\n28.9\n42.9\n25.0\n55.0\n73.8\n50.0\n---\n---\n55.0\n73.8\n50.0\n100\nExpon. ·\nIndex\nEqual\n2.3\n2.0\n1.0\n11.1\n9.7\n5.0\n21.1\n18.9\n10.0\n45.7\n43.6\n25.0\n73.3\n74.8\n50.0\n73.3\n74.8\n50.0\n200\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n2.0\n1.0\n0.5\n9.8\n4.9\n2.5\n18.6\n9.7\n5.0\n40.4\n23.4\n12.5\n64.7\n43.7\n25.0\n88.3\n74.9\n50.0\n500\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n2.0\n0.4\n0.2\n9.6\n2.0\n1.0\n18.3\n4.0\n2.0\n39.7\n9.7\n5.0\n63.6\n19.0\n10.0\n99.4\n75.0\n50.0\n1000\nExpon.\nIndex\nEqual\n2.0\n0.1\n0.1\n9.6\n1.0\n0.5\n18.3\n2.0\n1.0\n39.7\n4.9\n2.5\n63.6\n9.7\n5.0\n99.996\n75.0\n50.0\n* F = 0.98 for exponential filter\n+ \"Last\" refers to the most recent data point\nThe index-count filter has serious deficiencies when applied to either small or large\nsamples of missiles and space vehicles. For small samples, too much emphasis is\nplaced on recent data. For a sample of four, 40% of the total weight is given to the last\ntest, and 70% to the last two tests. For a sample of ten, 18.2% of the total weight is\ngiven to the last test and 72.7% to the last five tests. The reliability improvement rate\nimplied by these weightings seems too optimistic unless there were serious design\nflaws in the early configurations that were discovered and corrected. Since many types\nof failures surely exist that occur only once in 50 or once in 100 or more launches, the\ntenth launch may be no better than the first for predicting the probability of occurrence\nof such failures. For large samples, the index-count filter under-weights current data\n9/10/96\n19\nRTI" }, { "n": 29, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p29.jpg", "text": "more and more as the sample size increases. For samples of 200, 500, and 1000, the\nweighting of the last 50 tests are, in each case, 43.7%, 19.0%, and 9.7% of the total\nweight. For samples of 100 or more, no matter how large, the index-count filter assigns\n25% of the data weight to the oldest half of the data sample - too much in RTI's\nopinion.\nFor missiles and space vehicles, the data weightings imposed by the exponential filter\n(F = 0.98) appear reasonable. For small samples less than 20 or so, there is little\ndifference between equal and exponential weightings. For sample sizes near 80, the\nindex-count and exponential filters produce similar results. For sample sizes of 200\nand more, the weights assigned to the most recent 5, 10, 25, and 50 tests are essentially\nconstant, showing the fading-memory nature of the exponential filter.\nThe denominator of the exponential-filter equation [Eq. (18), Appendix CJ is a\ngeometric series that asymptotically approaches a limit of [1/(1- F)] as n approaches\ninfinity. For F = 0.98, that limit is 50. Thus, the last data point, which is always given a\nweight of one, can never be weighted less than 2% of the total, no· matter how large the\nsample. For samples of 200 and 300, the oldest half of the data receives only 11.7% and\n5% of the total weight. For samples of 500 and larger, the oldest half of the data sample\nis essentially o~tted altogether. The exponential filter is clearly a fading-memory\nfilter, as it should be for space-vehicle performance data.\nHaving decided upon the exponential filter as the best method for weighting missile\nand space-vehicle performance data, a filter constant F must be chosen. To see how\ndata weighting varies with filter-factor value, weighting percentages for various\nsamples were computed for representative configurations of Atlas, Delta, and Titan\nusing values of F from 0.96 to 0.995. The results are shown in Table 5.\n9/10/96\n20\nRTI" }, { "n": 30, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p30.jpg", "text": "Table 5. Filter Factor Influence on Weighting Percentages\nVehicle\nFilter\n• Last\nLast 10\nLast 50\nLast\nLastl00\nPt. Ratio\n(sample)\nCons't\nPoint\nPoints\nPoints\nHalf*\nPoints\nlast: first\nAtlas\n0.96\n4.01\n33.6\n87.2\n96.0\n98.5\n560\n(156)\n0.97\n0.98\n0.99\n0.995\n3.03\n2.09\n1.26\n0.92\n26.5\n19.1\n12.1\n9.0\n78.9\n66.4\n49.9\n40.9\n91.5\n82.9\n68.7\n59.7\n96.1\n90.6\n80.1\n72.7\n112\n22.9\n4.7\n2.2\nDelta\n0.%\n4.02\n33.5\n87.5\n92.9\n98.9\n158\n(125)\n0.97\n0.98\n0.99\n0.995\n3.07\n2.17\n1.40\n1.07\n26.9\n19.9\n13.4\n10.5\n80.0\n69.1\n55.2\n47.6\n87.3\n78.3\n65.6\n58.2\n97.4\n94.3\n88.6\n84.7\n43.7\n12.2\n3.5\n1.9\nTitan\n0.96\n4.00\n33.5\n87.1\n97.1\n98.4\n1030\n(171)\n0.97\n0.98\n0.99\n0.995\n3.02\n2.07\n1.22\n0.87\n26.4\n18.9\n11.7\n8.5\n78.6\n65.7\n48.1\n38.5\n93.2\n85.1\n70.5\n60.8\n95.8\n89.6\n77.2\n68.5\n177\n31.0\n5.5\n2.3\n*Last half + 1 if sample size is odd\nAlthough the choice of a filter constant cannot be completely objective, use of a value\nless than 0.97 or greater than 0.99 produces undesirable weightings. For F = 0.96, for\nexample, the most recent test result for Titan is weighted 1030 times that for the oldest\ntest; the last 50 data points receive 87.1% of the total weighting, leaving only 12.9% for\nthe first 121 flights; the last 100 flights receive 98.4% of the total weighting thus, in\neffect, omitting the oldest 71 flights from the solution.\nAt the high end of the F spectrum, a value of 0.995 fails to down-weight the old test\n•results sufficiently. Using Atlas as an example, the most recent data point (1/31/96) is\nweighted only 2.2 times that of the oldest data point (8/14/64). The oldest half of the\ndata, stretching from 8/14/64 to 3/06/73, receives 40% of the total weight, and the\nearliest 56 launches, comprising 36% of the data, receive 27% (100 - 73) of the total\nweight. This is not too different from equal weighting of tests, a procedure that fails to\nacknowledge the improvements in Atlas reliability that have taken place over a period\nof 32 years.\nIn choosing a value of F, an attempt is made to strike a suitable balance between two\ncontrary objectives:\n(1) to down-weight substantially those failures for which the probability of\noccurrence has been greatly reduced through redesign and replacement of\ncomponents, improved test procedures, and the like;\n9/10/96\n21\nRTI" }, { "n": 31, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p31.jpg", "text": "(2) to down-weight only slightly, or not at all, those failures that are random in\nnature, that can still occur in replacement components, or that occur only once in\n100 or several hundred launches in components that have not yet failed.\nNo matter what technique is employed, filtering is at best a compromise. The perfect\nfilter would somehow down-weight to some extent or entirely those failures that have\nbeen \"fixed\" or made less likely, without down-weighting those random failures with\nunknown causes. The filters considered in this study have no such capabilities; they\nproduce a result based solely on the launch sequence, and where in the sequence\nfailures have occurred.\nIn predicting vehicle failure probabilities from empirical data, large representative\nsamples are essential for a good estimate, and the more reliable the vehicle, the greater\nthe need for a large sample. For example, if some characteristic exists in exactly 1% of a\npopulation, the probability is 0.37 that it will not appear in a random sample of 100,\nand 0.61 that it will not appear if the sample size is 50. If the characteristic exists in 2%\nof the population, it fails to-appear about 36% of the time in a random sample of 50.\nFor reasons presented above, the data samples for Atlas, Delta, and Titan have been\nmade as large as possible consistent with the notion of representative configurations, as\nset forth in Ref. [4]. In RTI's judgment, the value of F that best weights the performance\ndata is 0.98, although a value anywhere in the interval 0.97 to 0.99 cannot be ruled out.\nFor consistency in data weighting, the same values of F have been used for all vehicle\nprograms. The differences in predicted failure probability that result from these three\nF's are illustrated in Figure 4 for Atlas. The plots show the inverse relationship\nbetween filter volatility and the value of F. For F = 0.97 vis-a-vis larger values, it can be\nseen that the filtered failure probability jumps higher with each failure and drops at a\nfaster rate with each successful launch that follows.\n9/10/96\n22\nRTI" }, { "n": 32, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p32.jpg", "text": "0.12\n0.11\n0.10\n0.09\n>­\n~ 0.08\n:a\n.c\nca\n0.07\ne\na..\n0.06\n(l)\nlo...\n::J\n0.05\n'ffi\nu..\n0.04\n\"C\n(l)\nlo...\n(l)\n0.03\n=\nu::\n0.02\n0.01\n0.00\n..............i.................!................J................. L...............!...-.-.J..F.=..o.97.....\n:\ni\ni\ni\ni\n: F\ni\n1\n11\ni\ni\ni\ni -\n=0~98\n••••• ······1· ··············1·················1·················1·················j···-----i••F·=··~~99·····\ni\n\\\\\ni\ni\n!\n\\ ;\n\\ ;',,,\n.............LI'~:-~:t-1-1········---1' ..............r,,~­\n............. ;OOOOOOOppO&aOOOOO; •••••••••••••••••;••ooOOOOOOOOOOOOO ;OOOOOO ■ OOOOOOOHO; ..•••••••••••••••; OOOOO ■ OHHOOOOOO ; ■ --600000000 ..\nI\n!\n!\nl\ni\n!\ni\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100 120 140 160\nSample Index (newer->)\nFigure 4. Filter Factor Results for Representative Configurations of Atlas\nIn summary, it must be recognized that there is no \"correct'' value for F, and that it is\neven difficult to argue generally that one value of F is better than another. In RTI's\nview, values of F below 0.97 place too much emphasis on a relatively small sample of\nrecent launches. Values above 0.99 extend the sample so far back in time that too little\nemphasis is placed on improvements in design, materials, and operational procedures.\nIn any event, the value chosen for F is crucial in arriving at a predicted failure\nprobability. For the more conservative, a value of 0.99 can be chosen; the optimistic\nmight chose 0.97.\nSince most risk-analysis studies that RTI makes are concerned with the launch area,\nfailure probabilities beyond flight-phase 2 are of minor interest. The overall failure\nprobabilities shown in Table 6 have, with one exception, been extracted from Table 2\nfor F = 0.98. Where a best estimate is called for, RTI plans to use these probabilities in\nfuture launch-area risk analyses for the 45 SW/SE unless directed otherwise, or until\nadditions to the data samples in Appendix D justify changes.\n9/10/96\n23\nRTI" }, { "n": 33, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p33.jpg", "text": "Table 6. Failure Probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan\nPredicted Failure Probability*\nVehicle\nAtlas\nDelta\nFlight Phase\n0-1\n0.022\n0.010\nFlight Phase\n0-2\n0.031\n0.013\nTitan\n0.040\n0.064\n*Exponential filter with F = 0.98\nFor Delta, the predicted failure probabilities shown in Table 2 for flight-phases O - 1\nand O - 2 are the same, since no second-stage failure has occurred in the 125 flights\nincluded in the representative sample.\nObviously, this does not mean that the\nprobability of a Delta second-stage failure is zero. As stated earlier, the choice of F is a\njudgment matter with the most reasonable range for F considered to be 0.97 SF S 0.99.\nj\nTo- show a difference in failure probabilities between Delta flight phases, a value of\nF = 0.98 has been used for flight phases O-1, and 0.99 for flight phases O - 2. It is an\ninteresting coincidence that the same value of 0.013 is obtained using F = 0.98 and all\nI\nDelta configurations (see Table 3). Another way to estimate the Delta second-stage\nI\nfailure probability is to calculate an upper confidence limit at some suitable level for an\nevent that has occurred zero times in 125 trials. At the 80% confidence level, the\nI\nreliability is at least 0.987, so- the failure probability during second-stage bum (flight\nphases 1.5 - 2) is no bigger than 0.013.\nI\n5.2 Relative and Absolute Probabllltles for Response Modes\nI\nFor Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles, failure-response Modes 1, 2, and 3 are much less\nI\nlikely to- occur than Modes 4 and 5. Since the probabilities of occurrence for the less-\nlikely modes may be only one in a thousand or less, such responses may not have\noccurred at all in the flight tests of representative configurations. • In fact, in· the\nI\ncombined samples for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, only 16 failures have occurred during\nflights phases O - 2. None of the 16 resulted in response-modes 1, 2, or 3. Because of\n. the small number of failures in the representative configuration samples, the relative\nprobabilities of occurrence for Modes 1 through 5 have been estimated using results\nfrom all vehicle configurations and launches shown in Appendix D. The rationale for\nthis approach is that, except for obvious problems that have been corrected, other\nchanges made through the years to improve vehicle reliability have reduced the\nprobabilities of occurrence of all response modes more or less proportionally. The\ngreater significance of more recent vehicle modifications and test results is. accounted\nfor by using an exponential filter to estimate overall failure probabilities. Thus, if\nMode-1 failures occurred more frequently in the distant past than in recent years, the\nweighting process reduces the significance of the earlier Mode-1 responses in the\nrelative probability-of-occurrence calculations. As tabulated from Appendix D, the\nnumber (count) of failures by response mode and flight phase for Atlas, Delta, Titan,\nand Eastern-Range Thor launches are given in Table 7 through Table 10. Thor launches\n9/10/96\n24\nRTI" }, { "n": 34, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p34.jpg", "text": "from the Western Range were not included since available performance records were\nincomplete. The results for the four vehicles are combined in Table 11. Table 12 gives\nlast-occurrence dates by' response mode for each launch vehicle.\nTable 7. Number of Atlas Failures - All Confisrurations (532 Flights)\nFlight\nFailure-Res :,onse Mode\n3&4\nPhase\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n'NA'\nTumble\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0-1\n7\n1\n2\n38\n8\n4\n11\n0-2\n7\n1\n2\n66\n15\n13\n19\n0-3\n7\n1\n2\n86\n15\n18\n25\n0-4\n7\n1\n2\n89\n15\n21\n27\n0-5\n7\n1\n2\n89\n15\n23\n27\nTable 8. Number of Delta Failures - All Configurations (232 Flights)\nFlight\nFailure-Res oonse Mode\n3&4\nPhase\n1\n2\n4\n5\n'NA'\nTumble\n3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n·2\n0-1\n0\n0\n2\n5\n0\n0\n0-2\n0\n0\n4\n2\n10\n1\n0\n0-3\n0\n0\n0\n7\n3\n12\n1\n13\n0-4\n0\n0\n0\n7\n3\n1\n1\n7\n3\n15\n0-5\n0\n0\n0\nTable 9. Number of Titan Failures - All Configurations (337 Flights)\nFlight\nPhase\n1\nFail\n2\nure-Res\n3\n4\noonse Mode\n5\n'NA'\n3&4\nTumble\n0\n0\n0\n0\n3\n0\n0\n1\n0-1\n2\n2\n0\n13\n1\n0\n5\n0-2\n2\n2\n0\n39\n5\n3\n10\n0-3\n2\n2\n0\n46\n5\n5\n11\n0-4\n2\n2\n0\n47\n5\n7\n11\n0-5\n2\n2\n0\n47\n5\n10\n11\nTable 10. Number of Eastern-Range Thor Failures (85 Flights)\nFlight\nFailure-Res oonse Mode\n3&4\nTumble\nPhase\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n'NA'\n0\n0-1\n0-2\n0-3\n0-4\n0-5\n0\n4\n4\n4\n4\n4\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n1\n15\n4\n1\n1\n20\n5\n1\n1\n22\n5\n1\n1\n22\n5\n1\n1\n22\n5\n0\n1\n3\n3\n4\n5\n0\n3\n3\n3\n3\n3\n9/10/%\n25\nRTI" }, { "n": 35, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p35.jpg", "text": "Table 11. Number of Failures for All Vehicles (1186 Flights)\nFlight\nPhase\n1\nFail\n2\nure-Res\n3\noonse Mode\n4\n5\n'NA'\n3&4\nTumble\n0\n0-1\n0-2\n0-3\n0-4\n0-5\n0\n13\n13\n13\n13\n13\n0\n4\n4\n4\n4\n4\n0\n3­\n3\n3\n3\n3\n3\n68\n129\n161\n165\n165\n0\n15\n27\n28\n28\n28\n0\n11\n29\n38\n45\n53\n1\n19\n33\n40\n42\n42\nTable 12. Date of Most Recent Failure\nResponse\nVehicle\nMode\nAtlas\nDelta\nTitan\nThor*\n1\n03/02/65\nnone\n12/12/59\n04/19/58\n2\n12/18/81\nnone\n05/01/63\n12/30/58\n3\n.04/25/61\nnone\nnone\n07/21/59\n4\n08/22/92\n05/03/86\n10/05/93\n03/24//64\n5\n12/08/80\n08/27/69\n11/30/65\n01/24/62\n*Last Thor launch was 02/23/65\nFor the reasons advanced previously, an exponential filter has been used to estimate\nrelative probabilities of occurrence for Modes 1 through 5 and the fraction of Mode-3\nand Mode-4 failures that tumble while the vehicle is thrusting.\nThe percentage\nweightings for various data samples are shown in Table 13 for values of F from 0.980 to\n0.999. Because of the large size of the composite sample (1186), the filter-control\nconstant of 0.98 used previously to estimate absolute failure probabilities for individual\nvehicles does not seem suitable for estimating relative probabilities for the individual\nresponse modes. Use of 0.98 would effectively place 98.2% of the total weight on the\nmost recent 200 tests thus, in effect, eliminating the earliest 986 tests from the solution.\nThese are the very tests needed to provide an adequate sample of failures from which\nto estimate relative frequencies of occurrence of the individual response modes.\n9/10/96\n26\nRTI" }, { "n": 36, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p36.jpg", "text": "Table 13. Percentage Weighting for Sample of 1186 Launches\nter\nLast\nLast 100\nLast200\nLast 300 I i:st 500\nPoint Ra\nPoint\nPoints\nPoints\nnstant\nPoints\nPoints\nLast:Fir\n0.999\n0.14\n13.7\n26.1\n37.3\n56.7\n3.3\n0.996\n0.40\n33.3\n55.6\n70.6\n87.3\n1.2 X 1()2\n0.995\n0.50\n39.5\n63.5\n78.0\n92.1\n3.8x 1()2\n0.994\n0.60\n45.3\n70.0\n83.6\n95.1\n1.3x Hf\n0.993\n0.70\n50.5\n75.5\n87.9\n97.0\n4.2 X l(f\n0.992\n0.80\n55.2\n79.9\n91.0\n98.2\n1.4 X 104\n0.991\n0.90\n59.5\n83.6\n93.4\n98.9\n4.5 X 104\n0.990\n1.00\n63.4\n86.6\n95.1\n99.3\n1.5x Hf\n0.980\n2.00\n86.7 ·\n98.2\n99.8\n99.996\n3.9 X 1011\nThe value of F = 0.999 is considered inappropriate because, as seen in Table 13, the\nweighting factor applied to the most recent datum is only 3.3 times that applied to the\noldest test result from 39 years ago. The most recent 200 and 300 points in the sample\ncomprising 16.8% and 25.2% of the data receive only 26.1% and 37.3% of the total\nweight. This is not too different from equal weighting of data, which is appropriate\nonly if the relative frequency of occurrence of each response mode has not changed\nsignificantly through the years. On the other hand, use of F = 0.99 effectively throws\nout the oldest 600 to 700 launches that are sorely needed for an adequate sample size.\nThe results of the filtering process are given in Table 14 for failures during flight phases\n0 - 2.\nTable 14. Response-Mode Occurrence Percentages\nFilter\nRespcnse Mode\nFactor\n0.999\n1\n7.39\n2\n2.27\n3\n1.70\n4\n73.30\n5\n15.34\n0.996\n2.24\n4.35\n0.37\n80.37\n12.67\n0.995\n1.32\n4.92\n0.19\n82.59\n10.98\n0.994\n0.993\n0.992\n0.991\n0.73\n0.39\n0.20\n0.11\n5.26\n5.37\n5.31\n5.13\n0.09\n0.04\n0.02\n0.01\n84.57\n86.25\n87.68\n88.92\n9.35\n7.95\n6.78\n5.84\n0.990\n0.05\n4.87\n0.00\n90.02\n5.06\n0.980\n0.00\n1.86\n0.00\n96.81\n1.33\nThe results in Table 14 show that the percentages of occurrence for response-modes 2\nand 4 are relatively insensitive to filter-factor values, while the percentages for\nModes 1, 3, and 5 decrease as filter memory (filter factor) decreases. This suggests that\noccurrences of Modes 1, 3, and 5 have been decreasing over the years, while Modes 2\nand 4 occurrences have not changed much. Although it cannot be argued convincingly\n9/10/96\n27\nRTI" }, { "n": 37, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p37.jpg", "text": "that 0.993 is superior to 0.992 or 0.994, or even values outside this interval, a value of\n0.993 was chosen.\nThis section has thus far described a rationale for selecting a filtering process and filter\nconstant to estimate percentages of occurrence of failure-response modes for Atlas,\nDelta, and Titan launch vehicles. These are mature launch systems with improved\nreliability as a result of years of experience and corrections of problems. Although the\ndesigns of new launch vehicles may be based to some extent on mature systems, new\nsystems are expected to fail at a higher rate. For vehicles with liquid-propellant stages\nburning at liftoff, the percentages of occurrence of the various response modes are more ••\nlikely to be similar to the earlier versions of Atlas, Delta, and Titan· than to current\nvehicles. For lack of any other data, for such new liquid-propellant systems the relative\npercentages for the five failure-response modes have been calculated using the total\ncombined sample of Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Thor with a filter constant of 0.999 (almost\nequal weighting).\nFor new solid-propellant vehicles, use of F = 0.999 results in a Mode-1 percentage that\nseems much too high. All of the 13 Mode-1 failures in the composite sample (Table 11)\ninvolved liquid-propellant vehicles, whereas none of the Atlas, Delta, or Titan\nconfigurations with solid-propellant boosters have experienced a Mode-1 response. On\nthe other hand, use of F = 0.993 that is applied for mature launch systems seems to\nreduce the probability of a Mode-5 response too much, since a Red Tigress vehicle and\na Joust vehicle launched at the Cape in 1991 both experienced Mode-5 failure responses\n(see Section 2). As a compromise between new and mature liquid-propellant vehicles,\na value of F = 0.996 has been assumed for new solid-propellant vehicles.\nThe\npercentages shown in Table 15 for flight phases O-2 have been·obtained from Table 14.\nSimilar information for flight phases O - 1 are given in Table 16. In future risk studies\nfor the 45 SW/SE, RTI plans to use these relative percentages for mature and new\nsystems.\nTable 15. Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases O - 2\nResponse\nMature .caunch\nMode\nSvstems (F = 0.993)\n1\n0.4\n2\n5.4\n3\n0.1\n4\n86.2\n5\n7.9\nNew Solid Systems\nNew Liquid Systems\n(F =0.996)\n(F =0.999)\n2.2\n7.4\n4.3\n2.3\n0.4\n1.7\n80.4\n73.3\n12.7\n15.3\n9/10/96\n28\nRTI" }, { "n": 38, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p38.jpg", "text": "Response\nMature Launch\nNew Solid Systems\nNew Liquid Systems\nMode\nS stems (F =0.993)\n{F =0.996)\n{F = 0.999)\n1\n0.5\n3.4\n10.7\n2\n7.4\n6.6\n4.3\n3\n0.1\n0.6\n2.4\n4\n81.9\n74.5\n67.0\n5\n10.1\n14.9\n15.6\nAbsolute probabilities of occurrence for response Modes 1 through 5 can be obtained by\nmultiplying the absolute failure probabilities for flight phases 0 - 1 and 0 - 2 {Table 6)\nby the relative failure probabilities in Table 15 and Table 16. The results are shown in\nTable 17. Probabilities are listed to six decimal places to show differences, not because\nall figures are actually significant. To obtain these results, more precise values for\nrelative probabilities of occurrence were used than shown in Table 15 and Table 16.\nTable 17. Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1 - 5\nVehicle:\nAtlas\nDelta\nTitan\nFlight\nPhase:\n0-1\n0-2\n(0-170 sec)\n(0-280 sec)\n0-1\n0-2\n(0-270 sec)\n(0-630 sec)\n0-1\n(0-300 sec)\n0-2\n(0-540 sec)\nModel\nMode2\nMode3\nMode4\n0.000119\n0.000121\n0.001637\n0.001665\n0.000011\n0.000012\n0.018007\n0.026738\n0.000054\n0.000051\n0.000744\n0.000698\n0.000005\n0.000005\n0.008185\n0.011212\n0.000216\n0.002976\n0.000020\n0.032740\n0.000250\n0.003437\n0.000026\n0.055200\nModes\n0.002226\n0.002465\n0.001012\n0.001034\n0.004048\n0.005088\nTotal\n0.022\n0.031\n0.010\n0.013\n0.040\n0.064\nFor each vehicle, the absolute probabilities for Modes 1, 2, and 3 ~iffer slightly for flight\nphases 0 - 1 and 0 - 2. This difference is due to the unequal data weighting produced\nby the exponential filter. If equal data weighting had been applied, the absolute\nprobabilities for these modes would have been identical as expected, since Modes 1, 2,\nand 3 cannot occur beyond flight phase 1.\nDifferences in absolute probabilities for Modes 4 and 5 for flight phases O - 1 and O - 2\ncan also be seen in the table. A part of this difference may result from unequal data\nweighting, but primarily it is due to the obvious fact that fewer Mode 4 and 5 failures\nhave occurred during flight phase 0 - 1 than during the longer span of flight phase 0 - 2.\n9/10/96\n29\nRTI" }, { "n": 39, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p39.jpg", "text": "5.3 Relative Probability of Tumble for Response-Modes 3 and 4\nExponential filters with values of F from 0.98 to 0.999 have been used to- estimate the\npercentage of Mode-3 and Mode-4 • responses that tenninate with a thrusting tumble.\nResults are given· in Table 18 for flight phases 0 - 2 and 0 - 5. For launch-area risk\ncalculations, only flight phases O - 2 are of interest.\nThe data sample was a\nchronological composite of all Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Thor tests and configurations\nshown in Appendix D. To several decimal places at least, the values in the table are\ndetermined entirely from Mode-4 responses, since the last vehicle to experience a\nMode-3 response (4/25/61) is weighted out of the solution: The results in Table 18 are\nbased ona total sample size of 1,186 flight tests.\nTable 18. Percent of Response Modes 3 and 4 That Tumble .\nFilter Factor\nFlight Phases O - 2 Flie.:ht Phases 0 - 5\n0.999\n25.0\n25.0\n0.996\n26.3\n27.0\n0.993\n27.3\n28.6\n0.990\n28.3\n30.1\n0.980\n31.3\n34.8\nThrough flight phase 2, there were 33 tumbles out of a total of 132 Mode-3 and Mode-4\nresponses. Through flight phase 5, there were 42 tumbles out of 168 Mode-3 and\nMode-4 responses.\nAs seen from Table 13, the smaller the filter factor, the greater the weight placed on\nrecent test data. In view of this, it is apparent from Table 18 that the percentage of\nMode-4 responses that end with a thrusting tumble has been increasing gradually. The\nsame conclusion is reached for flight phases 0 - 2 and 0 - 5. In recognition of this\ngradual increase, in future studies RTI will assume that approximately one-third of\nMode-3 and Mode-4 failure responses end with a thrusting tumble.\n9/10/96\n30" }, { "n": 40, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p40.jpg", "text": "6. Shaping Constants Through Simulation\nSince adequate test data are not available to establish the Mode-5 shaping constants\nempirically, other methods are needed for this purpose. It will be recalled that, after\nvehicle pitchover, any malfunction with the potential to cause a substantial deviation\nfrom the intended flight line is, by definition, a Mode-5 failure response.\nThe\nmalfunction need not actually cause a large deviation to be classified as a Mode-5\nresponse. One such class of failures leading to a Mode-5 response has been termed a\nrandom-attitude failure. Such responses can result from guidance and control failures\nthat lead to erroneous orientation of the guidance platform or an erroneous spatial\ntarget. Another class of failures that can cause sustained deviation away from the flight\nline is the slow turn, where the engine nozzle, in effect, locks in some fixed position,\ngenerally but not necessarily near null.\nBoth types of malfunctions have been\ninvestigated in an attempt to estimate numerical values for Mode-5 shaping constants A\nand B. Basically, the idea is to (1) run a large sample of random-attitude and slow-tum\nfailures, (2) calculate the percentages of impacts in five-degree sectors from 0° to 180°,\n(3) compare these percentages with those obtained from the Mode-5 impact density\nfunction when specific values are assigned to A and B, and (4) assign values to A and B\nuntil the best pos~ible fit is obtained between the simulated-tum impacts and the\ntheoretical Mode-5 impacts.\n6.1 Malfunction Turn Slmulatlons\n6.1.1 Random-Attitude Failures\nA guidance and control failure leading to a fixed erroneous direction of thrust is\ntermed a random-attitude failure. Such failures represent a subset of possible Mode-5\nfailure responses. Random-attitude failures can be used to establish the maximum\npossible region of impact, given that a vehicle has flown normally for a specified period\nof time. For this purpose RTI has developed a Random-Attitude Failure Impact Point\n(RAFIP) program written in Fortran (3900 lines of code) for execution on a personal\ncomputer.\nUsing a Monte Carlo approach, program RAFIP first selects a starting time and then a\nrandom thrust direction on the attitude sphere, with all directions having the same\nchance of being chosen. Each Monte-Carlo run is begun using the nominal vehicle\nposition and velocity at the selected start time, assuming an instantaneous change in\nthrust direction. Thrust is applied continuously in the selected random direction, and\nthe equations of motion are numerically integrated until one of four conditions is\nsatisfied: (1) final stage burnout occurs, (2) the vehicle impacts while thrusting,\n(3) orbital insertion occurs, (4) the vehicle breaks up due to aerodynamic forces\nFor conditions (1) and (4), the trajectory is extended to impact using Kepler's equations.\nFor condition (3), an impact point does not exist. The process just described is repeated\n9/10/%\n31\nRT!" }, { "n": 41, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p41.jpg", "text": "for a suitably large sample so the distribution of resulting impact points will, for all\npractical purposes, represent all possible impact points, irrespective of the actual nature\nof the failure.\nDepending on vehicle breakup characteristics and failure time, a vehicle that\nexperiences a random-attitude failure may break up at the instant of failure, or after a\nfew seconds into the tum, or not at all. In making the calculations, three separate\nbreakup thresholds and a no-breakup case were investigated. With respect to vehicle\nbreakup, the assumption was made that the vehicle would break up if qa. exceeded a\nspecified constant limit, where q is the dynamic pressure and a. is the total angle of\nattack. Although the breakup qa may well be a complicated function of Mach number\nand other parameters, this simplistic approach was taken.\nRandom-attitude-failure calculations were made individually for Atlas, Delta, Titan,\nand LLVl starting shortly after pitchover and continuing to some convenient time such\nas a stage burnout when the vehicle could no longer endanger the launch area.\nTheoretically, the Mode-5 impact density function extends downrange until the\ninstantaneous impact point vanishes. Since this study is concerned with evaluation of ·\ndensity-function parameters for launch-area risk analysis, the random-attitude\ncalculations were _stopped at a staging event when the vehicle no· longer had sufficient\nenergy to return the impact point to the launch area. Using trajectory data for each\nvehicle, program RAFIP was run to generate 10,000 impact-point samples at each\nstarting time. Calculations were made at ten-second intervals.\n6.1.2 Slow-Turn Failures\nCertain types of guidance and control failures can cause the thrusting engine to gimbal\nto null or a near-null position: Such failures can produce what is herein called a slow\ntum. For various reasons, after an engine is commanded to null it may not thrust\nprecisely through the center of gravity, e.g., structural misalignments, shifting center of\ngravity, canted nozzles. Since, like random-attitude failures, slow ·turns constitute a\nsubset of Mode-5 failure responses, they have been investigated using RTI program\nRAFIP. The following assumptions have been made in making the calculations:\n(1) The effective thrust offset of a \"nulled\" engine is normally distributed with a zero\nmean and a standard deviation of 0.1°.\n(2) A fixed thrust offset results in a constant angular acceleration of the airframe, and\nthus a constant angular acceleration of the thrust vector.\n(3) For small thrust misalignments, the angular acceleration of the airframe is\nproportional to the angular thrust misalignment.\nAt each time point, the angular acceleration produced by small thrust offsets was\nestimated from the malfunction turn data provided to the safety office by the range\nuser. Malfunction turns for the Atlas IIAS were provided for three gimbal angles, the\nsmallest being one degree.\nFor each gimbal angle, the results were plotted as\n9/10/96\n32\nRTI" }, { "n": 42, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p42.jpg", "text": "cumulative angle turned versus time. Since the slope of the curve (i.e., the turning rate)\nis greatest when the thrust (and thus airframe) is directed at right angles to the velocity\nvector, the average angular acceleration during the first 90° of rotation was obtained\nfrom the equation\n(4)\nso that\n8 = 2 8(deg) = 180 deg\n(5)\nt2 (sec2 )\nt2 sec2\nwhere t is the elapsed time from the beginning of the tumble tum until the airframe has\nrotated approximately 90°. If the assumption is made that the angular acceleration is\ndirectly proportional to the thrust offset angle (i.e., nozzle deflection), the angular\nacceleration 0d for any small deflection angle becomes\n(6)\nwhere 0 is the angular acceleration computed from Eq. (5) for deflection angle 6 (1° for\nAtlas IIAS), and 6d is some small deflection angle.\nUsing the Atlas IIAS data, angular accelerations 8 were computed at ten-second\nintervals from the programming time of 15 seconds to 275 seconds for 6 = 1°. For each\nstarting time, a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.1°\nwas sampled to obtain an initial thrust misalignment 6d to substitute in Eq. (6). The\nresulting angular acceleration 8d was applied throughout the. tum.\nSlow-tum\ncalculations were made in a manner analogous to the random-attitude turns, using the\nreference trajectory to obtain the starting position and velocity components. The slow\nturn was assumed to occur in a randomly oriented plane containing the starting\nvelocity vector. Each turn was carried out until one of the four conditions listed in\nSection 6.1.1 for random-attitude turns was met. For conditions (1) and (4), impact\npoints were calculated and, along with thrusting impacts from condition (2), summed\nfor each five-degree sector from 0° to 175°. At each starting time, 10,000 impact-point\ncalculations were made.\n6.1.3 Factors Affecting Malfunction-Turn Results\nRandom-attitude turns and slow turns are only subsets of the totality of Mode-5 failure\nresponses. As discussed earlier in Section 3, other types of behavior following a Mode-\ns failure are numerous and largely impossible to categorize, much less simulate.\nIdeally, impact distributions from all types of Mode-5 responses should be combined\nbefore results are compared with those obtained from the theoretical Mode-5 impact\n9/10/96\n33\nRTI" }, { "n": 43, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p43.jpg", "text": "density function. Since this could not be done in general, impacts from only the two\ntypes of malfunction turns were considered. Several factors affect the results of the\nsimulations:\na. Weighting of tum data: Both random-attitude and slow-tum. simulations were\nmade for Atlas HAS. In combining impacts from the two data sets, random-\nattitude turns were assumed to be three times as likely to occur as slow turns. A\nfactor of three was selected· since, among the Mode-5 failure responses in the\nperformance summaries for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, random-attitude turns\nappeared to occur about three times as often as slow turns. In many cases, lack of\ndetailed information made it difficult to· decide whether a Mode-5 response\nshould be considered as a random-attitude tum, a slow tum, or some other type\nof failure. The relative weighting of turns makes little difference, however, since\nthe impact distribution for the two types of turns are similar (as shown later in\nFigure 5), and since the weighted composite must lie between the two. It was\nassumed that similar results would be obtained for Delta, Titan, and LCVl, so\nslow-turn computations were not made for these vehicles, cutting the number of\ntime-consuming simulations in half.\nb. Breakup qa: In the tum calculations, the assumption was made that vehicle\nbreakup would occur if a certain value of qa. was reached~ In addition to the no-\nbreakup case which is considered unrealistic, separate runs were made for three\nconstant values of qa: 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 deg-lb/ft2. As stated previously,\nthe determination of vehicle breakup is, in reality, much more involved than this\nsimplistic approach would suggest. However, to add realism to the malfunction-\ntum calculations, use of a simple approach seemed better than none at all. For\nTitan IV, allowable (but not breakup) qa.'s were provided as functions of Mach\nnumber. The maximum permissible value and corresponding Mach number for\nTitan/Centaur, Titan/NUS~ and Titan/lUS were, respectively, 6819 deflb/ft2 at\nMach No. 0.77, 5332 deg-lb/ft2 at Mach No. 0.815, and 17,000 deg-lb/ft at Mach\nNo. 0.325.\nFor Atlas, Delta, and LLVl vehicles, no breakup qa. data were\navailable.\nThe breakup qa.'s used in the calculations bracket the range of\npermissible qa.'s for the Titan vehicles.\nc. End time T5: The simulated impact distributions from random-attitude failures\nand slow turns were compared with impact distributions computed from the\nMode-5 theoretical impact-density function.\nFor the comparisons to be\nmeaningful, the value selected for T5 in the Mode-5 impact-density equation and\nthe stop time for thrusting-turn simulations must be the same. To some extent,\nthe shaping constants A and B derived by fitting the theoretical and simulated\nimpact data depend on TJY since the percentage of impacts in each 5° sector\ndepends on TB. However, after A and B have been established for a particular TJY\nusing a different TB in the DAMP calculations has no effect on computed risks\nprovided an adjustment is made in the probability of occurrence of a Mode-5\n9/10/96\n34\nRTI" }, { "n": 44, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p44.jpg", "text": "response. Referring to Eq. (3), the right-hand member must be multiplied by the\nprobability p5 of a Mode-5 response to obtain absolute probabilities. Except for TB\nitself (and to a slight degree, shaping constants A and B), the quantities in the\nequation do not depend on TB. Thus if TB and p5 are both changed so that p/(TB -\nTp) remains constant, the computed risks are unchanged.\nIf destruct action (i.e., impact limit lines) is included in the DAMP calculations,\nthe supplemental risks* resulting from that action must be accounted for. In this\ncase, the termination time has a minor influence on results, since it affects the\nnumber of impacts that would occur beyond the impact limit lines without\ndestruct that are forced inside when destruct action is taken. If destruct action is\nomitted, the value of TB is immaterial (i.e., supplemental Mode-5 risks are non-\nexistent) provided that the impact range along the reference trajectory at time TB\nexceeds the range to all targets of interest.\n(Except in this paragraph,\nsupplemental Mode-5 risks are not addressed in this present report.)\nd. Vacuum calculations: Atmospheric effects were accounted for in determining\nwhen vehicle breakup would occur and, to some extent, during each thrusting\ntum by using accelerations from the nominal trajectory. To reduce computer time\nand cost of this study, vacuum calculations were made during free fall after\nvehicle breakup or burnout.\nAlthough this increased impact dispersions\nsomewhat, vacuum results should not be drastically different from those\nobtainable using a maximum-beta piece. In theory at least, different mode-5\nshaping constants exist for each debris class. In view of the uncertainties in\nvehicle breakup conditions and characteristics, and in the overall process of\n• simulating Mode-5 malfunctions, attempts to derive unique shaping constants for\neach debris class did not seem justified.\n6.1.4 Malfunction-Turn Results for Atlas IIAS\nFor Atlas IIAS, .the distribution of impacts for simulated random-attitude turns, slow\nturns, and a weighted combination (75% random-attitude and 25% slow tum) are\nshown in Figure 5. Since the impact distribution (i.e., the percentages of impacts in 5°\nsectors) for the weighted composite was not significantly different from that for\nrandom-attitude failures, slow-turn computations were not made for Delta, Titan, and\nLLVl.\n* See Ref. [1], Section 10.\n9/10/96\n35\nRTI" }, { "n": 45, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p45.jpg", "text": "100 ................... ················..·························-················•\"·············· ..............................................................................\n·············At~as·ftA~··Fatlu~es··thr9tJgh··2~··sec···j--·..'. ..............,....................:...................\n•••••••••••••••••••:\n•••1.••••...............L...........,u.uo,,L._,._.,._,,,o\nl\n,,,,,joooo,..\n:\n,,,,uL,u~Hn•••nnn•\n:\n:\n!\n:\n; 2\n:\n;\n··················t...Breakap··q~a!Pha··=··20··000tdeg~tblft'········..····t··:................t...................\n.................. i ................. i ...................j....................i ...... ' ........... i.__1....................1....................! ...................\nI\n~\nRandom-attitude turns :\nI\nj\n•• ··············1 ·················J········sto,~rtumsf···················t·············.....+..................+..................+..................\n~\nI\n~\nCon,bined ~urns (0.75 rahdom ~ 0.25 Slow)\n~ 10 ---l-__i __!___! __!___: __1___,_1__\n.................;..••••••-•••i•••••••••••••••••..•i••••••••....••••••••O••••..........\n••••••••••••••••••••••••••••im••••••••••••..•••>•••••••••••••••••••\n0\n1\n••••~oouuu•••••••••••+•a.••H••••••••••••~-...............u ...i..............••••••• ► •uUnu•••••n•o\n!\n.............. L_ l i_ l _J_ L J i\n\"'°'\n:\nl\n;\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\ni\n.....\n..._\n....\"!T_\n•• F\n·, ·-;-r_--\n..··~···l_·····_-···_·_ ....- .....--;••;__.........-+-r-····__ ••••\n1 t-····_····__••••-+.i-·_ ..............·tir'r~.........-+____\n.._····._\n........-+-r-....-_ .....••••__\n.....••••-i\nQ)\n.................... : ................... , ..............; .................... : ................... : ................... : .................... : .................... : .................. .\no..\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\ni\nl\n--....:...,,.,...,,....\ni\n!\n!\n!\n!\n••••nn••••••••••o-t,unon••..•••nH•i••••••.n•\nou\n•ouHH~..•••••••••••••••..'f'..••...........•••••i•••••••••••••••••..•t•u......•••••••••••t•••••••••••••u•U•\n.........:.........L.................l....................1\n:\nl\n········.l.·..................!\n....[...................\n!\n!\n.\n:\nu•••••••..•••••~•••}uu-••1•n•H•••••••••..•--•i••••-u•u••?••••••••..•••• ..u•+-•_......,,,\n,..~•••\n••••••\n••n\n!\nj\n]\n!\n~\n1\n~\nI\ni\nf\ni\ni\nl\n~\n.\n..••••••••....••••••••••••••••••n•••..• ...••n••••••••••••...•..•••..•••nHOn••,••••••••••••••••\n•••••••••••••••••••••..•••••••......_...,•,.•••,•••ou••••••----H.,\nI\nI\nI\nI\nI\nI\nI\n0.1 ··················· ...................,....................,....................,................... •...................•....................,....................'...................\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 5. Combined Random-Attitude and Slow-Tum·Results\n9/10/96\n36\nRTI" }, { "n": 46, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p46.jpg", "text": "6.2 Shaping Constants for Atlas IIAS\n6.2.1 Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\navailable, random-attitude failures were simulated for a no-breakup case and for three\nbreakup qa's: 20,000 deg-lb/ft2, 10,000 deg-lb/ft2, and 5,000 deg-lb/ft2. For each case,\n270,000 trajectories were run, giving a total of 1,080,000. It turned out that the value\nchosen for the breakup qa was critical in determining shaping constant A, since the\nlower the qa, the less the thrusting time before breakup, and the higher the percentages\nof impacts in sectors near the flight line.\nFor Atlas HAS, the effects of qa on breakup are shown in Figure 6 where, for the\nselected qa's, the percentages of random-attitude turns that result in breakup before\n280 seconds are plotted against failure time.\n.\n.\n'\n'\n'\n'\n'\n'\n'\n'\n100\n'\n,1- - -1-, l\ni AtlasillAS l\n90\n.........\n, ...• ......,/--;',, .... \\ .... • ...................: ....................f ....................: ................ .\nI 1/\ni\n\\ \\:\ni\n, i\n2\n::\nj\n\\\n\\ i\nq-alpha in deg-lb/ff .\n........ , ....,.................... : ........... , ....rt· ................. : .................... : .................... t ............... ..\n80\nI\nI\n•\n\\\n•\n•\n;\n•\nI 1:\n:\n, 1:\n-+ q-alpha = 5 000\n.... 7···/+...................f.............~....~ .........:::..=i~..cfalptta··;··,-0~600..........\n- 70\n, ,\n,\n\\ I\n,\n,\n' '\n0-\n~ - 60\nC:\nQ)\n~ 50\nQ)\n·1' l:i...............\\i,,~--1·q·alp1a=20,r0•••••••••\na..\na. 40\n::::,\n:::,::.\nct1\nQ) 30\n1\ncc\n'­\ni ............1................\n...... __ / __ ~, .. i............ ! ................... !.................\n20\nl\n:\n!\n.\n.\nl\n1\n!\n.................1....................1............................................................ 1 .................... 1 .................\n10\n·················r···..···············r····················;···················-r·\n•\n•\n0\n0\n40\n80\n120\n160\n200\n240\n280\nFailure Time (sec)\nFigure 6. Atlas IIAS Breakup Percentages for Random-Attitude Turns\nFor failures between 10 and 30 seconds, most breakups do not occur at failure, but later\nin flight after the vehicle has built up significant velocity. For failures between 40 and\n105 seconds, more than 80% breakup occurs, even for qa's as high as 20,000 deg-lb/ft2.\n9/10/96\n37\nRTI" }, { "n": 47, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p47.jpg", "text": "In this region, breakup occurs at or shortly after vehicle failure. Beyond 170 seconds,\nthe dynamic pressure between failure and 280 seconds stays sufficiently low so that the\nvehicle remains intact.\nThe dramatic differences in impact distributions that can result at certain times during\nflight if the vehicle is subject to aerodynamic breakup can be seen by comparing the\nimpact footprints in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Both patterns show 10,000 impact points\nfrom random-attitude failures of the Atlas IIAS at 130 seconds. Figure 7 is for no\nbreakup, and Figure 8 is for a breakup q?\n.p\nd\nV1\n(I/\nL\n:1\n....,::s\nV1 d u\n.p '-'- a,\nIll\nu (l)\nd C:S o\na. ::s 0:,\nE .p ru\n1-1 .p\na.\n(I) .p O ::s\n<[ <[ .p ~\nt-tl\nd\n1-1\n.p a,\n£\nL\nviOVli:q\nd ~ ::S\n...., CLO\n.p d..S:: z\n<[ O:'. I-\nFigure 7. Atlas IIAS Impacts with No Breakup\n9/10/96\n39\nRTI" }, { "n": 49, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p49.jpg", "text": "u\nN\nOJ\n+>\nVI\n4­\n0\n_g\n(\") '\n...... --I\nCJ)\n+>\nQJ\nd\n\"'O\nVI\n0\n~\nOJ\n0\n0\ns...\nj\nIf)\n.3\nvi~UII\n+>\na,\nU OJ V'I d\nd \"'O c:,£.\na. :J (X) -­\nE,t->rucS\nt-4 .µ\nI\n(.I) +> O CT\n<'.[ <'.[ +> a.\n1-1 I\n...... E +> :::5\nviOVl~\noc:5:::5Q.J\n...., C t. t.\n+> d £ P=I\n<'.[ 0::: I-\nFigure 8. Atlas IIAS Impacts with Breakup\n9/10/96\n40\nRTI" }, { "n": 50, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p50.jpg", "text": "Table 19. Sample Impact Distribution for Atlas HAS with No Breakup\nFailure Time (sec)\n35\n55\n75\n95\n115\n135\n155\n175\n195\n215\n235\n255\n300\n411\n487\n608\n835\n1107\n1843\n3333\n4092\n5386\n7906\n10000\n314\n388\n465\n575\n808\n1082\n1762\n3065\n3827\n4206\n2094\n0\n316\n427\n495\n627\n744\n975\n1652\n2820\n2081\n408\n0\n0\n329\n354\n464\n558\n730\n945\n1445\n782\n0\n0\n0\n0\n319\n378\n421\n566\n670\n845\n1292\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n316\n349\n406\n525\n641\n776\n1203\n-0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n339\n337\n415\n452\n505\n617\n800\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n336\n381\n368\n405\n506\n550\n3\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n293\n388\n374\n409\n454\n520\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n298\n310\n397\n366\n412\n441\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n282\n331\n346\n323\n352\n378\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n308\n282\n303\n314\n292\n331\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n308\n289\n306\n293\n299\n260\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n262\n279\n300\n294\n286\n256\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n275\n326\n281\n264\n243\n205\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n261\n272\n271\n238\n232\n170\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n266\n249\n272\n234\n194\n111\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n274\n241\n242\n219\n191\n96\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n285\n246\n230\n226\n171\n70\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n283\n280\n235\n180\n136\n55\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n283\n268\n215\n190\n126\n49\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n254\n246\n211\n200\n108\n30\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n267\n237\n204\n168\n114\n27\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n255\n230\n178\n162\n120\n18\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n263\n251\n211\n167\n98\n17\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n255\n225\n189\n155\n62\n11\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n251\n227\n195\n126\n86\n8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n259\n227\n176\n128\n77\n8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n244\n184\n186\n169\n63\n5\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n243\n187\n180\n118\n59\n8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n225\n178\n166\n128\n72\n8\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n259\n199\n151\n113\n68\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n213\n220\n177\n127\n59\n6\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n242\n203\n172\n115\n68\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n256\n195\n171\n127\n60\n6\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n267\n205\n140\n131\n59\n5\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\n10000\nAne.\n15\n0\n255\n5\n279\n10\n261\n15\n298\n274\n20\n25\n287\n30\n257\n35\n299\n275\n40\n299\n45\n242\n50\n280\n55\n60\n272\n65\n288\n70\n250\n75\n283\n80\n273\n85\n287\n90\n235\n303\n95\n100\n292\n105\n279\n110\n283\n115\n261\n120\n311\n125\n276\n130\n266\n135\n283\n140\n286\n145\n305\n150\n251\n155\n293\n160\n253\n165\n254\n170\n298\n175\n312\nTotal\n10000\n275\n10000\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n10000\nAll\n%\n87746\n32.50\n38474\n14.25\n21265\n7.88\n12195\n4.52\n8875\n3.29\n8189\n3.03\n6893\n2.55\n5883\n2.18\n5593\n2.07\n5285\n1.96\n1.68\n4535\n4005\n1.48\n3827\n1.42\n3666\n1.36\n1.29\n3483\n3321\n1.23\n3022\n1.12\n2888\n1.07\n2778\n1.03\n2815\n1.04\n2620\n0.97\n2571\n0.95\n2448\n0.91\n0.87\n2346\n2321\n0.86\n2239\n0.83\n2246\n0.83\n2221\n0.82\n2138\n0.79\n2102\n0.78\n1895\n0.70\n2103\n0.78\n1952\n0.72\n2008\n0.74\n2034\n0.75\n2018\n0.75\n270000\n100.00\n9/10/96\n41\nRTI" }, { "n": 51, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p51.jpg", "text": ".\nIn Figure 9, the percentages of impacts in 5° sectors from 0° to 180° have been plotted\nfor Atlas IIAS random-attitude turns out to 280 seconds. (It should be remembered that\nrandom-attitude turns are representative of combined random-attitude and slow turns.)\nFor B = 1000, theoretical Mode-5 impact percentages are also plotted in the figure for\nbest-fit values of A obtained by trial and error.\n100 .----..----..----..----..----..----..----..----..-----,\n·:::::::·····At,as·!!~r.::~~.......:·· m..A~-l~~e··F~Hur~~:r~~~~~.i..:~~::~~::::::::::::\n_..,...:-···········i····················!·········Br-eakup·Qtalpha·ifldeg-i,b/ft·········+··..······........\n.• ::::::L=J:............... J::::.•:g.ggfup:=I :::::::! =-~•::\n-o\n~o\n'II\n' '\nI\n!:\nI!\na\n: '\nd.\n1 5,00\n:\n:\n!\ni\n~-§\n1\n0\n,_..,,..~,;~..,_______-•--•••.....\n~o•-••o-n•o-nn-nn.......\n•in-••••-••.,•-••••-••••....\nn~•-un-uu-uu-HH...j.U~--•\n..-oH-HH-•••n-in~•-••••-••••-••••-••o-,,o•ii-•u•-u••-••---••••­\n.. • .. •.j.....·•••-••••-••••-••••---r••••\n.\n..;....................;....................,........................................;....................;....................(...................\n5s!\n•••••· =\n··--l···············.....l.............·······f••••••••••••••..··+········..sL··1···066 ..............····[...................\n······i__i..:::::t=::t:::~:~:j ::=\n.5\nC: -\n~\nQ)\n1\n••••••H•••••••\n,\nI.\nn•••••••••••• .. ••••r•OUU\n'\n•L•••u•••••\n-\n'\n•=••t-=°=--A• u=••3·.20\n'\n•••••.......i...,,uuou•••••••\n-: A=3.45 i\n!\ni\ni\n.\n.\n.\nI\n.............. ••••~~OHH•HH~• .... ••••••rHHUOOOH•U•OOOO\na..\n:::::::::::::::::::r:::::::\n...................T...\n::r::::::::.:.....~-t.....::···:::~:::::::::::·······-----·\nur•············••u••r••u•..-·..·••n•nHr•············-----·\n···················r\n:\n·•r 0 ••········•--u...!..............u ......r············••ooo\n:\n:\n:\n:\n:\nO ♦♦ •ooo,nUOH>>THO ....HoH•••Hr ♦ U ♦•\n:•:.:.•••uoOoO\nO\nOOOOHOfHH••••••••••n•••\n...................-r···················•··········\n'\n.........,...................\n•\n··r·i···· !\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n0.1 ................... ·\n.. ·....................·....................................... ·...................·....................·....................·...................\n·r\ni\nI\nI\nI\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 9. Atlas IIAS Simulation Results with B = 1,000\nBy observing curve shapes, it <;:an perhaps be seen that no single value of A causes a\ntheoretical impact distribution and a distribution of impacts from random-attitude\nturns to match closely over the entire range of 5° sectors. Attempts to improve the\nmatch on one end of the curve by selecting a different A merely degrades the match on\n9/10/96\n42\nRTI" }, { "n": 52, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p52.jpg", "text": "the other end. It is possible, however, to obtain fairly close agreement over sectors\"'\nfrom ±80° to ±180°, as seen in Figure 9. Since for Atlas HAS there are few, if any,\nsignificant population centers in the launch area outside these sectors (i.e., within ±80°\nof the flight line), failure of the curves to match closely near the flight line is of little\n. consequence. If a better data match is considered desirable for computing risks to\npopulation centers within ±80° of the flight line (e.g., ships), either a different A can be\nselected for use with B = 1,000 or other values of A and B can be derived. If only a\nsingle value of B is used, no matter what the value, a good match between theoretical\nand simulated data is not possible over the entire 180° sector for various breakup qa.'s.\nBefore becoming too concerned about lack of a data match between 0° and 80°, it\nshould be remembered that many types of Mode-5 responses cannot be simulated, so\nthat the malfunction-tum impact distributions plotted in Figure 9 are only a subset of\nall possible Mode-5 impacts. Based on twelve Mode-5 failure responses for. which\nimpact data are available, it is believed that inclusion of the ''non-simulatable\" Mode-5\nresponses would considerably improve the match in the sector from ±10° to ±80°.\nAnother mitigating factor is that risks near the flight line are totally dominated by\nMode-4 failure responses.\nTo see how data matching is affected by selecting widely differing values of B, the\ntheoretical Mode-5 impact distributions were computed for B =50,000, 100,000, 500,000,\nand 5,000,000. Best-fit values for A were again determined by trial and error. Results\nare shown in Figure 10 through Figure 13 along with the same impact distributions for\nrandom-attitude turns plotted in Figure 9.\n\"' For other values of B and qa, close agreement is possible from ±60° to ±180°.\n9/10/96\n43\nRT!" }, { "n": 53, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p53.jpg", "text": "1 00 ,------,,------,-----,.---,---,-------.-----,-----,----,\n:::::::::::::AtJas.::HA$.::Rao.d9.m:A..Jud.e.::E~i1u.re.s.jhrougJJ:2:8.0::~c:::::::::::::\n········.·········;···················l····················!···················-'···················:···················'····················!··2·············-'···················\n·:::::::::::::::··t:::::::::::::::::l::::::::::::::::::::l::~~!?~~P.P:9:~!i?.ry~:~~:::~:~9:~!~::::::::::::::::::I:::::::::::::::::::\n•••••••••••••••• i···················l····················I··················--[···············:·1·····~0,~toakup.r···················I···················\nl\nj\n1\nj\ni\nO J\n10,000\nj\nj\n000\n~ 10 .....,_.-_l..____......\ni\nl\n0 -l._5\n,__i_\nI\nl______.....__\n_,_\n___.I_____\n0\n:..\n··:::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::::i:::::::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::::i::::::::::::::::::j:::::::::::::::::::\n!\n·······\n·············1· -r-··r······r··············~~i~~•r··········\nv\n········\n······r·················r··················1··················r·············_+__··A =1=· 4.10 T..................\nLO\n!\ni\ni\n- j- - A ➔ 4~50 !\n!\n..............\n··,···················r················-r-············--r-··A·=r4·;7s-••·:···················\n55\ni\n1\ni\ni\ni\nI\n~\ni\ni\ni\ni\ni\n~\n1\n:::::::::::::::::::!::::::::\n:~~~=-1-~i=~~:::::\n••••••••••••••••••••}•o.outt\n•';'••••••••••••HHn•~••••••••••••••••••Hj••••••••••••••••••••~u••••Hu•n••••••\n:::::::::::::::::::i:::::::::::::::::::1,....\n·f········:·:::::::::l:::::::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::J::::::::::::::::::\n••U>UHoou•••••.l••••uun•••••••••L••HoOtU\n-~q\"'&-Q; - - - -\n:--:•=••••=•=••:.:....::::.... ••••~•••••••..•••••••n•\ni\nj\n.\n-..\n!\n:\n!\n•••••--~~H•~•H••••~ •••••••••n•••••••• i••••uu..•••..••..•i•••••••ouu\n:\n:\n!\n!\nI\nI\nI\n!\nl\n!\n!\nl\n1\n0.\n··················· ···················'····················'····················'···················'···················'····················'····················'···················\n•\n:\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 10. Atlas HAS Simulation Results with B = 50,000\n9/10/96\n44\nRTI" }, { "n": 54, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p54.jpg", "text": ";\n,.........._\n100 1-~--········· ·························•~f--••··········· ..............................................................................\n.............Ars·HA~··Ra°4°m~A.. ;tude··F~Hures·rhrotJg:;::·28:·:src:--·---......\n·········..······..r--··--·............•....................( ........greakup·q-atpha·jn·deg:..Jb/ff·-------t················--·\n................l............\n..... i ...........t····:::· · i na··~:t~:~~~P:l:::··..············t::::::::::::::::::\n1\n!\n• ! 20 000\ni\n:\n..\n.................................j ....................1....................l...............o·,L.1·0'ooo--····........ ....................f...................\nI\n:\n:\n'\n:\n:\n\"o'\nI\n[\nal\n5000\nI\nc:,'\n:\n:\n:\n' :\n:\n':'o\n10 ..............!,...................;..\n>\n'.\nl\nl\n!\n---•••--•••••·•••••••• ■-- ■ uo••• ❖..•••••••••••••••••• ■H••••uuauuunf••••••••••••..••••••·u•OU••----•••••••\n1d\n......... •..... •t...................j....................,..........··········!·······............+...........,....fi._..1,ooiooo········l···················\nen\n.\nC -e\nQ)\n(J)\n1 l--_-..:::-..:±-.==:\\-k-l~~=t::..~d:=!~~::.::--+--l---+-----l\nQ.\n== =1--.J-\\,~~~~t:~L~\nH ■••••••••••••o•i ,uuuou•••••••••-i••••••••••••u ■uoufu ■ , _ _\n••n•\n....;....................f, ..•••• ........■■■■•ni•••••••nnnnn•o•~•••••••••••••••••••\n1\nI\nI\n!\n•\n'\na.o•o--HUUOOOWH\n.......... ~\n!,.\n0.1 ................... ·············-- ---....;................... ·...................·....................·.--•!\n..-­\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 11. Atlas IIAS Simulation Results with B = 100,000\n9/10/96\n45\nRTI" }, { "n": 55, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p55.jpg", "text": "•\n-\n- ···-\n•\n......................-.....,•····················.--·---·······································································...........--\n100 ........................................................... ·············•---,---.•··· .............................................................................\n········-···A. _as·HA$··Randpm..A... tttde..Ft,itures·~hroug..:·280·:sec:·······.....\n...................t...................l.....\n'\n......i...................l...................i.............2-····'\n1 .............\n..\nf······..···········i-············er-eakt1p..q..afpha.in-.degj,,lbtft.......! .................... !'...................\nt······..···········j····················j·············. ···1'no br~akup ;\n................................................\n.\n.~.............. , ..................r·····.....·-···r···..······:····. ··~g;ggg··••m-•.......i.......... ...... ............\n~\ni\ni\n!\na\ns,oob\n5:-\n1 o ........ .. ...L.................~..\ni\ni\ni\n-§\n::::::::. ·::.. \"t::···--············:\n.....::!·••m••·········:+:·:::::::::::::::$::;;;::50q~ooo......;..........::······+·······:::::::::::\nj\n:::~ ~:::~~~~::r~~=-1~ ·-r~:··t~#i~1 =·--·[::::~~\n!\n...................'[ ··~:~~; ,;:r··-·'t i ..A}·5.55·······-··············-····\n~\nI\n\\\n!~~\n~\n1~.........-\n... -\n.........­\n....- - .....+·+·--····~~~~~~~-~-.\n--........=\n➔..... .....................\n- -\n.....~:····-·····-····-·····+··:··-····-·····-·····~···\n,...................\na..\n···················+······\nu•\ni ....\n.................r--··--· ........:·--•--u••····••n•\n••••••uuuuuoui,oo•••••••\n.,.....__\n•+---••f..........•••••uuutnuu•••••unH••\n·········:········· ;...................l.....\n--,--......-\n!················=·L·=·=·=·=·=·\n:::::=~~::: ·· ······1··-­\n!\n0.1\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 12. Atlas IIAS Simulation Results with ff= 500,000\n9/10/96\n46\nRTI" }, { "n": 56, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p56.jpg", "text": "100 ·································································································· ................................·.............................................\n•••••••...···Atlas·ffA:S··Random~Attftt.tde··Fattures·~hrot:1g....·:280··s,ec-·······..•••\n:::··············· 1···················:·········sr.eaI!>\n......\nI\nj ....\n:\n!...................\nC:\n:::::::::::::::::::1::......,.,...,.m••••1:::::::::••••~:;:-=...J-~~~\n::::,,,,, i\n••••••••~:::::::::::::::::::\nC: -\n~\nQ)\n::~~=::t !:::::i=:::::··l···· !\na.\nI =~·····!···.....··~=\n.......,;--U::-::::.......,:::1i--::::-::::-:::::-::::--l:::!-::::-::::-::::-:::::-;:::r-::::-::::-::::-::::--I:::\n0.1\n•••\n..... ....\n-••••-........i-\n........-...... ....-....-.\n♦♦♦ ,.._t............\n- - -..\nt----\n..-··•••-••••----+-t••-,>,>,o,0-,0,0~~--H--H•O;+--\n- ....\n­\n.............H•n••· 1♦ hU,....u••········~··················..•··.............h ••••••~ ................... : -···········{·················......i.......................~ .................. .\n••••• ....•••u••n•• :••••••••..••••• .......... : ....•••••••••••••••Ha:a.. unonn>•h••••.: •UHHH<<••••> ♦ ..•: • ► o.eHOeH••••••••• : .. ,,,ouHOHo......: ......••••••• .. •••••••: ••• .. • .. •\\\"···A•tt'' •\n·C'l\"i't•·~· ...... is··•k·;,;•;;;(1~k··~n . ··,s;,<;;o;.·····••; ...................\n.................~•...••~.. • .. • .. ?.!•~ttf-t!\\ • ;I\n•uc• ~?.1.~•s:.~••~~~•~l::l~~•=~--. .-•~~~••••••t•••••••••••••••••••\n.....\n:\n···········J..·······...........1....................:\n.i,........... , ......g....................1\n1 ..............\n.................. 4 .................. cr.eakup..q..alpna..in.deg...lb/ft.1....................1..................) ...................\n----l i- i:iglgg1-···l··--····1······-r······\n-\n10 1--....\\,,'.'.~\n....c-.-t;....·\n.....-.... ...\n-\n:;....:-\n-\n........-, .-.\"\"\"·.-\n....-...±i--\n...-•••••\n'\"\"\"' ••••-\n.....-.... ...\n'\"\"\"'i,....\n........ -\n-\n........\n'\"\"\"';'-\n............ -\n- -\n....-1\n........l\n... -.... -\n............ -.... -....;....i:a.--\n... ..,.;·_.fx,\n-••••-•••••••;i--••••-\n.... -\n...\n'#.\nim\n:::i~j= =I ~= l=±!:i~i~6~:::~=\n.\n.\n'\n'\n. '\n. '\n.\n................... .................. '\n.........-)................... ~ ........-.-.+. ..A.--2.70,B)-.1,000 ................\n~\n!\n•\nI --t A= ~-75, Br 1,ooq\n1\n~Q)-\n~::': ¥.:::~::1:~::::t:=...\n::.:::~: !E\"3\"~\"\"'\n1\nl\n!\n1\n!\n~\n•••••••••••••••••••~•..•••••••n••nuolo••••..••••••..••••i••••••••••.•••••••••i••n\n•••••••••••••••••:•••••••••n\n~\n................... t···· ............... 1.............. ;\n.......1·······............ j\n;\nI\ni\n~\n0\n~ 1\n••••••....••••••••}•Houu•n••H•••i••HHH>•••~U•&..-J-n•••n•-•n•noo).••••ouu•uuaH: .uu6&&HUHH•n,Cou•••••••••••••••••f•\nu•H....HH••••••••\n···················:··················•:•········..·······••:••·····-········••:••·······..······••:••···············••:••·····..···········:·--····...............\n••••••••••••••••..•t•••oH•H\n.................•!••••••••••••••••••• f•••••••••••n••••••: •••••,_,.,.,.._._..,.. ... •1••••••••••........••••••: •\n:\n.-+uH.......••••\n:\nn••!•--••••••••....••••+••••uuu••••• ..... ~........................... •:--\n0••••••....••t••••••\n~:~~~:~:~~~~~~~:~~r-•«««••••..•--- ••• ~• >Omu•••••••\nI\n••••t:~~~::::::::::::::t::::~::::::::::::::t::::::::::::::::~~~~ •••m••••••••mm~ •••••••mh••• o++0\n•0\n\"••.,••••••••••••• i\n;\n____..,___•u••• [\nn•••••Uuu••t•••uuuu ............ ol♦ -••••••••H•n ...... , .. : ....... •n••••••••on•f•••••• .. •u.. uu, .... ..\ni\ni\ni\nI\nl\nl\ni\nl\nl\ni\nl\n~\ni\n~\n!\n0.01\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\nAngle From Flight Path (deg)\nFigure 31. LLVl Simulation Results with Best-Fit Shaping Constants\n9/10/96\n71\nRTI" }, { "n": 81, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p81.jpg", "text": "The best-fit values of B and A from Figure 30 and Figure 31 have been listed for\nconvenient reference in Table 25.\nIt is interesting to note that, for all breakup\nconditions, the currently-used value of B = 1,000 provided a better data fit than any\nother B that was investigated.\nTable 25. Shaping Constants for LLVl\nTB\nBreakup qa\n(sec)\n(deg-lb/£t2)\nB\nA\n290\nnone\n1,000\n1.85\n20,000\n2.60\n10,000\n2.70\n5,000\n2.75\n290\nnone\n10,000\n2.45\n20,000\n1,000\n2.60\n10,000\n1,000\n2.70\n5,000\n1,000\n2.75\nNo launch-area risk calculations were made for LLVl.\n6.6 Shaping Constants for Other Launch Vehicles\nProcedures for developing Mode-5 shaping constants A and B are fully· described in\nthis report. For Atlas, Delta, Titan, and LLVl, best-fit values of A were derived for four\nbreakup conditions (1) for the currently-used value of B = 1,000, and (2) for optimum-fit\nvalues of B.\nFor any new launch vehicle requiring risk calculations, the same\nprocedures should be followed to obtain suitable values for A and B.\nAs an alternative and less time-consuming process, values of A and B can be estimated\nby comparing the new vehicle with one of the four vehicles referred to above and listed\nin Table 26. If the configuration and trajectory of the new vehicle and one of the listed\nvehicles are similar, values of A and B shown in the table for that vehicle and the\nassumed breakup condition can be used. There may, of course, be no similarity\nbetween the new vehicle and any of the listed vehicles. In that event and depending on\nassumed breakup conditions, one of the mean values shown in the last row of the table\ncan be selected until better values can be developed.\nTable 26. Summary of A Values for B = 1,000\nVehicle\nIP Range (nm)\nat 30 sec\nBreakup qa (deg-lb/ft2)\n5,000\n10,000\n20,000\nNone\nAtlas HAS\nDelta-GEM\nTitan IV\nCLVl\n0.3\n5.2\n1.9\n33.4\n3.45\n4.30\n3.50\n2.75\n3.20\n2.75\n3.10\n2.90\n3.25\n2.95\n2.70\n2.60\n1.90\n1.90\n2.00\n1.85\nOther vehicles\n3.5\n3.1\n2.8\n1.9\n9/10/96\n72\nRTI" }, { "n": 82, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p82.jpg", "text": "7. Potentlal Future Investigations\nBecause of contract limitations on funds and the deadline for publishing the report,\ncertain interesting facets of the Mode-5 modeling process could not be fully\ninvestigated. Several such issues are listed below in considered order of importance:\n(1) Effects. on shaping constants A and B of using more precise breakup (qa.)\nconditions during malfunction-tum simulations.\n(2) Effects on shaping constants A and B (and thus overall risks) if different values of\nTB are used in computing theoretical and simulated impacts (e.g., TB\ncorresponding to burnout of zero, first, and second stages).\n(3) Effects on shaping constants A and B if drag is accounted for in computing free-\nfall impact points after • a malfunction tum.\n(Shaping constants could be\ndetermined for maximum, minimum, and intermediate ballistic coefficients, then\ninterpolated for other values. This more accurate approach would ultimately\nrequire extensive modifications to DAMP.)\n(4) Effects on shaping constants A and B if sectors smaller than 5° are used to\ncompare theoretical and simulated impact data (e.g., 1 ° or 2°).\n(5) Effects on relative failure probabilities for solid-propellant vehicles if unclassified\nsolid-propellant vehicles or declassified test results are used in the historical data\nsamples (e.g., Pershing, Polaris, Poseidon, Trident).\nOther tasks that should be performed at some point in the future include:\n(a) Update absolute failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, Titan, and perhaps other\nvehicles.\n(b) Develop suitable shaping constants A and B for new vehicles. (In this regard, see\nSection 6.6)\n9/10/96\n73\nRTI" }, { "n": 83, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p83.jpg", "text": "8. Summary\nIn RTI's risk-computation program DAMP, vehicle failures per se are not considered.\nInstead each catastrophic failure is assumed to· produce one of five failure responses,\nand it is these response modes that are modeled in DAMP. Although most catastrophic\nfailures result in impacts near the flight line, less likely malfunctions may cause debris\nto fall either uprange or well away from the flight line. In DAMP, vehicle failures with\nthis potential are, for the most part, classified as Mode-5 failure responses. The\nresulting impacts are modeled by a rather formidable-looking density function that\nincludes two shaping constants (A and B) that strongly influence the nature of the\nimpact-density function. To obtain absolute probabilities (or risks), the function must\nbe multiplied by-a probability-of-occurrence factor (p5). The primary purpose of this\nstudy was to determine the best values for A, B, and p5 for various vehicle programs.\nOther objectives not explicitly included in the statement of work were to develop\nabsolute failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan and to derive relative\nprobabilities of occurrence for the five failure-response modes in DAMP.\nAlthough some risk analyses may ignore unlikely failure-response modes, Section 2\ndemonstrates the _need for a Mode-5 response - or some similar response - through\nbrief descriptions of actual vehicle flights. Section 3 and Appendix B provide the\nreader with a fuller understanding of the nature and intricacies of the Mode-5 impact-\ndensity function. Together, they show how density-function shaping is affected by\nvalues of A and B, and in particular how the Atlas IIAS launch-area risk _contours\nchange if the value of A is changed.\nSection 4 is a philosophical discussion of methods of assessing vehicle failure\nprobability (or reliability). Two approaches are discussed, one strictly empirical, the\nother a parts-analysis method that involves the assignment of failure probabilities to\nindividual parts, components, and systems. Although difficulties exist with both\napproaches, the empirical method was chosen to estimate both absolute and relative\nfailure probabilities.\n-As the first step in estimating failure probabilities empirically, performance histories\nwere gathered, summarized, and tabulated (Appendix D) by launch date for Atlas,\nDelta, and Titan vehicle launches from the Eastern and Western Ranges, and for Thor\nlaunches from the Eastern Range. Obtaining this information, and assigning response\nmodes and associated flight phases for each failure consumed a large portion of the\neffort expended on this task.\nA filtering (i.e., data weighting) technique was selected (see Section 5.1 and\nAppendix C) and applied to the launch failure data to estimate overall failure\nprobabilities by flight phase (see Section D.1.3) for Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles. The\nrecommended failure probabilities are based on test results involving only those\nvehicle configurations that are considered to be representative of current launch\n9/10/%\n74\nRTI" }, { "n": 84, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p84.jpg", "text": "configurations (see Section D.1.4). The results, summarized previously in Table 6 of\nSection 5.1, are repeated here in Table 27. Flight phases 0 - 1 go from liftoff through\nfirst-stage or booster cutoff, while flight phase 2 extends through second-stage or\nsustainer cutoff. Although failure probabilities for all flight phases are listed in Table 2,\nonly malfunctions during flight phases Othrough 1 have significant effects on launch-\narea risks.\nTable 27. Failure Probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan\nPredicted Failure Probabili\nVehicle\nFlight Phase\nO - 1\nFlight Phase\n0 - 2\nAtlas\nDelta\nTitan\n0.022\n0.010\n0.040\n0.031\n0.013\n0.064\nAbsolute overall failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan were based only on\nflight results from \"representative\" vehicle configurations.\nBecause of the small\nnumber of failures in the individual representative samples, test results for all\nconfigurations (including Thor) were combined into a single sample and filtered to\nestimate relative failure probabilities for the five failure-response modes in program\nDAMP (see Section 5.2). The results for flight phases O - 2 and O - 1, together with\nrecommended values for new launch systems, were summarized in Table 15 and Table\n16, respectively, and are repeated here in Table 28 and Table 29.\nTable 28. Recommended Res onse-Mode Percenta es for Fli ht Phases O-2\nResponse\nMature Launch\nNew Solid Systems\nNew Liquid Systems\nMode\nS stems (F = 0.993)\n(F = 0.996)\n(F = 0.999)\n1\n0.4\n2.2\n7.4\n2\n5.4\n4.3\n2.3\n3\n0.1\n0.4\n1.7\n4\n86.2\n80.4\n73.3\n5\n7.9\n12.7\n15.3\nTable 29. Recommended Res\nResponse\nMode\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nMature Launch\nS stems (F = 0.993)\n0.5\n7.4\n0.1\n81.9\n10.1\nNew Solid Systems\nNew Liquid Systems\n(F = 0.996)\n(F = 0.999)\n3.4\n10.7\n6.6\n4.3\n0.6\n2.4\n74.5\n67.0\n14.9\n15.6\nFor Atlas, Delta, and Titan, absolute probabilities for the individual response modes\nwere obtained by multiplying absolute failure probabilities from Table 27 by the\nrelative probabilities shown in the second columns of Table 28 and Table 29. The\nresults, presented originally in Table 17, are repeated below in Table 30. To obtain\n9/10/96\n75\nRTI" }, { "n": 85, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p85.jpg", "text": "these results, the relative probabilities used were more precise than those given in\nTable 28 and Table 29. No pretense is made that all figures in Table 30 are actually\nsignificant.\nTable 30. Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1 - 5\nVehicle:\nAtlas\nDelta\n0-1\n0-2\n(0-270 sec)\n(0-630 sec)\nTitan\n0-1\n0-2\n(0-300 sec)\n(0-540 sec)\nFlight\nPhase:\n0-1\n(0-170 sec)\n0-2\n(0-280 sec)\nModel\n0.000119\n0.000121\n0.000054\n0.000051\n0.000216\n0.000250\n0.003437\nMode2\nMode3\n0.001637\n0.000011\n0.001665\n0.000744\n0.000698\n0.002976\n0.000012\n0.000005\n0.000005\n0.000020\n0.000026\nMode4\n0.018007\n0.026738\n0.008185\n0.011212\n0.001012\n0.001034\n0.032740\n0.004048\n0.055200\n0.005088\nMode5\n0.002226\n0.002465\nTotal\n0.022\n0.031\n0.010\n0.013\nnn11n\n0.064\nThe same chronological composite sample used to estimate relative failure probabilities\nfor the failure-response modes was used to estimate the conditional probability that a\nMode-3 or Mode-4 response terminates with a rapid tumble. This was found to be\nabout one-third (see Section 5.3).\nBecause the empirical data were insufficient to determine Mode-5 density-function\nshaping constants A and B, an alternate approach was used. Basically, for each of four\nvehicles (Atlas, Delta, Titan, and LLVl), Mode-5 failure responses were simulated at a\nseries of failure times. The simulated malfunctions investigated were random-attitude\nturns and slow turns. At each time, 10,000 impact points were computed. The\npercentages of impacts in 5° sectors from 0° (downrange) to 180° (uprange) were\ndetermined. These were compared with the percentages obtained in the same sectors\nfrom the theoretical Mode-5 impact-density function when specific values were\nassigned to A and B. By trial and error, values of A and B producing a good match\nbetween the two sets of percentages were established (see Section 6). After best-fit\nvalues were determined, the impact percentages for Atlas HAS in 10-mile range\nincrements were checked to verify that the range part of the Mode-5 impact-density\nfunction was consistent with impact ranges resulting from 266,000 simulated Mode-5\nfailure responses (see Section 6.2.4).\nSince the impact distributions resulting from simulated malfunction turns were highly\ndependent upon the dynamic pressure (qa) assumed to cause vehicle breakup, shaping\nconstants A and B were likewise dependent on breakup assumptions. Three breakup\nqa's and a no-breakup case were investigated by-simulating 270,000 malfunction turns\nfor each of the four conditions. Although a qa of 5,000 deg-lb/ft2 is considered most\nlikely applicable for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, shaping constants for all breakup\nconditions were provided earlier in Section 6.\n9/10/96\n76\nRTI" }, { "n": 86, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p86.jpg", "text": "Traditionally, a value of B = 1,000 has been used by the 45 SW/SE in ship-hit\ncalculations, and by RTI in performing launch-area risk analyses for the 45 SW/SE.\nUsing this value. of B, for each vehicle values of A were found that produced a good\nmatch between simulated and theoretical data. The results for qa = 5,000, 10,000, and\n20,000 deg-lb/ft2 are given in Table 31. As discussed earlier in the report, no single\nvalue of A could be found that produced a good fit over the entire 180° sector, although\nwith one exception a good match did exist in the uprange portion of the sector from\nabout ±90° to ±180°. For launches from Cape Canaveral, most population centers are\nlocated in this uprange sector. For any launch-area population centers located in the\ndownrange sector, the risks are almost surely dominated by the Mode-4 failure\nresponse.\nTable 31. Summary of A Values for B = 1,000\nFlight\nTB\nBreakup qa (deg-lb/ft2)\nVehicle\nPhase\n(sec)\n5,000\n10,000\n20,000\nAtlas HAS\n0-2\n280\n3.45\n3.20\n2.75\nDelta-GEM\n0-1\n270\n4.30\n3.10\n2.90\nTitan IV\n0-1\n300\n3.50\n3.25\n2.95\nLLVl\n0-2\n290\n2.75\n2.70\n2.60\nOther vehicles\n---\n---\n3.5\n3.1\n2.8\nOther values of B were investigated to find combinations of B and A that provided the\nbest possible data fits over the largest possible portion of the 0° to 180° sector.\nAlthough no combinations of A and B could be found that produced good fits for the\nentire 180° sector, the values shown in Table 32 extended the fit from the uprange\ndirection to within about 40° of the downrange direction.\nTable 32. Summary of Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants\nFlight\nTB\nBreakupqa\nVehicle ·\nPhase\n(sec)\n(deg-lb/ ft2)\nB\nA\nAtlas\n0-2\n280\n5,000\n5,000,000\n6.30\nDelta\n0-1\n270\n5,000\n4\n3.50\nTitan\n0-1\n300\n5,000\n1,000\n3.50\nLLVl\n0-2\n290\n5,000\n1,000\n2.75\nLaunch-area risk calculations were made for Atlas and Delta to ascertain the effects of\nusing radically different values of A and Bin the Mode-5 impact-density function. For\nexample, for a breakup qa of 5,000 deg-lb/ft2, values of A= 3.45 and B = 1,000 from\nTable 31 and A= 6.30 and B = 5,000,000 from Table 32 were used to determine total\nMode-5 launch-area risks for an Atlas HAS launch from Complex 36. The total risks\ndiffered by about 10%. (Other results for Atlas HAS are given in Table 21, and for Delta\nin Table 23.) Other calculations for Atlas and Delta show that the value of B is not\n9/10/96\n77\nRTI" }, { "n": 87, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p87.jpg", "text": "important in the launch-area risk calculations provided an appropriate value of A is\nselected.\nSince a good data match within ±40° of the flight line was not found, the effect of this\non ship-hit calculations was investigated. It was discovered that the values chosen for\nA and B made no significant difference, since the risks to shipping near the flight line\nare totally dominated by the Mode-4 failure response (see Section-6.2.3).\nMode-5 baseline risks for Atlas and Delta were recomputed using newly derived\nvalues for (1) shaping constants A and B, (2) the overall vehicle failure probability, and\n(3) the relative probabilities of occurrence of the individual failure-response modes.\nResults were then compared with baseline risks computed in prior RTI studies. For\nAtlas, Mode-5 launch-area risks were reduced by a factor between 3 to- 11, the exact\nvalue depending on the assumed breakup qa. for the vehicle. For Delta, the reduction\nfactor was between 4 and 75, with the exact value again· depending on assumed\nbreakup conditions.\n9/10/96\n78" }, { "n": 88, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p88.jpg", "text": "Appendix A. Failure Response Modes In Program DAMP\nIn program DAMP, no attempt is made to model vehicle behavior for failure of specific\nsystems and components. A list of such failures and possible behaviors for any vehicle\nwould be extensive, and variations from vehicle to vehicle would complicate the\nmodeling process, or make it almost impossible. Instead, failure responses are modeled\nin DAMP without regard to the specific failure that causes the response. There are only\nsix possible response modes in DAMP, five for failures, and one to model the behavior\nof a normal vehicle.\nThe six vehicle-response modes are described in layman's\nlanguage as follows; technical descriptions are provided in Ref. [1].\nMode 1: Vehicle topples over or falls back on the launch point after a rise of, at\nmost, a few feet. Propellants deflagrate or explode with some assumed TNT\nequivalency.\nMode 2: Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions\nequally likely. Destruct is transmitted as soon as erratic flight is confirmed, usually\nno later than six to twelve seconds after launch. For each vehicle, a latest destruct\ntime is established that is used in computing the maximum impact distance for\npieces, given that a Mode-2 response has occurred.\nMode 3: Vehicle fails to pitch-program normally, producing near-vertical flight\nwhile thrusting at normal levels. Vehicle may tumble rapidly out of control at any\npoint during vertical flight resulting in spontaneous breakup, or may be destroyed\nwhen destruct criteria are violated. The mode is terminated by destruct action if\nthe vehicle reaches the so-called 11straight-up\" time without programming. This\ntime varies with launch vehicle and with mission, but usually occurs (at Cape\nCanaveral Air Station) between 30 and 70 seconds after launch.\nMode 4: Vehicle flies within normal limits until some malfunction terminates\nthrust, causes spontaneous breakup, or results in destruct by flight-control\npersonnel. Breakup may or may not be preceded by a rapid tumble while the\nvehicle is still thrusting but, in any event, vehicle debris and components impact\nnear the intended flight line.\nMode 5: Vehicle may impact in any direction from the launch point within its\nrange capability. At any range, impacts are most likely to ocrur along the flight\nline, becoming less likely as the angular deviation from the flight line increases. As\nthe impact range increases, weighting is progressively increased to favor the\ndownrange direction. In any fixed direction, the impact probability decreases as\nthe impact range increases. Flight may terminate spontaneously due to complete\nloss of vehicle stability or because of destruct action Outside the launch area, any\nmalfunction with the potential to cause a substantial deviation from the intended\nflight direction is classified as a Mode-5 failure response. By definition, Mode-5\n9/10/96\n79\nRTI" }, { "n": 89, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p89.jpg", "text": "responses begin at vehicle pitch-over or programming for vertically-launched\nmissiles, and at liftoff for those not launched vertically.\nMode 6: Unlike impacts from response Modes 1 through 5, Mode-6 impacts result\nfrom normal flights and normal impacts of separated stages and components.\nJettisoned components are assumed to be non-explosive. For each impacting stage\nor component, a mean point of impact and bivariate-normal impact dispersions in\ndownrange and crossrange components .are assumed. The impact dispersions\ninclude the effects of variations in vehicle performance, drag uncertainties, and\nwinds.\nOf the five failure-response modes, only Mode 5 is modeled to- allow for the possibility\nof failure of the flight termination system, since vehicles experiencing other failure\nresponses tend to impact within the impact limit lines. In DAMP, risk computations for\nModes 2 through 4 are based on the assumption that the flight termination system is\nsuccessfully employed when required.\nFailure responses originally classified as\nMode 2, 3, or 4 may be reclassified as Mode 5 if the flight termination system fails or\nsubsequent vehicle performance does not conform with the original response-mode\ndefinition. Risks associated with vehicle failure responses accompanied by a failure of\nthe flight termination system are assumed to be adequately modeled in DAMP\" by\nMode 5.\n•\nThe five failure-response modes modeled in DAMP are sufficient to account for all\nanomalous impacts in the estimation of risks. However, some vehicle failures and\nanomalous behaviors have an effect on mission success without increasing risks to\npeople and property on the ground. These behaviors have been assigned Mode NA\n(not applicable) in the response-mode column of the launch-history tables in\nAppendix D.\n9/10/96\n80\nRTI" }, { "n": 90, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p90.jpg", "text": "Appendix B. Shaping-Constant Effects on Mode-5 Impact Distributions\nThe values chosen for shaping constants A and B that appear in the Mode-5 impact-density\nfunction [Eq. (3)) have a significant effect on the angular distribution of impacts about the\nlaunch point. This Appendix shows the effects of A and B on (1) the ratio of impacts along\nthe downrange line to any other radial through the launch point, and (2) the percentages of\nimpacts in various sectors relative to the downrange line.\nFollowing the procedures outlined in Section 9.7 of Reference [l], it is interesting to observe\nthe effects of varying the constants A and B. This is done in terms of a so-called f-ratio,\nwhich is expressed in Ref. [1] as Eq. (9.19), and is repeated here:\neAit+B\n£-ratio=\n:\n(7)\neA•+-\nR\nThe ratio shows how much more likely impact is to occur along the flight line (where = 1t)\nthan along some other radial line that makes an angle 0 (0 = 1t - \n1.0\n1.4\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n0\n1.4\n2.0\n1.3\n1.2\n1.4\n1.3\n1.3\n1.2\n5\n1.8\n15\n1.7\n1.5\n2.0\n1.8\n1.6\n10\n1.3\n2.8\n20\n2.5\n2.2\n2.8\n1.8\n2.0\n2.4\n1.5\n4.0\n5.7\n3.4\n2.8\n2.2\n4.0\n2.5\n3.3\n1.7\n4.6\n30\n2.6\n3.6\n5.6\n4.3\n3.1\n1.9\n25\n8.1\n11.4\n6.1\n4.5\n3.1\n7.9\n5.8\n2.1\n3.7\n8.3\n40\n3.7\n5.8\n11.1\n7.6\n2.3\n4.5\n35\n16.1\n45\n11.1\n7.3\n4.3\n15.5\n5.3\n9.8\n2.5\n22.8\n50\n14.9\n9.2\n4.9\n21.5\n12.6\n6.2\n2.6\n32.1\n45.1\n11.4\n19.9\n5.7\n7.0\n15.9\n29.5\n2.8\n26.3\n60\n14.1\n6.4\n40.2\n19.7\n7.9\n2.9\n55\n63.1\n65\n34.7\n17.1\n7.2\n24.0\n53.8\n8.7\n3.0\n87.8\n70\n45.2\n20.6\n7.9\n70.7\n28.5\n9.5\n3.1\n121.4\n75\n58.2\n24.3\n8.6\n33.1\n91.0\n10.2\n3.2\n166.3\n80\n73.8\n28.5\n9.3\n37.6\n113.9\n10.8\n3.3\n224.8\n85\n92.1\n32.5\n10.0\n138.6\n11.3\n41.8\n3.3\n299.2\n390.1\n112.6\n36.5\n10.5\n163.6\n45.5\n11.7\n3.4\n134.7\n4%.7\n40.4\n11.1\n187.4\n48.7\n12.1\n3.4\n90\n157.4\n100\n44.1\n11.5\n51.4\n208.9\n12.3\n3.4\n95\n615.2\n105\n179.9\n47.3\n11.9\n227.2\n53.5\n12.6\n3.5\n739.7\n110\n200.9\n50.2\n12.3\n242.2\n55.2\n12.7\n3.5\n862.9\n115\n219.9\n52.7\n12.5\n254.1\n56.5\n12.9\n3.5\n977.7\n120\n54.7\n236.4\n12.8\n263.1\n57.6\n13.0\n3.5\n1079.0\n125\n250.2\n56.4\n13.0\n270.0\n58.3\n13.1\n3.5\n1164.0\n130\n261.4\n57.8\n13.2\n275.0\n58.9\n13.2\n3.5\n1232.6\n135\n270.4\n58.9\n13.3\n278.6\n59.4\n13.2\n3.5\n1286.0\n140\n277.4\n59.8\n13.4\n281.2\n59.7\n3.6\n13.3\n1326.5\n145\n282.8\n60.5\n13.5\n283.1\n59.9\n3.6\n13.3\n286.9\n1356.7\n150\n61.1\n13.6\n284.5\n13.3\n60.1\n3.6\n290.0\n1378.8\n155\n61.5\n13.6\n285.4\n13.3\n60.2\n3.6\n292.3\n1394.8\n•62.1\n61.8\n13.7\n286.1\n60.3\n13.3\n3.6\n294.1\n1406.3\n165\n13.7\n286.6\n60.4\n3.6\n13.4\n160\n295.4\n1414.6\n170\n62.3\n13.7\n286.9\n60.5\n13.4\n3.6\n2%.3\n1420.5\n175\n62.4\n287.2\n13.8\n60.5\n3.6\n13.4\n297.0\n1424.7\n297.6.\n1427.6\n62.6\n13.8\n287.3\n60.5\n13.4\n3.6\n62.6\n13.8\n287.5\n60.5\n13.4\n180\n3.6\nRTI\n9/10/96\n82" }, { "n": 92, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p92.jpg", "text": "Table 34. Effect on £-Ratio of Varving Mode-5 Constant A (B = 1000) - Part 2\nR= 10run\nR=25nm\n180-ct>\nA=2.5\nA=3.0\nA=3.5\nA=4.0\nA=2.5\nA=3:o\nA=3.5\nA=4.0\n0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n5\n1.2\n1.3\n1.4\n1.4\n1.2\n1.3\n1.4\n1.4\n10\n1.5\n1.7\n1.8\n2.0\n1.5\n1.7\n1.8\n2.0\n15\n1.9\n2.2\n2.5\n2.8\n1.9\n2.2\n2.5\n2.8\n20\n2.3\n2.8\n3.4\n4.0\n2.3\n2.8\n3.4\n4.0\n25\n2.8\n3.6\n4.6\n5.7\n2.9\n3.7\n4.6\n5.7\n30\n3.4\n4.7\n6.2\n8.1\n3.6\n4.8\n6.2\n8.1\n35\n4.1\n6.0\n8.4\n11.5\n4.4\n6.1\n8.4\n11.5\n40\n4.9\n7.7\n11.3\n16.2\n5.3\n7.9\n11.4\n16.3\n45\n5.8\n9.8\n15.3\n23.0\n6.5\n10.2\n15.5\n23.1\n50\n6.8\n12.4\n20.5\n32A\n7.9\n13.2\n20.9\n32.7\n55\n8.0\n15.7\n21.5·\n45.8\n9.6\n16.9\n28.3\n46.2\n60\n9.3\n19.7\n36.7\n64.5\n11.5\n21.6\n38.1\n65.4\n65\n10.7\n24.4\n48.8\n90.6\n13.7\n27.5\n51.2\n92.3\n70\n12.1\n29.9\n64.3\n126.7\n16.2\n34.8\n68.7\n130.2\n75\n13.5\n36.3\n84.1\n176.4\n19.0\n43.8\n91.7\n183.1\n80\n15.0\n43.4\n108.6\n243.9\n22.1\n54.5\n121.8\n256.9\n85\n16.4\n51.1\n138.4\n333.9\n25.4\n67.3\n160.6\n358.9\n90\n17.8\n59.1\n173.5\n451.4\n28.8\n82.2\n209.9\n498.3\n95\n19.0\n67.3\n213.3\n600.5\n32.4\n98.9\n271.3\n686.6\n100\n20.1\n75.3\n256.8\n782.9\n35.9\n117.3\n345.7\n936.0\n105\n21.2\n82.9\n302.1\n996.3\n39.4\n137.0\n433.3\n1258.3\n110\n22.1\n89.8\n347.2\n1233.5\n42.7\n157.2\n532.8\n1662.1\n115\n22.9\n96.0\n390.2\n1482.5\n45.9\n177.4\n641.3\n2148.4\n120\n23.5\n101.4\n429.4\n1728.6\n48.7\n196.9\n754.5\n2707.0\n125\n24.1\n106.0\n463.6\n1957.9\n51.3\n215.0\n867.2\n3315.0\n130\n24.6\n109.9\n492.6\n2159.9\n53.5\n231.5\n974.6\n3939.0\n135\n25.0\n113.0\n516.4\n2329.5\n55.5\n245.9\n1072.3\n4542.1\n. 140\n25.3\n115.5\n535.5\n2466.0\n57.2\n258.3\n1158.0\n5092.0\n145\n25.6\n117.6\n550.4\n2572.4\n58.6\n268.8\n1230.3\n5567.4\n150\n25.8\n119.2\n562.0\n2653.1\n59.9\n277.4\n1289.7\n5959.9\n155\n26.0\n120.5\n570.8\n2713.1\n60.9\n284.5\n1337.3\n6271.7\n160\n26.1\n121.5\n577.5\n2757.1\n61.7\n290.1\n1374.6\n6512.1\n165\n26.3\n122.2\n582.5\n2789.0\n62.4\n294.6\n1403.5\n6693.0\n170\n26.4\n122.8\n586.3\n2812.0\n63.0\n298.2\n1425.6\n6826.7\n175\n26.4\n123.3\n589.1\n2828.4\n63.4\n301.0\n1442.3\n6924.4\n180\n26.5\n123.7\n591.2\n2840.1\n63.8\n303.2\n1454.9\n6994.9\n9/10/%\n83\nRTI" }, { "n": 93, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p93.jpg", "text": "Table 35. Effect on £-Ratio of Varving Mode-5 Constant 8 (A= 3) - Part 1\nR=-1 nm\nR=5nm\n180--(1)\n8=500\n8 = 1000\n8=2000\n8=500\n8 = 1000\n8 =2000\n0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n5\n1.3\n1.3\n1.2\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n10\n1.6\n1.6\n1.5\n1.7\n1.7\n1.7\n15\n2.1\n2.0\n1.9\n2.2\n2.2\n2.1\n20\n2.7\n2.5\n2.3\n2.8\n2.8\n2.7\n25\n3.4\n3.1\n2.7\n3.6\n3.6\n3.4\n30\n4.2\n3.7\n3.1\n4.7\n4.5\n4.3\n35\n5.2\n4.5\n3.6\n6.0\n5.8\n5.4\n40\n6.4\n5.3\n4.1\n7.7\n7.3\n6.6\n45\n7.7\n6.2\n4.5\n9.8\n9.2\n8.1\n50\n9.2\n7.0\n5.0\n12.4\n11.4\n9.8\n55\n10.8\n7.9\n5.3\n15.7\n14.1\n11.7\n60\n12.4\n8.7\n5.7\n19.7\n17.1\n13.7\n65\n14.1\n9.5\n6.0\n24.4\n20.6\n15.8\n70\n15.8\n10.2\n6.2\n29.9\n24.3\n17.8\n75\n17.3\n10.8\n6.4\n36.3\n28.5\n19.9\n80\n18.7\n11.3\n6.6\n43.4\n32.5\n21.8\n85\n20.0\n11.7\n6.7\n51.1\n36.5\n23.5\n90\n21.1\n12.1\n6.8\n59.1\n40.4\n25.0\n95\n22.0\n12.3\n6.9\n67.3\n44.1\n26.3\n100\n22.8\n12.6\n7.0\n75.3\n47.3\n27.5\n105\n23.4\n12.7\n7.0\n82.9\n50.2\n28.4\n110\n23.9\n12.9\n7.1\n89.8\n52.7\n29.1\n115\n24.3\n13.0\n7.1\n96.0\n54.7\n29.7\n120\n24.6\n13.1\n7.1\n101.4\n56.4\n30.2\n125\n24.9\n13.2\n7.1\n106.0\n57.8\n30.6\n130\n25.1\n13.2\n7.1\n109.9\n58.9\n30.9\n135\n25.3\n13.3\n7.2\n113.0\n59.8\n31.2\n140\n25.4\n13.3\n7.2\n115.5\n60.5\n31.3\n145\n25.5\n13.3\n7.2\n117.6\n61.1\n31.5\n150\n25.5\n13.3\n7.2\n119.2\n61.5\n31.6\n155\n25.6\n13.3\n7.2\n120.5\n61.8\n31.7\n160\n25.6\n13.4\n7.2\n121.5\n62.1\n31.8\n165\n25.7\n13.4\n7.2\n122.2\n62.3\n31.8\n170\n25.7\n13:4\n7.2\n122.8\n62.4\n31.8\n175\n25.7\n13.4\n7.2\n123.3\n62.6\n31.9\n180\n25.7\n13.4\n7.2\n123.7\n62.6\n31.9\nRTI\n9/10/96\n84" }, { "n": 94, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p94.jpg", "text": "Table 36. Effect on £-Ratio of Varying_. Mode-5 Constant B (A= 3)- Part 2\nR=l0nm\nR=25nm\n180 _:_\nB=500\nB = 1000\nB=2000\nB::: 500\nB = 1000\nB =2000\n0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1.0\n5\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n10\n1.7\n1.7\n1.7\n1.7\n1.7\n1.7\n15\n2.2\n22\n2.2\n2.2\n2.2\n2.2\n20\n2.8\n2.8\n28\n2.8\n2.8\n2.8\n25\n3.7\n3.6\n3.6\n3.7\n3.7\n3.6\n30\n4.7\n4.7\n4.5\n4.8\n4.8\n4.7\n35\n6.1\n6.0\n5.8\n6.2\n6.1\n6.0\n40\n7.9\n7.7\n7.3\n8.0\n7.9\n7.8\n45\n10.2\n9.8\n9.2\n10.4\n10.2\n9.9\n50\n13.0\n12.4\n11.4\n13.4\n13.2\n12.7\n55\n16.7\n15.7\n14.1\n17.3\n16.9\n16.1\n60\n21.2\n19.7\n17.1\n22.3\n21.6\n20.3\n65\n26.9\n24.4\n20.6\n28.7\n27.5\n25.3\n70\n33.9\n29.9\n24.3\n36.8\n34.8\n31.3\n75\n42.3\n36.3\n28.3\n47.0\n43.8\n38.5\n80\n52.3\n43.4\n325\n59.7\n54.5\n46.6\n85\n63.9\n51.1\n36.5\n75.4\n67.3\n55.5\n90\n77.1\n59.1\n40.4\n94.5\n82.2\n65.2\n95\n91.7\n67.3\n44.1\n117.4\n98.9\n75.3\n100\n107.3\n75.3\n47.3\n144.4\n117.3\n85.5\n105\n123.5\n82.9\n50.2\n175.4\n137.0\n95.4\n110\n139.7\n89.8\n52.7\n210.1\n157.2\n104.7\n115\n155.4\n96.0\n54.7\n247.9\n177.4\n113.3\n120\n170.1\n101.4\n56.4\n287.7\n196.9\n120.9\n125\n183.5\n106.0\n57.8\n328.3\n215.0\n127.5\n130\n195.3\n109.9\n58.9\n368.2\n231.5\n133.1\n135\n205.5\n113.0\n59.8\n406.3\n245.9\n137.7\n140\n214.1\n115.5\n60.5\n441.4\n258.3\n141.5\n145\n221.2\n117.6\n61.1\n472.8\n268.8\n144.6\n277.4\n147.1\n150\n227.0\n119.2\n61.5\n500.3\n155\n231.7\n120.5\n61.8\n523.6\n284.5\n149.0\n290.1\n150.5\n160\n235.4\n121.5\n62.1\n543.2\n165\n238.4\n122.2\n62.3\n559.3\n294.6\n151.7\n240.7\n122.8\n62.4\n572.3\n298.2\n152.7\n170\n62.6\n582.7\n301.0\n153.4\n175\n242.5\n123.3\n62.6\n591.0\n303.2\n154.0\n244.0\n123.7\n180\n9/10/96\n85\nRTI" }, { "n": 95, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p95.jpg", "text": "The £-ratios in Table 33 and Table 34 (also in·Table 35 and Table 36) have been plotted in\nFigure 32 for A =3.0 arid B =1000. Reading from the 10-mile plot for 8 = 90°, it can be seen\nthat a vehicle experiencing a Mode-5 response is about 60 times more likely to impact along\nthe flight line than along the 90-degree radial. Essentially the same value (actually 59.1)\nappears in Table 34.\n300 ,---,.----,------,---.--,-----.----,-----r-~\n15\n0\na:\n..,!..\n250\n200\n150\nFigure 32. £-Ratios for Ranges from 1 to 25 Miles\n9/10/96\n86\nRTI" }, { "n": 96, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p96.jpg", "text": "There are other ways to show how the value chosen for A affects the Mode-5 impact\ndensity function For five values of A, the plots in Figure 33 show the percentages* of\nAtlas IIAS impacts that lie between the flight line and any radial line through the launch\npoint that makes an angle 8 with respect to the flight line. If A = 3.0, it can be seen that\napproximately 46% of all Mode-5 impacts lie between 0° and 20°. If A is 4.0, the percentage\nof impacts between 0° and 20° increases to about 64%.\n100\n..J..-.--­\n..;,,-.......r ..: ......r.........\n90\n:.-,\n80\n70\n60\nC -\n(I) e 50\n(I)\n,f\n'\n! /\n!\n1\n!Data jfor Atl. s IIA~\na..\n.... ,'.j..............,r ............. ;............;...............;.............. !...............i...............;............\n40\n:\n/ i\n'\n:\n:\n8 = 1 000\ni\n30 /J/ I ! I j\ni-~=1-~\n,\n,\n,\n- -\n-\n= 2.u\n20\nr·•,l-r•····· •••••••••••••••••••••••••\n• •••••••••••••••••••••••• -----~ =·3.()··········\n/ 1\n:\n;\n;\n.\n,\n--- A= 4.()\n10\nO\n/\n1\nr\nI\nr\nr= 5·~\n0\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80 100 120 140· 160 180\nTheta (deg)\nFigure 33. Percentage of Impacts Between Flight Line and Any Radial\n············~ ·············· l\n: ---:\n...... -t-/.\n;\n* The Mode-5 impact density function must be integrated numerically to arrive at the values plotted in\nFigure 33. Since the quantity R that appears in the density function is trajectory dependent,\nsomewhat different curves would be obtained for other trajectories and vehicles.\n9/10/96\n87\nRTI" }, { "n": 97, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p97.jpg", "text": "Another way to show how the value of A affects Mode-5 impacts is illustrated in Figure 34.\nFor the same values of A used previouslyin Figure 33, the graphs in Figure 34 show the\npercentages of impacts in any 5° sector between radials that make angles of 0° and (0 + 5)0\nwith respect to the flight line. It is interesting to note that if A is set equal to 1.0 with\nB = 1,000, impacts in all 5° sectors are approximately the same, thus resulting in an\nimpact-density function that is essentially uniform in direction.\n1, .\nOat~ for Atlas IIAS\n!\nJ\nI\n=10Jo\n1\n!,:\n,\n,\n1\n-iA =1 0\n'\n.\n.\nl.\n.l\n.1\n- - -!.A = 2 0\n.\n~ 10\ne....\n\\ l l\n• I\nr\ni -----jA = 3jo\n...\n,\n,\n1\n---···,A= 4•0\n0 0\n'\nI\nI\nIA = sJo\nQ)\nen\nC)\nQ)\n~\nC\n1\nc\n~\nQ)\na..\n0.1\n, , ,,\no\n~l\ni\nI\n!\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80 100 12n 140 160 180\nAngle from Flight Path, Theta (deg)\nFigure 34. Percentage of Impacts in 5-Degree Sectors\nFor A= 1, the Mode-5 impact-density function is essentially the same as a density\nfunction formerly used in the Launch Risk Analysis (LARA) Program at the Western\nRange to model gross azimuth failures. This response mode was called the Gross\nFlight Deviation Failure (GFDF) mode. In LARA the range and azimuth portions of the\nGFDF density function were assumed to be independent. Impact azimuths were\nuniformly distributed, while the range density function can be represented as\n(8)\n9/10/96\n88\nRTI" }, { "n": 98, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p98.jpg", "text": "where p is the probability of occurrence of the GFDF mode, TB is the stage bum time,\nand R is the rate of change of the impact range. The function cannot be applied early\nin flight before programming when R is essentially zero. The range portion of the\nMode-5 impact-density function used in DAMP reduces to essentially the same form. If\nEq. (3) is integrated between the limits of zero and 1t, the conditional Mode-5 density\nfunction reduces to\n(9)\nwhere TP is the programming time, and TB and Rare as previously defined. To obtain\nabsolute values, f(R) must of course be multiplied by the probability of occurrence of a\nMode-5 failure response.\nAlthough the GFDF density function may be a suitable model for random-attitude\nfailures occurring at or a few seconds after programming, the performance histories in\nAppendix D indicate that such failures are no more likely to occur at programming\nthan at any other time. Thus, there appears to be no need for including a GFDF mode\nper se in the risk calculations, since all random-attitude failures are accounted for by\nthe Mode-5 density function. However, if for some obscure reason inclusion of a GFDF\nresponse mode is desired, two approaches are possible: (1) run the GFDF mode\nseparately in DAMP (by using Mode-5 with A = 1) while zeroing out all other response\nmodes; (2) modify DAMP to handle two separate Mode-5 density functions, each with\nits own values of A and B. Obviously approach (2) is much more involved and time\nconsuming to implement.\nAlthough it may not be obvious, the probability of impact in any annular range interval\nobtained by integrating the Mode-5 density function between the interval boundaries is\nindependent of the values assigned to A and B. I£ Eq. (3) is integrated between the\nangle limits of zero and 1t (and only for these limits), the A's and B's cancel leaving the\nprobability of impact between R,_ and ~ as a function of impact range alone. With a\nchange of variable, the probability of impacting between R,_ and ~ becomes a simple\nfunction of time (see pages 84 and 85 of Ref. [1] for details).\n9/10/96\n89\nRTI" }, { "n": 99, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p99.jpg", "text": "Appendix C. Filter Characteristics\nEstimating launch-vehicle failure probabilities using empirical launch data is an\nuncertain process when the sample size is small and the data are obtained from an\nevolving system. One approach that may be used to estimate failure probabilities is to\nperform a least-squares fit to trial outcome values (0 =success, 1 =failure). For mature\nlaunch vehicles, failure probabilities have decreased markedly from their early\nexperimental days. For new programs, empirical data may be scant or nonexistent.\nOne decision that must be made involves the type of function to- fit to the data. The\ntrue nature of the failure-rate function may be unknown or extremely complex, or there\nmay be insufficient data to estimate a complex function. The easiest calculation is made\nwhen a constant failure-rate function is assumed. However, available data appear to\nindicate that failure rates decrease as a program matures, at least up to a point. If it can\nbe assumed that launch-vehicle failure probabilities decrease over time (i.e., as the\nnumber of launches increases), then some non-constant function (perhaps linear or\nexponential) can be chosen for the fit, or the data weighted as a function of time. In\nestimating Atlas reliability, General Dynamics161 chose the latter option by adopting the\nDuane model. ~s model is based on the assumption that the mean number of\nlaunches between failures increases when causes of failure are corrected. Although this\nmay be the case up to- a point, eventually reliability seems to level off at a fairly\nconstant value. Consequently, for mature programs RTI has chosen to fit the failure-\nrate function to a constant. Su<;h a fit can be based on simple least squares using a\nfixed-length sliding-window filter to allow for changes in the estimated value over\ntime, or on a least squares fitwith unequal weighting.\nIf a constant function is fit to a set of data using least squares with equal weighting of\ndata, the solution is given by the mean:\n(10)\n·Consider the following example:\nX1­-6\n\"2 = 5\n\"3 = 7\nThen,\nRecursively,\nX = 6+5+7 =-18\n3\n3\n= 6\n(11)\n9/10/96\n90\nRTI" }, { "n": 100, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p100.jpg", "text": "Xn = Xn-1 (1-an) + xn (an)\n(12)\nXn = Xn-1 + an (xn -Xn-1)\nFor the equally-weighted case, the recursive filter factor an= 1/n.\nUsing the same example, with X0 = 0,\n(13)\nIn general terms, this recursive formulation of the least squares solution is called an\nexpanding-memory filter, as opposed to a sliding-window or fixed-length filter. In an\nexpanding-memory filter, the solution is always based on the entire data set. In the\nequally-weighted case, all data points have an equal influence on the solution,\nregardless of their locations in the sequence.\nIt can be seen that in the limit as n becomes very large, an approaches zero. That is,\neach data point in the sequence is accorded a decreased weight due to the increased\nnumber of points being fit. If the data being fit should actually describe a constant, this\nis exactly what is desired. Normally, however, the function that the data should fit is\nunknown, and a constant function is used merely as an approximation to smooth or\nedit the data. What is desired is a recursive least squares fit that assigns a decreasing\nweight to data of increasing age, so the fit de-weights data points used in earlier\nrecursions.\nIn a fading-memory filter, the weighting factor decreases as time recedes into the past,\nso that the importance of any given datum will decrease as the age of the datum\nincreases. An example of such a filter is one in which each datum is weighted by its\ncount or index number in the sequence:\nn I,i xi\nXn = i=l n L,i\n(14)\ni=l\nUsing the same numerical example as before, where x1 =6, x2 = 5, and x3 =7,\n-\n1-6+2•5+3•7\n37\nX = ----- = -\n= 6.17\n(15)\n1+2+3\n6\n9/10/96\n91\nRTI" }, { "n": 101, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p101.jpg", "text": "For the recursive form of this filter, where each datum is weighted by its position in the\nchronological sequence, the recursive filter factor for the nth point is given by\nn\n2n\n2\na=-=---=--\n(16)\nn f i\nn·(n+l)\nn+l\ni=l\nUsing Eq. (12),\n(17)\nThe \"memory'' (i.e., importance) of older data in this filter fades at a rate dictated by\nthe filter. In this case, the 50th value is 50 times more important than the first, and the\n100th value is twice as important as the 50th and 100 times more important than the first.\nThe exponentially-weighted filter provides the analyst with more flexibility. This filter\nuses F as a weighting factor, where the filter-control constant F is a value chosen\nbetween zero and one, and i is the \"age-count\" of the ith data point. For this filter, i = 0\nnow designates the current -or latest data point, i =1 designates the immediately\npreceding or next-to-last data point, etc., so the data points are indexed in reverse\nchronological order starting with zero. The weighted least-squares solution is\n(18)\nUsing F =0.9 and the same example as before,\nX3 = Fox3 + F1x2 + F2x1\npo +Fl +F2\n(.9)0(7) +(.9)1(5) +(.9)2(6)\n(19)\n=\n0\n1\n2\n(.9) +(.9) +(.9)\n= 7 + 4.5 +4.86 =- 16.36 = 6.04\n2.71\n2.71\nThe weighting of each data point for sample sizes up to 300 is sqown in Figure 35 for\nvalues of F from 0.8 to 1.0. For F = 1, all points in the sample are weighted equally. For\n9/10/96\n92\nRTI" }, { "n": 102, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p102.jpg", "text": "F = 0.8, only the most recent 25 or so data points contribute to the final result, since all\nolder data points are essentially weighted out of the solution.\n1.0\n0.9\n0.8\n0.7\n... ­\ni:!:\n0.6\nu..-\n.c -\n0.5\n........\n. ...........\ni ..........................J ...........................+········-­\nF = ~ (equally weighted)\n!\nF=0.J9\nI\n!\nI\n--.:\n···········;···························\n....\n--········-----···--\n····\n-•-1-\n+-\n=0.9! 5\n!\nC)\n·a5\ni\nI\n~\n' ............................~............................\nca\n0.4\nCl\n0.3\n0.2\n0.1\n0.0\nca\ni -­\n0.99\n.....\n...........................:.......\n.\n.....\n1\n/.-····---;\n-----i··········\n-1..................\n+o.s\n.......... ,\nI\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\nData Index (older->)\nFigure 35. Exponential Weights for Fading-Memory Filters\nFor the exponentially-weighted fading-memory filter, it can be shown that the\nrecursive filter factor used in Eq. (12) is\n1-F\na=--\n(20)\nn\n1-Fn\nSince OS F S 1, an in Eq. (20) does not approach zero as n approaches infinity (as the\nother two filters do), but instead approaches the value (1 - F). If F = 0, then an= 1 for all\nn, the filter has no memory at all, and the filtered value always equals the last\nmeasurement. In the limit as F approaches one, L'Hospital' s rule can be applied to\n9/10/96\n93\nRTI" }, { "n": 103, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p103.jpg", "text": "show that an approaches 1/n, the filter-factor value for the equally-weighted case, and\nthe filter memory no longer fades. For values of F between zero- and one, the rate at\nwhich the filter memory fades decreases as F increases. The analyst can control the rate\nat which the filter memory fades by selecting an appropriate value of F.\nAs the number of points n increases, the value of an used in the recursive exponential-\nfilter equation decreases continuously as it asymptotically approaches 1-F. For any\ngiven n, a larger an means more emphasis is placed on the current data point and less\non previous points. That is, the larger the recursive filter factor an, the faster the filter\nmemory fades. Filter factors for sample sizes up to- 300 points are shown in Figure 36\nfor six different filters. Early in the data-index count (n less than 30), the filter based on\nindex-number weighting has the fastest fading memory, since for 30 data points or\nfewer the filter has the largest filter factors. After 160 points or so, the index-weighted·\nfilter fades at a slower rate than the exponential filter with F = 0.99. Consequently,\nusers of index-count-based fading filters frequently calculate a filter factor for some\nmaximum value of n that is then applied to all subsequent data points as well. For\nexample, if a maximum count of about 180 is used for n; this filter from _that point on\nwill behave similarly to the exponentially-fading filter with F = 0.99.\n...\n0\n~\nLL ...\nQ)\n.:t:::\nu:::\nQ) >\n-~\n.::S ia:\n1 ---------------------------..-----,\n0.1\n0.01\n~\n0 E\nQ)\nE\n0.001 '--------'------'---------'-----'----...1...-------'\n0\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n300\nNumber of Data Points in Sample\nFigure 36. Recursive Filter Factor for Last Data P-oint\n9/10/96\n94\nRTI" }, { "n": 104, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p104.jpg", "text": "The fading-memory recursive filter, defined by Eqs. (12) and (20), can be applied to\nlaunch test results to estimate failure probability. For this application the values to be\nfiltered are the test . outcomes, with 0 representing a successful launch, and 1\nrepresenting a failure or anomalous behavior. Given a series of outcomes, the filtered\nresult after each launch in the series represents the estimate of failure probability at that\npoint. Filtered results for two filter-control constants are shown in Table 37 for a\nhypothetical series of ten launches for which all but the second and fourth flights were\nsuccessful.\nTable 37. Filter Application for Failure Probability\nj[]\nF = 0.98\nF =0.90\nIndex\nOutcome\nlter factor, an\nFail. Prob.\nFilter factor, an\nFail. Prob.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n0\n1\n0\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1.0000\n0.5051\n0.3401\n0.2576\n0.2082\n0.1752\n0.1517\n0.1340\n0.1203\n0.1093\n0.0\n0.5051\n0.3333\n0.5051\n0.3999\n0.3299\n0.2798\n0.2423\n0.2132\n0.1899\n1.0000\n0.5263\n0.3690\n0.2908\n0.2442\n0.2132\n0.1917\n0.1756\n0.1632\n0.1535\n0.0\n0.5263\n0.3321\n0.5263\n0.3978\n0.3129\n0.2529\n0.2085\n0.1745\n0.1477\nIn this example, estimated failure probabilities are shown for two values of the filter\nconstant that force the filter to fade at two different rates. After ten launches the\nestimated failure probability using F = 0.98 is 0.1899. For the faster fading-memory\nfilter (F =0.90), the result is 0.1477. Both estimates are less than that obtained by equal\nweighting, since the two failures occurred early in the sequence. Note that after four\nlaunches (2 successes and 2 failures) both filtered estimates exceed 0.5, since one of the\ntwo failures occ~rred during the fourth flight.\nIf the l's and O's used in the example to represent failures and successes were reversed,\nthe same filter would provide estimates of probability of success.\n9/10/96\n95" }, { "n": 105, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p105.jpg", "text": "Appendix D. Launch and Performance Histories\n0.1 S-asic Data\nIn support of the empirical approach to use post-test results to estimate future vehicle\nfailure rates, the performance histories for Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Thor missiles/\nvehicles were studied. Results are summarized in Appendix Das_ follows:\nAppendix D.2: Atlas Launch and Performance History\nAppendix D.3: Delta Launch and Performance History\nAppendix D.4: Titan Launch and Performance History\nAppendix D.5: Thor Launch and Performance History\nThe histories include all Atlas, Delta, and Titan launches from the Eastern and Western\nRanges prior to 1 September 1996. For Thor, only Eastern Range launches are included,\nsince this summary was completed before it was decided not to use Thor results in\npredicting failure probabilities for Delta.\nThe Atlas, Titan, and Thor summaries\ninclude both weapons systems tests and space flights, while the Delta summary\nincludes only space flights.\nFor each vehicle, each section of the appendix is divided into two parts:\n(1) A tabular summary listing all launches in chronological order by sequence\nnumber, a mission identifier, launch date, vehicle configuration, launch range, the\nfailure-response mode to which any failure has been assigned, the flight phase in\nwhich the failure or anomalous behavior occurred, and a configuration flag (0 or\n1) indicating whether the vehicle is sufficiently representative of current vehicles\nto be included in the data sample used to predict vehicle reliability.\n(2) A brief narrative - necessarily brief in most cases due to lack of information ­\ndescribing the general nature of the failure or the behavior of the vehicle after\nfailure, or the effects of the failure on flight parameters.\nD.1 .1 Data S-ources\nThe vehicle performance summaries and histories were collected primarily from the\nfollowing sources:\n(1) \"Eastern Range Launches, 1950-1994, Chronological Summary\", 45th Space Wing\nHistory Office.171\n(2) Extension to (1) updating the launch summary through 30 December 1995.rsi\n(3) \"Vandenberg AFB Launch Summary\", Headquarters 30th Space Wing, Office of\nHistory, Launch Chronology, 1958 -1995.r91\n9/10/96\n96\nRTI" }, { "n": 106, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p106.jpg", "text": "(4) \"Spacelift Effective Capacity: Part 1 - Launch Vehicle Projected Success Rate\nAnalysis\", Draft prepared by Booz•Allen & Hamilton, Inc. 19 February 1992,\nprepared for Air Force Space Command Launch Services Office.141\n(5) Isakowitz, Steven J., (updated by Jeff Samella), International Reference Guide to\nSpace Launch Systems, Second Edition, published and distributed by AIAA in\n1995.[to]\n(6) Smith, 0. G., \"Launch Systems for Manned Spacecraft'', Draft, July 23, 1991Y11\n(7) \"Comparison of Orbit Parameters - Table 1\", prepared bl McDonnell Douglas\nSpace Systems Company, Delta launches through 4 Nov 95. 121\n(8) Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight\nControl and Analysis (SEO), 1957 through 1995.1131\n(9) Missile Launch Operations Logs, 30th Space Wing, copies provided via ACTA,\nInc., (Mr. James Baeker), 1963 through 1995.[141\n(10) \"Titan IV, America's Silent Hero\", published by Lockheed Martin in Florida Today,\n13 Nov 95.1151 .\n.\n(11) \"Atlas Program Flight History\" (through April 1965), General Dynamics Report\nEM-1860, 26 April 1965.1161\n(12) Fenske, C. W., \"Atlas Flight Program Summary\", Lockheed Martin, April 1995.117]\n(13) Brater, Bob, \"Launch History\", Lockheed Martin FAX to RTI, March 13, 1996.[181\n(14) Several USAF Accident/Incident Reports for Atlas and Titan failuresY 91\n(15) Quintero, Andrew H., \"Launch Failures from the Eastern Range Since 1975\",\nAerospace memo, February 25, 1996, provided to RTI by Bill Zelinsky.1201\n(16) Set of \"Titan Flight Anomaly /Failure Summary\" since 1959, received from\nLockheed Martin, April 4, 1996.i211\n(17) Chang, I-Shih, \"Space Launch Vehicle Failures (1984 - 1995)\", Aerospace Report\nNo. TOR-96(8504)-2, January 1996.[221\nThere were numerous discrepancies in the source data, particularly with regard to\nlaunch date and vehicle configuration. Some sources apparently list launch dates in\nlocal time, others use Greenwich time, and in some cases the same source may use both\nwith no indication of which is which. Most of the launch dates shown in Appendix D\nagree with those in the Eastern Range and Western Range summaries published by the\nrespective History offices. Since the dates on these summaries are not consistently local\nor Greenwich, neither are the dates listed in Appendix D. Although launch dates are\n9/10/96\n97" }, { "n": 107, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p107.jpg", "text": "used to order the vehicle tests for filtering, whether the dates are inconsistently in local\nor Greenwich times is inconsequential. In most cases, the ordering is not affected by a\none-day change in launch date. In rare cases where the order of two launches might be\ninadvertently reversed, the filtering calculations are unaffected if the interchanged\nflights are both failures or both successes. Even when this is not the case, the effect on\nthe final results for samples greater than one-hundred is negligible.\nConfiguration discrepancies also existed in the source data as, for example, the listing\nof the same Atlas vehicle as a IIA in one source and as a HAS in another. In rare cases,\na launch may have been called a success in one document and a failure in another, with\nlittle or no data provided to make it clear whether the difference in classification was\ndue to error or different success criteria. Although a considerable effort was made to\neliminate errors and discrepancies in Appendix D, there can be no assurance that the\neffort was 100% successful.\nD.1.2 Assignment of Failure-Response Modes\nIn the tabular historical summaries in Appendix D, the column labeled \"Response\nMode\" refers to the failure-response modes in program DAMP.\nThe numbers 1\nthrough 5 in this column correlate with the failure-response modes described in\nAppendix A. The letter \"T\" following either a \"3\" or \"4\" indicates that the vehicle\nexecuted a thrusting tumble before breakup or destruct. An \"NA\" (i.e., not applicable)\nappearing in the column means that some anomalous behavior caused stages or\ncomponents to impact outside their normal impact areas without necessarily failing the\n, flight, or that the anomalous behavior resulted in an unplanned orbit that may or may\nnot have interfered with mission objectives. If the response-mode column is blank,\neither the flight was a success, or there was no information in the data sources to\nindicate otherwise.\nIn some cases where the data sources contained only sketchy or incomplete\ninformation, assignment of the response mode involved ·some speculation; Mostly, this\nsituation arose in trying to decide between response modes 4 and 5 or between modes 4\nand 4T or, in rare cases, what mode to assign when the vehicle response did not exactly\n-fit any of the response-mode definitions.\nD.1.3 Assignment of Flight Phase\nThe number shown in the \"Flight Phase11 column in the tabular summaries of\nAppendix D indicates the phase of vehicle flight in which the failure or anomalous\nbehavior occurred. Definitions of flight phase are given in Table 38. The assigned\nnumbers are arbitrary, but were chosen in a way that suggests the vehicle stage that\nfailed or the stage that was thrusting when the failure occurred.\n9/10/96\n98\nRTI" }, { "n": 108, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p108.jpg", "text": "Table 38. Flight-Phase Definitions\nFlight Phase\n0\nDescription\nSRM auxiliary thrust phase\n1\nFirst-stage thrust phase if no auxiliary SRM's carried, or\nFirst-stage thrust phase after SRM separation\n1.5\nAttitude-control phase after first-stage thrust phase or between\nfirst and second-thrust phases\n2\n2.5\nSecond-stage thrust phase\nAttitude-control phase after second thrust phase or between\nsecond and third-thrust phases\n3\nThird-stage thrust phase, or third thrust phase if second stage is\nrestartable\n3.5\nAttitude-control phase after third thrust phase or between\nthird and fourth thrust phases\n4\nFourth thrust phase, or\nUpper stage/payload thrust phase\n5\nAttitude control phase after Flismt Phase 4, or orbital phase\nIn some cases, two•flight phases are listed opposite an entry, e.g., 2 and 5. This means\nthat some failure or anomalous behavior occurred during the second-stage thrusting\nperiod that did not prevent the attainment of an orbit, but did result in an abnormal\nfinal orbit. Other somewhat arbitrary decisions were necessary in assigning a flight\nphase when an expended stage failed to separate, or an upper stage failed to ignite. If,\nfor example, the first and second stages failed to separate, any of flight phase 1, 1.5, or 2\ncould be assigned, depending on the exact cause of the failure.\nThe detailed\ninformation needed to make the proper choice was sometimes lacking.\nTable 39 is provided to assist in understanding how flight phases were assigned for\nAtlas, Delta/Thor, and Titan vehicles.\nTable 39. Flight Phases by Launch Vehicle\n·Flight Phase Atlas\nDeltall'hor\nTitan\n0\nCastor burn\nCastor /GEM burn\nSRMsolo\n1\n1.5\n2\nAtlas booster\nBooster separation\nSustainer\nFirst-stage bum\nVernier solo - Sep 1/2\nSecond-stage bum\nStage 1\nStage-1 separation\nStage 2\n2.5\nVernier/ACS solo\nCoast between stg 2 / 3 Vernier solo\nTS/Centaur/IDS\n-\nSecond burn\n3\n3.5\n4\nAgena/Centaur\n-\nSecond bum\nThird-stage bum\nCoast after stg 3\nSecond bum\n5\nOrbit\nOrbit\nOrbit\n!\n9/10/96\n99\nRTI" }, { "n": 109, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p109.jpg", "text": "0.1.4 Representative Configurations\nThe last column in the tables in· Appendix D indicates whether the vehicle\nconfiguration is considered sufficiently similar to- current and future vehicles for the\ntest result to be included in the representative data sample used to· predict absolute\nreliability. A \"1\" in the column indicates that the test result is included, while a \"(Y'\nindicates that it is excluded. There are likely to be differences of opinion about which\npast configurations are representative and which are not. In determining which to\ninclude, RTI has relied entirely on the Booz•Allen & Hamilton report'41 referred to\nearlier. When faced with the same problem, Booz•Allen established the following\ncriteria for deciding whether past configurations were sufficiently similar to current\nconfigurations:\n(1) Genealogy: Is the current system a direct or indirect derivative of the historical\nconfiguration?\n(2) Operations: Is the current system operated in the same manner as the historical\nconfigurations (e.g., ICBM versus space-launch vehicle)?\n(3) Composition: Does the current system use the same types of elements (i.e., SRMs,\nupper stage, etc.)?\nBased on these criteria and other factors, Booz•Allen decided to use test results from\nflights of the following vehicle configurations to predict future success rates:\nAtlas: SLV-3 and later configurations to include SLV-3A, SLV-3C, SLV-3D, G, H, I, II,\nIIA, ITAS. (Excluded: Atlas A, B, C, L V-3A, 3B, 3C, D, E, F)\nDelta: 291X and later configurations to include 391X, 392X, 492X, 592X, 692X, 792X.\nTitan: Titan IIIC and later configurations to include IIIB, IIID, IIIE, 34B, 34D, III/CT,\nIV, II-SLV.\n9/10/96\n100" }, { "n": 110, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p110.jpg", "text": "D.2 Atlas Launch and Performance History\nAtlas space-launch vehicles, originally manufactured by General Dynamics and\ncurrently by Lockheed Martin, derived from the Atlas ICBM series developed in the\n1950s. The primary one-and-one-half-stage vehicle played a major role in early lunar\nexploration activities (the unmanned Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, and Surveyor programs),\nand planetary probes (Mariner and Pioneer). Table 40 shows a summary of Atlas\nconfigurations since the beginning of the program.[1°1\nTable 40. Summarv of Atlas Vehicle Configurations\nonfiguration\nscription\nA\nICBM single-stage test vehicle\nB,C\nICBM 1 ½-stage test vehicle\nD\nICBM and later space-launch vehicle\nE,F\nFirst an ICBM (1960), then a reentry test vehicle (1964), then a\nspace-launch vehicle (1968)\nLV-3A\nSame as D except Agena upper stage\nLV-3B\nSame as D except man-rated for Project Mercury\nSLV-3\nSame as L V-3A except reliabilitv improvements\nSLV-3A\nSame as SLV-3 except stretched 117 inches\nLV-3C\nIntegrated with Centaur D upper stage\nSLV-3C\nSame as LV-3C except stretched 51 inches\nSLV-3D\nSame as SLV-3C except Centaur uprated to D-lA and Atlas\nelectronics integrated with Centaur (no longer radio guided)\nG\nSame as SLV-3D but Atlas stretched 81 inches\nH\nSame as SLV-3D except with E/F avionics and no Centaur\nI\nSame as G except strengthened for 14-ft payload fairing, ring laser\ngyro added\nII\nSame as I except Atlas stretched 108 inches, engines uprated,\nhydrazine roll-control added, verniers deleted, Centaur stretched\n36 inches\nIIA\nIIAS\nSame as II except Centaur RL-l0s engines uprated to 20K lbs\nthrust and 6.5 seconds lsp increase from extendible RL-10 nozzles\nSame as IIA except 4 Castor IVA strap-on SRMs added\nAtlas A, B, and C were developmental ICBMs. Atlas D, E, and F configurations were\ndeployed as operational ICBMs during the 1960s. During that time, some Atlas Ds\nwere modified as space-launch vehicles in the L V series: LV-3A, 3B, and· 3C. The\nStandardized Launch Vehicle (SLV) series derived from a need to reduce lead times in\ntransforming Atlas missiles to space-launch vehicles. The SLV series began with the\nSLV-3 vehicle, which used an Agena upper stage. The G and H vehicles evolved from\nthe SLV series. Eventually the I, II, IIA, and IIAS configurations were developed with\nthe aim of also supporting commercial launches.\n9/10/96\n101\nRT!" }, { "n": 111, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p111.jpg", "text": "Atlas vehicles are fueled by a mixture of liquid oxygen and kerosene (RP-1). The latest\nHAS configuration also incorporates Castor IVA solid-rocket motors. The early Atlas\ncore vehicle included a sustainer, verniers, and two booster engines, all ignited prior to\nliftoff. In the Atlas II, IIA, and HAS vehicles, the vernier engines have been replaced by\na hydrazine roll-control system. Of the four Castor SRBs on the HAS, two are ground\nlit and two are air lit some 60 seconds later. Atlas vehicles are now typically integrated\nwith the Centaur upper stage vehicle that is fueled with liquid oxygen and liquid\nhydrogen. Earlier flights used an Agena upper stage.\nThe entire Atlas history through 1995 is depicted rather compactly in bar-graph form in\nFigure 37. The solid-block portion of each bar indicates the number of launches during\nthe calendar year for which vehicle performance was entirely normal, in-so far as could\nbe determined. The clear white parts forming the tops of most bars show the number\nof launches that were either failures or flights where the launch vehicle experienced\nsome sort of anomalous behavior. Every launch with an entry in the response mode\ncolumn in Table 41 falls in this category. Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the\nattainment of some, or even all, mission objectives.\n50\n!\ni\n45\n!\n!\non••••••----;••••• ••••..••;• • •••..••••••;••••••••••••••••;••••••••••••••••;..••• ....••••••••;••••••••••••••••;•••••••••••••••••;•••\n40\n......\n/ . · -1 · -l7.iFw1lre1Alomrui............. )...\nCJ)\n!\n:\n!\n• Norrr,al P~rforrtjance !\nC: 35\n••..•••••....\n•\ni\n.. ··\n•\nf'• o '\no uoo t\n•••••..••••-!--••••••••••--••• •••••••..•••h••'l••••..•••••••••••t••..••••••..••••i•••••••••••n••••~•••\n0·u;\nI\nI\nI\nI\nI\nI\nCJ) 30 ············\ni i i l i i\n~\nCJ)\nj\ni\ni\ni\ni\ni\nm\n............\n•••••••• ,:......................................................................,!'.................... .\n':.:; 25\n!\n!\n!\ni\ni\nl\ni\n!\ni\ni\n!\n!\n0\nH-1+---•··---•• ••••~••••..••••••••••t•••••••••U••••• ,•••••••••••••••••t•••••••••••..•••i:•••••••••••••••••, •••\n-\n<(\n20\n1\ni\nl\n!\n·!\ni\n\"­\nQ)\n.c\n!\n!\n!\n!\n!\n!\n....·................·................·.................·................ '.................·...\nE 15\n::::, z\n1\nI I I ! I\n10\n••'••······················· ··••'••···························.....·................ .\n1\n1\nI\nI I\n5\n•\n•• ···············1·····\n0 55\n60\n65\n70\n75\n80\n85\n90\n95\nLaunch Year\nFigure 37. Atlas Launch Summary\n9/10/96\n102\nRTI" }, { "n": 112, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p112.jpg", "text": "0.2.1 Atlas Launch History\nThe data in Table 41 summarize the flight performance of all Atlas and Atlas-boosted\nspace-vehicle launches since the program began in June 1957. A launch sequence\nnumber is provided in the first column, a mission ID and launch date in columns 2\nand 3. The vehicle configuration or Atlas booster number is given in the fourth\ncolumn, while the fifth column shows whether the launch took place from the Eastern\nor Western Range. The last three columns in the table show, respectively, the response\nmode assigned by RTI to any failure or anomalous behavior that occurred, the flight\nphase in which it occurred, and whether the vehicle configuration is considered\nrepresentative for the purposes of predicting future Atlas reliability. Launches through\nsequence number 532 were used in the filtering process to estimate failure rate.\nTable 41. Atlas Launch History\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nTest\nConfKJuration\nRanae\n4A\nER\n6A\nER\nResponse\nMode\n4T\n4\nFlight\nPhase\n1\n1\nRep.\nCont.\n0\n0\n1\n2\nWeaoons Svstem (WS)\nws\n06/11/57\n09/25/57\n3 ws\n12/17/57 12A\nER\n0\n4 ws\n01/10/58\n10A\nER\n0\n5 ws\n02/07/58\n13A\nER\n4\n1\n0\n6 ws\n02120/58\n11A\nER\n4T\n1\n0\n7 ws\n04/05/58\n15A\nER\n4\n1\n0\n8\n9\n10\nws\nws\nws\n06/03/58\n07/19/58\n08/02168\n16A\nER\n38\nER\n48\nER\n4T\n1\n0\n0\n0\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\nws\nws\nws\nws\nws\n08/28/58\n09/14/58\n09/18/58\n11/17/58\n11128/58\n58\nER\n88\nER\n68\nER\n98\nER\n128\nER\n4\n4\n4\n4\n2.5\n2.5\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n16\nSCORE\n12/18/58\n108 LV-3A/AGENA\nER\n0\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\nws\nws\nws\nws\nws\nws\n12123/58\n01/15/59\n01/27/59\n02/04/59\n02/20/59\n03/18/59\n3C\nER\n138\nER\n4C\nER\n118\nER\n5C\nER\n7C\nER\n5\n5\n4\n4\n1\n2\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n23 ws\n04/14/59\n3D\nER\n4\n1\n0\n24\n25\n26\nws\nws\nws\n05/18/59\n06/06/59\n07/21/59\n70\nER\n5D\nER\nSC\nER\n4\n4\n1\n2\n0\n0\n0\n27 ws\n07/28/59\n11D\nER\n0\n28 ws\n08/11/59\n14D\nER\n0\n29\n30\n31\nws\nMERCURY (test)\nDESERT HEAT\n08/24/59\n09/09/59\n09/09/59\n11C\nER\n10D LV-38\nER\n12D\nWR\n4\n2\n0\n0\n0\n9/10/96\n103\nRTI" }, { "n": 113, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p113.jpg", "text": "32\n33\n34\n35\n36\n37\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n48\n49\n50\n51\n52\n53\n54\n55\n56\n57\n58\n59\n60\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n66\n67\n68\n69\n70\n71\n72\n73\n74\n75\n76\n77\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nConf.\nws\n09/16/59\n17D\nER\n4\n2.5\n0\nws\n10/06/59\n18D\nER\n0\nws\n10/09/59\n22D\nER\n0\nws.\n10/29/59\n26D\nER\n4\n2.5\n0\nws\n11/04/59\n28D\nER\nNA\n2\n0\nws\n11/24/59\n15D\nER\nNA\n2.5\n0\nABLE (PIONEER)\n11/26/59\n20D LV-3A/AGENA\nER\n4\n1\n0\nws\n12/08/59 310\nER\n0\nws\n12/18/59\n40D\nER\n0\nws\n01/06/60\n43D\nER\n0\nws\n01/26/60\n440\nER\n0\nDUAL EXHAUST\n01/26/60\n6D\nWR\n4\n2&2.5\n0\nws\n02/11/60\n49D\nER\n0\nMIDASI\n02/26/60\n290 LV-3A/AGENA A\nER\n4\n2.5\n0\nws\n03/08/60\n42D\nER\n4\n2.5\n0\nws\n03/10/60\n510\nER\n1\n1\n0\nws\n04/07/60\n48D\nER\n1\n1\n0\nQUICK START\n04/22/60\n25D\nWR\n0\nLUCKY DRAGON\n05/06/60 230\nWR\n3\n1\n0\nws\n05/20/60\n560\nER\n0\nMIOASII\n05/24/60\n45D LV-3A/AGENAA\nER\n0\nws\n06/11/60 540\nER\n0\nws\n06/22/60 62D.\nER\n4\n2.5\n0\nws\n06/27/60 270\nER\n0\nws\n07/02/60\n60D\nER\n4\n2\n0\nTIGER SKIN\n07/22/60\n74D\nWR\n5\n1\n0\nMERCURY1\n07/29/60\nSOD LV-3B\nER\n4\n1\n0\nws\n08/09/60\n32D\nER\n0\nws\n08/12/60\n660\nER\n0\nGOLDEN JOURNEY\n09/12/60\n470\nWR\n4\n2\n0\nws\n09/16/60\n760\nER\n0\nws\n09/19/60\n79D\nER\n0\nABLE 5(PIONEER)\n09/25/60\n800 LV-3A/AGENA\nER\n4T\n2.5&3\n0\nHIGH ARROW\n09/29/60\n33D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nws\n10/11/60\nSE\nER\n5\n2\n0\n· Gibson Girl\n10/11/60\n57D LV-3A/AGENA A\nWR\nNA\n3&5\n0\nDIAMOND JUBILEE\n10/12/60\n81D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nws\n10/13/60 710\nER\n0\nws\n10/22/60\n55D\nER\n0\nws\n11/15/60\n83D\nER\n0\nws\n11/29/60\n4E\nER\n5\n2\n0\nABLE 5B (PIONEER)\n12/15/60\n91 DLV-3A/AGENA\nEA\n4\n1\n0\nHOT SHOT\n12/16/60\n99D\nWR\n0\nws\n01/23/61\n90D\nER\n0\nws\n01/24/61\nBE\nER\n5\n2\n0\nJawhawk Jamboree\n01/31/61\n70D LV-3A/AGENAA\nWR\nNA\n2\n0\n9/10/96\n104\nRTI" }, { "n": 114, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p114.jpg", "text": "78\n79\n80\n81\n82\n83\n84\n85\n86\n87\n88\n89\n90\n91\n92\n93\n94\n95\n96\n97\n98\n99\n100\n101\n102\n103\n104\n105\n106\n107\n108\n109\n110\n111\n112\n113\n114\n115\n116\n117\n118\n119\n120\n121\n122\n123\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nConf.\nMERCURY2\n02/21/61\n67D LV-38\nER\n0\nws\n02/24/61\n9E\nER\n0\nws\n03/13/61\n13E\nER\n4\n2\n0\nws\n03/24/61\n16E\nER\n4\n1.5\n0\nMERCURY3\n04/25/61\n100D LV-38\nER\n3\n1\n0\nws\n05/12/61\n12E\nER\n0\nLITTLE SATIN\n05/24/61\n95D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n0\n0\nws\nSURE SHOT\n05/26/61\n06/07/61\n18E\n27E\nER\nWR\nws\n06/22161\n17E\nER\n4\n1\n0\nws\n07/06/61\n22E\nER\n0\nPolar Orbit (Midas Ill)\n07/12/61\n97D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\nws\n07/31/61\n21E\nER\n0\nws\n08/08/61\n2F\nER\n0\nNEW NICKEL\n08/22/61\n1010\nWR\n0\nRANGER 1\n08/23/61\n111 DLV-M{AGENA\nER\nNA\n4\n0\nws\n09/08/61\n26E\nER\n4\n2\n0\nFirst Motion (Samos Ill)\nMERCURY4\nws\n09/09/61\n09/13/61\n10/02/61\n106D LV-3A/AGENA B\n88D LV-38\n25E\nWR\nER\nER\n1\n1\n0\n0\n0\nws\nBig Town (Midas IV)\nws\n10/05/61\n10/21/61\n11/10/61\n30E\n105D LV-3A/AGENA B\n32E\nER\nWR\nER\nNA\n4T\n2\n1\n0\n0\n0\n•\nRANGER2\nws\nRound Trip (Samos IV)\n11/18/61\n11/22161\n11/22/61\n117D LV-3A/AGENA\n4F\n108D LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\nER\nWR\nNA\n4T\n4\n2\n0\n0\n0\nMERCURY5\nBIG PUSH\nws\n11/29/61\n11/29/61\n12/01/61\n93D LV-38\n53D\n35E\nER\nWR\nER\n0\n0\n0\nBIG CHIEF\nws\nws\nws\n12/07/61\n12/12/61\n12/19/61\n12/20/61\n82D\nSF\n36E\n6F\nWR\nER\nER\nER\n5\n4T\n2\n2\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOcean Wav (Samos V)\n12/22/61\n114D LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\nNA\n2\n0\nBLUE FIN\n01/17/62\n123D\nWR\n0\nBLUE MOSS\n01/23/62\n132D\nWR\n0\nRANGER3\nws\nBIG JOHN\nMERCURY6\n01/26/62\n02/13/62\n02/16/62\n02/20/62\n121D LV-3A/AGENA B\n40E\n137D\n1090, LV-3B\nER\nER\nWR\nER\nNA\nNA\n2&5\n1.5\n0\n0\n0\n0\nCHAIN SMOKER\n02/21/62\n52D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nSILVER SPUR\n02/28/62\n66E\nWR\n4T\n1.5 & 2\n0\nLoose Tooth\n03/07/62\n1120, LV-3A/AGENAB\nWR\n0\nCURRY COMB I\n03/23162\n134D\nWR\n0\nws\nNight Hunt\n04109/62\n04/09/62\n11F\n11 OD LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\nWR\n1\nNA\n1\n1\n0\n0\n9/10/96\n105" }, { "n": 115, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p115.jpg", "text": "124\n125\n126\n127\n128\n129\n130\n131\n132\n133\n134\n135\n136\n137\n138\n139\n140\n141\n142\n143\n144\n145\n146\n147\n148\n149\n150\n151\n152\n153\n154\n155\n156\n157\n158\n159\n160\n161\n162\n163\n164\n165\n166\n167\n168\n169\nFlight\nRep.\nNo.\nMission/ID\nDate\nConflauration\nTest\nResponse\nLaunch\nVehicle\nCont.\nCURRY COMB II\n04/11/62\n129D\nPhase\nRanae\nMode\n0\nRANGER4\n04/23/62\n133D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\nDaintv Doll\n04/26/62\n118D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n0\nBLUE BALL\n04/2.7/62\n140D\nWR\n0\nAC-1 (SUBORBITAL)\n05/08/62 1040 LV-3C/CENT. D\nER\n4\n1\nWR\n0\nCANNONBALL FLYER\n05/11/62\n127D\nWR\n0\nMERCURY7\n05/24/62\n1070, LV-3B\nER\n0\nRubber Gun\n06/17/62\n115D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n4\n3\n0\nALLJAZl.\n06/26/62\n21D\nWR\n0\nLONG LADY\n07/12/62\n1410\nWR\n0\nEXTRA BONUS\n07/13/62\n67E\nWR\n4\n2&2.5\n0\nArmored Car\n07/18/62\n1200, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\nFIRST TRY\n07/19/62\n130\nWR\n0\nMARINER 1(VENUS)\n07/22/62\n145D LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n5\n2\n0\nHIS NIBS\n08/01/62\n15F\nWR\n0\nAir Scout\n08/05/62\n1240, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\nPEGBOARD\n08/09/62\n8D\nWR\n0\nPEGBOARD II\n08/09/62\n870\nWR\n4\n2.5\n0\nCRASH TRUCK\n08/10/62\n57F\nWR\n5\n1\n0\nws\n08/13/62\n7F\nER\n0\nMARINER 2{VENUS)\n08/27/62\n1790 LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\nNA\n2\n0\nws\n09/19/62\nSF\nER\n0\nBRIAR STREET\n10/02/62 40\nWR\n4\n2\n0\nMERCURYS\n10/03/62\n113D, LV-3B\nER\n0\nRANGERS\n10/18/62 2150 LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\nNA\n5\n0\nws\n10/19/62 14F\nER\n0\nCLOSED CIRCUITS\n10/26/62\n1590\nWR\n0\nws\n11/07/62\n16F\nER\n0\nAfter Deck\n11/11/62 1280, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\nACTION TIME\n11/14/62\n13F\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nws\n12/05/62 21F\nER\n0\nDEER PARK\n12/12/62\n161D\nWR\n0\nBargain Counter\n12/17/62 1310, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n4T\n1\n0\nOAKTREE\n12/18162\n64E\nWR\n4T\n1\n0\nFLY HIGH\n12/22162\n160D\nWR\n4\n2\n0\nBIG SUE\n01/25/63 390\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nFAINT CLICK\n01/31/63\n1760\nWR\n0\nFLAG RACE\n02/13/63\n1820\nWR\n0\nPITCH PINE\n02/28/63\n1880\nWR\n0\nABRES-1\n03/01/63\n134F\n0\nTALL TREE3\n03/09/63\n1020\nER\nWR\n5\n1\n0\nTALL TREE2\n03/11/63 640\nWR\n0\nTALL TREE 1\n03/15/63 460\nWR\n4T\n2\n0\nTALL TREES\n03/15/63\n63F\nWR\n0\nLEADING EDGE\n03/16/63\n193D\nWR\n4T\n2\n0\nKENDALL GREEN\n03/21/63\n83F\nWR\n4\n2.5\n0\n9/10/96\n106\nRTI" }, { "n": 116, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p116.jpg", "text": "170\n175\n180\n185\n190\n195\n200\n205\n210\n215\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConflauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nCont.\nTALL TREE4\n03/23/63\n52F\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n171\nBLACK BUCK\n04/24/63\n65E\nWR\nNA\n2.5\n0\n172 ABRES-2\n04/26/63\n135F\nER\n0\n173 DamoClav\n05/09/63\n119D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\n174 MERCURY9\n05/15/63\n130D, LV-3B\nER\n0\nDOCK HAND\n06/04/63\n62E\nWR\n0\n176 HARPOON GUN\n06/12/63\n198D\nWR\n0\n1n Bia Four .\n06/12/63\n139D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n4T\n1\n0\n178 GO BOY\n07/03/63\n69E\nWR\n0\n179\nFish Pool\n07/12/63\n2010, LV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n0\nOamoDuck\n07/18/63\n75D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nWR\n0\n181\nSILVER DOLL\n07/26/63\n24E\nWR\n4\n2\n0\n182 BIG FLIGHT\n07/30/63\n70E\nWR\n0\n183 COOL WATER I\n07/31/63\n143D\nWR\n0\n184\nPIPE DREAM\n08/24/63\n72E\nWR\n0\nCOOL WATER 11\n08/28163\n142D\nWR\n0\n186\nFixed Fee\n09/06/63\n212D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n0\n187 COOL WATER 111\n09/06/63\n63D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n188\nCOOL WATER IV\n09/11/63\n84D\nWR\n4T\n2.5\n0\n189\nFILTER TIP\n09/25/63\n71E\nWR\n4T\n2\n0\nHOTRUM\n10/03/63 45F\nWR\n1\n1\n0\n191\nCOOLWATERV\n10/07/63 1630\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n192\nVELA 1&2\n10/16/63\n197D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n0\n193 HavBailer\n10/25/63 224D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n0\n194 ABRES-3\n10/28163\n136F\nER\n4T\n2\n0\nHICKORY HOLLOW\n11/04/63 232D\nWR\n0\n196 COOL WATER VI\n11/13/63\n158D\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n197 AC-2\n11/27/63 1260, LV-3C/CENTAUR 0\nER\n0\n198\nLENS COVER\n12/18163 2330\nWR\n0\n199 Rest Easy\n12/18163 227D, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nWR\n0\nOAYBOOK\n12/18/63\n109F\nWR\n0\n201\nRANGERS\n01/30/64\n1990, LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n0\n202\nBLUE BAY\n02/12/64\n48E\nWR\n4\n2\n0\n203\nUooer Octane\n02/25/64\n2850, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nWR\n·O\n204 ABRES-4\n02/25/64\n5E\nER\n0\nInk Blotter\n03/11/64 2960, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nWR\n0\n206\nABRE5-5\n04/01/64\n137F\nER\n0\n207 HIGHBALL\n04/03/64\n3F\nWR\n1\n1\n0\n208\nPROJECT FIRE\n04/14/64 263D, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nER\n0\n209 Anchor Dan\n04/23/64\n351D, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nWR\n0\nBig Fred\n05/19/64 3500, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nWR\n0\n211\nIRON LUNG\n06/18/64 2430\nWR\n0\n212\nAC-3\n06/30/64\n1350,LV-SC/CENT.D\nER\n4\n3\n0\n213 Quarter Round\n07/06/64 3520, LV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n0\n214 VELA3 &4\n07/17/64 2160, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nER\n0\nRANGER7\n07/28/64 2500, LV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n0\n9/10/96\n107\nRTI" }, { "n": 117, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p117.jpg", "text": "216\n217\n218\n219\n220\n221\n222\n223\n224\n225\n226\n227\n228\n229\n230\n231\n232\n233\n234\n235\n236\n237\n238\n239\n240\n241\n242\n243\n244\n245\n246\n247\n248\n249\n250\n251\n252\n253\n254\n255\n256\n257\n258\n259\n260\n261\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRange\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nCont.\n0\nKNOCK WOOD\n07/29/64\n248D\nWR\nLARGE CHARGE\n08/07/64\n110F\nWR\n0\nBig Sickle\n08/14/64\n7101, SLV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nGALLANT GAL\n08/27/64\n57E\nWR\n4\n2\n0\nBIG DEAL\n08/31/64\n36F\nWR\n0\nOG0-1\n09/04/64\n1950, LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n0\nBUTTERFLY NET\n09/15/64 2450\nWR\n0\nBUZZING BEE\n09/22/64\n247D\nWR\n0\nSlow Pace\n09/23/64\n7102, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBusy Line\n10/08/64 7103, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBoon Decker\n10/23/64 3530, LV-3A/AGENA D\nWR\n0\nMARINERS\n11/05/64\n289D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n4\n4\n0\nMARINER4\n11/28/64 2880, LV-3A/AGENA 0\nER\n0\nBROOK TROUT\n12/01/64 2100\nWR\n0\nOPERA GLASS\n12/04/64\n300D\nWR\n0\nBattle Royal\n12/04/64\n7105, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nAC-4\n12/11/64\n1460, LV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n0\nSTEP OVER\n12/22/64\n111F\nWR\n0\nPILOT LIGHT\n01/08/65\n106F\nWR\n0\nPENCIL SET\n01/12/65\n1660\nWR\n0\nBeaver's Dam\n01/21/65\n172D/ABRES\nWR\n4\n2&3\n0\nSand Lark\n01/23/65\n7106, SLV-3/AGENA 0\nWR\n1\nRANGERS\n02/17/65\n196D, LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n0\nDRAG BAR\n02/27/65\n2110\nWR\n0\nPORK BARREL\n03/02/65\n301D\nWR\n0\nAc-5\n03/02/65\n1560, LV-3C/CENT. D\nER\n1\n1\n0\nShioRail\n03/12/65\n7104, SLV-3/AGENA 0\nWR\n1\nANGEL CAMP\n03/12/65\n154D\nWR\n0\nRANGER9\n03/21/65 2040, LV-3A/AGENA B\nER\n0\nFRESH FROG\n03/26/65\n297D\nWR\n0\nAirPumo\n04/03/65\n7401, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nFLIP SIDE\n04/06/65\n150D\nWR\n0\nDwarf Tree\n04/28/65\n7107, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nPROJECT FIRE\n05/22/65\n264D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n0\nBottom Land'\n05/27/65\n7108, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nTennis Match\n05/27/65\n68D/ABRES\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nOLD FOGEY\n06/03/65\n1770\nWR\n0\nLEA RING\n06/08/65\n299D\nWR\n0\nSTOCK BOY\n06/10/65\n302D\nWR\n0\nWorn Face\n06/25/65\n7109, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBLIND SPOT\n07/01/65\n59D\nWR\n0\nWhite Pine\n07/12/65\n7112, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n4&5\n2&3\n1\nVELA 5 & 6\n07/20/65\n225D, LV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n0\nWater Tower\n08/03/65\n7111, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nPIANO WIRE\n08/04/65\n183D\nWR\n0\nSEA TRAMP\n08/05/65\n147F\nWR\n0\n9/10/96\n108\nRTI" }, { "n": 118, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p118.jpg", "text": "262\n263\n264\n265\n266\n267\n268\n269\n270\n271\n272\n273\n274\n275\n276\n277\n278\n279\n280\n281\n282\n283\n284\n285\n286\n287\n288\n289\n290\n291\n292\n293\n294\n295\n296\n297\n298\n299\n300\n301\n302\n303\n304\n305\n306\n307\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nCont.\nAC-6\n08/11/65\n151D, LV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n0\nTONTO RIM\n08/26/65\n61D\nWR\n0\nWATER SNAKE\nLog Fog\nSeethina Citv\nGTV-6\nShop Degree\n09/29/65\n09/30/65\n125D\n7110, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\nWR\n0\n1\n10/05/65\n10/25/65\n11/08/65\n11/29/65\n12/20/65\n34D/ABRES\n5301, SLV-3/AGENA D\n7113, SLV-3/AGENA D\n200D\n85D\nWR\nER\nWR\nWR\nWR\n4\n3\n0\n1\n1\n0\n0\nWILD GOAT\nTAG DAY\nBlanket Partv\nYEAST CAKE\n01/19/66\n02/10/66\n02/11/66\n02/15/66\n02/19/66\n7114, SLV-3/AGENA D\n305D\n86D\n7115, SLV-3/AGENA D\n73D\nWR\nWR\nWR\nWR\nWR\n1\n0\n0\n1\n0\nLONELY MT.\nMucho Grande\nSYCAMORE RIDGE\nETERNAL CAMP\n03/04/66\n303D\nWR\n5\n1\n0\nGTV-8\n03/16/66\n5302, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nDumb Dora\n03/18/66\n7116, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nWHITEBEAR\n03/19/66\n304D\nWR\n5\n2\n0\nBronze Bell\nAC-8\nOA0-1\nShallow Stream\nCRAB CLAW\nSUPPLY ROOM\nPump Handle\nGTV-9\nSAND SHARK\nSURVEYOR-1 (AC-10)\nGTV-9A\nPower Drill\nOGO-3\nMama's Boy\nVENEER PANEL\n03/30/66\n04/07/66\n04/08/66\n04/19/66\n05/03/66\n05/13/66\n05/14/66\n05/17/66\n72D\n184D, LV-3C/CENT. D\n5001, SLV-3/AGENA D\n7117, SLV-3/AGENA D\n208D\n98D\n7118, SLV-3/AGENA D\n5303, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\nER\nER\nWR\nWR\nWR\nWR\nER\n4T\n4T\n5\n4\n1\n1\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n0\n1\n1\n05/26/66\n05/30/66\n06/01/66\n06/03/66\n06/06/66\n06/09/66\n06/10/66\n410\n290D, LV-3C/CENTAUR D\n5304, SLV-3/AGENA D\n7119, SLV-3/AGENA D\n5601, SLV-3/AGENA B\n7201, SLV-3/AGENA D\n960\nWR\nER\nER\nWR\nER\nWR\nWR\n4\n2.5\n0\n0\n1\n1\n1\n1\n0\nGOLDEN MT.\nHEAVY ARTILLERY\nSnake Creek\n06/26/66\n06/30/66\n07/12/66\n1470\n298D\n7120, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\nWR\nWR\n0\n0\n1\nStonv Island\n07/13/66\n580/ABRES\nWR\nNA\n3\n0\nGTV-10\n07/18/66\n5305, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nBUSY RAMROD\n08/08/66\n149F\nWR\n4\n2\n0\n1\nLUNAR ORBITER 1\n08/10/66\n5801, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\nSilver Doll\n08/16/66\n7121, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nHaoov Mt.\n08/19/66\n7202, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nGTV-11\nTaxi Driver\n09/12/66\n09/16/66\n5306, SLV-3/AGENA D\n7123, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\nWR\nNA\n5\n1\n1\n0\nSURVEYOR 2(AC-7)\nDwarf Killer\n09/20/66\n10/05/66\n1940, LV-3C/CENT. D\n7203, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\nWR\n1\n9/10/96\n109\nRTI" }, { "n": 119, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p119.jpg", "text": "308\n309\n310\n311\n312\n313\n314\n315\n316\n317\n318\n319\n320\n321\n322\n323\n324\n325\n326\n327\n328\n329\n330\n331\n332\n333\n334\n335\n336\n337\n338\n339\n340\n341\n342\n343\n344\n345\n346\n347\n348\n349\n350\n351\n352\n353\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConflauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nCont.\nLOWHILL\n10/11/66\n115F\nWR\n4\n1\n0\nGleamina Star\n10/12/66\n7122, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nAC-9\n10/26/66\n174D, LV-3C/CENT. D\nER\nNA\n2\n0\nRed Caboose\n11/02/66 7124, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nLUNAR ORBITER 2\n11/06/66 5802, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nGTV-12\n11/11/66 5307, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nBusv Mermaid\n12/05/66 7125, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nATS-S\n12/06/66 5101, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nBusvPanama\n12/11/66 89O/ABRES\nWR\n0\nBusv Peacock\n12/21/66 7001, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBUSY STEPSON\n01/17/67\n148F\nWR\nNA\n2.5\n0\nBUSY NIECE\n01/22/67 350\nWR\n0\nBusv Party\n02/02/67 7126, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nLUNAR ORBITER 3\n02/04/67 5803, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\nt\nBUSY BOXER\n02/13/67\n121F\n'WR\n0\nGiant Chief\n03/05/67\n7002, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nLITTLE CHURCH\n03/16/67\n151F\nWR\n0\nATS-A\n04/05/67\n5102, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nBUSY SUNRISE\n04/07/67\n38D\nWR\n0\nSURVEYOR 3(AC-12)\n04/17/67 2920, LV-3C/CENTAUR 0\nER\n0\nBusv Tournament\n04/19/67\n7003, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nLUNAR ORBITER 4\n05/04/67\n5804, SLV-3/AGENA 0\nER\n1\nBUSY PIGSKIN\n05/19/67\n119F\nWR\n0\nBusvCamoer\n05/22/67\n7127, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBusvWolf\n06/04/67 7128, SLV-3/AGENA D\nWR\n1\nBUCKTYPE\n06/09/67\n122F\nWR\n0\nMARINER 5(VENUS)\n06/14/67\n5401, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nABRES (AFSC)\n07/06/67 650\nWR\n0\nSURVEYOR 4(AC-111\n07/14/67 2910, LV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n0\nABRES (AFSC)\n07/22/67\n114F\nWR\n0\nAFSC\n07/27/67\n92D/ABRES\nWR\n0\nBREAD HOOK\n07/29/67\n150F\nWR\n0\nLUNAR ORBITER 5\n08/01/67\n5805, SLV-3/AGENA D\nER\n1\nSURVEYOR 5(AC-13)\n09/08/67 5901C, SLV-3/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\nABRES (AFSC)\n10/11/67 690\nWR\n0\nABRES (AFSC)\n10/14/67 118F\nWR\n0\nABRES (AFSC)\n10/27/67 81F\nWR\n4T\n1\n0\nATS-C\n11/05/67 5103, SLV-3/AGENA 0\nER\n1\nSURVEYOR 6(AC-14)\n11/07/67 5902C, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\nABRES (AFSC}\n11/07/67 94D\nWR\n0\nABRES (AFSCl\n11/10/67 113F\nWR\n0\nABRES (AFSC)\n12/21/67 117F\nWR\n0\nSURVEYOR 7(AC-15)\n01/07/68\n5903C, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\nABRES (AFSCl\n01/31/68 94F\nWR\n0\nABRES (AFSC)\n02/26/68\n116F\nWR\n0\nOGO-E\n03/04/68\n5602A, SLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n1\n9/10/96\n110\nRTI" }, { "n": 120, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p120.jpg", "text": "No.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nConf.\n354 ABRES {AFSC)\n03/06/68\n74E\nWR\n0\n355\nAFSC\n04/06/68\n107F/ABRES\nWR\n0\n356\nABRES (AFSC)\n04/18/68\n77E\nWR\n0\n357\nABRES (AFSC)\n04/27/68\n78E\nWR\n0\n358\nABRES (AFSC)\n05/03/68\n95F\nWR\n5\n1\n0\n359\nABRES (AFSC)\n06/01/68\n89F\nWR\n0\n360\nABRES (AFSC)\n06/22/68\n86F\nWR\n0\n361\nABRES (AFSC)\n06/29/68\n32F\nWR\n0\n362\nAFSC\n07/11/68\n75F/ABRES\nWR\n0\n363\nDOD (AA-27)\n08/06/68\nSLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n1\n364 ATS-D (AC-17)\n08/10/68\n5104C, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\nNA\n4\n1\n365\nAFSC\n08/16/68\n7004, SLV-3/BURNER II\nWR\n4\n3\n1\n366\nABRES (AFSC)\n09/25/68\n99F\nWR\n0\n367\nABRES (AFSC}\n09/27/68\n84F\nWR\n0\n368\nABRES {AFSC)\n11/16/68\n56F\nWR\n4T\n2.5\n0\n369\nABRES (AFSC)\n11/24/68\n60F\nWR\n0\n370\nOAO-A2 (AC-16)\n12/07/68 5002C, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n371\nABRES (AFSC)\n01/16/69\n70F\nWR\n0\n372\nMARINER 6(MARS) (AC-20)\n02/24/69\n54030, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\nNA\n1\n1\n373\nAFSC\n03/17/69\n104F/ABRES\nWR\n0\n374\nMARINER 7 (MARS) (AC-19)\n03/27/69\n5105C, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n375\nDOD (AA-28)\n04/12/69\nSLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n1\n376\nATS-E (AC-18}\n08/12/69\n54020, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n377\nABRES (AFSC)\n08/20/69\n112F\nWR\n0\n378\nABRES (AFSC)\n09/16/69\n100F\nWR\n0\n379\nABRES (AFSC)\n10/10/69 98F\nWR\n4\n1\n0\n380\nABRES (AFSC)\n12/03/69\n44F\nWR\n0\n381\nABRES (AFSC)\n12/12/69 93F\nWR\n0\n382\nABRES (AFSC)\n02/08/70\n96F\nWR\n0\n383\nABRES (AFSC}\n03/13/70\n28F\nWR\n0\n384 ABRES (AFSC)\n05/30/70\n91F\nWR\n0\n385\nABRES {AFSC)\n06/09/70\n92F\nWR\n0\n386\nDOD (AA-29)\n06/19/70\nSLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n1\n387\nDOD (AA-30)\n08/31/70\nSLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\n1\n388 OA0-8 (AC-21)\n11/30/70 50030, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n4\n2\n1\n389\nABRES (AFSC)\n12/22/70\n105F\nWR\n0\n390\nINTELSAT IV F-2 (AC-25)\n01/25171\n50050, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n391\nABRES (AFSC)\n04/05/71\n85F\nWR\n0\n392\nMARINER 8(MARS) (AC-24)\n05/08/71\n5405C, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n4T\n3\n1\n393\nMARINER 9(MARS) (AC-23)\n05/30/71\n5404C, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n394\nABRES (AFSC)\n06/29/71\n103F\nWR\n0\n395\nAFSC\n08/06/71\n76F\nWR\n0\n396\nABRES (AFSC)\n09/01/71\n74F\nWR\n0\n397\nDOD (AA-31)\n12/04/71\nSLV-3NAGENA D\nER\n4\n1\n1\n398\nINTELSAT IV F-3 (AC-26)\n12/19171\n50060, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n399\nINTELSAT IV F-4 (AC-28)\n01/22/72\n50080, SLV-3O/CENTAUR D\nER\n1\n9/10/96\n111\nRTI\nl\nI" }, { "n": 121, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p121.jpg", "text": "400\n401\n402\n403\n404\n405\n406\n407\n408\n409\n410\n411\n412\n413\n414\n415\n416\n417\n418\n419\n420\n421\n422\n423\n424\n425\n426\n427\n428\n429\n430\n431\n432\n433\n434\n435\n436\n437\n438\n439\n440\n441\n442\n443\n444\n445\nFlight\nRep.\nNo.\nResponse\nLaunch\nTest\nVehicle\nConf.\nPIONEER 10 (AC-2n\nPhase\nMode\nMission/ID\nConflauration\nRanae\nDate\n1\nINTELSAT IV F-5 (AC-29}\n50070, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\nER\n03/02/72\n1\nER\n50090, SLV-3C/CENTAUR D\n06/13/72\n1\nAFSC\nOAO-C{AC-22)\n50040, SLV-30/CENTAUR D\nER\n08/21n2\n0\nDOD (AA-32)\n10/02/72\n102F/BURNER II\nWR\n•SLV-3A/AGENA D\n1\nDOD (AA-33)\n1212on2\nER\n1\nPIONEER 11 {AC-30)\nER\n03/06/73\nSLV-3A/AGENA D\n1\nINTELSAT IV F-7 (AC-31)\nER\n5011D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\n04/05/73\n1\nABRES (AFSC)\nER\n5010D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\n08/23/73\n0\nACE\n08/29n3\nWR\n78F\n0\nMARINER 10 (AC-34)\n09/30ll3\n108F\nWR\n1\nSFT-1\n11/03/73 5014D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n0\nACE\nWR\n03/06/74 73F\n0\nSFT-2\nWR\n03/23/74\n97F\n0\nSFT-3\nWR\nos101n4 54F\n0\nNTS-1\n06/28ll4\nWR\n82F\n0\nACE\n07/13/74\nWR\n69F\n0\nABRES {AFSC)\n09/08ll4\n80F\nWR\n0\nINTELSAT IV F-8 (AC-32}\n10/12ll4 31F\nWR\n1\nINTELSAT IV F-6 (AC-33)\n5012D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n11121n4\n2\n1\nAFSC\nER\n4T\n02/20ll5 5015D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\n1\n0\nINTELSAT IV F-1 (AC-35)\n04/12ll5\nWR\n4\n71F\n1\nDOD (AA-34)\n05/22/75\n5018D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSAT IVA F-1 (AC-36)\n06/18ll5\nSLV-3A/AGENA\nER\n1\nINTELSAT IVA F-2 (AC-37)\n09/25ll5\n5016D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nAFSC\n01/29176\n5017D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\nWR\n0\nCOMSTAR D-1 (AC-38)\nF\n04/30ll6\n1\nCOMSTAR D-2 (AC-40)\n05/13ll6\n5020D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nDOD(AA-35)\n07/22ll6\n5022D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSAT IVA F-4 (AC-39)\n05123m\nSLV-3A/AGENA\nER\n1\nNTS-2\n5019D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\n05/26/77\nER\n0\nHEAO-A (AC-45)\n65F\nWR\n06/23/Tl\n1\n1 •\n08/12ll7 5025D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nAFSC\nINTELSAT IVA F-5 CAC-43)\n4T\n09129n1 57010, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n0\nDOD (AA-36}\n12108f17 F\nWR\n1\n12111m SLV-3A/AGENA D\nER\nINTELSAT IVA F-3 (AC-46)\n1\nFLTSATCOM-A (AC-44)\n01/06/78\n50260, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n02/09ll8 50240, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNDS-1\n0\nINTELSAT IVA F-6 (AC-48)\n02/22ll8\n64F\nWR\n1\nDOD (AA-37)\noa131n8\n5028D, SLV-3O/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNDS-2\nSLV-3A/AGENA 0\nER\n04/07n8\n05/13/78\n49F\n0\nPIONEER (VENUS) (AC-SO)\nWR\n1\nSEASATA\n05/20/78 50300, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n0\nCOMSTAR D-3 (AG-41)\n06/26/78 .23F/AGENA 0\nWR\n1\n06/29ll8\n5021D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1 .\nPIONEER (VENUS) (AC-51)\nER\nNAVSTAR Ill\n08/08n8\n50310, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\n10/06ll8 47F\nWR\n0\n'\n9/10/%\n112\nRTI\n-1" }, { "n": 122, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p122.jpg", "text": "446\n447\n448\n449\n450\n451\n452\n453\n454\n455\n456\n457\n458\n459\n460\n461\n462\n463\n464\n465\n466\n467\n468\n469\n470\n471\n472\n473\n474\n475\n476\n477\n478\n479\n480\n481\n482\n483\n484\n485\n486\n487\n488\n489\n490\n491\nNo.\nMission/ID\nLaunch\nDate\nVehicle\nConfiauration\nTest\nRanae\nResponse\nMode\nFlight\nPhase\nRep.\nCont.\nTIROSN\n10/13/78\n29F\nWR\n0\nHEAO-B (A0-52)\n11/13/78 50320, SLV-3O/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNAVSTAR!V\n12/10/78\n39F\nWR\n0\nSTP-78-1\n02/24/79\n27F\nWR\n0\nFLTSATCOM-B (AC-4n\n05/04/79\n50270, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNOAA-A\n06/27/79\n25F\nWR\n0\nHEAO-C (AC-53)\n09/20/79\n5033D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nFLTSATCOM-C (AC-49)\n01/17/80 50290, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNAVSTARV\n02/09/80\n35F\nWR\n0\nAFSC\n03/03/80 F\nWR\n0\nNAVSTARVI\n04/26/80\n34F\nWR\n0\nNOAA-B\n05/29/80\n19F\nWR\nNA\n1\n0\nFLTSATCOM-D (A0-5n\n10/31/80 5037D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSAT IV F-2 (AC-54)\n12/06/80\n5034D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nAFSC\n12/08/80\n68E\nWR\n5\n1\n0\nCOMSTAR D(AC-42)\n02/21/81\n5023D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSAT V(Ao-56)\n05/23/81\n5036D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNOAA-C\n06/23/81\n87F\nWR\n0\nFLTSATCOM-E (AC-59}\n08/06/81\n5039D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\nNA\n1&5\n1\nINTELSAT VF-3 {AC-55}\n12/15/81\n5035D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nNAVSTARV!I\n12/18/81\n76E\nWR\n2\n1\n0\nINTELSAT VF-4 (A0-58)\n03/05/82\n5038D, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSATV F-5 (AC-60)\n09/28/82\n50400, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nDMSP F-6\n12/20/82\n60E\nWR\n0\nAFSC\n02/09/83 H\nWR\n1\nNOAA-E\n03/28/83\n73E\nWR\n0\nINTELSAT VF-6 (AO-S1)\n05/19/83\n50410, SLV-3D/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nAFSC\n06/09/83 H\nWR\n1\nNAVSTAR VIII\n07/14/83\n75E/PAM-D\nWR\n0\nDMSP F-7\n11/17/83\n58E\nWR\n0\nAFSC\n02/05/84 H\nWR\n1\nINTELSAT VF-9 (AC-62)\n06/09/84\n5042G/CENT D-1A\nER\n4T\n4\n1\nNAVSTARIX\n06/13/84\n42E/PAM-D\nWR\n0\nNAVSTARX\n09/08/84\n14E/PAM-D\nWR\n0\nNOAA·F\n12/12/84 39E\nWR\n0\nGEOSTA-A\n03/12/85\n41E\nWR\n0\nINTELSATV F-10 (Ao-63)\n03/22185\n5043G/CENT D-1A\nER\n1 .\nINTELSATV F-11 (AC-64}\n06/30/85\n5044G/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nINTELSATV F-12 (AC-65)\n09/28/85\n5045G/CENT D-1 A\nER\n1\nNAVSTARXI\n10/08/85\n55E\nWR\n0\nAFSC\n02/09/86\nH\nWR\n1\nNOAA-G\n09/17/86\n52E\nWR\n0\nFLTSATCOM F-7 (AC-66)\n12/05/86\n5046G/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nFLTSATCOM F-6 (AC-67)\n03/26/87\n5048G/CENT D-1A\nER\n4T\n1\n1\nAFSC\n05/15/87\nH\nWR\n1\nDMSP F-8\n06/19/87\n59E\nWR\n0\n9/10/96\n113\nRTI" }, { "n": 123, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p123.jpg", "text": "492\n493\n494\n495\n496\n497\n498\n499\n500\n501\n502\n503\n504\n505\n506\n507\n508\n509\n510\n511\n512\n513\n514\n515\n516\n517\n518\n519\n520\n521\n522\n523\n524\n525\n526\n527\n528\n529\n530\n531\n532\n533\n534\n535\nr\nFlight\nRep.\nVehicle\nTest\nResponse\nLaunch\nPhase\nConf.\nNo.\nMission/ID\nDate\nConfiauration\nRange\nMode\nDMSP F-9\n02/02/88\n54E\nWR\n0\nNOAA·H\n09/24/88\n63E\nWR\n0\nFLTSATCOM F-8 (AC-68)\n09/25/89\n5047G/CENT D-1A\nER\n1\nP87-2\n04/11/90 28E/ALT3A\nWR\n0\nCARES (AC-69)\n07/25/90\n5049 I/CENT I\nER\n1\nDMSS10\n12/01/90\n61E\nWR\n0\nBS-3H COMSAT (AC-70)\n04/18/91\n5050 I/CENT I\nER\n4T\n3\n1\nNOAA-D\n05/14/91\nSOE\nWR\n0\nDMSP F-11\n11/28/91\n53E\nWR\n0\nEUTELSAT (AC-102)\n12/07/91\n810211/CENT I\nER\n1\nDSCS Ill (AC·101)\n02/11/92\n8101 II/CENT I\nER\n1\nGAIJJ.XY 5(AC-72)\n03/14/92\n50521/CENT\nER\n1\nINTELSAT K(AC-105)\n06/10/92\n8105 IIA/CENT\nER\n1\nDSCS 111 (AC-103)\n07/02/92\n810311/CENT\nER\n1\nGAIJJ.XY 1 R (AC-71)\n08/22/92\n50511/CENT\nER\n4T\n3\n1\nUHF FOLLOW ON-1 (AC-74)\n03/25/93\n50541/CENT\nER\nNA\n2&5\n1\nDSCS Ill (AC-104)\n07/19/93\n810411/CENT\nER\n1\nNOAA-I\n08/09/93\n34E\nWR\n0\nUHF F/O-2 (AC-75)\n09/03/93\n50551/CENT\nER\n1\nDSCS 111 (AC·106)\n11/28193\n8106 II/CENT\nER\n1\nTELSTAR 4(AC-108)\n12/16/93\n8201 IIAS/CENT\nER\n1\nGOES-1 (AC-73)\n04/13/94\n50531/CENT\nER\n1\nUHF F/0-3 (AC-76)\n06/24/94\n50561/CENT\nER\n1\nDIRECT TV (AC-107)\n08/03/94\n8107 IIA/CENT\nER\n1\nDMSP F-12\n08/29/94\n20E\nWR\n0\nINTELSAT VII (AC-111)\n10/06/94 8202 IIAS/CENT\nER\n1\nORION (AC-110)\n11/29/94 8109 IIA/CENT\nER\n1\nNOAA-J\n12/30/94\n11E\nWR\n0\nINTELSAT 704-2 (AC-113)\n01/10/95\n8203 HAS/CENT\nER\n1\nEHF F/O-4 (AC-112)\n01/29/95\n8110 II/CENT\nER\n1\nINTELSAT VII {AC-115)\n03/22/95\n8204 HAS/CENT\nER\n1\nDMSP F-13\n03/24/95\n45E\nWR\n0\nMSAT(AC-114}\n04/07/95\n8111 IIA/CENT\nER\n1\nGOEs-J (AC-77)\n05/23/95\nI/CENT\nER\n1\nEHF F/O-5 (AC-116)\n05/31/95\nII/CENT\nER\n1\nDSCS Ill (AC-118)\n07/31/95\nIIA/CENT\nER\n1\nJCSAT (AC-117)\n08/29/95\nHAS/CENT\nER\n1\nEHF F/O-6 (AC-119)\n10/22/95\nII/CENT\nER\n1\nSOLAR OBSERV. (AC-121}\n12/02/95\nIIAS/CENT\nER\n1\nGALAXY IIIR (AC-120}\n12/15/95\nIIA/CENT\nER\n1\nPALAPA-C (AC-126)\n01/31/96\nIIAS/CENT\nER\n1\nINMARSAT-3 (AC-122}\n04/03/96\nIIA/CENT\nER\n1\nSP-:1,. (AC-78)\n04/30/96\nI/CENT\nER\n1\nUHF F7 (AC-125)\n07/25/96\nII/CENT\nER\n1\n9/10/96\n114\nRTI" }, { "n": 124, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p124.jpg", "text": "D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives\nThe following narratives provide the available details about each Atlas failure since the\nbeginning of the Atlas program. The narratives are numbered to match the flight-\nsequence numbers in Section D.2.1.\n•\n1.\n4A, 11 June 57, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Flight appeared normal for\n24.7 seconds when drop in fuel supply to B2 engine produced a drop in\nperformance and shutdown\nBoth engines moved to hardover in pitch to\ncompensate for thrust asymmetry. The Bl engine failed at 27 seconds. A fuel fire\nwas observed in aft end after thrust was lost. The missile continued to rise,\nreaching an altitude of 9,800 feet at 38 seconds. Missile was destroyed by safety\nofficer 50.1 seconds after liftoff. Thrust unit and other hardware impacted about\n1/4 mile south of launch pad (105° flight azimuth).\n2.\n6A, 25 Sep 57, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Flight appeared normal until\nabout 32.5 seconds after liftoff, when performance level of both engines dropped\nto 35% of normal. Both engines shut down at 37 seconds. Missile was destroyed\nat 63 seconds. Loss of thrust was due to loss of LOX regulator in the booster gas\ngenerator. Major components impacted about 8000 feet downrange and 1000 feet\nright of flight line.\n•\n5.\n13A, 7 Feb 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The B2 turbopump and engine\nstopped operating about 118 seconds due either to loss of 102 regulator reference\npressure or a control-system failure. The Bl engine ceased to operate 0.3 second\nlater. Failure was attributed to shorting of a vernier engine feedback transducer\ndue to aerodynamic heating. Propellant sloshing that began building up at about\n100 seconds led to missile instability. Vehicle broke up at 167 seconds. Impact\noccurred about 280 miles downrange and about 3 miles crossrange.\n6.\nllA, 20 Feb 58, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Vernier engine was hardover\nfrom 51.9 seconds to 89.4 seconds, then returned to null until 104 seconds, then\nwent hardover again. Other systems appeared normal until 109.6 seconds, when\ndivergent oscillations began in rate-gyro outputs and engine positions.\nAll\nengines reached stops by 114.3 seconds and continued thereafter to oscillate\nbetween stops until loss of thrust at 124.8 seconds. Vehicle breakup occurred one\nsecond later. Probable cause of oscillation was a component failure in flight\ncontrol system. Vehicle impacted about 105 miles downrange and 8 miles right of\nflight line.\n7.\n15A, 5 Apr 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Booster engines shut down\nprematurely at 105.3 seconds (instead of planned 127 seconds) due to Bl\nturbopump failure. Since Bl chamber pressure drives the gas generator, the B2\nturbopump and engine also stopped. Impact was 180 miles downrange and\nslightly left of flight line.\n9/10/96\n115\nRTI" }, { "n": 125, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p125.jpg", "text": "9.\n3B, 19 July 58, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Random failure of yaw rate\ngyro caused violent maneuvers resulting in rupture of LO2 tank, engine\nshutdown, and a fire near the lube oil drain. Missile broke up about 42 seconds\nwith impact about 2 miles downrange and 0.4 miles crossrange left.\n11.\nSB, 28 Aug 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Missile was normal to SECO.\nAfter SECO, failure of hydraulic system caused loss of vernier engine control.\nWarhead impacted close to intended target.\n12.\nBB, 14 Sep 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Warhead impacted close to\ntarget although control was lost after SECO due to failure of vernier-engine\nhydraulic system.\n13.\n6B, 18 Sep 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Except for a late-opening\nsustainer fuel valve, flight was apparently normal until 80.8 seconds, when the Bl .\nturbopump failed. Performance of the Bl engine and the axial acceleration\ndropped sharply at about 81.7 seconds, and the B2 system shut down about 0.1\nseconds later. The sustainer and vernier engines continued to operate normally\nuntil .82.9 seconds, when the missile exploded.\nImpact was about 25 miles\ndownrange and about 0.6 miles right of the flight line.\n•\n14.\n9B, 17 Nov 58, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The flight was terminated at\n227.6 seconds by premature fuel depletion caused either by failure of the\npropulsion utilization system or by a tanking error. Missile impacted near the\nflight line about 2300 miles downrange, some 850 miles short of target.\n18.\n13B, 15 Jan 59, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: The vehicle appeared normal for\nthe first 50-60 seconds, at which time it was obscured by clouds. It was probably\nnormal until about 100 seconds, but prelaunch removal of the mainframe\ntelemetry system prevented a precise determination.\nBeginning about 101\nseconds, various erratic pitch, yaw; and roll rates and oscillations were noted with\naccompanying drops in acceleration and velocity. These rates become excessive at\n106.6 seconds. At 121 seconds, the nosecone telemetry system showed that yaw\nand pitch rates abruptly increased, and this condition existed ·until reentry at 281\nseconds. All thrusting apparently stopped between 121 and 123 seconds. The\nmissile impacted about 170 miles downrange and 7.5 miles left.\n19.\n4C, 27 Jan 59, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Since the guidance system was\ninoperative throughout, the flight path was controlled by the pre-programmed\nflight control system. Impact was about 80 miles long and 30 miles left of target\npoint.\n21.\nSC, 20 Feb 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: After a normal booster phase,\nmissile exploded at 173 seconds (BECO at 149.2 sec) apparently due to loss of fuel-\ntank pressure and subsequent rupture of LOX/ fuel-tank bulkhead. Impact was\nabout 1000 miles downrange and 6 miles left.\n9/10/96\n116\nRTI" }, { "n": 126, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p126.jpg", "text": "22.\n7C, 18 Mar 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Booster engines shut down\nprematurely at 129.4 seconds, but booster section was not jettisoned until the near-\nnormal time of 153 seconds. Guidance was inoperative. Since the sustainer\nengine could not gimbal before booster separation, the autopilot was unable to\nstabilize the missile after BECO. The sustainer shut down about 40 seconds before\npropellant depletion. The reentry vehicle spin rockets fired prematurely at 86.3\nseconds after liftoff.\n23.\n3D, 14 Apr 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Performance of B2 engine\ndropped 36% at launch, resulting in a violent pitch as missile left the launcher.\nFlight control system corrected missile attitude, and flight continued at reduced\nthrust until a more violent explosion tore the thrust section away from the missile\nat 26.1 seconds. The sustainer continued operating with decreased thrust until\nshutdown by the safety officer at 36 seconds. Debris impacted about 3000 feet\nfrom launch point.\n24.\n7D, 18 May 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Failure in pneumatic system\nresulted in missile explosion at 65 seconds. A temporary failure of the thrust-\nstructure fairing at liftoff strained the pneumatic lines and disconnects, resulting\nin leaks in the pneumatic system.\n25.\n5D, 6 June 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Either structural damage at\nbooster staging or failure of the booster staging valve to dose resulted in a fuel\nleak and explosion at 159.3 seconds. Impact occurred near the flight line about\n780 miles downrange.\n30.\n10D (Mercury), 9 Sep 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Booster section failed\nto jettison resulting in a final velocity about 3000 ft/sec low and an impact range\nabout 500 miles short of target.\n32.\n17D, 16 Sep. 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: :Flight was considered a\nsuccess since impact was within two miles of target point. However, failure of the\nvernier hydraulic package resulted in loss of missile control during the vernier\nsolo phase.\n35.\n26D, 29 Oct 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier solo phase was\nunstable in pitch·due to loss of thrust from V2 vernier engine. The V2 engine lost\nchamber pressure during booster jettison. Impact was about 14 miles short and\nout of splash net.\n36.\n28D, 4 Nov 59, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2: The flight was normal, but\nwas terminated prematurely when the range-safety impact-predictor system\nfailed.\n37.\n15D, 24 Nov 59, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was normal, except\nthe reentry vehicle failed to arm or separate.\n9/10/96\n117\nRTI" }, { "n": 127, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p127.jpg", "text": "38.\n20D (Able M, 26 Nov 59, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Third and fourth\nstages and payload broke off about 47 seconds. Atlas flight was normal and\nsecond stage ignited properly after Atlas SECO.\n43.\n6D (Dual Exhaust), 26 Jan 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase .2 and 2.5: At 175\nseconds, as a result of a full-scale positive yaw command generated for five\nseconds, the missile stabilized on an erroneous heading. When a range-rate flag\nwas lost 20 seconds later, the differentiated range-rate data substituted for\nmeasured data corrected the erroneous azimuth by generating a full-scale\nnegative yaw command. The substituted data resulted in slightly erratic steering\nand a premature VECO signal that was not acted upon The verniers were\nsubsequently cutoff by the backup signal.\n45.\n29D (Midas I), 26 Feb 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was normal·\nuntil firing of the retro rockets after Atlas separation. An explosion at this time,\nprobably due to activation of the Agena inadvertent separation destruct system,\ndestroyed both the Atlas vehicle and the Agena.\n46.\n42D, 8 Mar 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was considered a\nsuccess although failure of the vernier hydraulic system resulted in loss of attitude\ncontrol during the vernier solo phase.\n47.\n51 D, 10 Mar 60, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Due to combustion instability,\nan explosion occurred in the Bl chamber before missile movement. Missile was\ndestroyed at 2.5 seconds after 2-inch motion when main propellants ignited.\n48.\n48D, 7 Apr 60, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Missile was destroyed in launch\nstand during launch attempt, apparently due to combustion instability in the B2\nthrust chamber.\n50.\n23D (Lucky Dragon), 6 May 60, Response Mode 3, Flight Phase 1: An inoperative\npitch gyro caused pitch instability, and resulted in destruct at 25.6 seconds.\n54.\n62D, 22 June 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier engines were cutoff\nby autopilot backup when guidance discrete was not sent. Impact was 18 miles\nlong.\n56.\n60D, 2 July 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Depletion of helium bottle\npressure led to low sustainer and vernier engine thrust, and eventually early\nshutdown of engines. Impact was 40 miles short of target.\n57.\n74D (Tiger Skin), 22 July 60, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: A pitchover rate\nthat was 69% above the nominal rate resulted in vehicle breakup at 69.2 seconds.\n9/10/96\n118\nRTI" }, { "n": 128, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p128.jpg", "text": "58.\nSOD (Mercury), 29 July 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Flight appeared\nnormal till 57.6 seconds when missile broke up apparently due to a rupture of the\nforward section of the LO2 tank.\n61.\n470 (Golden Journey), 12 Sep 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Flight was\napparently normal until about 222 seconds, when missile acceleration began to\ndecay.\nA LOX regulator failure caused. low sustainer performance and\ninsufficient velocity to reach target. Impact was about 535 miles short.\n64.\nBOD (Able V /Pioneer), 25 Sep 60, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2.5 and 3: Atlas\nperformed normally except for failure of vernier engines to cut off. Flight was not\nsuccessful since the Agena chamber pressure stabilized at 70% of normal shortly\nafter ignition. Stage then apparently tumbled before cutting off 30 seconds early.\nThird-stage spun up and stabilized in a nose-down attitude.\n65.\n33D (High Arrow), 29 Sep 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The booster\nengines cut off prematurely and failed to separate from sustainer. The missile\nremained intact, but failed to achieve the desired range because of the added\nbooster weight.\n66.\n3E, 11 Oct 60, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer hydraulic pressure\nbegan to decay at 41 seconds and dropped to zero at 62 seconds. Sustainer began\ntumbling at booster staging when control was essentially lost. Thrust continued\nfor about 18 seconds moving the impact point some 270 miles farther downrange\nand 27 miles crossrange. The missile exploded at 155 seconds.\n67.\n570 (LV-3A)/ Agena A (Gibson Girl), 11 Oct 60, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase\n3 and 5: Atlas performance was satisfactory. An umbilical failed to release\nproperly from the Agena at liftoff, resulting in loss of pneumatic supply to the\nAgena attitude control system. A satisfactory orbit was not achieved. Guidance\nbeacon failed at 106 seconds resulting in autopilot flight.\n68.\n81D (Diamond Jubilee), 12 Oct 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1:\nOverpressurization of the LOX tank resulted in tank rupture and vehicle breakup\nat 71.6 seconds.\n72.\n4E, 29 Nov 60, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer hydraulic pressure lost\nat 41 seconds. Missile tumbled shortly after booster staging. Sustainer thrust\nterminated at about 150 seconds, some 22 seconds after BECO.\nDuring the\nsustainer solo phase, the impact point moved about 120 miles downrange and 44\nmiles crossrange.\n73.\n91D, 15 Dec 60, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Vehicle performed normally till\nabout 66.7 seconds, when a blast-band failure apparently resulted in rupture of\nthe forward section of the LOX tank. The upper stages separated at this time, but\nthe Atlas engines continued thrusting until 71 seconds. Control was lost between\n9/10/96\n119\nRTI" }, { "n": 129, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p129.jpg", "text": "72 and 73 seconds, and a final explosion occurred at 7 4 seconds. Impact was\nabout 8 miles downrange and one mile crossrange.\n76.\nSE, 24 Jan 61, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Missile stability was lost at about\n161 seconds, some 30 seconds after BECO, probably due to failure of the servo-\namplifier power supply. The sustainer engine shut down at 248 seconds, and the\nvernier engines about 10 seconds later. Impact occurred 1316 miles downrange\nand 215 miles crossrange.\n77.\n70D (LV-3A)/ Agena A (Jawhawk Jamboree), 31 Jan 61, Response Mode NA,\nFlight Phase 2: Flight was considered successful although loss of rate lock at 222\nseconds caused slightly erratic steering during the last 20 seconds of Atlas\nsustainer thrusting flight and failure of vehicle to pitch over during the vernier\nsolo period.\n80.\n13E, 13 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer main fuel valve\nremained in the full open position throughout flight, resulting in fuel depletion\nand premature shutdown of sustainer engine at 251 seconds.\n81.\n16E, 24 Mar 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1.5: Due to depletion of helium-\nbottle pressure, booster section failed to jettison, leading to fuel depletion and\nimpact far short of target.\n82.\n100D (Mercury 3), 25 Apr 61, Response Mode 3, Flight Phase 1: Flight was\nterminated at 40 seconds by RSO when vehicle failed to perform roll and pitch-\nover maneuvers, apparently due to failure of the autopilot programmer. The\nmalfunction was attributed to a plastic coating on the connector pins within the\nprogrammer, causing an open circuit. Major debris impacted about 1800 feet\ndownrange and 6100 feet crossrange left.\n86.\n27E (Sure Shot), 7 June 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Apparent combustion\ninstability caused an explosion and missile destruction 3.86 seconds after liftoff.\n87.\n17E, 22 June 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Missile destroyed itself at 101.5\nseconds due to failure of flight-control system. Pitch rate was about 1.55 times\nnormal. Just before breakup at 66,000 feet altitude, missile had pitched over\nalmost 90° due to higher than normal pitch rate, producing excessive heating and\naerodynamic loads. At breakup, flight path was nearly horizontal. Impact was\nabout 64 miles downrange.\n93.\n111D(Ranger-1), 23 Aug 61, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 4: The Agena\nachieved a normal parking orbit. Flight continued normally until Agena second\nbum. During the restart sequence the fuel valve failed to open so only oxygen\nwas pumped .into the thrust chamber. Apogee of final orbit was only slightly\nabove the normal circular parking-orbit altitude.\n9/10/96\n120\nRTI" }, { "n": 130, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p130.jpg", "text": "94.\n26E, 8 Sep 61, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Sustainer engine shut down\nprematurely during the booster jettison sequence. Most probable cause was drop\nin fuel flow to the gas generator. The vernier engines continued to burn for about\n28 seconds after the sustainer shut down. Vernier thrust decayed at 137 seconds,\nguidance platform tumbled at 163 seconds. The missile remained intact until at\nleast 470 seconds, when data were lost. Impact was about 525 miles downrange.\n95.\n106D (LV-3A)/ Agena B (First Motion), 9 Sep 61, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1:\nFailure of an umbilical to eject allowed a commit/stop-power signal to reach the\nmissile. Lack of electrical power 0.265 seconds after liftoff caused the vehicle to\nfall back on the launch pad after a rise of about 18 inches.\n.\n.\n99.\n105D (LV-3A)/ Agena B (Big Town), Midas IV, 21 Oct 61, Response Mode NA,\nFlight Phase 2: Flight was regarded as a success, since the Agena compensated for\nAtlas anomalies. Atlas roll control was lost at 186 seconds, resulting in a roll rate\nof over 40° per second at Agena separation. Control in pitch and yaw was\nmaintained. A LOX leak affected sustiliner performance just before SECO and\nthroughout the vernier phase.\n100. 32E, 10 Nov 61, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Sustainer engine shut down\n0.7 seconds after liftoff. Although a fire appeared in the thrust section at 19\nseconds, booster engines maintained stability until 24.5 seconds, when the B2\nengine-performance began to decay. All control was lost after this point, and the\nmissile was destroyed by the RSO at 35 seconds. Impact was about 2500 feet\ndownrange and 320 feet crossrange.\n101. 1170 (Ranger-2),18 Nov 61, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 4: The Atlas booster\nfunctioned normally. A parking orbit was attained during the Agena first burn\nalthough roll control was not maintained due to failure of the roll gyro. When\ncontrol gas was depleted, missile lost stability and began to tumble. Second\nAgena bum lasted only one second.\n103. 108D (LV-3A)/ Agena B (Round Trip), 22 Nov 61, Response Mode 4T, Flight\nPhase 2: Flight was not successful since vehicle failed to achieve orbit. Loss of\npitch control at 244 seconds was attributed to aerodynamic heating. At Agena\nseparation the Atlas had pitched up 145°.\n108. SF,12 Dec 61, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: A failure in the inertial guidance\nsystem of 1.06 seconds duration caused the existing inertial X velocity to be\ninserted in the Z-velocity channel. As a result, the missile impacted 575 miles\nshort and 30 miles left of target.\n110. 6F, 20 Dec 61, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Flight appeared normal until\nstaging. During booster jettison, sustainer and vernier hydraulic pressure began\nto decay, leading to compete loss of sustainer yaw and pitch control at 229 and\n232 seconds, respectively.\nMissile began tumbling at about 226 seconds.\n9/10/96\n121\nRTI" }, { "n": 131, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p131.jpg", "text": "Sustainer engine shut down at 282 seconds.\nMissile impacted 1300 miles\ndownrange and 18 miles crossrange.\n111. 114D (LV-3A)/ Agena B (Ocean Way), 22 Dec 61, Response Mode NA, Flight\nPhase 2: Flight was considered successful although a failure in· the flight\nprogrammer prevented the SECO signal from cutting off the sustainer engine.\nSustainer burned an additional 2.5 seconds to propellant depletion producing\nexcess Atlas velocity.\n114. 121 D (Ranger 3), 26 Jan 62, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2 and 5: Failure of\npulse beacon in guidance system at 49 seconds caused sustainer to burn to LOX\ndepletion, resulting in a 300 ft/sec overs peed. Due to malfunction of pulse\nbeacon at 49 seconds, no guidance steering commands or discretes were given;\nBooster was cut off by backup signal from accelerometer, sustainer by fuel\ndepletion. Due to excess speed, spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon,\nand primary mission objective was not met. All other Atlas and Agena systems\nperformed as planned.\n116. 1370 (Big John), 16 Feb 62, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1.5: Flight was\nconsidered successful, although RV did not separate properly.\n118. 52D (Chain Smoke), 21 Feb 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: A fire in the\nengine comparhnent resulted in shutdown of all engines at 60 seconds and vehicle\nexplosion at 72 seconds.\n119. 66E (Silver Spur), 28 Feb 62, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1.5 and 2: Loss of\nhelium-bottle pressure resulted in failure to jettison booster engines and\npremature vernier-engine cutoff at 131.5 seconds. Cutoff of verniers resulted in\nloss of roll control. Vehicle exploded at 295 seconds.\n122. llF, 9 Apr 62, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: An explosion in thrust section at\n0.9 seconds after about 6 feet of motion was followed by-a further explosion in the\npropellant tanks and total missile destruction at 1.2 seconds.\n123. 110D (LV-3A)/ Agena B (Night Hunt), Midas, 9 Apr 62, Response Mode NA,\nFlight Phase 1: An autopilot malfunction prevented sufficient pitchover during\nbooster and sustainer phase resulting in improper SECO conditions and an\nimproper orbit.\n128. 104D, 8 May 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Flight appeared normal until\nabout 45 seconds when weather shield shifted~ Further shocks occurred at 50\nseconds with loss of weather shield. Booster-engine cutoff was initiated at 55\nseconds. Missile destroyed itself at 57 seconds due to breakup of Centaur upper\nstage. Recorded impact was 8500 feet downrange and 8200 feet crossrange.\n9/10/96\n122\nRTI" }, { "n": 132, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p132.jpg", "text": "131. LV-3A/ Agena B (Rubber Gun), 17 June 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3:\nAlthough Atlas performance was satisfactory, the mission was apparently a\nfailure. No other data available.\n134. 67E (Extra Bonus), 13 July 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2 and 2.5: A LOX\nleak in the high-pressure line apparently froze sustainer control components.\nResidual sustainer thrust after cutoff continued for some 30 seconds, causing a\n120-mile overshoot.\n137. 145D (Mariner R-1), 22 July 62, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: Booster stage\nand flight appeared normal until after booster staging at guidance enable at about\n157 seconds. Operation of guidance rate beacon was intermittent. Due to this and\nfaulty guidance equations, erroneous guidance commands were given based on\ninvalid rate data.\nVehicle deviations became evident at 172 seconds and\ncontinued throughout flight with a maximum yaw deviation of 60° and pitch\ndeviation of 28° occurring at 270 seconds. The vehicle deviated grossly from the\nplanned trajectory in azimuth and velocity, and executed abnormal maneuvers in\npitch and yaw. The missile was destroyed by the RSO at 293.5 seconds, some 12\nseconds after SECO.\n141. 87D (Peg Board II), 9 Aug 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: Failure of the\nsustainer/vernier hydraulic system to maintain system pressure prevented\nnormal operation during the vernier solo phase.\n142. 57F (Crash Truck), 10 Aug 62, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: The roll program\nfailed. The missile was destroyed by the RSO at 68 seconds.\n144. 179D (Mariner R-2), 27 Aug 62, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2: Flight was\nsuccessful although roll control was lost during the period from 140 seconds to\n190 seconds due to erratic performance of vernier engine #2. Before and after this\ntime interval, vernier #2 and all other Atlas and Agena systems performed\nnormally.·\n146. 4D (Briar Street), 2 Oct 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The missile self-\ndestructed at 183 seconds. The vernier engines shut down prematurely at 46\nseconds. Subsequently, closure of the vernier bleed valves led to excessively high\nsustainer performance and premature shutdown at 181.3 seconds.\n148. 215 D (Ranger-5), 18 Oct 62, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: Flight was\nregarded as successful although failure in the ground control system 35 minutes\nafter launch prevented accomplishment of primary lunar impact and study\nm1ss10n.\nThe guidance . rate beacon failed at 94.6 seconds but backup\ndifferentiated tracking data kept the vehicle within normal limits.\n153. 13F (Action Time), 14 Nov 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The flight was\nterminated when sustainer and vernier engines shut down prematurely at\n9/10/96\n123\nRTI" }, { "n": 133, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p133.jpg", "text": "94.3 seconds. A thrust-section fire before 20 seconds apparently failed the lube oil\nsystem, which led to cessation of propellant flow.\n156. 131D LV-3A/ Agena B (Bargain Counter), 17 Dec 62, Response Mode 4T, Flight\nPhase 1: Mission failed because of an Atlas hydraulic failure. Missile lost stability\nat 77.5 seconds, then rolled clockwise, pitched down and yawed left before\nbreaking up at about 80.5 seconds.\n157. 64E (Oak Tree), 18 Dec 62, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: The B2 engine\nfailed at 37.1 seconds as a result of lubrication loss to the pinion gear. Booster\nengine shutdown resulted in· a violent rolling yaw maneuver that caused missile\nbreakup followed by an explosion at about 38 seconds.\n158. 160D (Fly High), 22 Dec 62, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Due to noisy data,\nrange safety limits in the automatic cutoff system were exceeded, causing\ngeneration of an· all-engines-cutoff signal. As a result, the vernier engines were\ncut off about 10 seconds early, and the reentry vehicle was about 12.3 miles short.\n159. 39D (Big Sue), 25 Jan 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Propulsion system\nperformance was unsatisfactory after 78 seconds, when booster engine\nperformance started to decay. Booster engines shut down· shortly after this,\nprobably as a result of excessive heating in the gas-generator regulator. The\nsustainer operated normally until at least 106 seconds, with shutdown occurring\nsometime between 106 and 126 seconds. Breakup· occurred about 300 seconds.\nMissile apparently impacted about 100 miles downrange.\n164. 102D (Tall Tree 3), 9 Mar 63, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: A flight-control\nmalfunction occurred at about 15 seconds at the start of the pitch program. The\nmissile pitched excessively, reaching 310° and an altitude of 5,000 feet at\n33.5 seconds when it broke up. Debris impacted close to pad.\n166. 64D (Tall Tree 1), 15 Mar 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: A sustainer\nhydraulic-system failure at 83.5 seconds resulted in loss of sustainer engine\ncontrol by 86 seconds and loss of vernier control at 99 seconds. Missile control\nwas maintained by the booster engines until booster cutoff, when lack of sustainer\nand vernier control caused the missile to roll clockwise, pitch up, and yaw left.\nSustainer thrust decayed at 131 seconds, and the missile began tumbling at\n136.6 seconds. Missile self-destructed at 146 seconds with impact point about 600\nmiles downrange.\n168. 193D (Leading Edge), 16 Mar 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Loss of B2\npitch feedback signal at 103.5 seconds resulted in loss of vehicle stability. Missile\ntumbled, then self-destructed at about 270 seconds.\n169. 83F (Kendall Green), 21 Mar 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: A defective\nsolder joint apparently led to two instances of erroneous velocity computations in\n9/10/96\n124\nRTI" }, { "n": 134, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p134.jpg", "text": "the x and z velocity channels. As a result, the missile impacted about 12 miles\nshort and 0.2 miles right of target.\n170. 52F (Tall Tree 4), 23 Mar 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Missile self-\ndestructed at about 91 seconds for unknown reasons. Impact was near the flight\nline about 120 miles downrange.\n171. 65E (Black Buck), 24 Apr 63, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: Vernier\nhydraulic-system pressure was lost at 301 seconds, resulting in loss of vernier-\nengine control during the vernier solo phase. The reentry vehicle impact point\nwas not perceptibly affected by this malfunction.\n176. 139D LV-3A/ Agena B (Big Four), 12 Jun 63: Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1:\nFlight appeared normal until about 88.4 seconds when, due to a hydraulic failure,\nthe vehicle made a violent right and down maneuver. The missile broke up five\nseconds later at 93.4 seconds.\n181. 24E (Silver Doll), 26 July 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Spurious voltage\ntransients caused premature pressurization of the vernier solo tanks at\n101.3 seconds, and premature sustainer engine shut down just after booster\nseparation at 141 seconds.\n187. 63D (Cool Water III), 6 Sep 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: All systems\nperformed satisfactorily till 110 seconds, when the sustainer/vernier hydraulic\npressure dropped from 3080 to 490 psig. The failure resulted in premature\nshutdown of the sustainer engine at 136 seconds. Booster-engine cutoff occurred\nnormally at 140.3 seconds, and the booster was successfully jettisoned. The\nimpact point occurred about 620.miles downrange.\n188. 84D (Cool Water IV), 11 Sep 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2~5: Flight\nseemed normal through SECO, although the pneumatic precharge to the vernier\nsolo accumulator was lost at 96.6 seconds. Due to this failure, missile stability was\nlost near the start of the vernier solo phase. The R/V probably failed to separate.\n189. 71E (Filter Tip), 25 Sep 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: Visual observers\nreported a boat-tail fire, radical oscillations in yaw, and rough running booster\nand sustainer engines. Failure of the sustainer hydraulic system during the\nstaging sequence resulted in loss of missile stability at 140 seconds. Sustainer and\nvernier engines shut down at about 267 seconds with the impact point about 600\nmiles downrange.\n190. 45F (Hot Rum), 3 Oct 63, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: The B-1 booster-engine\nfuel valve failed to open during the start sequence, so the engine did not ignite.\nMissile toppled over and exploded.\n9/10/96\n125\nRTI" }, { "n": 135, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p135.jpg", "text": "191. 163D (Cool Water V), 7 Oct 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Flight was\nnormal up to about 73 seconds when the missile exploded. Suspected cause was\nintermediate bulkhead reversal/rupture due to insufficient helium pressure.\n194. 136F (ABRES), 28 Oct 63, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: After a normal\nbooster phase and staging, failure of sustainer hydraulic system resulted in loss of\nsustainer control and stability at 138 seconds. Sustainer and vernier engines shut\ndown at 260 seconds, some 28 seconds early. The R/V impacted about 507 miles\ndownrange.\n196. 158D (Cool Water VI)., 13 Nov 63, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The trajectory\nwas low throughout flight. The sustainer/vernier hydraulic pressure was lost at\n112.7 seconds, followed by missile self-destruct at about 118 seconds when the\nvacuum impact point was about 280 miles downrange and on azimuth.\n202. 48E (Blue Bay), 12 Feb 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The booster engine\nshut down at 119.5 seconds, and the sustainer engine shut down prematurely at\n198.8 seconds. Impact was near the flight line about 635 miles downrange.\n207. 3F (High Ball), 3 Apr 64, Response Mode 1, Flight Phase 1: Missile was destroyed\non the pad when the Bl booster engine failed to ignite.\n212. 135D (AC-3), 30 June 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: The Centaur engines\nshut down early, apparently due to a hydraulic coupling failure that led to a\nfailure in the propellant system. Impact was about 2340 miles downrange.\n219. 57E (Gallant Gal), 27 Aug 64, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Missile\nexperienced an early SECO with no vernier bum thereafter due to a guidance-\nsystem malfunction. Impact was about 88 miles short and 0.4 miles right of\ntarget.\n227. 289D (Mariner-3),5 Nov 64; Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 4: A short second burn\nof the Agena prevented attainment of the desired orbit, and resulted in a\nheliocentric orbit.\n232. 146D., 11 Dec 64, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: Flight was completely\nnormal through Centaur first bum. During the coast phase, liquid hydrogen\nvented through the vent valve caused vehicle instability and tumbling. By second\nengine firing, insufficient liquid hydrogen remained at boost-pump· sump to\nsustain normal combustion.\n236. 172D/ABRES (Beaver's Dam), 21 Jan 65: Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2 and 3:\nThe Atlas apparently performed normally, except that the sustainer shut down\n1.35 seconds early. The OVl\"l failed to·separate from the Atlas and thus failed to\nput the spacecraft in orbit.\n9/10/96\n126\nRTI" }, { "n": 136, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p136.jpg", "text": "240. 156D, 2 Mar 65, Response Mode 1 Flight Phase 1: At 0.36 seconds booster fuel-\npump pressure dropped due to a fuel prevalve failure, booster lost thrust, fell\nback on launch pad, and was destroyed at 3.26 seconds.\n251. 68D/ABRES (Tennis Match), 27 May 65: Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: A\nfailure in the booster gas-generator loop resulted in decreasing booster\nperformance after 116 seconds. The impact point stopped moving at 122 seconds\nwhen an explosion occurred in the thrust section.\nFurther vehicle breakup\noccurred at 218 seconds. Destruct was sent at 293 seconds. Debris impacted close\nto the intended ground track.\n257. SLV-3/ Agena D (White Pine), 12 Jul 65: Response Mode 4 & 5, Flight Phase 2 & 3:\nFlight was normal until booster engines cutoff at 131 seconds. As a result of a\ncircuit board failure caused by excessive vibrations, the sustainer also shutdown\nat BECO. The Atlas booster engines did not separate immediately from the\nsustainer, but did so some 50 seconds later after the event timer recycled. The\nAgena subsequently separated and ignited at about 198 seconds, creating wild\nuprange movements on the IP display by 255 seconds. Destruct was sent at 257\nseconds.\n267. SLV-3 (GTV-6), 25 Oct 65, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 3: The flight was a\nfailure although all Atlas objectives were achieved. The Agena startup appeared\nnormal, but the engine shut down after about one second of operation,\nPropellants ceased flowing but the helium pressurization system continued to\npressurize the propellant tanks until they burst.\n276. 303D (Eternal Camp), 4 Mar 66, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: Although track\nand rate lock were lost at 88 seconds, missile appeared normal till about 112\nseconds when skyscreen operator reported that vehicle was spiraling.\nA\nhydraulic system failure occurred during the staging sequence, resulting in loss of\nvehicle stability at 153 seconds and sustainer engine shutdown at 194 seconds.\nThe impact point initially appeared to stop about 800 miles downrange, well\nbeyond the booster impact point.\nAt about this time or shortly thereafter,\ntelemetry indicated rapidly varying pitch, roll, and yaw rates and shutdown of\nsustainer and vernier engines. Final impact was estimated to be 976 miles\ndownrange and 3° left of the nominal track.\n279. 304D (White Bear), 19 Mar 66, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 2: The reentry\nvehicle impacted 82 miles beyond the target point when the head suppression\nvalve failed to close at SECO. The LOX tank thus vented through the sustainer\nchamber, adding impulse in the process.\n281. 184D (AC-8) ,7 Apr 66, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 4: Flight appeared normal\nuntil second Centaur burn. Both Centaur engines started but one could not\n9/10/96\n127\nRTI" }, { "n": 137, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p137.jpg", "text": "maintain thrust.\n1hrust imbalance resulted in tumbling, followed by fuel\nstarvation, and early thrust termination.\n284. 208D (Crab Claw), 3 May 66, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: High engine-\ncompartment temperatures were first noted· at 41 seconds. The sustainer pitch-\nactuator feedback-loop failed open at 136 seconds, a few seconds before planned\nBECO. The flight appeared normal to the safety officer until about this time when\nroll and pitch rates increased. The IIP apparently stopped about 155 seconds,\nalthough General Dynamics reported that vehicle stability was not lost until 216\nseconds. Shutdown of sustainer and vernier engines occurred at 235 seconds.\nSuspected cause of malfunction was excessive heating in·the boat-tail section.\n287. SLV-3 (GTA-9), 17 May 66, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: Vehicle became\nunstable when B2 pitch control was lost at 121 seconds. Loss of pitch control\"\nresulted in a pitch-down maneuver much greater than 90°. Guidance control was\nlost at 132 seconds. After BECO, the vehicle stabilized in an abnormal attitude.\nAlthough the vehicle did not follow the planned trajectory, SECO (at 280\nseconds), VECO (at 298 seconds), and Agena separation occurred normally from\nprogrammer commands.\n294. 96D (Veneer Panel), 10 Jun 66, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5: The reentry\nvehicle undershot the target by 20 miles when the vernier engines shut down\nearly.\nFailure was caused by an abnormal decay of control-bottle helium\npressure.\n298. 58D/ABRES (Stony Island), 13 July 66: Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 3: Flight\nwas regarded as a success, although one of two OV's failed to orbit when it\nimpacted the structure door which had not been opened.\n300. 149F (Busy Ramrod), 8 Aug 66, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: The sustainer\nengine shut down 27 seconds early due to· fuel depletion caused by an\nunfavorable ratio of propellant usage during the booster stage. Verniers burned\nto fuel depletion.\n306. 194D .(AC-7), 20 Sep 66, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5: Atlas Centaur\nperformance was normal, but Surveyor spacecraft lost stability on the way to the\nmoon.\n308. 115F (Low Hill), 11 Oct 66, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The missile was\nnormal till about 85 seconds when it appeared to lose thrust and breakup. Several\nmajor pieces impacted 32 to 40 miles downrange near the intended flight line.\n310. 174D (AC-9), 26 Oct 66, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2: Although Atlas\npressurization system anomaly caused decaying sustainer engine performance\nand early SECO, no mission objectives were compromised.\n9/10/96\n128" }, { "n": 138, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p138.jpg", "text": "318. 148F (Busy Stepson), 17 Jan 67, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was\nnorm.al except that reentry vehicle failed to separate.\n344. 81F (ABRES/AFSC), 27 Oct 67, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: Although\nvarious anomalous events occurred early in flight, the missile appeared to follow\nthe intended trajectory till about 24 seconds. Diverging roll oscillations actually\nbegan about 21.4 seconds, and pitch and roll stability were lost by 24.8 seconds.\nBy 27.9 seconds, the vehicle was tumbling about 6.5 degrees per second in pitch\nand yaw, and 12 degrees per second in roll. By 30 seconds, the vehicle lost all\nthrust and began to break up. Fuel cutoff and destruct were sent at 35 and 39\nseconds, respectively.\n•\n358. 95F (ABRES/AFSC), 3 May 68, Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: Immediately\nafter liftoff the telemetered roll and yaw rates indicated that the missile was\nerratic. During the first 10 seconds of flight the missile yawed hard to the left. It\nthen began a hard yaw to the right, crossed over the flight line and continued\ntoward the right destruct line. Shortly thereafter the missile apparently pitched\nup violently and the IIP began moving back toward the beach. The missile was\ndestructed at about 45 seconds when the altitude was about 14,000 feet and the\ndownrange distance about 9 miles. Major pieces impacted less than a mile\noffshore, indicating uprange movement of the impact point during the last part of\nthrusting flight.\n364. 5104C AC-17 (ATS-D), 10 Aug 68, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 4: A normal\nparking orbit was achieved, but when Centaur restart was attempted, thrust could\nnot be maintained because of inoperative boost pumps. Frozen H20 2 line was the\napparent root cause.\n365. 7004 SLV-3/Burner II/Agena D (AFSC), 16 Aug 68: Response Mode 4, Flight\nPhase 3: Atlas performance was norm.al. The vehicle failed to achieve orbit\nbecause th~ protective shroud surrounding the second stage failed to separate.\n368. 56F (ABRES/AFSC), 16 Nov 68, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2.5: Flight was\nnorm.al through SECO. The missile then lost attitude control, executing a hard\nyaw rate tum throughout and beyond the vernier solo phase.\n372. 5403C AC-20 (Mariner 6 Mars), 24 Feb 69, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1:\nEarly Atlas BECO due to staging accelerometer failure was compensated for by\nextended Atlas sustainer and Centaur burns. Mission was successful.\n379. 98F (ABRES/AFSC), 10 Oct 69, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: The missile\nappeared normal until about 66 seconds when the sustainer engine shut down\nprematurely. The booster engine apparently continued normally to BECO. At\nabout 255 seconds the payload SPDS engine ignited. Destruct was sent at 272\nseconds.\n9/10/96\n129\nRT!" }, { "n": 139, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p139.jpg", "text": "388. 5003C AC-21 (OAO-B), 30 Nov 70, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2: Since the\nnose fairing failed to separate, Centaur did not have enough energy to make orbit.\nPayload impacted in Africa.\n392. 5405C AC-24 (Mariner 8 Mars), 8 May 71, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 3:\nMission requirements were not met. The Atlas boost phase was normal. Shortly\nafter Centaur main-engine start, pitch stabilization was lost due to failure. of the\nrate gyro or an electrical failure in the pitch channel of the flight control system.\nThe vehicle began an accelerated nose-down tumbling motion that subsequently\nresulted in early and erratic main-engine shutdown due to propellant starvation.\n397. SLV-3A (Agena), 4 Dec 71, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Sustainer engine\nturbine damage during engine start resulted in hot gas leaks and eventual failure\nof thrust-section hardware. Vehicle broke up at 87 seconds.\n419. 5015D AC-33 (Intelsat IV F-6), 20 Feb 75, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2: The\nAtlas booster-section electrical disconnect failed at booster staging. The harness\nwas pulled apart, so flight-control avionics was unable to maintain vehicle\nstability:\nMissile appeared normal until the IP stopped at 200 seconds.\nPrecautionary destruct was sent at 414 seconds.\n420. 71F (AFSC), 12 Apr 75: Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1: Although an abnormal\noverpressure occurred at the base of the missile 620 msec before liftoff, the vehicle\nappeared normal until about 45 seconds when sustainer manifold and fuel-pump\npressures began dropping. By 61 seconds, both the sustainer and vernier engines\nhad shut down. Booster engines continued thrusting until about 123 seconds\nwhen the IIP stopped moving and radar operator reported multiple pieces. The\nbreakup apparently resulted from an external explosion in the flame bucket that\ndamaged the thrust section. Destruct was sent at 303 seconds when missile\nelevation dropped to 5°.\n432. 5701D AC-43 (Intelsat IVA F-5), 29 Sep 77, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1: A\nleak in the booster hot-gas generator at 2.3 seconds resulted in a fire in the thrust\nsection at 36.5 seconds. The vehicle went into a violent maneuver at 54.9 seconds,\nfailing the structure. The Atlas exploded at 55.8 seconds, leaving the Centaur\nintact. The Centaur was destroyed by the RSO at 61.7 seconds.\n457. 19F (NOAA-B), 29 May 80: Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1: Failure of\nturbopump seal allowed fuel to enter the gear box resulting in 21 % low thrust by\nthe Bl booster engine. The payload was inserted into- an abnormal orbit and the\nmission was lost.\n460. 68E, 8 Dec 80: Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1: Flight appeared normal until\n102.7 seconds when the lube oil pressure on the B2 booster engine suddenly\ndropped. At 120.1 seconds, the engine shut down, followed 385 msec later by\nguidance shutdown of the Bl engine. The asymmetric thrust during shutdown\n9/10/96\n130\nRTI" }, { "n": 140, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p140.jpg", "text": "caused yaw and roll rates that the flight control system could not correct. As a\nresult, attitude control was lost and the thrusting sustainer pivoted the missile to a\nretrofire attitude before the vehicle could be stabilized. After the booster package\nwas jettisoned, the missile was stabilized and decelerating in the retrofire mode\nby 148 seconds. The sustainer continued thrusting in this attitude until 282.9\nseconds when reentry heating apparently caused sustainer shutdown and vehicle\nbreakup.\n464. 5039D AC-59 (FLTSATCOM), 6 Aug 81, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1 and 5:\nThe basic mission was accomplished although three increasingly severe shock\nevents were recorded at 56.2, 70,7, and 120.8 seconds. The structural damage\nsustained by the spacecraft severely limited on-orbit operations.\n466. 76E (NAVSTAR VII), 18 Dec 81: Response Mode 2, Flight Phase 1: Shortly after\nclearing the launch tower at an altitude of about two tower heights, the thrust\nperformance of the Bl engine began to decay. The engine was shut down\ncompletely by 7.4 seconds. The unbalanced thrust caused the missile to pitch over\nto the right, and travel horizontally for about one second. It then pitched toward\nthe ground. A small explosion . occurred about one-third of the way down,\nfollowed by a larger explosion when the missile impacted the ground directly\nbehind the launch pad about 19 seconds after liftoff. Cause of the engine failure\nwas plugging of the gas-generator fuel-cooling parts that resulted in a gas-\ngenerator bum-through.\n477. 5042G AC-62 (Intelsat V), 9 Jun 84, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 4:\nPerformance was normal until an abnormal shock event occurred at\nAtlas/Centaur separation. Subsequent data indicated that a Centaur oxygen tank\nleak resulted in a loss of 1483 pounds of LOX during Centaur first burn. The leak\nresulted in the LOX tank pressure falling below the LH2 tank pressure, which led\nto collapse of the intermediate bulkhead during the coast phase.\nBulkhead\ncollapse caused unexpected tumbling forces during coast. The Centaur engines\nrestarted after coast, but burned for only 6 or 7 secorids of a planned 90-second\nbum.\n489. 5048G AC-67 (FLTSATCOM F-6), 26 Mar 87, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1:\nVehicle performance was normal till 48.4 seconds, when the vehicle was struck by\nlightning. As a result, the guidance computer commanded a hard right tum\nwhich caused vehicle breakup due to inertial and aerodynamic loads. RSO sent\ndestruct at 70.7 seconds.\n498. 5050 AC-70 (BS-3H COMSAT), 18 Apr 91, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 3:\nAtlas performance was normal. Although both Centaur main engines began the\nstart sequence properly, the C-1 turbo-machinery decelerated and stopped,\nleaving the C-1 engine thrust at the ignition level. Air entering through the stuck-\nopen check valve liquefied and froze in the LH2 pump and gear box of the C-1\n9/10/96\n131\nRTI" }, { "n": 141, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p141.jpg", "text": "engine, thus preventing the engine from achieving full thrust.\nDue to the\nresulting thrust imbalance, the vehicle tumbled out of control. Destruct was sent\nsome 80 seconds after Centaur ignition.\n506. 5051 AC-71 (Galaxy lR), 22 Aug 92, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 3: A Centaur\nengine check valve stuck open allowing air into the turbopumps. Air entering\nthrough the stuck-open check valve liquefied and froze in the LH2 pump and gear\nbox of the C-1 engine, which prevented the engine from achieving full thrust.\nDestruct was sent by the RSO about 193 seconds after Centaur ignition. This is the\nsame failure experienced by AC-70 launched on 18 Apr 91.\n507. 5054 AC-74 (UHF Follow On-1), 25 Mar 93, Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2\nand 5:\nThe flight was considered successful although below normal Atlas\nperformance resulted in a low spacecraft apogee (5000 nm vice planned 9225 nmk\nThe perigee altitude was near nominal at 120 run. A loose screw that allowed the\noxygen regulator to go out of adjustment caused booster-engine thrust to drop to\n65% .of nominal at 103 seconds. The booster engines remained attached to the\nsustainer, which flew to propellant depletion. These events led to depletion\nshutdown of the Centaur stage 22 seconds early.\n9/10/%\n132\nRTI" }, { "n": 142, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p142.jpg", "text": "D.3 Delta Launch and Performance History\nThe Delta launch-vehicle family originated in 1959 with a NASA contract to Douglas\nAircraft Company, now McDonnell Douglas Corporation.\nThe Delta, using\ncomponents form USAF's Thor IRBM program and USN's Vanguard launch-vehicle\nprogram, was operational 18 months later. On May 13, 1960, the first Delta was\nlaunched from Cape Canaveral with a 179-pound Echo-I passive communications\nsatellite. In the intervening years, the Delta has evolved to meet the ever-increasing\ndemands of its payloads - including weather, scientific, and communications satellites.\nEach Delta modification corresponded to an increase in payload capacity. Table 42\nshows a summary of Delta configurations since the beginning of the program.1101\nThe Delta 7925, the latest vehicle in the series, is a three-stage liquid-propellant vehicle\nwith nine solid-propellant strap-on booster motors. For propellants, the Delta uses RP­\n1 and liquid oxygen in Stage 1, and nitrogen tetroxide and aerozine 50 in Stage 2.\nStage 3 consists of a Payload Assist Module (PAM) with a solid-propellant motor. The\nstrap-on boosters are Hercules graphite epoxy motors (GEMs) using HTPB-type solid\npropellant. At liftoff, the liquid-propellant Stage-1 engine and six of the nine GEMs are\nignited. The remaining three GEMs are ignited some 65 seconds later.\nTable 42. Summary of Delta Vehicle Configurations\nConfiguration\nDescription\nDelta\nStg. 1: Modified Thor. MB-3 Blk I engine\nStg. 2: Vanguard AJl0-118 propulsion system\nStg. 3: Vanguard X-248 motor\nA\nStg. 1: Erurine replaced with MB-3 Blk II\nB\nStg. 2: Tanks lengthened; higher energy oxidizer used\nC\nStg. 3: Replaced with Scout X-258 motor\nPLF: Bulbous replaced low drag\nD\nStg. 0: Added 3 Thor-developed SRMs (Castor I)\nE\nStg. 0: Castor II replaced Castor I\nStg. 1: MB-3 Blk III replaced Blk II\nStg. 2: Propellant tank diameters increased\nStg. 3: Replaced with USAF-developed FW-4 motor\nPLF: Fairing enlarged to 65-inch diameter\nJ\nStg. 3: TE-364-3 used\nL,M,N\nStg. 1: Tanks lengthened, RP-1 tank diameter increased\nStg. 3: Varied: FW-4 (L), TE-364-3 (M), none (N)\nM-6, N-6\nStg. 0: Six Castor IIs employed\n900\nStg. 0: No Castor Ils employed\nStg. 2: Replaced with Transtage AJ10-118F engine\n1604\nStg. 0: Six Castor IIs employed\nStg. 3: Replaced with TE-364-4\n9/10/96\n133\nRTI" }, { "n": 143, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p143.jpg", "text": "Configuration\nDescription\n1910, 1913,\nStg. 0: Nine Castor Ils employed\n1914\nStg. 3: Varied: none (1910), TE-364-3 (1913), TE-364-4 (1914)\nPLF: 96-inch diameter replaced 65-inch\n2310, 2313,\nStg. 0: Three Castor Ils employed\n2314\nStg. 1: RS-27 replaced MB-3\nStg. 2: TR-201 engine replaced AJ10-118F_.\nStg. 3: Varied: none (2310), TE-364-3 (2313), TE-364-4 (2314)\n2910, 2913,\n2914\n3910, 3913,\n3914\n3920,3924\n4920\n5920\n6925\nStg. 0: Nine Castor Ils employed\nStg. 3: Varied: none (2910), TE-364-3 (2913), TE-364-4 (2914)\nStg. 0: Nine Castor N s replaced Castor Ils\nStg. 3: Varied:none or PAM (3910),TE-364-3 (3913),TE-364-4 (3914)\nStg. 2: AJ10-118K engine replaced TR-201\nStg. 3: Varied: none or PAM (3920), TE-364-4 (3924)\nStg. 0: Castor NA replaced Castor N\nStg. 1: MB-3 replaced RS-27\nStg. 1: RS-27 replaced MB-3\nStg. 1: Tanks lengthened 12 feet\nStg. 3: STAR 48B motor used\n• PLF: Bulbous 114-inch diameter used\n7925\nStg. 0: GEM replaced Castor NA\nStg. 1: RS:.27A replaced RS-27\n9/10/96\n134\nRTI" }, { "n": 144, "image": "https://wearenotalone.space/transcripts/dow-uap-d48/p144.jpg", "text": "The entire Delta history through 1995 is depicted rather compactly in bar-graph form in\nFigure 38. The solid-block portion of each bar indicates the number of launches during\nthe calendar year for which vehicle performance was entirely normal, in so far as could\nbe determined. The clear white parts forming the tops of most bars show the number\nof launches that were either failures or flights where the launch vehicle experienced\n•some sort of anomalous behavior. Every launch with an entry in the response-mode\ncolumn in Table 43 falls in this category. Such behavior did not necessarily prevent the\nattainment of some, or even all, mission objectives.\n16\n14\nen\n12\nC:\n0·en\nen 10\n~\n